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Americans Increasingly See Strains in U.S.-Germany Ties as Germans Remain Pessimistic

In the U.S., Democrats are now much more negative than Republicans about relations; 77% of Germans say they are bad

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Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It does not take policy positions. The Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, computational social science research and other data-driven research. It studies politics and policy; news habits and media; the internet and technology; religion; race and ethnicity; international affairs; social, demographic and economic trends; science; research methodology and data science; and immigration and migration. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder.

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About this research

Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung began collaborating on joint public opinion surveys in 2017 to gauge relations between the United States and Germany.

The questions are developed together, and each organization fields their survey in its own country. Some questions are re-asked annually to track attitudes over time. The results are published in both the U.S. and Germany.

Why did we do this?

Pew Research Center does research to help the public, media and decision-makers understand important topics. As part of this work, we track U.S. attitudes toward other countries, including China, Russia, India, and traditional American allies in Europe and Asia.

Previous Center analyses from this survey collaboration were published in November 2025, November 2024, November 2023, October 2022, November 2021, November 2020, May 2020, March 2020, March 2019 and February 2018.

The Körber-Stiftung findings are contained within its larger annual report, "The Berlin Pulse."

Learn more about Pew Research Center and our work on international affairs.

How did we do this?

U.S. findings come from a Pew Research Center survey of 1,014 adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026.

The survey was conducted by Ipsos on the Ipsos KnowledgePanel Government & Academic Omnibus. Ipsos' KnowledgePanel is an online survey panel recruited using address-based sampling. The survey is weighted by gender, age, race, ethnicity, education, income and other characteristics.

Germany findings come from a Körber-Stiftung survey of 1,501 eligible voters conducted Sept. 15-28, 2026. The survey was conducted by Forsa Institute via telephone.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and the U.S. survey methodology.

Americans Increasingly See Strains in U.S.-Germany Ties as Germans Remain Pessimistic

In the U.S., Democrats are now much more negative than Republicans about relations; 77% of Germans say they are bad

The 10th annual joint survey of the American and German publics by Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung finds that views of the two countries' relationship continue to cool among Americans, while Germans remain deeply pessimistic about the current state of bilateral affairs.

One-third of Americans now say the relationship between the United States and Germany is bad, the highest such measure in a decade of surveys. Still, 62% of Americans say the relationship is good, though that's down from 71% in 2025 and 84% in 2024.

Views of the U.S.-Germany relationship

% of U.S./German adults who say relations between the U.S. and Germany are ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Prior to 2022, U.S. surveys were conducted over the phone. All Germany surveys were conducted by phone.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026; Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-28, 2026.
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Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party drive much of this decline. In 2024, during the Biden administration, 91% of Democrats said relations with Germany were good. But in 2025, that figure dropped to 65% and it stands at 51% today.

Among Republicans and Republican leaners, 76% now say relations are good, statistically similar to the share in 2025 (81%) but down since 2024 (84%).

Germans, for their part, remain deeply skeptical of the countries' current relations, with 21% saying they are good and 77% saying they are bad. These attitudes are similar to what they were early in the first Trump administration.

And while there are partisan divides in Germany on a variety of topics related to foreign policy – especially between Alternative for Germany (AfD) supporters and nonsupporters – Germans are relatively aligned in the view that relations with the U.S. are bad.

Democrats are souring on the state of U.S.-Germany relations

% of U.S. adults who say relations today between the U.S. and Germany are ___, by party



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Trend data prior to 2023 is not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026. "Americans Increasingly See Strains in U.S.-Germany Ties as Germans Remain Pessimistic"

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Are the U.S. and Germany seen as partners on global issues?

In the past few years, fewer Americans and Germans see their countries as partners on various international issues.

- **Free trade:** 54% of Americans say Germany is a partner on promoting free trade, down from 72% in 2023. Around a quarter of Germans (23%) say the U.S. is a partner on free trade, similar to what we found last year but down from 65% in the Biden era.

- **War in Ukraine:** 47% of Americans see Germany as a partner on this issue, down from 64% in 2023. About a third of Germans (35%) see the U.S. as a partner. As recently as 2023, about two-thirds of Americans and Germans said their nations were partners in dealing with the war Ukraine.

- **China:** 45% of Americans see Germany as a partner on China policy, down from 60% in 2023. A quarter of Germans see the U.S. as a partner in dealing with China, down from about half in 2024 (49%).

- **Iran:** 33% of Americans see Germany as a partner in dealing with Iran, down from 56% in 2020. The share of Germans who see the U.S. as a partner on Iran policy has shrunk as well, from 45% in 2020 to 15% today. (The 2026 surveys were conducted in September, following U.S.-Israeli military action in Iran that began in February.)

- **Artificial intelligence:** Newly asked this year, 43% of Americans and a quarter of Germans say the other nation is a partner in regulating AI.

Declining sense that Americans and Germans are partners on various issues

% of U.S./German adults who say the other country is a partner on ...



Note: Prior to 2022, U.S. surveys were conducted over the phone. All Germany surveys were conducted by phone.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026; Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-28, 2026.
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Which nation is their most important foreign policy partner?

Another longstanding question on this survey asks which country is the most important partner for U.S. and German foreign policy.

Views among Germans

Attitudes in Germany are similar to last year, with 40% of Germans naming France as their most important foreign policy partner and another 24% naming the U.S. China, the European Union and Russia sit at 4% each.

Prior to the second Trump administration, most Germans said the U.S. was their most essential partner.

Most mainstream party supporters, including those who support the governing coalition – comprised of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria, or CDU/CSU, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) – as well as supporters of the Greens and the Left Party (Die Linke) say France is Germany's most important parter.

What countries do Americans and Germans say are their top foreign policy partners?

% of U.S./German adults who say ___ is currently the most important partner for their country's foreign policy



Note: Open-ended question. Responses given by fewer than 3% of respondents are not shown; 1% of U.S. adults named Germany. Those who answered "No country," those whose responses were coded as "Other" and those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026; Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-28, 2026.
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Supporters of Alternative for Germany (AfD), however, are more likely to name the U.S. as their most important partner, ranking France second. AfD supporters also have more positive views of Russia than supporters of other parties, and 10% name Russia as their top partner – a much higher share than other groups.

Views among Americans

In the U.S., 13% name Canada as their most important partner, nearly double the amount who said the same last year (7%) and approximately tripled from 3% in 2024.

Previously, the United Kingdom was typically seen as the United States' top partner by a large margin. In this year's survey, 12% name the U.K., 11% name Israel and 8% name China. Only 1% of Americans say Germany is their top partner.

Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to name Canada as their top partner, while Republicans are more likely than Democrats to name Israel. This pattern conforms with other recent Center research on partisans' views toward those countries.

Related: *How Do Americans Feel About G20 Countries?*

Germans are down on the 'West'

The Germany survey also included more hypothetical questions about Germany's reliance on the U.S. for national security and the future of the "West." Among these findings:

- 61% of Germans say they can't rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to protect their country in event of a war; 69% instead want a French or British nuclear umbrella.
- 13% want Germany to acquire its own nuclear weapons, while 86% do not.
- 35% favor Germany taking on a military leadership role in Europe, while 64% oppose this.
- 61% say Western unity – the concept of political and cultural linkage between the U.S. and Europe – no longer exists. Around four-in-ten (37%) say this unity still exists.

Which nations are seen to pose security concerns?

Americans remain more concerned, on balance, than their German counterparts about security threats from other countries.



- **China:** 58% of Americans say China is a major threat to their nation's security, compared with 7% among Germans. Republicans are 10 percentage points more likely than Democrats to describe China this way (64% vs. 54%).

- **Russia:** 53% of Americans say Russia is a major security threat, as do 45% of Germans. In Germany, CDU/CSU supporters are far more likely than AfD supporters to hold this view (67% vs. 21%). In the U.S., Democrats are 10 points more likely than Republicans to see Russia as a major security threat (59% vs. 49%).

- **Iran:** 42% in the U.S. see Iran as a major security threat, while 10% of Germans agree. In the U.S., Republicans are more likely to say this than Democrats (47% vs. 39%).

- **U.S. and European Union:** 7% of Germans see the U.S. as major security threat. Similarly, 9% of Americans describe the countries of the European Union as such. Majorities in each country do not see the other as a military threat.

More specifically on China, 64% of Americans and 60% of Germans see the country as a major economic threat, mostly unchanged from previous years.

Additionally, six-in-ten Americans see China's rising influence in the world as mostly a bad thing for their nation, while 43% of Germans feel the same.

In recent years, the share of Germans who feel neutral about China's growing influence has increased steadily.

In 2023, 62% of Germans said its influence was bad and 31% said it did not make a difference for their country. Today, 43% see China's rising influence as a negative and 46% are neutral. Meanwhile, the share of Germans who say it's a good thing has shifted only slightly (from 6% in 2023 to 10% in 2026).

Views of American troops in Germany

This year, President Donald Trump pledged to withdraw 5,000 American troops from among the approximately 35,000 troops currently based in Germany.

Eight-in-ten Americans say U.S. bases in Germany are somewhat or very important for U.S. national security.

By comparison, 64% of Germans say these U.S. bases are somewhat or very important for their own national security, but views vary by geography: 66% of those living in former West Germany see U.S. bases as important to their security, compared with 52% among those living in former East Germany.

Among Germans, there is an increasing sense that having American troops in their country is important for national security (up 12 percentage points since 2019).

Both Americans and Germans support U.S. troops in Germany, to varying degrees

% of U.S. adults who say U.S. military bases with approximately 35,000 troops stationed in Germany are ___ for U.S. national security



% of German adults who say U.S. military bases with approximately 35,000 troops stationed in Germany are ___ for German national security



Notes: Those who did not answer are not shown. See topline for full question wording.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026; Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-28, 2026.
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Among Americans, 46% now see American deployments in Germany as *very* important to U.S. national security, compared with 56% in 2019.

Support for military assistance in Ukraine and elsewhere

More Americans support sending military assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia (42%) than Taiwan in its struggle with China (34%) or Israel in its war with Hamas (25%). Around a quarter to a third are not sure about whether the U.S. should provide military assistance in these cases.

Germans, for their part, are strongly opposed to military assistance for Israel (83%) or Taiwan (78%). But they are more evenly divided on Ukraine: 46% support sending military assistance and 53% oppose.

Looking at the party differences on the Ukraine conflict, Democrats in the U.S. are much more likely than Republicans to support military assistance (54% vs. 30%).

Sharp partisan divides on military assistance to Ukraine in the U.S. and Germany

*% of U.S./German adults who say their country **should** provide military assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia, by party*



Note: Due to differing survey methodologies, the U.S. survey offered an explicit "Not sure," while the Germany survey did not.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 18-24, 2026; Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 15-28, 2026.
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And in Germany, there is a massive gap in support for military aid to Ukraine between AfD supporters and those of other political parties. Around six-in-ten or more among supporters of the Greens, CDU/CSU, SPD and Die Linke favor sending military assistance to Ukraine, compared with 11% of AfD supporters.

Is the UN important for resolving wars and conflicts?

Americans and Germans generally agree that the United Nations plays an important role in resolving wars and conflicts around the world. Around half in Germany (48%) and 45% in the U.S. say that it is extremely or very important in this way.

Americans and Germans agree that the UN is important for resolving conflicts around the world

% of U.S./German adults who say the United Nations is ___ for resolving wars and conflicts around the world



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Mirroring to their general attitudes toward international organizations, Democrats in the U.S. are much more likely than Republicans to say that the UN is important for resolving conflicts. Nearly six-in-ten Democrats say it is extremely or very important (58%) compared with around a third of Republicans (32%).

Similarly, 34% of AfD supporters say the UN is not very or not at all important for resolving wars and conflicts around the world, while roughly two-or-ten or fewer among the mainstream party supporters say the same.

And on a new question asking whether the rise of artificial intelligence will increase or decrease conflict around the world, both Germans and Americans are more likely to say AI will increase conflict rather than decrease it. But in the U.S., nearly four-in-ten are not sure.

Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

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Methodology

Ipsos KnowledgePanel and Omnibus methodology

Introduction

Ipsos delivers affordable, statistically valid online research through KnowledgePanel. KnowledgePanel is the first and largest online research panel that is representative of the entire U.S. population. Panel members are randomly recruited through probability-based sampling, and households are provided with access to the Internet and hardware if needed.

Ipsos recruits panel members using address-based sampling (ABS) methods to ensure full coverage of all households in the nation. Once household members are recruited for the panel and assigned to a study sample, they are notified by email for survey taking, or panelists can visit their online member page for survey taking (instead of being contacted by telephone or postal mail). This allows surveys to be fielded quickly and economically. In addition, this approach reduces the burden placed on respondents, since email notification is less intrusive than telephone calls and the self-administered mode minimizes social desirability bias and positivity effects that can be present with an interviewer. Many respondents find answering online questionnaires more interesting and engaging than being questioned by a telephone interviewer. Furthermore, respondents have the convenience to choose what day and time to complete their assigned survey.

KnowledgePanel methodology

KnowledgePanel provides probability-based samples with an “organic” representation of the study population for measurement of public opinions, attitudes and behaviors. The panel was first developed in 1999 by Knowledge Networks, an Ipsos company. Panel members are randomly selected so that survey results can properly represent the U.S. population with a measurable level of accuracy and a calculable response rate, features that are not obtainable from nonprobability or opt-in online panels.

KnowledgePanel’s recruitment process was originally based exclusively on a national random-digit dial (RDD) sampling methodology. In 2009, in light of the growing proportion of cellphone-only households, Ipsos migrated to an ABS recruitment methodology via the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. ABS not only improves population coverage, but also provides a more effective means for recruiting hard-to-reach individuals, such as cellphone-only households, non-internet households, young adults and persons of color. Households without an internet connection are provided with a web-enabled device and free internet service.

After initially accepting the invitation to join the panel, participants are asked to complete a short demographic survey (the initial Core Profile Survey); answers to this survey allow efficient panel sampling and weighting for future surveys. Upon completing the Core Profile Survey, participants become active panel members. All panel members are provided privacy and confidentiality protections.

Ipsos uses probability-based sampling methods for recruiting new members to join KnowledgePanel. For this purpose, we rely on the latest version of the Delivery Sequence File (DSF) from the USPS to select address-based samples that are nationally representative of all households. By taking advantage of a host of ancillary data that are appended to each address, we use stratified random sampling to ensure the geodemographic composition of our panel members mimic those of the adult population in the U.S.

Adults from sampled households are invited to join KnowledgePanel through a series of mailings, including an initial invitation letter, a reminder postcard and a subsequent follow-up letter. Moreover, telephone refusal-conversion calls are made to nonresponding households for which a telephone number could be matched to a physical address. Invited households can join the panel by:

- Completing and mailing back a paper form in a postage-paid envelope
- Calling a toll-free hotline phone number maintained by Ipsos
- Going to a designated Ipsos website and completing the recruitment form online

KnowledgePanel Latino[SM] recruitment

In 2008, KnowledgePanel Latino[SM] was developed to provide researchers with the capability to conduct representative online surveys with U.S. Hispanics, including both English- and Spanish-dominant Hispanics. With the advent of KnowledgePanel Latino, the first U.S. online panel representative of Hispanics was established to include those without internet access and those who only speak Spanish. Hispanic members recruited through KnowledgePanel's traditional ABS sampling methodology described above are supplemented with recruitment using a custom dual-frame RDD sampling methodology targeting telephone exchanges associated with census blocks that have a 65% or greater Latino population density (this density level covers just over 50% of the U.S. Hispanic population). Moreover, cellular numbers from rates centers with high concentration of Hispanics are also used to improve the representation of samples. With this telephone recruitment, households are screened in the Spanish language to only recruit those homes where Spanish is spoken at least half the time.

Household member recruitment

During the initial recruitment survey, all household members are enumerated. Following enumeration, attempts are made to recruit every household member who is at least 13 years old to participate in KnowledgePanel surveys. For household members ages 13 to 17, consent is collected from the parents or the legal guardian during the initial recruitment interview. No direct communication with teenagers is attempted before obtaining parental consent.

Survey sampling from KnowledgePanel

Once panel members are recruited and profiled by completing KnowledgePanel's Core Profile Survey, they become eligible for selection for client surveys. Typically, specific survey samples are based on an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) for general population surveys. Customized stratified random sampling based on "profile" data can also be implemented as required by the study design. Profile data can also be used when a survey calls for pre-screening – that is, members are drawn from a subsample of the panel, such as females, Republicans, grocery shoppers, etc. (This can reduce screening costs, particularly for lower incidence subgroups.) In such cases, Ipsos ensures that all subsequent survey samples drawn that week are selected in such a way as to result in a sample that remains representative of the population distributions.

As detailed above, significant resources and infrastructure are devoted to the recruitment process for KnowledgePanel so that its active panel members can properly represent the adult population of the U.S. This representation is achieved not only with respect to a broad set of geodemographic indicators, but also for hard-to-reach adults (such as those without internet access or Spanish-language-dominant Hispanics) who are recruited in proper proportions. Consequently, the raw distribution of KnowledgePanel mirrors that of the U.S. adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that emerge for certain subgroups due to differential recruitment and attrition.

For selection of general population samples from KnowledgePanel, a patented methodology has been developed such that samples from the panel behave as EPSEM samples. Briefly, this methodology starts by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks secured from a combination of the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) and the latest March supplement of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions. Typically, the geodemographic dimensions used for weighting the entire KnowledgePanel include the following dimensions, with additional nesting of dimensions as well:

- Gender (male/female)
- Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (White/non-Hispanic, Black/non-Hispanic, Other/non-Hispanic, 2+ races/non-Hispanic, Hispanic)

- Education (less than High School, High School, Some College, Bachelor and beyond)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Household income (under $10K, $10K to <$25K, $25K to <$50K, $50K to <$75K, $75K to <$100K, $100K to <$150K, and $150K+)
- Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- Household size (1, 2, 3, 4+)
- Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- Hispanic origin (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, other, non-Hispanic)
- Language dominance (non-Hispanic and English dominant, bilingual, and Spanish dominant Hispanic) when survey is administered in both English and Spanish

Using the resulting weights as measures of size, a probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) procedure is used to select study specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces demographically balanced and representative samples that behave as EPSEM. Moreover, in instances where a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the census benchmarks for the population of interest.

Survey administration

Once assigned to a survey, members receive a notification email letting them know there is a new survey available for them to complete. This email notification contains a link that sends them to the survey. No login name or password is required. The field period depends on the client's needs and can range anywhere from a few hours to several weeks.

Typically, after three days, automatic email reminders are sent to all nonresponding panel members in the sample. Additional email reminders are sent, and custom reminder schedules are set up as needed. To assist panel members with their survey taking, each individual has a personalized member portal listing all assigned surveys that have yet to be completed.

Ipsos also operates an ongoing modest incentive program to encourage participation and create member loyalty. The incentive program includes special raffles and sweepstakes with both cash rewards and other prizes to be won. On average, panel members complete three to four surveys per month with durations of about 10 to 15 minutes per survey. An additional incentive is usually provided for longer surveys.

Response rates

As a member of the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), Ipsos follows the AAPOR standards for response rate reporting. While the AAPOR standards were established for

single survey administrations and not for multistage panel surveys, Ipsos uses the Callegaro-DiSogra (2008) algorithms for calculating KnowledgePanel survey response rates.

Omnibus survey completion rates

The field period and completion and qualification rates for this survey are presented below:

Omnibus survey completion rates

Field start	Field end	N fielded	N completed	Completion rate	N qualified	Qualification rate
Sept. 18, 2026	Sept. 24, 2026	1,500	1,014	68%	1,014	100%

Limitations of the design and data collection

All forms of public opinion research are subject to unmeasured error that cannot be eliminated. When a probability-based panel like KnowledgePanel is used, Ipsos employs the total survey error approach to identify and minimize error due to coverage error, sampling error, nonresponse error, measurement error, and data processing and editing error. Coverage error is addressed in our KnowledgePanel recruitment strategies. Sampling error is addressed in recruitment and at the time of sample selection for each study. Nonresponse error is reduced in recruitment, study sampling, panel management strategies (including communication, incentive, and retention protocols), and weighting of the final data. These strategies support the computation of sampling error to estimate the extent to which the results from the sample might differ from population values. To reduce measurement error, our research staff evaluates questionnaires in terms of item flow, wording, and response formats to provide respondent-friendly surveys and elicit high-quality data. Additionally, we conduct a quality control review of data processing steps and any data cleaning to minimize errors.

Ipsos KnowledgePanel weighting

Study-specific post-stratification weights

Once all survey data have been collected and processed, design weights are adjusted to account for any differential nonresponse that may have occurred. Depending on the specific target population for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KnowledgePanel profile data. For this purpose, an iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

For this study, the following benchmark distributions of U.S. adults ages 18 and over from the 2026 March Supplement of the CPS were used for the raking adjustment of weights for 18+ Gen pop respondents, except for language proficiency, which is not available from the CPS data and were attained from the 2024 American Community Survey:

- Gender (male/female) by Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (White/non-Hispanic, Black/non-Hispanic, Other or 2+ races/non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Education (Less than High School, High school, Some College, Bachelor or higher)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Metropolitan status (metro, non-metro)
- Household income (less than $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 or higher)
- Language dominance (English Dominant Hispanic, Bilingual Hispanic, Spanish Dominant Hispanic, Non-Hispanic)

The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3.14 percentage points at the 95% confidence level, for results based on the entire sample of adults. The margin of sampling error takes into account the design effect, which was 1.04. The margin of sampling error is higher and varies for results based on sub-samples. In our reporting of the findings, percentage points are rounded off to the nearest whole number. As a result, percentages in a given table column may total slightly higher or lower than 100%. In questions that permit multiple responses, columns may total substantially more than 100%, depending on the number of different responses offered by each respondent.

Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
September 2026 Survey
November 23, 2026 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the Methodology section.

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.

- Combined totals are based on unrounded topline figures. Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures, so these figures might be different than in previous years.

- The U.S. survey was conducted by Ipsos for Pew Research Center on the Ipsos KnowledgePanel Government and Academic Omnibus. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel and on the phone. Web and phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.

- German results, based on a nationally representative telephone sample, can be found through Körber-Stiftung.

		September, 2026	September, 2025	September, 2024	September, 2023
		United States	United States	United States	United States
IMP_COUNTRY. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	U.K.	12	19	20	25
	U.S.	2	1	3	4
	Canada	13	7	3	6
	China	8	10	7	11
	Europe	2	3	2	2
	Russia	1	2	1	1
	France	1	1	1	1
	Germany	1	1	4	6
	Israel	11	7	10	4
	Japan	2	2	2	3
	Mexico	3	3	3	3
	Ukraine	0	1	1	1
	India	0	0	0	2
	Other	4	3	4	3
	All	0	0	0	0
	None	3	3	2	1
	DK/Refused	38	36	37	24
	Total N=	100	100	100	100
		1014	1015	1021	1014

Data is displayed vertically.

U.S. WEB TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		July-August, 2022
		United States
Q1. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	Asia	0
	Africa	0
	Canada	5
	China	11
	Europe	2
	European Union	1
	France	1
	Germany	3
	Israel	6
	Japan	2
	Mexico	2
	NATO	0
	Russia	1
	Saudi Arabia	0
	South America	0
	South Korea	0
	Ukraine	1
	United Kingdom	24
	United States	2
	Other	2
	All	0
	None	1
	DK/Refused	36
	Total N=	100
		12147

Data is displayed vertically.

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		September, 2021	September, 2020	April, 2020	September, 2019	September, 2018	October, 2017
		United States	United States	United States	United States	United States	United States
Q1. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	Australia	2	0	0	1	0	0
	Canada	13	7	10	9	12	3
	China	9	14	18	16	18	15
	France	4	2	1	1	1	3
	Germany	7	10	6	4	3	5
	United Kingdom	31	27	26	22	21	20
	Israel	9	10	3	9	8	9
	Italy	0	0	1	0	1	0
	Japan	1	1	1	2	1	3
	Mexico	6	5	4	6	4	2
	North Korea	0	1	1	1	0	1
	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Russia	3	4	4	2	5	4
	South Korea	1	1	0	0	0	1
	Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0
	The European Union (EU)	3	5	2	4	3	1
	Other	2	2	3	2	2	4
	DK/Refused	10	11	20	22	19	29
	Total N=	100	100	100	100	100	100
		1008	1007	1008	1004	1006	1012

Data is displayed vertically.

		US_GERM_REL. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	62	33	7	55	27	6	5	100
	September, 2025	71	24	9	63	20	4	5	100
	September, 2024	84	9	23	62	8	2	6	100
	September, 2023	86	10	22	63	8	2	4	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		US_GERM_REL. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	80	15	16	65	13	2	5	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		US_GERM_REL. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	85	12	23	62	10	2	3	100
	September, 2020	74	21	19	55	17	4	5	100
	September, 2019	74	17	13	62	14	3	9	100
	September, 2018	69	25	12	58	21	4	6	100
	October, 2017	68	22	9	59	18	4	10	100

		PARTNER_BATT_UKRAINE. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with the war in Ukraine			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	47	43	10	100
	September, 2025	54	37	9	100
	September, 2024	59	29	12	100
	September, 2023	64	30	6	100

		PARTNER_BATT_TRADE. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Promoting free trade			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	54	35	11	100
	September, 2025	62	29	9	100
	September, 2024	67	22	11	100
	September, 2023	72	21	6	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_TRADE. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Promoting free trade			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	78	19	3	100
	September, 2020	76	21	3	100

		PARTNER_BATT_CHINA. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	45	45	10	100
	September, 2025	52	39	9	100
	September, 2024	55	33	12	100
	September, 2023	60	34	6	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_CHINA. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	52	40	8	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_CHINA. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	59	39	2	100
	September, 2020	60	35	5	100

		PARTNER_BATT_IRAN. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with Iran			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	33	56	11	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		PARTNER_BATT_IRAN. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Dealing with Iran			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2020	56	38	6	100

		PARTNER_BATT_AI. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? Regulating artificial intelligence (AI)			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	43	46	11	100

		MIL_ASSIST_UKRAINE. Do you think the United States should provide military assistance to the following places or should they not provide military assistance? Ukraine in its war with Russia				
		Yes, should provide military assistance	No, should not provide military assistance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	42	28	26	4	100
	September, 2025	41	28	28	3	100
	September, 2024	41	29	27	3	100

		MIL_ASSIST_TAIWAN. Do you think the United States should provide military assistance to the following places or should they not provide military assistance? Taiwan in its conflict with China				
		Yes, should provide military assistance	No, should not provide military assistance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	34	30	32	4	100
	September, 2025	32	28	36	4	100
	September, 2024	36	26	34	4	100

		MIL_ASSIST_ISRAEL. Do you think the United States should provide military assistance to the following places or should they not provide military assistance? Israel in its war with Hamas				
		Yes, should provide military assistance	No, should not provide military assistance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	25	45	26	4	100
	September, 2025	22	47	28	3	100
	September, 2024	30	36	31	3	100

		CHINA_INFLU. In recent years, China has gained a lot of influence globally. Do you see this as more of a good thing, more of a bad thing or does it not make a difference for our country?				
		More of a good thing for our country	More of a bad thing for our country	Does not make a difference	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	8	60	28	4	100
	September, 2025	7	61	27	5	100
	September, 2024	5	67	24	4	100
	September, 2023	6	71	21	3	100

		MIL_THREAT_CHINA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? China				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	58	24	12	7	100
	September, 2025	61	25	9	5	100
	September, 2024	64	21	9	6	100
	September, 2023	70	21	5	4	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		MIL_THREAT_CHINA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? China				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	64	26	7	3	100

		MIL_THREAT_RUSSIA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? Russia				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	53	31	10	6	100
	September, 2025	59	27	9	5	100
	September, 2024	59	28	7	6	100
	September, 2023	68	24	5	3	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON

		MIL_THREAT_RUSSIA. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? Russia				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	66	26	5	3	100

		MIL_THREAT_IRAN. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? Iran				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	42	36	16	6	100
	September, 2025	32	46	18	5	100
	September, 2024	42	40	12	7	100

		MIL_THREAT_EUROPE. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? The countries of the European Union (EU)				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	9	28	56	6	100

		ECON_THREAT_CH. Does China represent a major economic threat, minor economic threat or no economic threat to the American economy?				
		Major economic threat	Minor economic threat	No economic threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	64	21	9	5	100
	September, 2025	66	21	9	4	100
	September, 2024	67	20	8	5	100
	September, 2023	70	21	5	4	100

		TROOPS. As you may know, the United States currently operates several military bases in Germany with approximately 35,000 active-duty American troops. How important do you think these military bases are for U.S. national security?							
		TOTAL Important	TOTAL Not important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not important at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	80	15	46	34	10	5	5	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		TROOPS. As you may know, the United States currently operates several military bases in Germany with approximately 35,000 active-duty American troops. How important do you think these military bases are for U.S. national security?							
		TOTAL Important	TOTAL Not important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not important at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2019	85	12	56	29	8	5	2	100

		UNIMPORT. How important do you think the United Nations (UN) is for resolving wars and conflicts around the world?								
		TOTAL Extremely/very imporant	TOTAL Not too/not at all important	Extremely important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not important at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2026	45	24	19	26	26	11	13	4	100

		AIPEACE. Do you think the increased use of artificial intelligence (AI) will...?					
		Increase military conflicts between countries	Decrease military conflicts between countries	Have no impact on military conflicts between countries	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**September, 2026**	41	4	15	38	2	100