In the ninth annual joint Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung surveys of the United States and German publics, we find profound changes in perceptions of the bilateral relationship. These are the first surveys in this series conducted since Donald Trump began his second term as U.S. president and Friedrich Merz became chancellor of Germany.
Key findings:
- Americans continue to have a positive view of relations between the two countries, even with a significant decline in perceptions since last year. Germans have completely flipped their assessments of the relationship over that same period.
- A declining share of Americans and Germans say the other country is a partner on key international issues, and around a third or fewer of Germans see the U.S. as a partner on each of the five issues we tested.
- France has once again become the most important foreign policy partner for the German public: 46% name France as this, while 26% say the same for the U.S. Only 1% of Americans name Germany as its most important partner, with the United Kingdom topping the list at 19%.
- Americans see China and Russia as major military threats to their country. Germans only see Russia, not China, as a major security threat.
- Both publics continue to perceive China as an economic threat and are concerned about its growing influence, even as this sentiment softens.
U.S.-Germany relations
In our 2025 survey, 71% of U.S. adults say that relations with Germany are very or somewhat good. This represents a 13 percentage point decline since last year. Around a quarter of Americans (24%) say relations with Germany are bad, the highest share saying this since 2018.
In Germany, there is a dramatic decline in those viewing relations with the U.S. as positive. Last year, before Trump was elected U.S. president again, 74% had positive views of the U.S.-German relationship. In 2025, 27% of Germans say relations with the U.S. are good, while 73% say they are bad.
There has also been a shift in partisan attitudes among Americans toward U.S.-Germany relations. In the current survey, 81% of Republicans and those that lean toward the Republican Party say relations with Germany are good, while 65% of Democrats and those that lean toward the Democratic party say the same. In 2024, 91% of Democrats and Democratic leaners and 84% of Republicans and GOP leaners said relations between the two countries were good.
In another sign of strained relations between the NATO allies, 38% of Germans see the U.S. as a major threat to their economy, 48% see the U.S. as a minor economic threat, and 14% say the U.S. is no threat economically.
U.S. and Germany as partners on key issues
Looking at five key issues in the U.S.-Germany partnership, two findings standout:
- Americans are more likely to say that Germany is a partner on all five key issues than Germans are to say the same about the U.S.
- There have been sharp declines among Germans saying the U.S. is a partner on these key issues, and a milder, but still significant, decline among Americans over the last three years.
For example, 62% of Americans say Germany is a partner on promoting free trade, compared with only 21% of Germans who say the same of the U.S. There is currently a 15% tariff on most German exports to the U.S. Last year, 64% of Germans said the U.S. was a partner on promoting free trade. And U.S. sentiment has also softened on this issue, down 10 percentage points since 2023.
Fewer Germans also say the U.S. is a partner on promoting democracy since 2023 (-36 percentage points). And since the change in U.S. administrations from 2024 to today, fewer Germans say the U.S. is a partner for dealing with the war in Ukraine (-32) and dealing with China (-18).
There has also been a 22-point drop on Germans seeing the U.S. as a partner on dealing with the Israel-Hamas war since last year. (The survey was conducted before the first phase of Trump’s peace deal to end the war was signed.) U.S. sentiment has also dropped on these key issues, ranging from an 8 to 10-point decline since 2023.
There are few significant demographic and political differences on these key issues. But Democrats are more willing to say Germany is a partner on promoting free trade (67%) compared with Republicans (59%), and similarly more likely to say the same about promoting democracy worldwide (63% vs. 56%, respectively).
In Germany, younger people are generally more willing to say that the U.S. is a partner on these issues and relations are good, but on no question do a majority of 18- to 29-year-old Germans say this.
U.S. and Germany’s top foreign policy partner
Americans most commonly name the UK when asked which country is the most important partner for American foreign policy – as has been the case since we first asked this question in 2017. However, many did not answer the question (36%).
Among both Republicans and Democrats, the UK is the most common response (21% and 19%, respectively). But when it comes to the second and third most frequently declared countries, views differ by party:
- Among Republicans, Israel (12%) and China (8%) are the next most common responses.
- For Democrats, it’s China (12%) and Canada (9%).
Germans are most likely to say that France is their top partner in foreign policy, a change from recent years. Since 2021, corresponding with Joe Biden’s presidency, Germans have said that the U.S. was their greatest partner. Today, in the wake of Trump’s return to the White House, 26% say so.
A significant share in Germany also says they don’t know (15%).
France is most commonly named among supporters of many of Germany’s major political parties, including the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/ Christian Social Union (CSU). Supporters of the opposition Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, however, are most likely to name the U.S.
European Union’s influence
Views on the European Union’s influence over the recent years differ among the U.S. and Germany. The more common opinion in the U.S. is that the EU’s influence has stayed about the same over the recent years, while Germans are much more likely to say it is getting weaker.
Germans are also 20 percentage points more likely to say the EU is getting weaker in 2025 than they were last year. Among Americans, views on the EU’s influence have remained largely unchanged since 2024.
While Democrats are more likely than Republicans to think the EU’s influence is getting stronger (29% vs. 17%), Republicans are more likely to say its influence is staying about the same (52% vs. 42%).
China, Russia and Iran as military threats
Americans are more likely than Germans to view China and Iran as a military threat to their country’s security. When it comes to Russia, however, about half or more of adults in both countries see it as a major threat.
- China: While 61% of Americans consider China a major military threat to their security, few Germans (9%) hold the same view.
- Russia: Roughly six-in-ten Americans see Russia as a major military threat, while about half of Germans agree.
- Iran: About a third of Americans see Iran as a major military threat, a much higher share than the 10% of Germans who say the same.
Just months after the U.S. conducted air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, fewer Americans say Iran is a major military threat in 2025 than said the same last year (42%).
Meanwhile, Germans have grown more concerned with Russia as a major military threat: 47% say this now, compared with the 39% who said the same last year.
Among Germans, 57% of those who support CDU/CSU (Merz’s party) and 64% who support the Social Democratic Party (coalition partner) say Russia is a major threat to their security. But around three-in-ten who support AfD (the right-wing populist party with the second most seats in parliament) agree that Russia is a major military threat (28%).
Additionally, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are 10 percentage points more likely than Republican and Republican-leaning independents to see Russia as a major military threat to American security (65% vs. 55%), marking a shift from 2024 when 62% of both groups saw Russia as a major threat.
Views of these countries as major threats also vary among Americans by age. Those ages 60 and older are at least 20 points more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to consider China and Russia a major military threat.
China’s influence
Although few Germans consider China a major military threat to their country, they are much more likely to consider it a major economic threat (59% vs. 9%). Meanwhile, a similar share of Americans consider China a major economic and a military threat (66% vs. 61%).
Among Americans, those ages 60 and older are more likely than adults ages 18 to 29 to perceive China as a major economic threat (73% vs. 53%). In Germany, 53% of adults ages 60 and older say China is a major economic threat to their country, compared with 64% of 18- to 29- year-olds.
When it comes to China’s role in the world, half or more of Americans and Germans think that China’s growing influence is more of a bad thing. Few in both countries consider this a good thing (7%).
The share who says that China’s growing influence is more of a bad thing has declined since 2023 in both countries (-10 in the U.S. and -12 in Germany). This reflects an upswing in views toward China in many countries around the world over the past few years.
Military assistance to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel
Americans have mixed opinions when asked whether the U.S. should or should not provide military assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia, Taiwan in its conflict with China, and Israel in its war with Hamas. (Our survey was fielded prior to the ceasefire agreed to by Israel and Hamas in early October 2025.)
Many Americans are unsure on whether the U.S. should provide military assistance to certain countries. Roughly three-in-ten or more say they are not sure about each conflict we asked about.
In the case of Ukraine and its war with Russia, more say the U.S. should provide military aid than say it should not. Democrats (54%) are more likely than Republicans (28%) to support giving military assistance to Ukraine.
On Taiwan, opinion is about evenly split.
When it comes to Israel, more say that the U.S. should not provide aid than say it should (47% vs. 22%, respectively). Since last year, support for providing military help to Israel has declined.
We also asked a question about how committed Trump was to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. Here Americans are about evenly split: 40% think he is at least somewhat committed, while 42% think he is not.
Republicans think he is more committed than Democrats (69% vs. 16%). In another Center survey conducted in March 2025, slightly more Americans said Trump was committed (47%) than not (41%).
And a similar question in Germany about whether Trump was interested in securing long-term peace between Russia and Ukraine showed 34% of Germans saying he is interested in peace and 65% saying he is not.
American and German attitudes toward free speech
Generally, Americans see the U.S. and Germany as places where people are free to express their opinions regardless of how popular those opinions might be.
Just under half of Americans say people are extremely or very free to express their opinions in the U.S., even if that opinion is unpopular. A third say the same about Germany. However, Americans are also more likely to say they are unsure when it comes to free speech in Germany (22%) than in the U.S. (6%).
For their part, Germans similarly see people in their country as freer to express their opinions, even if that opinion is unpopular, than people in the U.S.
