



THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER  
For The People & The Press

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011

Top Middle East Priority: Preventing Terrorism

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## Goal of Libyan Operation Less Clear to Public

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## Top Middle East Priority: Preventing Terrorism

### Goal of Libyan Operation Less Clear to Public

Two weeks after U.S. and NATO forces began military operations in Libya, the public's reaction to the situation remains mixed. Half (50%) say the United States and its allies made the right decision in conducting airstrikes in Libya, while 37% say it was the wrong decision – a balance of opinion virtually unchanged from a week ago.

However, despite President Obama's speech to the nation explaining the justifications for military engagement last Monday, an increasing percentage say that the military action lacks a clear goal – 57% today, up from 50% a week ago. And by an overwhelming 66% to 25% margin, most say they would oppose the U.S. and its allies sending arms and military supplies to the anti-government groups in Libya.

The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted March 30-April 3 among 1,507 adults, finds public ambivalence about the implications of the broader changes in the Middle East.

About four-in-ten (42%) believe that the recent protests and calls for change in a number of Middle Eastern countries will lead to lasting improvements for people living in these countries, while about as many (43%) say they will not. And by a 35% to 24% margin, more say these changes will be bad than good for the United States, with another 28% saying events in the Middle East will not have much effect on the U.S.

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#### Fewer See Clear Goal in Libya, Most Oppose Arming Rebels

|  | Mar 24-27 | Mar 30-Apr 3 |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| <i>U.S. and allies conducting airstrikes in Libya...</i>               | %         | %            |
| Right decision   | 47        | 50           |
| Wrong decision   | 36        | 37           |
| Don't know   | <u>17</u> | <u>13</u>    |
|  | 100       | 100          |
| <i>U.S. and allies have clear goal?</i>                                |           |              |
| Yes, clear goal  | 39        | 30           |
| No, do not   | 50        | 57           |
| Don't know   | <u>11</u> | <u>12</u>    |
|  | 100       | 100          |
|  | Mar 10-13 | Mar 30-Apr 3 |
| <i>U.S. and allies sending arms and supplies to anti-gov't groups?</i> | %         | %            |
| Favor  | 23        | 25           |
| Oppose   | 69        | 66           |
| Don't know   | <u>8</u>  | <u>9</u>     |
|  | 100       | 100          |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011.  
 Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding.


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In views of U.S. priorities for the Middle East, fully 81% say that preventing the spread of terrorism should be a very important goal of U.S. policy. Large majorities also say that preventing attacks on civilians and keeping oil prices low should be very important goals (67% each).

But there is less consensus when it comes to America's role in encouraging the

spread of democracy in the region. Just 42% say this should be a very important goal of U.S. policy in the Middle East. And just 39% say helping to protect Israel should be a very important policy goal for the United States.

### What Should U.S. Goals in Middle East Be?



PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011. Q46a-e.

### Partisan Fissures Emerge over Libya

While the overall balance of opinion about the Libyan air strikes has remained stable, the issue is eliciting a decidedly partisan reaction for the first time. Over just the past week, Republican opposition to the air strikes has grown substantially – 41% now say it was the wrong decision, up from 29% a week ago.

By contrast, Democratic support for the airstrikes has increased – 59% now say it was the right decision, up from 49% last week. As a result, while Republicans

were at least as supportive of the decision to take military action in Libya a week ago, there is now a substantial divide along partisan lines.

### Views of Libyan Operation Turn Partisan

U.S. and allies conducting airstrikes in Libya ...

|             | Mar. 24-27     |                | Mar. 30-Apr. 3 |                | Change in "right dec" |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------------|
|             | Right decision | Wrong decision | Right decision | Wrong decision |                       |
| Total       | 47             | 36             | 50             | 37             | +3                    |
| Republican  | 54             | 29             | 47             | 41             | -7                    |
| Democrat    | 49             | 36             | 59             | 29             | +10                   |
| Independent | 44             | 41             | 45             | 42             | +1                    |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011. Q7.

Meanwhile, doubts about the objectives of the Libya action have grown across party lines, as the number of Republicans, Democrats and independents who say the allied action has a clear goal has declined. Only about a quarter of Republicans (26%) and independents (27%) now say there is a clear goal for the airstrikes, down significantly from last week (41%, 35% respectively). And the balance of opinion among Democrats has turned negative, with just 39% saying the airstrikes have a clear goal, and 49% saying they do not.

### Doubts about Libyan Goal Increase among All Political Groups

*Do U.S. and allies have a clear goal in Libya?*

|             | March 24-27 |               | March 30-April 3 |               | Change in "clear goal" |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------|
|             | Clear goal  | No clear goal | Clear goal       | No clear goal |                        |
|             | %           | %             | %                | %             |                        |
| Total       | 39          | 50            | 30               | 57            | -9                     |
| Republican  | 41          | 52            | 26               | 63            | -15                    |
| Democrat    | 48          | 43            | 39               | 49            | -9                     |
| Independent | 35          | 57            | 27               | 63            | -8                     |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011. Q7.

## Reactions to Middle East Upheavals

With news about protests and political changes in numerous countries in the Middle East and North Africa, there is little agreement about the long-term impact of these changes for the region and the United States.

Views of the Middle Eastern protests and changes are split along partisan lines, with Democrats more optimistic about the direction the region is headed, and Republicans more pessimistic.

By a 52% to 33% margin, Democrats are more likely to believe that recent events will lead to lasting improvements for people living in Middle Eastern countries. By almost exactly

the same margin (52% to 32%) Republicans tend to believe that they will not. Democrats are split evenly over whether changes in the Middle East will end up being good (31%) or bad (32%) for the United States. Among Republicans, twice as many see the changes as bad for the U.S. (40%) as good (20%).

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### Democrats Are More Optimistic about Middle East Changes

| <i>Will protests and changes in Middle East lead to lasting improvements for people living in those countries?</i> | Total     | Rep       | Dem       | Ind       |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
|  | %         | %         | %         | %         |
| Yes  | 42        | 32        | 52        | 41        |
| No   | 43        | 52        | 33        | 45        |
| Depends/Don't know   | <u>16</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>14</u> |
|  | 100       | 100       | 100       | 100       |
| <i>How will the protests and changes in the Middle East end up affecting the U.S.?</i>                             |           |           |           |           |
| Good for the U.S.  | 24        | 20        | 31        | 21        |
| Bad for the U.S.   | 35        | 40        | 32        | 36        |
| Won't have much effect   | 28        | 28        | 25        | 31        |
| Depends/Don't know   | <u>13</u> | <u>11</u> | <u>11</u> | <u>13</u> |
|  | 100       | 100       | 100       | 100       |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011. Q43-44. Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding.

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## Differing Middle East Policy Goals

There is widespread agreement that stopping the spread of terrorism and preventing attacks on civilians should be top priorities in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. But Republicans are much more likely than Democrats or independents to view

keeping oil prices low and helping to protect Israel as top policy priorities.

### Rating Middle East Foreign Policy Goals

| <i>% saying very important goal for U.S. policy toward Middle East...</i> | Total | Rep | Dem | Ind |
|---|-------|-----|-----|-----|
|   | %     | %   | %   | %   |
| Preventing spread of terrorism  | 81    | 88  | 82  | 78  |
| Keeping oil prices low  | 67    | 75  | 65  | 63  |
| Preventing attacks on civilians   | 67    | 68  | 67  | 67  |
| Encouraging democracy   | 42    | 50  | 43  | 37  |
| Helping to protect Israel   | 39    | 51  | 34  | 36  |

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Three-quarters of Republicans (75%) say keeping oil prices low should be a very important goal for U.S. policy in the region, compared with 65% of Democrats and 63% of independents. Keeping oil prices low also is viewed as very important by more of those with low incomes (77% of those with family incomes of less than \$30,000) than those with higher incomes (57% of those with incomes of \$75,000 or more).

There is an even wider partisan divide over the importance of helping to protect Israel. Half of Republicans (51%) say helping to protect Israel should be a very important goal for U.S. policy in the Middle East, compared with 34% of Democrats and 36% of independents. Among conservative Republicans, 62% see helping to protect Israel as a top policy concern, more than double the 27% of moderate Republicans who say this.

Nearly two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants (64%) say helping to protect Israel should be a very important policy goal, compared with 34% of white mainline Protestants and 36% of white Catholics.

More Republicans (50%) than Democrats (43%) or independents (37%) also say that encouraging the spread of democracy in the Middle East should be an important goal of

### Conservatives, Evangelicals Say Protect Israel

*% saying helping protect Israel is a very important goal*

|                   | %  |
|-------------------|----|
| Total             | 39 |
| Men               | 44 |
| Women             | 34 |
| 18-29             | 30 |
| 30-49             | 34 |
| 50-64             | 46 |
| 65+               | 50 |
| Conservative Rep  | 62 |
| Mod/Lib Rep       | 27 |
| Independent       | 36 |
| Cons/Mod Dem      | 34 |
| Liberal Dem       | 33 |
| Protestant        | 47 |
| White evangelical | 64 |
| White mainline    | 34 |
| Catholic          | 35 |
| White Catholic    | 36 |
| Unaffiliated      | 18 |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER  
Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011. Q46e. Whites are non-Hispanic.

U.S. policy. Fostering democracy in the region is a particularly low priority for young people: Just 29% of those under 30 say this should be a top policy goal for the United States, compared with 49% of those 50 and older.

## Afghanistan Views Steady

There has been little change in the public's views about the military effort in Afghanistan in recent months. Currently, 50% say the U.S. military effort is going very well or fairly well, which is comparable with opinions in December (47% very/fairly well) and June (48%) of last year.

Support for keeping U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan until the situation there is stabilized had slipped from 53% last June to 44% in December. The new survey shows little change since then – 50% favor removing U.S. and NATO troops as soon as possible while 44% favor maintaining the troops in Afghanistan until the situation is stabilized.

As was the case in December, Republicans are far more supportive than either independents or Democrats of maintaining U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan until the situation there is stabilized. Currently, 55% of Republicans support keeping the troops in Afghanistan until the situation there is stable, compared with 43% of independents and 40% of Democrats.

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### Opinions about Afghan War Largely Unchanged

|   | June<br>2010 | Dec<br>2010 | Apr<br>2011 |
|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>U.S. military effort is going...</i>             | %            | %           | %           |
| Very/fairly well                                    | 48           | 47          | 50          |
| Not too/Not at all well                             | 45           | 43          | 44          |
| Don't know  | <u>7</u>     | <u>10</u>   | <u>7</u>    |
|   | 100          | 100         | 100         |
| <i>Should U.S./NATO keep troops in Afghanistan?</i> |              |             |             |
| Keep troops in until situation has stabilized       | 53           | 44          | 44          |
| Remove as soon as possible                          | 40           | 47          | 50          |
| Don't know  | <u>6</u>     | <u>8</u>    | <u>6</u>    |
|   | 100          | 100         | 100         |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2011. Q56, Q58.  
Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding.

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The long-range expectations for success in Afghanistan also have shown little change. About half of the public (49%) says it is very likely (10%) or somewhat likely (39%) that Afghanistan can become a country that is stable enough to withstand the threat posed by the Taliban and other extremist groups. Nearly as many (45%) say this is not too likely (29%) or not at all likely (16%). These opinions are little changed from November 2009 (46% likely/47% not likely).

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### Public Divided over Afghanistan's Long-Term Prospects

|  | Nov<br>2009 | Apr<br>2011 |
|--|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Likelihood Afghanistan can withstand extremist threats...</i> | %           | %           |
| Very likely  | 10          | 10          |
| Somewhat likely  | 36          | 39          |
| Not too likely   | 29          | 29          |
| Not at all likely  | 18          | 16          |
| Don't know   | <u>8</u>    | <u>5</u>    |
|  | 100         | 100         |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 31-Apr. 3, 2011. Q59.  
 Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding.

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While there are wide partisan differences over maintaining forces in Afghanistan, about half of Democrats (54%) and Republicans (50%) say it is at least somewhat likely that Afghanistan can eventually become a country that withstands the threat from extremist groups. Among independents, 46% say this is at least somewhat likely.



## About the Survey

The analysis in this report is based on telephone interviews conducted March 30-April 3, 2011 among a national sample of 1,507 adults 18 years of age or older living in the continental United States (1,001 respondents were interviewed on a landline telephone, and 506 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 215 who had no landline telephone). The survey was conducted by interviewers at Princeton Data Source under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. A combination of landline and cell phone random digit dial samples were used; both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International. Interviews were conducted in English. Respondents in the landline sample were selected by randomly asking for the youngest adult male or female who is now at home. Interviews in the cell sample were conducted with the person who answered the phone, if that person was an adult 18 years of age or older. For detailed information about our survey methodology, see <http://people-press.org/methodology/>

The combined landline and cell phone sample are weighted using an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, region, and population density to parameters from the March 2010 Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. The sample also is weighted to match current patterns of telephone status and relative usage of landline and cell phones (for those with both), based on extrapolations from the 2010 National Health Interview Survey. The weighting procedure also accounts for the fact that respondents with both landline and cell phones have a greater probability of being included in the combined sample and adjusts for household size within the landline sample. Sampling errors and statistical tests of significance take into account the effect of weighting. The following table shows the sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey:

| <b>Group</b> | <b>Sample Size</b> | <b>Plus or minus ...</b> |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| Total sample | 1,507              | 3.5 percentage points    |
| Republicans  | 395                | 6.0 percentage points    |
| Democrats    | 470                | 5.5 percentage points    |
| Independents | 561                | 5.0 percentage points    |

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request.

In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## About the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press is an independent opinion research group that studies attitudes toward the press, politics and public policy issues. We are sponsored by The Pew Charitable Trusts and are one of seven projects that make up the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan "fact tank" that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world.

The Center's purpose is to serve as a forum for ideas on the media and public policy through public opinion research. In this role it serves as an important information resource for political leaders, journalists, scholars, and public interest organizations. All of our current survey results are made available free of charge.

All of the Center's research and reports are collaborative products based on the input and analysis of the entire Center staff consisting of:

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**PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS**  
**APRIL 2011 POLITICAL SURVEY**  
**FINAL TOPLINE**  
**March 30-April 3, 2011**  
**N=1507**

**Q.1 THROUGH Q.3 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**

**Q.4 THROUGH Q.6 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED**

**ASK ALL:**

Thinking now about Libya...

Q.7 All things considered, do you think that the U.S. and its allies made the right decision or the wrong decision to conduct military air strikes in Libya?

|                    | Right<br><u>decision</u> | Wrong<br><u>decision</u> | <b>(VOL.)</b><br><u>DK/Ref</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011 | 50                       | 37                       | 13                             |
| March 24-27, 2011  | 47                       | 36                       | 17                             |

**TRENDS FOR COMPARISON:**

*Military force in Afghanistan*

|                                 |    |    |    |
|---------------------------------|----|----|----|
| Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010              | 52 | 38 | 10 |
| Oct 28-Nov 8, 2009 <sup>1</sup> | 56 | 34 | 10 |
| Jan 7-11, 2009                  | 64 | 25 | 11 |
| February, 2008                  | 65 | 24 | 11 |
| December, 2006                  | 61 | 29 | 10 |
| January, 2006                   | 69 | 20 | 11 |

*Military force in Iraq*

|                            |    |    |    |
|----------------------------|----|----|----|
| Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010         | 41 | 51 | 7  |
| January, 2009              | 43 | 49 | 8  |
| November, 2008             | 39 | 50 | 11 |
| Late October, 2008         | 38 | 56 | 6  |
| Mid-October, 2008          | 40 | 54 | 6  |
| Mid-September, 2008        | 43 | 50 | 7  |
| June, 2008                 | 39 | 55 | 6  |
| April, 2008                | 37 | 57 | 6  |
| Late February, 2008        | 38 | 54 | 8  |
| Late December, 2007        | 36 | 56 | 8  |
| October, 2007              | 39 | 54 | 7  |
| September, 2007            | 42 | 50 | 8  |
| July, 2007                 | 41 | 53 | 6  |
| June, 2007                 | 40 | 51 | 9  |
| April, 2007                | 45 | 47 | 8  |
| March, 2007                | 43 | 49 | 8  |
| February, 2007             | 40 | 54 | 6  |
| Mid-January, 2007          | 40 | 51 | 9  |
| Early January, 2007        | 40 | 53 | 7  |
| December, 2006             | 42 | 51 | 7  |
| Mid-November, 2006         | 41 | 51 | 8  |
| Early November, 2006 (RVs) | 45 | 48 | 7  |
| Late October, 2006         | 43 | 47 | 10 |
| Early October, 2006        | 45 | 47 | 8  |
| Early September, 2006      | 49 | 43 | 8  |
| August, 2006               | 45 | 46 | 9  |
| July, 2006                 | 44 | 50 | 6  |
| June, 2006                 | 49 | 44 | 7  |
| April, 2006                | 47 | 46 | 7  |

<sup>1</sup> In October 2009, the question was worded: "Do you think the United States' initial decision to use force in Afghanistan was the right decision or the wrong decision?"

**Q.7 TRENDS FOR COMPARISON CONTINUED...**

|   | Right<br><u>decision</u> | Wrong<br><u>decision</u> | (VOL.)<br><u>DK/Ref</u> |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| March, 2006   | 45                       | 49                       | 6                       |
| February, 2006  | 51                       | 44                       | 5                       |
| January, 2006   | 45                       | 47                       | 8                       |
| December, 2005  | 47                       | 48                       | 5                       |
| Late October, 2005  | 48                       | 45                       | 7                       |
| Early October, 2005   | 44                       | 50                       | 6                       |
| Mid-September, 2005   | 49                       | 44                       | 7                       |
| July, 2005  | 49                       | 44                       | 7                       |
| June, 2005  | 47                       | 45                       | 8                       |
| February, 2005  | 47                       | 47                       | 6                       |
| January, 2005   | 51                       | 44                       | 5                       |
| December, 2004  | 49                       | 44                       | 7                       |
| November, 2004 (RVs)  | 48                       | 41                       | 11                      |
| Mid-October, 2004   | 46                       | 42                       | 12                      |
| Early October, 2004   | 50                       | 39                       | 11                      |
| September, 2004   | 53                       | 39                       | 8                       |
| August, 2004  | 53                       | 41                       | 6                       |
| July, 2004  | 52                       | 43                       | 5                       |
| June, 2004  | 55                       | 38                       | 7                       |
| May, 2004   | 51                       | 42                       | 7                       |
| Late April, 2004  | 54                       | 37                       | 9                       |
| Early April, 2004   | 57                       | 35                       | 8                       |
| Mid-March, 2004   | 55                       | 39                       | 6                       |
| Late February, 2004   | 60                       | 32                       | 8                       |
| Early February, 2004  | 56                       | 39                       | 5                       |
| Mid-January, 2004   | 65                       | 30                       | 5                       |
| Early January, 2004   | 62                       | 28                       | 10                      |
| December, 2003  | 67                       | 26                       | 7                       |
| October, 2003   | 60                       | 33                       | 7                       |
| September, 2003   | 63                       | 31                       | 6                       |
| August, 2003  | 63                       | 30                       | 7                       |
| Early July, 2003  | 67                       | 24                       | 9                       |
| May, 2003   | 74                       | 20                       | 6                       |
| April 10-16, 2003   | 74                       | 19                       | 7                       |
| April 8-9, 2003   | 74                       | 19                       | 7                       |
| April 2-7, 2003   | 72                       | 20                       | 8                       |
| March 28-April 1, 2003  | 69                       | 25                       | 6                       |
| March 25-27, 2003   | 74                       | 21                       | 5                       |
| March 23-24, 2003   | 74                       | 21                       | 5                       |
| March 20-22, 2003   | 71                       | 22                       | 7                       |
| Late January, 1991  | 77                       | 15                       | 8                       |
| <br><i>Air strikes against Serbia to force them to agree to terms of the peace agreement<br/>and end the fighting in Kosovo</i> |                          |                          |                         |
| July 9-13, 1999   | 68                       | 22                       | 10                      |

**ASK ALL:**

Q.8 Do you think the U.S. and its allies have a clear goal in taking military action in Libya, or not?

| Mar 30-Apr 3<br><u>2011</u> |                           | Mar 24-27<br><u>2011</u> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 30                          | Yes, have a clear goal    | 39                       |
| 57                          | No, do not                | 50                       |
| 12                          | Don't know/Refused (VOL.) | 11                       |

**ASK ALL:**

Q.9 Would you favor or oppose the U.S. and its allies sending arms and military supplies to anti-government groups in Libya?

| Mar 30-Apr 3<br><u>2011</u> |                           | Mar 10-13<br><u>2011</u> <sup>2</sup> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 25                          | Favor                     | 23                                    |
| 66                          | Oppose                    | 69                                    |
| 9                           | Don't know/Refused (VOL.) | 8                                     |

**NO QUESTIONS 10-12****Q.13 THROUGH Q.35 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE****NO QUESTIONS 36-42****ASK ALL:**

Q.43 As you may know, there have been protests and calls for change in a number of Middle Eastern countries recently. From what you have read and heard, do you think these events will lead to lasting improvements for people living in these countries, or not?

| Mar 30-Apr 3<br><u>2011</u> |                                 |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 42                          | Yes, lasting improvements       |
| 43                          | No, no lasting improvements     |
| 3                           | Depends/Too soon to tell (VOL.) |
| 12                          | Don't know/Refused (VOL.)       |

**ASK ALL:**

Q.44 Do you think the anti-government protests and changes in the Middle East will end up being good for the United States, bad for the United States, or won't have much effect on the United States?

**TREND FOR COMPARISON:**

| Mar 30-Apr 3<br><u>2011</u> |                                 | <i>Egypt</i><br>Feb 2-7<br><u>2011</u> <sup>3</sup> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| 24                          | Good                            | 15  |
| 35                          | Bad                             | 28  |
| 28                          | Won't have much effect          | 36  |
| 4                           | Depends/Too soon to tell (VOL.) | 5   |
| 9                           | Don't know/Refused (VOL.)       | 7   |

**NO QUESTION 45****ASK ALL:**

Q.46 Thinking about U.S. policies toward the Middle East, how important should each of the following goals be? (First,) Should [INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE] be a very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important goal? How about [NEXT ITEM]?

|    |  | Very<br><u>important</u> | Somewhat<br><u>important</u> | Not too<br><u>important</u> | Not at all<br><u>important</u> | (VOL.)<br><u>DK/Ref</u> |
|----|--|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| a. | Helping to protect Israel<br>Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011          | 39                       | 37                           | 11                          | 9                              | 5                       |
| b. | Preventing the spread of terrorism<br>Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011 | 81                       | 13                           | 2                           | 2                              | 1                       |

<sup>2</sup> For March 10-13, 2011 question was worded "sending arms and supplies to anti-government groups in Libya" and item was part of a list.

<sup>3</sup> In February 2011, the question read "From what you've read and heard, do you think the anti-government protests and calls for political change in Egypt will end up being good for the United States, bad for the United States, or won't have much effect on the United States?"

**Q.46 CONTINUED...**

|  | <u>Very important</u> | <u>Somewhat important</u> | <u>Not too important</u> | <u>Not at all important</u> | <b>(VOL.)</b><br><u>DK/Ref</u> |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| c. Keeping oil prices low<br>Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011              | 67                    | 23                        | 6                        | 3                           | 1                              |
| d. Encouraging the spread of democracy<br>Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011 | 42                    | 36                        | 10                       | 6                           | 5                              |
| e. Preventing attacks on civilians<br>Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011     | 67                    | 21                        | 4                        | 5                           | 4                              |

**NO QUESTIONS 47-49****Q.50 THROUGH Q.51 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE****NO QUESTION 52-55****ASK ALL:**

Thinking about Afghanistan...

Q.56 How well is the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan going? **[READ IN ORDER]**

|                    | <u>Very well</u> | <u>Fairly well</u> | <u>Not too well</u> | <u>Not at all well</u> | <b>(VOL.)</b><br><u>DK/Ref</u> |
|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011 | 7                | 43                 | 29                  | 15                     | 7                              |
| Dec 1-5, 2010      | 8                | 39                 | 28                  | 15                     | 10                             |
| Jul 8-11, 2010     | 9                | 40                 | 31                  | 9                      | 11                             |
| Jun 16-20, 2010    | 8                | 40                 | 32                  | 13                     | 7                              |
| Mar 10-14, 2010    | 9                | 43                 | 22                  | 13                     | 13                             |
| Dec 9-13, 2009     | 7                | 39                 | 32                  | 11                     | 10                             |
| Oct 28-Nov 8, 2009 | 4                | 32                 | 41                  | 16                     | 6                              |
| Jan 7-11, 2009     | 7                | 38                 | 34                  | 11                     | 10                             |
| February, 2008     | 10               | 38                 | 31                  | 10                     | 11                             |

**NO QUESTION 57****ASK ALL:**

Q.58 Do you think the U.S. and NATO should keep military troops in Afghanistan until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the U.S. and NATO should remove their troops as soon as possible?

|                                 | <u>Keep troops in Afghanistan</u> | <u>Remove their troops</u> | <b>(VOL.)</b><br><u>DK/Ref</u> |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011              | 44                                | 50                         | 6                              |
| Dec 1-5, 2010                   | 44                                | 47                         | 8                              |
| Jul 8-11, 2010                  | 47                                | 42                         | 11                             |
| Jun 16-20, 2010                 | 53                                | 40                         | 6                              |
| Apr 15-May 5, 2010 <b>(GAP)</b> | 48                                | 45                         | 7                              |
| Sep 10-15, 2009 <b>(GAP)</b>    | 50                                | 43                         | 7                              |
| June, 2009 <b>(GAP)</b>         | 57                                | 38                         | 5                              |
| Mid-Sept, 2008                  | 61                                | 33                         | 6                              |
| April, 2008 <b>(GAP)</b>        | 50                                | 44                         | 6                              |
| Late Feb, 2008                  | 61                                | 32                         | 7                              |
| May, 2007 <b>(GAP)</b>          | 50                                | 42                         | 7                              |

**ASK ALL:**

Q.59 In the long run, how likely is it that Afghanistan can become a country that is stable enough to withstand the threat posed by the Taliban or other extremist groups? **[READ]**

| Mar 30-Apr 3<br>2011 |                           | Oct 28-Nov 8<br>2009 |  |
|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|
| 10                   | Very likely               | 10                   |  |
| 39                   | Somewhat likely           | 36                   |  |
| 29                   | Not too likely            | 29                   |  |
| 16                   | Not at all likely         | 18                   |  |
| 5                    | Don't know/Refused (VOL.) | 8                    |  |

**NO QUESTIONS 60-65****Q.66 THROUGH Q.73 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE****ASK ALL:**

PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?

**ASK IF INDEP/NO PREF/OTHER/DK/REF (PARTY=3,4,5,9):**

PARTYLN As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

|                      |            |          |             | (VOL.)<br>No | (VOL.)<br>Other<br>party | (VOL.)<br>DK/Ref | Lean<br>Rep | Lean<br>Dem |
|----------------------|------------|----------|-------------|--------------|--------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|
|                      | Republican | Democrat | Independent | preference   |                          |                  |             |             |
| Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011   | 25         | 32       | 37          | 3            | *                        | 3                | 17          | 16          |
| Mar 8-14, 2011       | 24         | 33       | 38          | 3            | *                        | 2                | 17          | 15          |
| Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011   | 24         | 33       | 37          | 3            | *                        | 3                | 15          | 16          |
| Feb 2-7, 2011        | 24         | 31       | 39          | 3            | *                        | 2                | 16          | 16          |
| Jan 5-9, 2011        | 27         | 32       | 35          | 4            | *                        | 2                | 15          | 14          |
| Dec 1-5, 2010        | 25         | 33       | 34          | 5            | 1                        | 2                | 13          | 14          |
| Nov 4-7, 2010        | 26         | 30       | 37          | 4            | *                        | 2                | 17          | 13          |
| Oct 27-30, 2010      | 25         | 34       | 31          | 6            | 1                        | 4                | 13          | 11          |
| Oct 13-18, 2010      | 25         | 31       | 36          | 4            | *                        | 3                | 16          | 13          |
| Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010   | 24         | 32       | 39          | 2            | *                        | 2                | 15          | 17          |
| Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010   | 26         | 33       | 34          | 4            | *                        | 3                | 14          | 14          |
| Jun 16-20, 2010      | 27         | 34       | 34          | 3            | 1                        | 2                | 15          | 15          |
| Apr 21-26, 2010      | 26         | 33       | 36          | 3            | 1                        | 3                | 16          | 13          |
| Mar 11-21, 2010      | 28         | 34       | 32          | 3            | *                        | 3                | 13          | 12          |
| Mar 10-14, 2010      | 22         | 33       | 37          | 6            | *                        | 3                | 14          | 13          |
| <b>Yearly Totals</b> |            |          |             |              |                          |                  |             |             |
| 2010                 | 25.2       | 32.7     | 35.2        | 3.6          | .4                       | 2.8              | 14.5        | 14.1        |
| 2009                 | 23.9       | 34.4     | 35.1        | 3.4          | .4                       | 2.8              | 13.1        | 15.7        |
| 2008                 | 25.7       | 36.0     | 31.5        | 3.6          | .3                       | 3.0              | 10.6        | 15.2        |
| 2007                 | 25.3       | 32.9     | 34.1        | 4.3          | .4                       | 2.9              | 10.9        | 17.0        |
| 2006                 | 27.8       | 33.1     | 30.9        | 4.4          | .3                       | 3.4              | 10.5        | 15.1        |
| 2005                 | 29.3       | 32.8     | 30.2        | 4.5          | .3                       | 2.8              | 10.3        | 14.9        |
| 2004                 | 30.0       | 33.5     | 29.5        | 3.8          | .4                       | 3.0              | 11.7        | 13.4        |
| 2003                 | 30.3       | 31.5     | 30.5        | 4.8          | .5                       | 2.5              | 12.0        | 12.6        |
| 2002                 | 30.4       | 31.4     | 29.8        | 5.0          | .7                       | 2.7              | 12.4        | 11.6        |
| 2001                 | 29.0       | 33.2     | 29.5        | 5.2          | .6                       | 2.6              | 11.9        | 11.6        |
| 2001 Post-Sept 11    | 30.9       | 31.8     | 27.9        | 5.2          | .6                       | 3.6              | 11.7        | 9.4         |
| 2001 Pre-Sept 11     | 27.3       | 34.4     | 30.9        | 5.1          | .6                       | 1.7              | 12.1        | 13.5        |
| 2000                 | 28.0       | 33.4     | 29.1        | 5.5          | .5                       | 3.6              | 11.6        | 11.7        |
| 1999                 | 26.6       | 33.5     | 33.7        | 3.9          | .5                       | 1.9              | 13.0        | 14.5        |
| 1998                 | 27.9       | 33.7     | 31.1        | 4.6          | .4                       | 2.3              | 11.6        | 13.1        |
| 1997                 | 28.0       | 33.4     | 32.0        | 4.0          | .4                       | 2.3              | 12.2        | 14.1        |
| 1996                 | 28.9       | 33.9     | 31.8        | 3.0          | .4                       | 2.0              | 12.1        | 14.9        |
| 1995                 | 31.6       | 30.0     | 33.7        | 2.4          | .6                       | 1.3              | 15.1        | 13.5        |
| 1994                 | 30.1       | 31.5     | 33.5        | 1.3          | --                       | 3.6              | 13.7        | 12.2        |
| 1993                 | 27.4       | 33.6     | 34.2        | 4.4          | 1.5                      | 2.9              | 11.5        | 14.9        |
| 1992                 | 27.6       | 33.7     | 34.7        | 1.5          | 0                        | 2.5              | 12.6        | 16.5        |

## PARTY/PARTYLN CONTINUED...

|      |                   |                 |                    | (VOL.)<br>No      | (VOL.)<br>Other | (VOL.)<br>DK/Ref | <i>Lean</i><br><i>Rep</i> | <i>Lean</i><br><i>Dem</i> |
|------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|      | <u>Republican</u> | <u>Democrat</u> | <u>Independent</u> | <u>preference</u> | <u>party</u>    |                  |                           |                           |
| 1991 | 30.9              | 31.4            | 33.2               | 0                 | 1.4             | 3.0              | 14.7                      | 10.8                      |
| 1990 | 30.9              | 33.2            | 29.3               | 1.2               | 1.9             | 3.4              | 12.4                      | 11.3                      |
| 1989 | 33                | 33              | 34                 | --                | --              | --               | --                        | --                        |
| 1987 | 26                | 35              | 39                 | --                | --              | --               | --                        | --                        |