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The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070

Why Muslims will soon become the world's largest religious group and Christians will be the second largest

BY *Conrad Hackett, Marcin Stonawski, Yunping Tong, Stephanie Kramer, Rebecca Leppert and Jeff Diamant*

FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:

Conrad Hackett, Associate Director of Research and Senior Demographer
Hannah Taber, Communications Manager

202.419.4372

www.pewresearch.org

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Pew Research Center collaborated on this project with the Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion (CASPAR) at Krakow University of Economics in Poland. Professor Marcin Stonawski led the CASPAR team of researchers who contributed to the collection and analysis of data for this project. The CASPAR team also developed the projection model and the software used to produce the demographic projections.

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About this research

This Pew Research Center study tries to answer two broad questions:

- First, how do the world's major religious groups differ in their age profiles, fertility, migration patterns, and rates of attracting and losing followers?
- Second, how will these differences shape the future of religion around the world?

We project future changes in the size and geographic distribution of seven religious groups – Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, followers of all other religions and religiously unaffiliated people – between 2020 and 2070. The projections cover 201 countries and territories, which collectively account for 99.98% of the world's population.

The results are not intended to predict all the ways the world could change. There are many events that could affect religious group populations (including wars, natural disasters, epidemics, and changes in economic or social circumstances) that are not analyzed here.

Why we did this

This research is part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which analyzes religious change and its impact on societies around the world. It builds on our recently published work measuring the world's recent religious makeup.

How we did this

Many countries make demographic projections to try to forecast how their populations may change. The most common projection method – used by researchers for more than a century – starts by estimating the size of a country's population in groups ("cohorts") divided by age and sex, such as the number of girls ages 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, etc. Each cohort is then projected into the future, modeling how its size will change every five years with the addition of expected births (based on fertility rates) and the subtraction of expected deaths (based on mortality rates). Demographers also often attempt to forecast future levels of immigration and emigration.

Our projections use an advanced version of this method. We pulled data from national censuses and surveys around the world to estimate the size and age distribution of each religious group in the baseline year, 2020. We incorporated data on differences in fertility rates between religious groups and on past patterns of movement into and out of each group, known as "religious switching." Our projections also drew on data from the United Nations' 2024 revision of its World Population Prospects, global migration flow estimates from University of Hong Kong professor

Guy Abel, and the Center's previous research on the religious composition of the world's migrants. Read more in the methodology. Here is the complete list of sources used for each country and territory.

Our projection model was developed in collaboration with researchers in the Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion (CASPAR) at Krakow University of Economics.

You can explore the findings using our data explorer and sortable table. The custom software developed for these projections, which includes our input data, is available online.

Table of contents

About Pew Research Center 2
About this research 3
Table of contents 5
The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070 6
Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions 31
The Future of the Global Muslim Population 63
The Future of the Global Christian Population 78
The Future of the Religiously Unaffiliated Population Around the World 96
The Future of the Global Hindu Population 114
The Future of the Global Buddhist Population 126
The Future of the Global Jewish Population 140
The Future of the Global Population of Other Religions 152
The Future of Religion in the Asia-Pacific Region 167
The Future of Religion in Europe 182
The Future of Religion in Latin America and the Caribbean 195
The Future of Religion in the Middle East-North Africa Region 205
The Future of Religion in North America 214
The Future of Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa 226
Acknowledgments 239
Methodology 242
Appendix A: Sources 270
Appendix B: Religious Composition by Country 310

The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070

Why Muslims will soon become the world's largest religious group and Christians will be the second largest

For centuries, Christianity has been the world's largest religion. That may soon change.


Muslims are expected to outnumber Christians by 2035, according to new projections from Pew Research Center. Both religious groups are growing in size, but Muslims are growing faster. By 2070, if recent trends continue, there will be more than 3.6 billion Muslims and just under 3 billion Christians worldwide.

The world's total population is projected to increase by 29% between 2020 and 2070. Muslims and Christians are the only religious groups analyzed here that are expected to keep pace, with Christians growing by 30% and Muslims by 80%.

As a result, the size of many religious groups will change relative to the world's overall population. Muslims will make up a larger percentage of the global population in 2070 (36%) than they did in 2020 (26%). Christians, meanwhile, will hold fairly steady at 29%.

Muslims will be the largest religious group by 2035

Number of Muslims and Christians worldwide, 2020-2070 (in billions)



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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Although Hindus are growing in absolute number, they are projected to decline as a percentage of the global population. Jews are expected to follow a similar pattern.[1]

Meanwhile, Buddhists are expected to shrink both in number *and* as a portion of the world's population in the coming decades.

Muslims are projected to grow much faster than other major religious groups

*Estimated percentage change in the **number** of __ worldwide, 2020-2070*



Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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All other religions combined (including Baha'is, Daoists, Jains, Sikhs, adherents of folk religions and many other groups) are expected to experience a modest increase in number. However, they will slip below 2% of the global population by 2070.[2]

And people who have no religious affiliation – sometimes called religious "nones" – are projected to drop substantially as a share of the world population, from 24% in 2020 to 17% in 2070.[3]

[1] Jews are projected to decrease slightly as a share of all the people in the world, from 0.19% in 2020 to 0.17% in 2070, despite growing in number from approximately 15 million to nearly 18 million. In these projections, all groups are defined by religious self-identity, and people who don't identify with Judaism as a religion but who consider themselves Jewish for other reasons – such as culturally, ethnically or because of their family background – generally are *not included* in the Jewish totals in this study. Refer to this study's discussion of "The Future of the Global Jewish Population" for more details.


[2] Some of the religions in the "other religions" category have a large presence in one country or a handful of countries, but because each of these religions is rare in most countries, they are not consistently measured in censuses and surveys around the world, and their future global size could not be projected separately. Although "other religions" is a catch-all category that includes people with widely differing belief systems and demographic profiles, using this broad category allows us to explore overall trends among people who identify as something other than the religious groups for which we have the most global data: Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and religiously unaffiliated people.

[3] The "religiously unaffiliated" category includes people who say they are atheist, agnostic or "nothing in particular" in response to a Pew Research Center survey question about religious identity, as well as people who choose a "no religion" or "none" option in other surveys and national censuses. While they do not identify with any religion, some religiously unaffiliated people do hold religious or spiritual beliefs and engage in religious or spiritual practices – though typically at lower levels than are found among people in the same country who have a religious affiliation. For details, read our 2024 report "Religious 'Nones' in America: Who They Are and What They Believe" and our 2025 report "Many Religious 'Nones' Around the World Hold Spiritual Beliefs."

Interested in projections for a specific religious group? Jump to sections of this study on:
Christians | *Muslims* | *Unaffiliated people* | *Hindus* | *Buddhists* | *Jews* | *Other religions*

Projected change in the world's religious group populations

All major religious groups except Buddhists and unaffiliated people are expected to have larger populations by 2070, but only Muslims and Christians will keep pace with overall population growth. All other groups will shrink as a share of the world population.



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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What's behind these changes?

The future size of religious groups is heavily influenced by demographic trends in the countries and regions in which each group is concentrated.


In the 21st century, most of the world's population growth is expected to occur in Africa, particularly in countries south of the Sahara Desert. By 2070, more than a quarter of all people worldwide will live in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the vast majority of people who currently live there are either Christians or Muslims, the region's high fertility and rising life expectancy will boost the global numbers of both faiths.

By comparison, the populations of other major geographic regions are expected to grow more modestly, or even to shrink. For example, between 2020 and 2070, the number of people living in Europe will decline, and their share of the world's population is projected to drop from 10% to 6%.

Fertility differences have big effects on populations. Globally, Muslims tend to have more children than other major religious groups. During the 2020-2025 period, the total fertility rate for Muslims was 3.1 children per woman.[4] By comparison, the rate for non-Muslims was 2.0 children per woman.

Sub-Saharan Africa's share of the global population is expected to grow by 2070

% of the world's population living in each region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[4] Throughout this study, we present *total fertility rates* – the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have in her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.

The current age profile of the people in each religious group also plays a role in the projections. In younger populations, a larger share of people have yet to complete their childbearing years. On average, Muslims around the world are younger than any other religious group in this study. As of 2020, the median age of Muslims (24) was nearly a decade lower than the median age of non-Muslims (33).

If recent trends continue, by 2070:

- More than half of the world's Christians will live in sub-Saharan Africa.
- An African country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, will surpass the United States as the country with the greatest number of Christians.
- The United States will no longer have a Christian majority, though Christians will remain the biggest religious group in the country.
- Pakistan will have the largest Muslim population, followed by India, Nigeria and Indonesia (which currently has the most Muslims).
- Hindus will increase the most in absolute number in India, but they will grow *faster* in countries outside India, including the U.S.
- The overall populations of China, Japan and South Korea will shrink, and their Buddhist populations will drop by more than half.
- Most countries will have more religiously unaffiliated people than they do now. But the increase will be entirely offset by population decline in China, where most religious "nones" currently live.
- 62% of all Jews will live in Israel, up from 46% in 2020.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center project examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

The rest of this analysis explores:

- How each region's religious populations will change
- How religious populations will change within countries
- How the religious majorities in countries will change
- Key factors behind change in the size of religious groups
- Evaluating earlier projections about the future of religion

How each region's religious populations will change

In the coming decades, religious groups will grow and contract at different speeds, reshaping the religious makeup of the world's six major regions. Muslims are projected to grow as a percentage of the population in all six regions, while Christians will decline in all but one (the Asia-Pacific region). Still, Christians will continue to make up about half or more of the population in most regions.

If recent trends continue:

- Religiously unaffiliated people will rise from a quarter of all **Europeans** in 2020 to about a third in 2070. Over the same period, the share of the region's population that is Muslim is expected to roughly double, from 6% to 13%.

- Muslims will surpass religiously unaffiliated people as the largest group in **Asia and the Pacific**, and Hindus will become the second-largest group.

- Christians will continue to make up a larger percentage of the population in **Latin America and the Caribbean** than in any other region, despite dropping from 85% in 2020 to 77% in 2070.


- Muslims will grow in number faster than Christians in **sub-Saharan Africa** and will make up a larger percentage of the regional population in 2070 (36%) than they did in 2020 (33%).

- The religious mix in **the Middle East and North Africa** will change little. Muslims are expected to make up 95% of the population in 2070, close to their share in 2020 (94%).

- **North America** will no longer have a Christian majority, as the portion of the population that is Christian is projected to fall from 63% to 46%.

Most regions' populations will grow more Muslim, less Christian in coming decades

Religious groups as a percentage of each region's population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Religious change in the United States

The United States is expected to follow roughly the same pattern of religious change as the overall North American region.[5] By 2070, Christians are expected to decline to less than half of the U.S. population, while religiously unaffiliated people will rise to about 41%. And Jews – who were the country's third-largest religious group in 2020 – will be outnumbered by both Muslims and Hindus in 2070 if recent demographic trends continue.


The projected change among Christians and unaffiliated people will largely be driven by religious switching. Christians tend to lose more followers than they gain through switching in the U.S.

In addition, unaffiliated Americans are younger, on average, than U.S. Christians. All else equal, a younger group will grow faster than an older group because the younger population contains more people of reproductive age and fewer people who are nearing the end of their natural lifespans.

Looking for religious projections for a specific country? Search our data explorer for information.

The United States is projected to no longer have a Christian majority in 2070

Religious groups as a percentage of the U.S. population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[5] In this study, North America corresponds to the United Nations' category of "Northern America." Because this analysis covers only countries and territories with populations exceeding 100,000 in 2020 or 2010, we omit Bermuda, Greenland, and St. Pierre and Miquelon, which have populations of less than 100,000 each. In this study, Mexico is included in the Latin America-Caribbean region. Puerto Rico also is included in the Latin America-Caribbean region. For details on this study's regional classifications of all countries, refer to the methodology.

How religious populations will change within countries


Around the world, many countries are expected to experience a *substantial shift* in their religious makeup between 2020 and 2070, defined in this study as an increase or decrease of at least 5 percentage points in any religious group's share of the country's overall population.[6]

The largest shifts are expected in:

- 61 countries and territories where the share of the total population that is **Christian** will decline substantially
- 37 places where the percentage of **unaffiliated people** will increase substantially
- 31 countries and territories where **Muslims** will grow substantially as a portion of the population

Religiously unaffiliated and Muslim populations are expected to grow substantially in over 30 countries

Number of countries and territories where each religious group's share of the population is expected to change by at least 5 percentage points, 2020-2070



Note: There are no countries in which the Jewish share of the population is expected to change by at least 5 percentage points.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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If we compare expected changes at the global and country levels, two puzzles emerge:

- How can the Christian share of the world's population stay stable if the general trend is toward declining Christian shares within many countries?
- How can the world experience a declining share of people who are religiously unaffiliated if many countries are expected to see a rising percentage of unaffiliated people in their populations?

[6] We acknowledge that 5 percentage points is an artificial threshold for measuring substantial change. To be clear, in this study the increase or decrease must be equal to 5% or more of the country's *total* population, not just 5% of any religious group's members.


In both cases, change in a single region or handful of countries plays a large role in these apparent paradoxes.

The greatest population growth in the coming decades is projected to occur in sub-Saharan African countries, where most people are Christian. Rapid growth among Christians in this region will offset the slower rate of growth – and in some cases, decline – of Christians elsewhere.

Christian population declines will be especially pronounced in Europe, where the *overall* population is projected to shrink by 17% in the coming decades. European Christians are projected to experience more deaths than births and to continue to see larger numbers of people leaving the faith than converting to it.

Meanwhile, the countries with the largest unaffiliated populations are projected to grow more slowly than the world's overall population, or to shrink.

Projected change in total population size, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. Projection for Greenland comes from the UN World Population Prospects, 2024 revision.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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Consider China, which was home to two-thirds of the world's religious "nones" in 2020. China's total population is expected to shrink dramatically by 2070. Consequently, even though about nine-in-ten people in China are expected to remain religiously unaffiliated during this period, the number of "nones" in China is projected to decrease by 361 million between 2020 and 2070.[7]

These losses will far outnumber the growth that is projected to occur among the unaffiliated population outside of China (+180 million people), causing the global unaffiliated population to decline in the coming decades.

The religiously unaffiliated population is projected to decline in China but rise in the rest of the world by 2070

Number of religiously unaffiliated people in each population, 2020-2070 (in billions)



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[7] Read "Measuring Religion in China" for more information about Pew Research Center's approach to estimating China's religious composition. Also consider "Is China a religious country or not? It's a tricky question to answer."

How the religious majorities in countries will change

In most countries and territories, a single religious group accounts for at least 50% of the population. By 2070, this will still be the case, though a slightly smaller number of places will have religious majorities than in 2020 (185 vs. 194).

Christians are expected to be the majority religion in most countries in 2070, as they were in 2020. However, the number of Christian-majority countries is expected to drop from 120 to 110 over this time span. If recent trends continue, the U.S., Canada and Germany are among the countries that will no longer have Christian majorities by 2070.

Christians are projected to make up a majority in 110 of the world's 201 countries and territories in 2070

Number of countries and territories where each group formed a majority of the population in 2020, or is projected to form one in 2070

	2020		2070	
	Number of places	% of places	Number of places	% of places
Christians	120	59.7%	110	54.7%
Muslims	53	26.4	54	26.9
Religiously unaffiliated	10	5.0	13	6.5
Buddhists	7	3.5	5	2.5
Hindus	2	1.0	2	1.0
Jews	1	0.5	1	0.5
Other religions	1	0.5	--	--
No majority	7	3.5	16	8.0
Total	**201**	**100.0**	**201**	**100.0**

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. This analysis is based on 201 countries and territories with populations of at least 100,000 people in 2010 or 2020. Collectively, these places were home to 99.98% of the world's population in 2020.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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While **Muslims** are projected to experience the greatest population growth in the decades ahead, the number of countries with Muslim majorities is expected to increase by just one – Ivory Coast – resulting in 54 Muslim-majority nations in 2070.

Although the global population of **religiously unaffiliated people** is projected to decline, the number of countries where they form majorities is expected to rise by three – South Korea, France and the United Kingdom – to reach 13 countries in 2070.

Mongolia and Laos, both of which had **Buddhist** majorities in 2020, are expected to see their Buddhist populations drop below 50% by the end of the projection period.

Places where the religious majority will shift by 2070

Among countries and territories that had a religious majority in 2020

	Majority religion in 2020	% of population in 2020	Largest religion in 2070	% of population in 2070
Laos	Buddhists	64.2%	Other religions	49.8%
Mongolia	Buddhists	51.1	Buddhists	48.9
Spain	Christians	69.5	Religiously unaffiliated	45.1
United States	Christians	64.0	Christians	47.8
Switzerland	Christians	61.6	Christians	44.8
Sweden	Christians	60.8	Christians	38.8
Togo	Christians	56.9	Christians	49.4
Germany	Christians	56.2	Christians	41.9
Canada	Christians	53.3	Religiously unaffiliated	40.5
Benin	Christians	53.2	Christians	48.8
Estonia	Christians	52.6	Religiously unaffiliated	47.2
Belgium	Christians	51.0	Religiously unaffiliated	43.8
Taiwan	Other religions	51.7	Other religions	38.7

Among countries and territories with no religious majority in 2020

	Largest religion in 2020	% of population in 2020	Majority religion in 2070	% of population in 2070
France	Christians	46.5%	Religiously unaffiliated	53.2%
United Kingdom	Christians	49.4	Religiously unaffiliated	52.3
Ivory Coast	Muslims	46.3	Muslims	51.3
South Korea	Religiously unaffiliated	48.3	Religiously unaffiliated	59.9

Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The number of countries and territories in which none of the seven groups in this analysis forms a majority is expected to more than double, from seven in 2020 to 16 in 2070. Switzerland, Mongolia and Taiwan, among other places, will no longer have a majority religion.[8]

[8] Taiwan was the only place in which the "other religions" category constituted a majority in 2020. This reflects the large numbers of Daoists (also spelled Taoists) and practitioners of Chinese folk religions in Taiwan.

Key factors behind change in the size of religious groups


The largest source of new members of major religions is not adults who convert to the faith, but babies who are born into the group.

Globally, the three Abrahamic religions – Islam, Christianity and Judaism – are the only religious groups with total fertility rates above the level typically necessary for each generation to replace itself (2.1 children per woman).[9]

Muslims have the highest fertility rate, at 3.1 children per woman (as of 2020-2025), followed by Christians (2.5), while the Jewish fertility rate matches the global average (2.3). Collectively, women in the "other religions" group – an umbrella category composed of people who identify with religions other than the major groups in this study – have about 2.1 children per woman. The remaining groups have fertility rates too low to sustain their populations in the long term.

Total fertility rate by religion

Number of children per woman



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020-2025 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2065-2070 are demographic projections. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[9] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

By the Center's estimates, Muslim women gave birth to more babies than women in any other religion during the 2020-2025 period. About 252 million babies were born to Muslim mothers, compared with 208 million babies born to Christian mothers.


Muslims are the only major religious group expected to have growing numbers of births in the decades ahead. The other groups are projected either to have steady numbers of births or to experience gradual decline in the number of children born.

These projections do not assume that fertility rates will remain constant. Rather, at the country level, fertility rates are assumed to follow the paths described by demographers in the United Nations Population Division.[10] The UN anticipates gradual declines in fertility in countries that currently have very high fertility levels, as well as stability or modest increases in fertility in countries with very low rates.

In the Center's projections, the rank order of fertility rates among groups stays constant even as the average differences between groups grow smaller.[11] In the 2065-2070 period, we project that rates will range from 2.2 children per Muslim woman to 1.5 children per religiously unaffiliated woman.

Muslims continue to outnumber other religious groups in total births worldwide

Projected number of babies born to mothers who are ... (in millions)



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020-2025 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[10] Specifically, the projections use country fertility values in the medium variant of the UN's 2024 revision of its World Population Prospects.
[11] Within countries, we assume that differences in fertility rates between religious groups will continue, with two caveats. First, differences between groups are scaled to expected change in country-level fertility. Second, our model includes an additional assumption that these differences will slowly decrease, moving toward convergence by 2100 due to diminishing differences between groups in factors such as access to contraceptives and women's educational attainment, which shape fertility levels. Read more about how our projections model future fertility in "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" and in the methodology.

The changing age profile of religious groups

Younger populations, which include many people with their prime childbearing years still ahead, have greater potential for growth than do older populations, which include many people who are past their childbearing years.


Comparing the median ages of people in various religious groups is a simple way to see how their age profiles differ. If everyone in the world had been lined up from youngest to oldest in 2020, the person in the middle – the median individual – would have been 31 years old.

Muslims had the youngest median age in 2020, at 24, followed by Hindus (29) and Christians (31).

Age gaps between religious groups are projected to persist. But the median age of each religious group is expected to increase in the coming decades as fertility rates decline and people live longer, on average.

Muslims and Hindus have the youngest median age

Median age by religion




Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Religious switching

For most religious groups, the Center projects that the net effect of people moving into and out of the group during their lifetimes will be modest. However, religious switching is projected to be especially consequential for two groups: unaffiliated people and Christians.

Projected cumulative change due to religious switching, 2020-2070



Note: Figures for Jews are not shown; movement out of Judaism could not be reliably measured in most countries due to small samples of respondents who were raised Jewish.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Between 2020 and 2070, we expect that 117 million more people will become religiously unaffiliated than will switch from having no religion to identifying with one. The overwhelming majority of people who become unaffiliated will be former Christians.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).


The impact of religious switching versus births and deaths

If we consider just the population change projected to have occurred between 2020 and 2025, we can get a sense of the relative influence of several factors. (While the 2020-2025 period is in the past, we use projections from our 2020 baseline to estimate this recent change.) Natural population change was the main cause of Muslim population growth as births outnumber deaths within the group. This is an example of natural *increase*.

Natural increase also was the largest factor behind Christian population change, resulting in an increase of 98 million Christians over the 2020-2025 period. However, this gain was projected to be partially offset by a decline of 13 million Christians who left or "switched out" of the faith over the same period.

Most religious population change between 2020 and 2025 is projected to come from natural population change (births minus deaths)

Population change projected to occur through ___, by religious group



Note: The projected growth for Jews via religious switching may be exaggerated; movement out of Judaism could not be reliably measured in most countries due to small samples of respondents who were raised Jewish.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The religiously unaffiliated population increased much more than any other group via religious switching (+15 million) during this period. "Nones" also saw some growth through natural increase (+10 million). But, in the long term, their demographic characteristics will limit their growth.

Demographic challenges facing the unaffiliated population


On average, religious "nones" have an older age profile and give birth to fewer children than do people who have a religious affiliation.

In 2020, the median age of unaffiliated people around the world was 37, compared with 28 for religiously affiliated people. Unaffiliated people also tend to have about half as many children as religiously affiliated people. The total fertility rate for unaffiliated people in 2020-2025 was 1.3 children per woman, while people who identify with a religion had 2.5 children per woman.

These demographic patterns are heavily influenced by Asian nations, including China and Japan. Collectively, the Asia-Pacific region was home to 78% of all "nones" in 2020.

Outside of Asia, religiously unaffiliated people tend to be younger than their religiously affiliated counterparts.

Globally, religiously unaffiliated people are older and have fewer children than people who are religiously affiliated



Note: Results for the Middle East-North Africa region -- home to <1% of all unaffiliated people – are not shown due to insufficient data.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Migration and religious change

Pew Research Center's projections assume that the world's population will remain on Earth. For this reason, migration is not projected to have much impact on religious groups at the *global* level.[12]


Because 96% of people live in the country in which they were born, migration also doesn't have a huge effect on the religious composition of most countries.

However, some countries *do* send and/or receive many international migrants. When those migrants have a different religious mix than the population of the country they move to, they can generate substantial religious change.

Future migration patterns are difficult to anticipate. In our projections, we use a conservative set of estimates of recent migration flows from University of Hong Kong professor Guy Abel and the Center's own estimates of the religious composition of migrants between each pair of countries.

Impact of migration on select regions' population projections

% of the population expected to be ___ in 2070 under the main projection scenario vs. a hypothetical scenario in which all migration stops after 2020



Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[12] It might seem intuitive that migration of members of a religious group from one country to another would have no impact on the group's global size. However, when members of a group change countries, factors such as their new country's culture, educational system and healthcare infrastructure could lead to different patterns of fertility, mortality and likelihood of staying in their group compared with what they would have experienced had they stayed in their home country.

Based on this data, migration is expected to fuel some of the growth in the percentage of Europeans who are Muslim. Without migration, the Muslim share of Europe's population would be expected to grow from 6% in 2020 to 9% in 2070. Factoring in migration, we project that Muslims will rise to 13% of the region's population.

Similarly, the share of North America's residents who are Muslim is expected to be larger in 2070 as a result of continuing migration than it would be without migration (5% vs. 2%).

In other cases, the net effect of migration is expected to be more modest. For example, by 2070 the share of people in the Middle East and North Africa who are Christian is expected to be 2.3% with migration, versus 2.0% if there were no migration. (Large numbers of non-Muslim migrants come to the region to work as migrant workers in Gulf Cooperation Council nations, although most eventually return to their country of origin rather than becoming permanent residents.)

Evaluating earlier projections about the future of religion

In 2012, Pew Research Center published estimates of the religious composition of the world's population, as of 2010. Three years later, we published our first projections of the future growth of religious groups, starting from a 2010 baseline and going through 2050.

How did these projections compare with the religious changes that took place worldwide between 2010 and 2020?

Our projections correctly foretold both the direction and the scale of change among most religious groups in most countries.[13] However, the religiously unaffiliated population grew faster than anticipated. We projected that unaffiliated people would rise in absolute numbers but begin to decline as a percentage of the world's total population between 2010 and 2020. We now estimate – based on our latest analysis of recent census and survey data – that "nones" actually grew *both* in absolute numbers *and* in percentage terms, rising from 23% of all people around the world in 2010 to 24% a decade later.

Our previous and new population projections assume that recently observed rates of religious switching will continue in the future. If rates of religious disaffiliation (i.e., people leaving religion to become unaffiliated) jump in countries where disaffiliation is already an established pattern, or if disaffiliation begins in countries where it has been rare in the recent past, our model will not capture these new dynamics.

Our new projections for 2020-2070 may be conservative about the degree to which the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated will grow, especially if social scientists are correct that many countries are at different stages in a "secular transition."[14] Their hypothesis suggests that religious disaffiliation could become more widespread.

On the other hand, it's also possible that there could be a turn toward religion among "nones" in the future, a process of re-affiliation or religious revival among people who often hold some spiritual beliefs even if they don't identify with any religious group.

In the United States, the percentage of adults who are religiously unaffiliated has leveled off in recent years. After decades of decline in religious affiliation, belief and behavior, the U.S. appears

[13] We have recently revised our estimates of the global religious composition in 2010, most consequentially in China, as we described in our report about religious change from 2010 to 2020. Such changes complicate direct comparisons.
[14] The secular transition model was proposed by University College London's David Voas and recently further developed in "The three stages of religious decline around the world" by Jörg Stolz and Jean-Philippe Antonietti of the University of Lausanne, Nan Dirk de Graaf of the University of Oxford, and Pew Research Center's Conrad Hackett. This research is summarized in "How religion declines around the world."

to be in a period of relative stability in religion, and by some measures the youngest U.S. adults are more religious than their immediate predecessors.

However, the data on religious switching that we've gathered from more than 100 countries does not at present show a pattern of more people joining than leaving religion. On the contrary, our recent surveys show that most religious switching has been by people who were raised in a religion and are now unaffiliated.

Guide to other parts of this study

This study on the Future of World Religions digs deeper into the factors driving demographic change, and how the population of each group and each geographic region is expected to change.

Jump to other parts of this study on:

- Key factors shaping the global future of religions
- The future of the global **Muslim** population
- The future of the global **Christian** population
- The future of the **religiously unaffiliated** population around the world
- The future of the global **Hindu** population
- The future of the global **Buddhist** population
- The future of the global **Jewish** population
- The future of the global population of **other religions**
- The future of religion in **Asia-Pacific** region
- The future of religion in **Europe**
- The future of religion in **Latin America and the Caribbean**
- The future of religion in the **Middle East-North Africa** region
- The future of religion in **North America**
- The future of religion in **sub-Saharan Africa**

Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions

High fertility drives Muslim population growth, while religious switching fuels the rising number of 'nones' in many countries


When people hear about the changing size of religious groups, many think of individuals converting to a new faith or leaving religion altogether. While that kind of switching does impact the size of religious groups, most of the change taking place globally is a result of demographic dynamics.

Fertility and mortality are powerful drivers of demographic change. Populations naturally grow when births outnumber deaths. This happens in young populations with high fertility. Conversely, populations that are older and have higher mortality will eventually shrink.

Looking at the world's three largest religious categories:

Natural population change (births minus deaths) accounts for most religious change projected to occur between 2020 and 2070

Projected population change from 2 causes, by religious group



Note: "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths. The projected growth for Jews via religious switching may be exaggerated; movement out of Judaism could not be reliably measured in most countries due to small samples of respondents who were raised Jewish.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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- **Muslims** are projected to experience the most population growth between 2020 and 2070. Their young age profile and high fertility will cause a natural increase as Muslim births outnumber Muslim deaths by at least 1.6 billion over five decades.

- **Christians,** too, are projected to experience a natural increase, though at a smaller scale than Muslims. Christians' growth will be tempered by people leaving (or "switching out" of) the faith.

- Many people around the world are projected to join the ranks of **the religiously unaffiliated population** between 2020 and 2070 as they leave the religions in which they were raised. But unaffiliated people, globally, have a relatively old age profile and low fertility, which will cause their numbers to decline in the coming decades.

Delve into how these five factors shape our projections for religious groups:

- Age structure
- Fertility
- Mortality
- Religious switching (leaving or joining a religion)
- Migration

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Age structure


In the coming decades, the world's population – viewed as a whole – is expected to grow older as fertility rates decline and people live longer. People ages 50 and older are projected to rise from 24% of the global population in 2020 to 38% in 2070. This gradual aging is expected to occur in all religious groups.

Muslims currently have the youngest age profile (or "age structure") of the seven religious groups in this study. In 2020, a third of Muslims were under 15, compared with fewer than one-fifth of Buddhists and religiously unaffiliated people. Muslims' relative youth is an advantage for growth, since a large portion of their population is in or near their prime childbearing years.

Muslims are projected to remain the youngest religious group in the coming decades. But their age structure will more closely mirror that of Christians by 2070, when people ages 50 and older are expected to make up similar shares of both groups (31% of Muslims and 34% of Christians).

Muslims are projected to remain the youngest religious group overall in 2070

% of people in each religious category who are ...



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Median age by religion and region in 2020


Many of the current age differences between religious groups reflect where they tend to live around the world.

Buddhists and religiously unaffiliated people – who have older age profiles – are heavily concentrated in East Asian countries such as China, where the median age of the whole population is 39, and Japan, where it is 49. By contrast, many Christians (about three-in-ten, as of 2020) live in sub-Saharan Africa, where the median age is 19. Sub-Saharan Africa also is home to about 18% of the world's Muslims.

In addition, Muslims are typically the youngest religious group *within* each geographic region, while Jews and Buddhists are often among the oldest. For example, in Europe, Muslims had the lowest median age (34) in 2020, while Jews had the highest (53).

In nearly every region, Muslims have the youngest median age, Jews or Buddhists the oldest

Median age by religion and region, 2020



Note: In some regions, there is not enough data to reliably estimate median age for certain groups.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Fertility

A population has greater potential for growth if it has both a young age structure *and* a high rate of childbirth. Throughout this study, we present *total fertility rates* – the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have in her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.[15]

Globally, **Muslims** have a relatively large percentage of women who are in, or soon will enter, their childbearing years. They also have the highest total fertility rate of any religious group covered in this study: 3.1 children per woman, according to our 2020-2025 global estimates.


Christians have the second-highest fertility rate (2.5).

Hindus have a slightly younger age structure than the global population, but because they have a lower-than-average fertility rate (1.9), the Hindu population is projected to grow at a slower pace than non-Hindus in the coming decades. In fact, their total fertility rate is below the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[16]

Religiously unaffiliated people and **Buddhists** have the lowest total fertility rates – 1.3 and 1.6 children per woman, respectively – both of which are well below the replacement level.

Total fertility rate by religion, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman



Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[15] Refer to the methodology to learn more about how we estimate fertility by religion in this study.
[16] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

How fertility is projected to change in the future

The Center's projections assume that religious groups' fertility rates will begin to slowly converge within countries in the coming decades.

Religious groups that currently have fertility rates well above the replacement level are projected to see their rates decline, while groups with fertility rates below the replacement level are generally expected to see their rates stabilize – or even rise – by 2070. Muslims are the only religious group projected to have above-replacement-level fertility at the end of the projection period.

How we model future fertility

Future fertility rates in this study are based on the "medium" scenario of projections published by the United Nations Population Division in the most recent (2024) revision of its World Population Prospects. The UN's forecasts follow the demographic transition model in assuming that countries with very high fertility rates eventually will see those rates decline.

Our population projections follow the UN's medium-variant forecasts for the future of fertility rates at the country level. Within countries, we have estimated recent fertility differences between religious groups. We assume that the relative differences between groups will persist, though our model also assumes that those differences gradually will narrow, slowly moving toward convergence by 2100 as education levels and access to contraceptives gradually become more equal.

Take Nigeria as an example. The UN estimates that a Nigerian woman would have an average of 4.5 children if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during the 2020-2025 period. Our estimates for *religious groups* in Nigeria include a total fertility rate of 5.4 children per Muslim woman and 3.4 per Christian woman – a difference of two full children per woman. In the 2065-2070 period, the UN projects that the fertility rate in Nigeria will drop to 2.2 children, less than half the current number. In 2065-2070, we project fertility rates in Nigeria will be 2.4 children per Muslim woman and 2.0 per Christian woman, a smaller difference than exists today.

Meanwhile, the UN's medium projection assumes that fertility rates in countries below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman will stabilize, and that fertility rates eventually will begin to rise in some countries, such as South Korea, where rates already have dipped below one child per woman. Read the methodology for more details.


By 2070, the Center projects …

- **Muslims** will experience the sharpest decline in fertility, falling from 3.1 to 2.2 children per Muslim woman, on average.
- **Buddhists'** rate will stabilize at 1.6.
- The total fertility rate of **religiously unaffiliated people** will rise slightly, from 1.3 to 1.5.
- Fertility rates of the remaining four religious groups will decline modestly.

Globally, the overall fertility rate for all women is projected to dip from 2.3 in 2020-2025 to 2.0 – just below replacement level – in 2070.[17]

Fertility differences between religious groups expected to narrow over time

Number of children per woman



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020-2025 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2065-2070 are demographic projections. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
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[17] We follow the country-level fertility estimates made by the professional staff of the United Nations' Population Division in the medium scenario of the 2024 revision of their World Population Prospects report. In this dataset, the global total fertility rate will fall to 1.99 in the 2065-2070 period. Some scholars, however, contend that a more rapid decline is likely, pointing out that countries with a decades-long history of low fertility have seen little rebound in birth rates despite policies intended to encourage childbearing. For instance, the Wittgenstein Center for Demography and Human Capital projects that the global fertility rate will drop to 1.88 by 2070, while the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation produces an even lower figure, projecting a drop to 1.83 by 2050. For more details, refer to United Nations. 2025. "World Fertility 2024."


Regional differences in fertility

All of the world's major geographic regions are projected to see their religious composition change, but some regions will change more than others. These shifts are influenced by fertility differences between religious groups, which often reflect the overall fertility of the countries in which they are concentrated.

For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, Muslims currently have a much higher total fertility rate than religiously unaffiliated people (2.5 children per woman vs. 1.1). If this fertility gap persists – while gradually narrowing in coming decades – Muslims will surpass unaffiliated people as the largest religious group in the region by 2040.

Total fertility rates by religion and region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman



Note: In some regions, there is not enough data to reliably estimate total fertility rates for certain groups.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Muslims also are projected to grow as a share of the population in sub-Saharan Africa, largely because they have a much higher fertility rate than non-Muslims there (5.1 vs. 4.0).

Fertility differences between regions also can gradually alter the geographic distribution of a religious group. For instance, in the decades ahead, Christians are expected to grow more concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa – where they are estimated to have a total fertility rate of 4.0 children per woman as of 2020-2025 – and less concentrated in Europe, where their fertility rate is 1.4.

Likewise, Jews are projected to become more concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa and less concentrated in North America, largely due to their higher fertility in Israel (3.0 children per Jewish woman, as of 2020-2025) than in the United States and Canada, where the average Jewish woman is expected to have fewer than two children.

Country-level differences in fertility

Many religious groups are concentrated in just a few countries. As a result, their global fertility rates are shaped largely by the national fertility rates in those countries.

For example, during the recent 2020-2025 period, the total fertility rate of Hindus (1.9) resembles the overall fertility rate of India (2.0). India is home to 95% of all Hindus, and Hindus make up 79% of India's population. Since 85% of all Jews live in Israel or the U.S., fertility patterns in these two countries heavily influence the fertility of Jews globally.

This also impacts the rankings of countries with the largest religious group populations. According to the Center's projections, by 2070:

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has a national fertility rate of 6.1 children per woman as of 2020-2025, will surpass the U.S. (fertility rate of 1.6) as the country with the largest Christian population.
- Pakistan (3.6) will replace Indonesia (2.1) as the country with the most Muslims.
- India (2.0) will surpass China (1.1) to have the largest number of followers of "other religions."[18]


[18] In this study, we use "other religions" as an umbrella category for those who do not identify as Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish or religiously unaffiliated. Doing so allows us to study trends among the many religious groups that have a large presence in one country or a

(Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their religious group populations.)

Within countries, religious groups tend to have roughly similar fertility levels. This is especially true in places where the overall fertility rate is low, such as the U.S., which has an overall fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman as of 2020-2025. Muslim Americans are estimated to have only a modestly higher fertility rate than Christian Americans (1.9 vs. 1.8).

Total fertility rate by country

Number of children per woman



Note: These total fertility rate estimates represent the number of children an average woman would have in her lifetime if she experienced the age-specific fertility rates of the 2020-2025 period.
Source: Data on total fertility rates comes from the 2024 revision of the United Nations' World Population Prospects. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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handful of countries but are not consistently measured in censuses and surveys around the world. In India, most people in this category are Sikhs and Jains; in China, this group is largely comprised of people practicing Chinese folk religions.

But there are often wide fertility gaps in countries with high overall fertility rates. This is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Muslim and Christian fertility rates differ by one child (7.1 vs. 6.1, respectively, as of 2020-2025).

How much difference does fertility make?

One way to assess the impact of fertility on the future religious landscape is to compare the main projection scenario – which assumes that the current fertility gaps between groups will persist but slowly converge toward the country's overall fertility level – with a hypothetical scenario in which all religious groups within a country share the same national fertility rate in the coming decades.

For example, in **Nigeria,** we estimate that Muslims made up 56% of the population in 2020, while Christians accounted for 43%. The total fertility rates of Muslims (5.4) and Christians (3.4) differed by two children, on average, during the 2020-2025 period. But if we were to assume that there was no difference between the fertility rates of Nigerian Muslims and Christians throughout the 50-year projection period:

- Muslims would make up a smaller share of the country's population in 2070 (59%) than they would under the main projection scenario (67%).

- Christians would make up a larger portion of the population (40% vs. 32%).

This suggests that Nigerian Muslims' comparatively high fertility will play a large role in their growth.


Several other countries are expected to see a shift in the religious makeup of their populations, largely due to fertility differences between their two largest religious groups.

Under the main projection scenario, Buddhists will no longer form a majority in **Laos** in 2070. However, Buddhists would remain a majority if they were to share the same fertility rate as the country's overall population in the coming decades, making up 58% of all Laotians in 2070 rather than declining to 49%. Similarly, if Christians in **Togo** were to have the same fertility rate as all other Togolese people, they would still make up a majority of the population in 2070 (56%).


By contrast, in the **United States**, where fertility differences between the two largest religious groups – Christians and unaffiliated people – are small, the percentage of the population that each group is projected to make up in 2070 is similar under the main projection scenario and the scenario without fertility differences.

A look at how fertility differences can alter countries' future religious makeup

In Nigeria, Muslims have far higher fertility than Christians. As a result, they are projected to make up 67% of the population by 2070. Without this demographic advantage, Muslims would make up a smaller share (59%).



Fertility differences between the United States' 2 largest religious groups, Christians and unaffiliated people, are small and will have less impact on the relative size of each group by 2070.



Note: The hypothetical scenario without fertility differences assumes all religious groups in a country have the same national fertility rate.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 and 2020-2025 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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At the global level, the religious landscape would look only modestly different under the hypothetical "no fertility differences" scenario versus the main projection scenario. Muslims would still surpass Christians as the largest religious group by 2040 – just five years later than is projected in the main scenario.[19]

(This scenario without fertility differences would not substantially change the global religious landscape because it models what would happen if every group within a country had the same fertility as the *national* average, rather than if every group worldwide had the same fertility as the *global* average. Total fertility rates vary greatly across countries, ranging from less than one child per woman in some parts of Asia to more than six children per woman in several African countries.)

[19] Muslims would make up a slightly smaller share of the global population in 2070 under this hypothetical scenario than in the main projection scenario (34.5% vs. 35.8%), but no other religious group would change by more than 1%.

Mortality


While fertility is key to population growth, populations also can increase over time if people begin to live longer, on average, and fewer die prematurely. One way to assess how much religious groups benefit from this demographic advantage is by examining the *expected longevity* of human life.

Life expectancy at birth is a common metric that demographers use to capture mortality rates at a given moment in time. It represents the expected lifespan of an average newborn child.[20]

Globally, life expectancy at birth was 72 years in 2020, according to the United Nations.[21] But life expectancy varies considerably across the six regions included in this study, reflecting differences in living conditions and access to healthcare.

Life expectancy by region, 2020 and 2070

Average number of years a newborn is expected to live, by region



Source: Data on life expectancy by region is calculated based on country-level life tables from the 2024 revision of the United Nations' World Population Prospects. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In 2020, Europe had the highest average life expectancy, at 78 years, followed closely by North America (77 years). Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest average life expectancy (61) and was the only region where life expectancy was below the global average.

Global life expectancy is projected to rise to 79 in 2070. People in most countries are expected to live longer due to better healthcare, diet and hygiene, and other factors.[22] Despite these gains, regional differences in life expectancy are projected to persist. In 2070, Europeans are forecast to have an average life expectancy of 86 years, compared with 70 years in sub-Saharan Africa.

[20] This is a "period life expectancy" measure based on mortality rates observed at one point in time.
[21] UN estimates for 2020 took into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Research suggests that the pandemic contributed to a reduction in life expectancy in 2020 in many European countries and the United States.
[22] In some countries, life expectancy may stall or even decline as gains from advances in healthcare and living conditions are offset by violent conflicts and epidemics. For instance, between 2010 and 2020, the life expectancy in Afghanistan remained at 61 years, and in the U.S., it declined from 79 to 77 years (but it has since bounced back to its pre-pandemic level of 79).

In this study, due to a lack of reliable information on differences in life expectancy between religious groups within individual countries, we assume that people in all religious groups have the average life expectancy of the country in which they live. For example, both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria are assigned the average life expectancy of all Nigerians, which was 53 years in 2020, while both Christians and Muslims in the United States are assigned the average life expectancy of all Americans, which was 77 years in 2020.


This approach allows us to indirectly estimate differences in life expectancy between religious groups due to variation in how each group is distributed around the globe.

Jews are estimated to have the highest life expectancy at birth of any religious group, with a global average of 80 years in 2020, followed by religiously unaffiliated people (78) and Buddhists (76).[23]

Muslims have the lowest life expectancy, at 68 years. The life expectancies of Hindus (70) and Christians (71) also are below the global average (72).

Estimated life expectancy by religion, 2020 and 2070

Average number of years a newborn is expected to live, by religion



Note: These results are based on country-level mortality patterns, weighted to account for each group's population size in the country. These estimates assume that within each country, all seven religious groups have the same life expectancy.
Source: Data on life expectancy by religion is calculated based on country-level life tables from the 2024 revision of the United Nations' World Population Prospects. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Over the next five decades, Hindus are projected to see the largest gains in life expectancy (+11 years), followed by Muslims (+8 years). The average life expectancy of Christians and Buddhists is expected to increase by six years.

By 2070, Christians and Muslims worldwide are projected to have the same life expectancy (77 years).

[23] The high life expectancy of Jews reflects the fact that the vast majority of the world's Jews live in the U.S. and Israel, where life expectancy in 2020 was 77 and 83 years, respectively, compared with a global average of 72.

Religious switching: Leaving or joining a religion

Globally, most people still belong to the religion – or nonreligion – in which they were raised. However, the percentage of people who keep their childhood religious identity in adulthood varies by religion.

How we estimate religious switching

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Our estimates of religious switching are based on surveys conducted in 112 countries and territories between 2008 and 2024 by Pew Research Center and other organizations, including studies carried out under the auspices of the International Social Survey Programme. Taken together, the 112 places account for 88% of the 2020 population, including almost all Hindus and 94% of religiously unaffiliated people. Coverage also is high for Christians (85%) and Muslims (80%).

In some countries where estimates of switching by people raised in a small religious group are not reliable, we conservatively assume there is no switching *out of* that group. Nonetheless, we still model rates of switching *into* that group from other, larger religious groups if those rates can be reliably estimated. In the remaining 89 countries for which switching data is unavailable, we assume no switching will occur. Read the methodology for more details.


Muslims and Hindus have the highest retention rate, at 99% each, followed by religiously unaffiliated people (92%), according to the Center's estimates.

Christians and Buddhists are less likely to retain their religion, followed by people in the "other religions" umbrella category, who have the lowest retention rate of the seven religious groups we studied.

In addition to people leaving, all religious groups have people who join, either by formally converting or by informally changing their religious identity.

Muslims and Hindus rarely leave their religion

Among those raised as ___, % who have since ...



Note: Disaffiliation is when a person was raised in a religion but now does not affiliate with any religion. The rates of switching for Jews are not shown; movement out of Judaism could not be reliably measured in most countries due to small samples of respondents who were raised Jewish.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 among adults ages 18 to 54 in 112 countries and territories (which are home to 88% of the global population). In the remaining countries, these calculations assume no religious switching took place. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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
Of the groups included in this study, Christians have *the highest ratio of people leaving to joining* the religion. For every person who joins Christianity, 2.3 are projected to leave the faith during the 2020-2025 period. By contrast, religiously unaffiliated people have the highest ratio of people *joining* to *leaving*, at 2.4 to 1.

Because it is relatively uncommon for people to leave or join Islam or Hinduism, there are only modest differences in the ratio of leavers to joiners in those religious groups.

We cannot calculate a meaningful ratio of people leaving to joining Judaism because in most countries, there is not enough survey data on people raised as Jews to reliably estimate rates of switching out of Judaism.

About 2.4 people leave a religion for every person who joins

Ratio of projected numbers of people leaving vs. joining each religion, 2020-2025



Note: The ratio of switching for Jews is not shown; movement out of Judaism could not be reliably measured in most countries due to small samples of respondents who were raised Jewish.
Source: Pew Research Center projections based on rates of religious switching recently observed in 112 countries and territories; in the remaining 89 places, no religious switching is assumed to occur. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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Over the long term, switching into and out of religious groups can shift religious landscapes. Based on recent experience, the largest global movement is expected to be people leaving religion. If switching were to continue in the decades ahead at the same levels recently observed in 112 countries and territories for which data on switching is available, then an estimated 211 million people would become unaffiliated between 2020 and 2070, while 94 million unaffiliated people would join a religion. As a result, unaffiliated people are expected to experience the largest *net* gains from religious switching, increasing by 117 million over the next five decades.

Christians are expected to experience the largest net *losses* through religious switching, declining by 105 million between 2020 and 2070. Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists are projected to experience modest net losses due to switching, while people who belong to other religions are expected to see modest *gains* through religious switching.

These patterns largely hold across all major geographic regions. Within each region, Christians typically are projected to lose the most followers, while unaffiliated populations often are expected to gain the most people from religious switching.

Projected cumulative change due to religious switching, 2020-2070



Note: Projections assume rates of religious switching remain constant between 2020 and 2070. Figures for Jews are not shown; movement out of Judaism could not be reliably measured in most countries due to small samples of respondents who were raised Jewish.
Source: Pew Research Center projections based on rates of religious switching recently observed in 112 countries and territories; in the remaining 89 places, no religious switching is assumed to occur. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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However, there are some exceptions. In the Asia-Pacific region, Buddhists are projected to experience the largest net loss (-7 million), followed by Christians (-6 million). And in sub-Saharan Africa, Christians are expected to see small *gains* through religious switching (+3 million), partially offsetting their losses at the global level.

Projected cumulative change due to religious switching by region, 2020-2070

In North America, Christians are projected to decline in number by 28 million from religious switching, because more people are projected to leave than join the religion.

	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Latin America-Caribbean	Middle East-North Africa	North America	Sub-Saharan Africa
Religiously unaffiliated	+17,750,000	+33,710,000	+34,670,000	+10,000	+25,940,000	+5,390,000
Hindus	-830,000	+80,000	+30,000	0	-360,000	+40,000
Other religions	-2,300,000	+1,740,000	+4,150,000	-10,000	+2,490,000	-4,570,000
Muslims	-2,360,000	-1,410,000	-10,000	+10,000	-460,000	-3,460,000
Christians	-5,550,000	-35,000,000	-39,190,000	-10,000	-27,710,000	+2,550,000
Buddhists	-6,740,000	+730,000	+230,000	0	-180,000	+40,000

Note: Projections assume rates of religious switching remain constant between 2020 and 2070. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000. Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. In regions where a religious group makes up a small percentage of the population, only switching *into* that group is modeled; as a result, we may have overestimated gains or underestimated losses via switching for that religion. This issue is particularly relevant to our projections for Jews because they make up a very small share of the population in nearly all countries; for this reason, data for Jews is not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center projections based on rates of religious switching recently observed in 112 countries and territories; in the remaining 89 places, no religious switching is assumed to occur. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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How much difference does religious switching make?

The global impact of religious switching can be seen by comparing the main projection scenario with a hypothetical scenario that assumes no religious switching will take place between 2020 and 2070.[24]

Under this "what if" scenario, everyone continues to identify with the same religion in which they were raised. (For example, all people who were raised as Christians remain Christians, and everyone who was raised without a religion stays unaffiliated throughout their lives.)

Under this "no switching" scenario, the religious makeup of the global population in 2070 would look broadly similar to the outcome in the main scenario, with some exceptions.

Without religious switching, Christians would make up a slightly larger share in 2070

% of the global population that identified/will identify as the following in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Christians	28.8%	29.1%	30.5%	+1.4
Muslims	25.6	35.8	36.0	+0.1
Buddhists	4.1	2.5	2.5	+0.1
Other religions	2.2	1.9	1.9	0.0
Hindus	14.9	13.6	13.6	0.0
Jews	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0
Religiously unaffiliated	24.2	17.0	15.4	-1.6
All world	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**0.0**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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If there were no more religious switching after 2020, Christians would make up 31% of the world population in 2070. That is 1.4 percentage points higher than projected in the main scenario, which factors in a net loss of Christians due to switching. On the other hand, religiously unaffiliated people would account for 15% of the global population under the "no switching" scenario. That's 1.6 points lower than in the main scenario, which includes a net gain in unaffiliated people through switching.

Even under a hypothetical "no switching" scenario, **Muslims** still would surpass Christians as the world's largest religion because differences in the age structure and fertility rates of the two groups have a much larger effect on their population sizes than switching does.

[24] We acknowledge that this scenario is implausible. There is no realistic possibility that all religious switching will stop. The value of this scenario is that it helps to isolate the effect of switching.

While religious switching is expected to have a modest impact on the global religious landscape, it is projected to substantially shift the religious makeup of some geographic regions. If all switching were to cease from 2020 through 2070, **Christians** would make up:

- 57% of North America's population, compared with 46% under the main projection scenario
- 85% of the population in Latin America and the Caribbean, rather than falling to 77% as the main scenario projects
- 60% of Europeans, rather than 52% as the main projection scenario forecasts

Unaffiliated people, meanwhile, would account for a smaller portion of these three regions' populations. Under the hypothetical "no switching" scenario, **religiously unaffiliated people** would make up:

- 31% of North Americans versus 41% under the main projection scenario
- 12% of the population in Latin America and the Caribbean, rather than 19% as the main scenario projects
- 25% of Europe's population – the same share as in 2020 – rather than rising to 33% under the main projection scenario

In the future, it is possible that people may leave religion at a higher rate, especially in countries where disaffiliation from religion is currently rare. Some scholars have suggested that religious affiliation becomes less common in societies during the final stage of a "secular transition," a process that they consider to be advanced in many European countries but still developing elsewhere.

In short, if leaving religion becomes more common in the future, the unaffiliated population could be larger than projected in 2070.

Conversely, it is possible we could see movement *toward* religion in countries where many people have disaffiliated from religion in the past, such as the United States. News media have reported a possible uptick in church attendance among young U.S. adults in some denominations, in some

parts of the country.[25] However, our projections for religious populations focus on religious *affiliation* rather than religious *behavior*.

While survey data shows stability in Christian and unaffiliated shares of the U.S. adult population in the last few years, it reveals a decades-long trend of religious disaffiliation; there is no evidence of an increase in affiliation. Our projections, based on switching data that capture long-term trends, do not forecast a rise in Christian affiliation in the coming decades.

Also, because religiously unaffiliated Americans are, on average, much younger than Christian Americans, the share of "nones" in the U.S. population would still grow by 2 percentage points by 2070 – and the share of Christians would shrink by 6 points – even if all disaffiliation from Christianity came to a halt (i.e., the "no switching" scenario).

[25] A recent Pew Research Center study finds mixed signals about religion among young people. Adults roughly ages 18 to 22 report relatively high rates of attendance at religious services. However, adults ages 23 to 26 have low attendance rates and they are the least religious age group on several other measures. In the past, young Americans sometimes entered adulthood with relatively high rates of religiousness that faded over time.

Christianity is expected to decline substantially through religious switching alone in Europe, North America and the Latin America-Caribbean region

% of each region's population that identified/will identify as the following in ...

		2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff without-with switching (pct. pts.)*
Asia-Pacific	Christians	5.9%	5.9%	6.1%	+0.2
	Religiously unaffiliated	32.8	23.1	22.6	-0.5
	Muslims	26.1	36.7	36.8	+0.1
	Hindus	25.7	27.6	27.6	0.0
	Jews	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
	Other religions	2.5	1.8	1.9	+0.1
	Buddhists	7.0	4.9	5.0	+0.2
Europe	Christians	67.1	51.6	59.5	+7.9
	Religiously unaffiliated	25.3	32.6	25.0	-7.6
	Muslims	6.0	12.7	13.1	+0.4
	Hindus	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.0
	Jews	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
	Other religions	0.8	1.6	1.2	-0.4
	Buddhists	0.3	0.7	0.5	-0.2
Latin America-Carib.	Christians	84.6	77.4	85.3	+7.9
	Religiously unaffiliated	11.9	18.9	12.0	-6.9
	Muslims	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
	Hindus	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
	Jews	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
	Other religions	3.1	3.3	2.4	-0.9
	Buddhists	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
North America	Christians	62.9	46.3	56.9	+10.6
	Religiously unaffiliated	30.2	41.2	31.4	-9.8
	Muslims	1.6	4.9	5.0	0.1
	Hindus	1.0	2.2	2.3	0.1
	Jews	1.6	1.2	1.2	-0.1
	Other religions	1.4	3.0	1.9	-1.1
	Buddhists	1.3	1.1	1.3	0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	Christians	62.0	58.7	58.3	-0.5
	Religiously unaffiliated	2.6	3.1	2.9	-0.2
	Muslims	32.8	36.1	36.3	0.2
	Hindus	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
	Jews	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
	Other religions	2.5	2.0	2.5	0.5
	Buddhists	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. Middle East-North Africa region is not shown because the difference between the two scenarios' results is very small, rounding to 0.0.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Migration

Over time, migration can substantially alter the religious makeup of a country or an entire region.

For instance, previous Pew Research Center studies have found that the non-Muslim populations of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – collectively have risen substantially due to an influx of Christian and Hindu migrant workers. As a result of Catholics moving to the UAE, St. Mary's Catholic Church in Dubai is reported to serve more people than any other Catholic parish in the world.

Migration also has been a primary driver of Muslim population growth in Europe in recent decades.

If migration inflows and outflows follow recent patterns, the religious makeup of these places could shift further.[26]

How we estimate migration flows

Our estimates of current migration flows between pairs of origin and destination countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel, a leading global migration expert at the University of Hong Kong. Data on the religious affiliation of migrants by origin-destination country pair comes from Pew Research Center's 2024 report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants." Our projections also take into account the estimated size of migrant flows into and out of each country and territory by religion, sex and five-year age groups. Read the methodology for more details.

Roughly 38 million people moved across international borders between 2020 and 2025, according to our projections, which assume that migration inflows and outflows have continued at roughly the same levels recently observed.[27] (Our latest estimates are for 2020; all figures after that year

[26] In the main projection scenario, recent rates of outmigration are held constant over the 2020-2070 period. But the *number* of people moving between each country pair (i.e., the migration flows) may change over time as the population sizes of migrants' origin countries change.

[27] Our estimates of migration flows come from Professor Guy Abel. Migration flows between pairs of origin and destination countries and territories are estimated primarily using United Nations bilateral migrant stock data for each five-year interval. They are estimated using a conservative approach that maximizes the number of immigrants who stay in the destination country. Other methods – as well as estimates based on different underlying migration data, such as Facebook location data – may produce higher estimates. For instance, one study estimated that roughly 35 million people moved across borders in 2023 alone. For more details about the methods we used, read Abel, Guy J., and Joel E. Cohen. 2019. "Bilateral international migration flow estimates for 200 countries." Scientific Data. Refer to the methodology for more details about our migration input data and why we chose this conservative approach.

are projections.) Most of these migrants belong to the world's two largest religions, Christianity and Islam.

Christians and Muslims make up a larger share of all international migrants (76%) than they do of the world's total population (54%).

By contrast, religiously unaffiliated people and Hindus are underrepresented among migrants. Hindus made up 15% of the world's 2020 population, but they account for just 5% of international migrants.

Religious composition of projected international migration flows between 2020 and 2025

	Total migrants, 2020-2025	% of all migrants, 2020-2025	% of world population, 2020
Muslims	14,990,000	39.0%	25.6%
Christians	14,360,000	37.4	28.8
Religiously unaffiliated	4,250,000	11.0	24.2
Hindus	1,940,000	5.1	14.9
Buddhists	1,770,000	4.6	4.1
Other religions	1,020,000	2.6	2.2
Jews	110,000	0.3	0.2
Total	**38,440,000**	**100.0**	**100.0**


Note: Population estimates are rounded to the nearest 10,000. Percentages are calculated from unrounded numbers and may not add to 100% due to rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on migration flow data from Guy Abel and the Center's 2024 estimates of religious composition of the world's migrants. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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About half of all migrants are projected to move between regions; the remainder will move between countries within the same region. The largest interregional movement is projected to occur among:

- **Muslims** moving between the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East-North Africa region, including many migrant workers moving to and from GCC countries
- **Christian** migrants from the Latin America-Caribbean region to North America

Largest migration flows projected to occur between regions, 2020-2025



Note: Only region pairs with a projected number of migrants of 500,000 or more are shown. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on migration flow data from Guy Abel and the Center's 2024 estimates of religious composition of the world's migrants. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Europe also is projected to receive large numbers of Muslims from the Asia-Pacific and Middle East-North Africa regions, as well as many Christians from sub-Saharan Africa and the Latin America-Caribbean region, between 2020 and 2025.

How much difference does migration make?

Migration has little impact on the *global* religious landscape as people move from one location to another on Earth.[28] However, migration can greatly impact the religious makeup of a region or country. Its effects are especially evident in places where migration flows are large and the religious profile of migrants differs from that of the broader population.

We can assess the impact of migration by comparing the main projection scenario, which assumes migration will continue at the same levels recently observed, with a hypothetical scenario that assumes all international migration will stop after 2020 – an implausible scenario that serves to isolate the effect of migration.

Under this "what if" scenario, Europe's religious landscape would shift slightly, since migrants to the region are more likely than Europeans overall to be Muslim and less likely to be Christian.

In the main scenario, Muslims are projected to make up 13% of Europe's population in 2070. But if migration to Europe ceased after 2020, that share would be 9%. This suggests that immigration is a substantial driver of Muslim population growth in Europe. (European Muslims also tend to have a higher birth rate and younger age structure than other religious groups in Europe.)

[28] International migration indirectly impacts the world's religious composition. For example, many people move from places with relatively high fertility and lower levels of economic development to places with relatively low fertility and higher levels of economic development. Over time, they adapt to the fertility patterns of the host countries and tend to have fewer children than they would have had if they had remained in their home countries. Furthermore, patterns of staying in or switching out of one's religion may be different for migrants.

Migration is expected to boost the percentage of the population that is Muslim in Europe and North America

% of each region's population that identified/will identify as the following in ...

		2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff without-with migration (pct. pts.)*
Europe	Christians	67.1%	51.6%	54.8%	+3.2
	Religiously unaffiliated	25.3	32.6	34.0	+1.4
	Muslims	6.0	12.7	8.8	-4.0
	Hindus	0.3	0.6	0.3	-0.3
	Jews	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0
	Other religions	0.8	1.6	1.4	-0.2
	Buddhists	0.3	0.7	0.6	-0.1
North America	Christians	62.9	46.3	46.2	-0.1
	Religiously unaffiliated	30.2	41.2	45.1	+3.9
	Muslims	1.6	4.9	2.2	-2.7
	Hindus	1.0	2.2	1.1	-1.1
	Jews	1.6	1.2	1.4	+0.2
	Other religions	1.4	3.0	2.8	-0.1
	Buddhists	1.3	1.1	1.0	-0.1

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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A similar pattern appears in North America, where Muslims are projected to make up 5% of the population in 2070. Without migration, that share would be similar to what it was in 2020, approximately 2%. Migration also is expected to slow down the growth in the share of the region's population that has no religious affiliation. If migration were to stop after 2020, unaffiliated people would make up 45% of the North American population in 2070, compared with 41% if recent trends in migration continue in the coming decades. This difference reflects the fact that incoming migrants to the region are more likely than the general population to be religiously affiliated. For example, nearly all migrants from India – who account for a large share of immigrants to the region – affiliate with a religion, with fewer than 1% identifying as religiously unaffiliated.

Migration plays less of a role in shaping the religious landscape of the other four major geographic regions. In the Middle East and North Africa, the share of the population that is Muslim would be just 0.5 percentage points larger under the "no migration" scenario than the main scenario (95.7% vs. 95.2%), while the share that is Christian would be 0.3 points smaller (2.0% vs. 2.3%).

Migration between Gulf Cooperation Council countries

Some of the world's largest international migration flows are into the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, migration is expected to have only a modest impact on these countries' religious composition in the future. This is because in our projections, natural increase (births exceeding deaths) is the primary driver of population change in the region. While we project a large number of migrants will continue to flow into the region, we expect that most of them will eventually return home and will not have children who remain in GCC countries.[29]

Migration is expected to slow the decline of the Christian and Hindu shares of the population in Gulf Cooperation Council countries

% of the population in GCC countries by religion, with and without migration

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Muslims	85.9%	87.9%	89.8%	+2.0
Christians	7.6	6.8	5.5	-1.3
Hindus	6.0	4.9	4.3	-0.6
Other religions	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0
Religiously unaffiliated	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Buddhists	0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.0
Jews	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Under the hypothetical scenario where migration stops after 2020, Muslims are projected to make up 90% of the total population in all six GCC countries combined in 2070. This compares with 88% under the main projection scenario, which assumes continued migration. (Still, Muslims are expected to make up a larger share of the population than they did in 2020 under either scenario.)[30]

[29] To address the temporary nature of such migrant labor, our model assumes an ongoing outflow of return migrants from GCC countries that is at least 60% of the size of incoming flows to GCC countries. Similarly, we assume high return migrant flows to Southeast Asian nations from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. And we assume return migrant flows to Latin American and Caribbean nations that are 15% of the size of incoming flows from those nations to the U.S. Read the methodology for more details about our return migration assumptions.

[30] In Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Muslim populations are expected to grow more from natural increase (having more births than deaths) than non-Muslims. In Saudi Arabia, we estimate the total fertility rate for Muslims in 2020-2025 was 2.3 children per woman versus 0.9 children for non-Muslims. The citizens of GCC countries tend to be Muslim and are legally allowed to remain in their country, whereas noncitizens often face more constraints regardless of their religion.

Together, GCC countries are expected to see an increase of 2.6 million Christians and 1.8 million Hindus through migration between 2020 and 2070. Because the Muslim majority is projected to grow more rapidly, Christians and Hindus are projected to shrink slightly as a share of these countries' combined population.

The Future of the Global Muslim Population

Between 2020 and 2070, the global Muslim population is expected to grow more than all other religious groups combined


Muslims are the world's fastest-growing religious group – a trend that's expected to continue in the coming decades. **According to Pew Research Center's projections, the global Muslim population will grow in number by 80% between 2020 and 2070, while the global non-Muslim population will increase by 11%.** Muslims' population growth will be fueled by their dual demographic advantages of relative youth and high fertility.

If current demographic trends continue, Muslims will total 3.6 billion people worldwide and make up 36% of the global population by 2070. **They are expected to surpass Christians as the world's largest religious group by 2035.**

Muslims are projected to outpace the population gains of non-Muslims in every major geographic region. Sub-Saharan Africa is forecast to see some of the most significant growth, with Muslims projected to more than double in number in that region over the coming decades.

Muslims are projected to grow faster than the rest of the population in every region

Projected percentage increase in population size, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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By 2070, sub-Saharan Africa will be home to about a quarter of the world's Muslims. The share of all Muslims living in the Asia-Pacific region, where about six-in-ten Muslims currently live, is projected to slip to about half.

Our demographic projections point to several additional changes in the Muslim population in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- Pakistan will replace Indonesia as the country with the largest number of Muslims.
- Muslims will more than triple in number in North America – from about 6 million to 20 million – with migration into the region playing a large role.
- The Muslim population will grow by 9 million in the United States but will still account for a relatively small percentage of the country's total population (4%).
- 54 countries and territories will have Muslim majorities, including 35 places where Muslims will make up at least 90% of the population.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for Muslims:

- Which regions of the world will have the most Muslims?
- Which countries will have the most Muslims?
- Where will the Muslim share of the population change the most?
- Countries where Islam will be the majority religion
- Key factors driving change in the Muslim population


Which regions of the world will have the most Muslims?

Roughly six-in-ten Muslims lived in Asia and the Pacific in 2020. The Middle East and North Africa (20%) and sub-Saharan Africa (18%) were home to the next-largest shares of the world's Muslims.

Together, these three regions will still hold the vast majority of the world's Muslims over the coming decades. But by 2070, the Asia-Pacific region is projected to hold a smaller share of the global Muslim population (50%) than in 2020 (59%). Meanwhile, the portion of the world's Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow by 9 percentage points, to 27%.

About half of all the world's Muslims will live in the Asia-Pacific region by 2070

% of the global Muslim population living in each region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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About 2% of the world's Muslims are expected to reside in Europe in 2070, the same percentage as in 2020.

Projected change in the Muslim population within regions

Muslims are set to grow as a percentage of the population in nearly all regions between 2020 and 2070. For example, if current demographic trends continue, the share of Europeans who are Muslim will roughly double, from 6% to 13%.[31]

Latin America and the Caribbean is the only region where the Muslim share of the population is expected to remain stable, but relatively few Muslims currently live there.

[31] In 2017, Pew Research Center projected the future of Muslim populations in the 27 nations that are now members of the European Union, as well as in Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For discussion of the differences between those projections and the current study, refer to our methodology.

North America, meanwhile, is projected to see the *fastest* Muslim growth. The number of Muslims living in that region is expected to more than triple, from 6 million to 20 million, by 2070.

The Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa will grow the second-fastest, with Muslims projected to more than double in number, from 369 million to 980 million, across the African continent south of the Sahara Desert and its nearby islands.

Although in the coming decades the Asia-Pacific region is expected to hold a smaller percentage of all the world's Muslims, the Muslim population *within* that region is projected to grow significantly. Muslims are projected to make up 37% of the Asia-Pacific region's overall population in 2070, up from 26% in 2020.

Muslims are projected to grow as a share of the population in nearly all regions

Muslim population in each region in …					Muslim share of region's population in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Asia-Pacific	1,187,660,000	1,806,570,000	**+618,910,000**	+52.1%	26.1%	36.7%
Sub-Saharan Africa	368,640,000	980,040,000	**+611,400,000**	+165.9	32.8	36.1
Middle East-North Africa	414,110,000	751,960,000	**+337,840,000**	+81.6	94.2	95.2
Europe	45,510,000	79,930,000	**+34,430,000**	+75.7	6.0	12.7
North America	5,910,000	19,860,000	**+13,950,000**	+235.9	1.6	4.9
Latin America-Caribbean	750,000	850,000	**+100,000**	+13.0	0.1	0.1
World	**2,022,590,000**	**3,639,210,000**	**+1,616,620,000**	**+79.9**	**25.6**	**35.8**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Which countries will have the most Muslims?

Nearly half of the world's Muslims lived in just five countries in 2020. Indonesia had the largest Muslim population (239 million), followed by Pakistan (227 million), India (213 million), Bangladesh (151 million) and Nigeria (120 million).

By 2070, Pakistan is projected to surpass Indonesia as the country with the most Muslims (461 million, or 13% of the global total). India will follow with 334 million Muslims, while Nigeria is expected to climb to third place. Another country in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia, is projected to join the list of places with the 10 largest Muslim populations, as is Afghanistan.

No countries in North America, Europe or the Latin America-Caribbean region ranked in the top 10 Muslim populations worldwide in 2020, and none are expected to make the top 10 in 2070.

The 10 countries with the largest Muslim populations in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	Muslim population in 2020	% of global Muslim population in 2020		Muslim population in 2070	% of global Muslim population in 2070
1. Indonesia	238,990,000	11.8%	1. Pakistan	461,020,000	12.7%
2. Pakistan	226,880,000	11.2	2. India	333,620,000	9.2
3. India	213,060,000	10.5	3. Nigeria	282,130,000	7.8
4. Bangladesh	151,440,000	7.5	4. Indonesia	273,860,000	7.5
5. Nigeria	119,980,000	5.9	5. Bangladesh	218,160,000	6.0
6. Egypt	104,040,000	5.1	6. Egypt	172,490,000	4.7
7. Iran	87,520,000	4.3	7. Ethiopia	128,310,000	3.5
8. Turkey	83,600,000	4.1	8. Sudan	116,200,000	3.2
9. Sudan	46,250,000	2.3	9. Turkey	99,390,000	2.7
10. Algeria	43,330,000	2.1	10. Afghanistan	99,310,000	2.7
Subtotal for 10 countries	**1,315,100,000**	**65.0**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**2,184,480,000**	**60.0**
Subtotal for rest of world	**707,490,000**	**35.0**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**1,454,730,000**	**40.0**
World	**2,022,590,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**3,639,210,000**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their Muslim populations.

Where will the Muslim share of the population change the most?

In 32 countries, the percentage of the population that is Muslim is expected to change substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) by 2070. In nearly all these places, the Muslim population share is projected to *grow*, ranging from a 5-point rise in Ivory Coast to a 16-point gain in Albania. Suriname is the only country projected to see the portion of its population that is Muslim decline substantially (by 6 points).

Most countries that are projected to experience substantial growth are in Europe (21 of 31). Within that region, Sweden and France are expected to see some of the largest gains (+11 points each).

Lebanon is the only predominantly Arabic-speaking country that is expected to experience substantial growth in the share of its residents who are Muslim. (Muslims already make up 95% or more of the population in most other Arabic-speaking countries.)

The Muslim share of the population is expected to change substantially in 32 countries by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Muslim is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Muslim share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Albania	74.5%	90.3%	+15.8
Nigeria	56.1	67.5	+11.4
Sweden	8.1	19.3	+11.2
North Macedonia	34.7	45.8	+11.1
France	9.1	20.0	+10.9
Malta	3.6	14.5	+10.8
Belgium	6.8	17.5	+10.7
Canada	4.9	15.6	+10.7
Austria	8.3	18.9	+10.6
Italy	4.4	14.5	+10.1
Bosnia & Herz.	53.6	63.4	+9.8
Montenegro	21.3	31.0	+9.7
United Kingdom	6.4	16.0	+9.6
Ethiopia	36.2	45.8	+9.6
Singapore	16.1	25.4	+9.3
Lebanon	67.8	76.9	+9.1
Spain	3.6%	12.0%	+8.4
Kazakhstan	77.9	86.2	+8.3
Malaysia	64.1	72.2	+8.1
Germany	6.5	14.3	+7.8
Gabon	8.6	15.9	+7.3
Netherlands	5.5	12.8	+7.3
Denmark	4.2	10.7	+6.5
Greece	5.1	11.5	+6.4
Australia	3.5	9.8	+6.3
Switzerland	6.1	12.4	+6.3
Ireland	1.7	7.3	+5.6
Finland	1.6	7.2	+5.6
Luxembourg	1.8	7.4	+5.6
Norway	4.1	9.2	+5.1
Ivory Coast	46.3	51.3	+5.0
Suriname	13.1	7.5	-5.6

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Countries where Islam will be the majority religion

All 53 countries and territories that were majority-Muslim in 2020 are projected to remain so in 2070. In one country – Ivory Coast – Muslims are expected to become a majority over this time span.

Muslims will make up 90% or more of the population in most of these places. Yet there are many countries where Muslims are expected to remain a relatively small minority. In 2070, Muslims are projected to make up less than 5% of the population in 92 countries and territories.

And the countries that are majority-Muslim tend to have small or midsize populations. Just seven of the 54 countries that are projected to have Muslim majorities in 2070 will have 100 million or more residents: Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Sudan and Turkey. (In 2070, 20 countries overall are expected to have populations this large.)

Places that are projected to have a Muslim majority in 2070

Countries and territories where Muslims are projected to make up at least 50% of the population in 2070

Iran	100.0%	Djibouti	94.5%
Afghanistan	99.9	Mali	94.4
Yemen	99.8	Maldives	94.4
Iraq	99.8	Turkmenistan	93.8
Somalia	99.8	Syria	93.7
Morocco	99.8	Saudi Arabia	93.5
Tunisia	99.8	Bangladesh	92.0
Tajikistan	99.5	Albania	90.3
Western Sahara	99.3	Guinea	89.1
Algeria	99.3	Kazakhstan	86.2
Sudan	99.1	Oman	85.7
Palest. terr.	99.0	Indonesia	84.4
Mauritania	98.8	Brunei	82.4
Senegal	98.7	Sierra Leone	82.4
Comoros	98.6	Kuwait	81.3
Mayotte	98.3	Bahrain	78.4
Libya	98.1	UAE	77.4
Gambia	98.1	Lebanon	76.9
Niger	97.6	Qatar	75.1
Jordan	97.2	Malaysia	72.2
Pakistan	96.8	Nigeria	67.5
Uzbekistan	96.7	Burkina Faso	67.4
Egypt	95.8	Bosnia & Herz.	63.4
Azerbaijan	95.8	Guinea-Bissau	60.2
Kosovo	95.5	Chad	58.5
Turkey	95.0	Eritrea	52.5
Kyrgyzstan	94.8	Ivory Coast	51.3

Note: Percentages are rounded; 100% does not necessarily indicate that every person in the country identifies as Muslim.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Key factors driving change in the Muslim population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

Muslims are projected to grow mainly through natural increase (i.e., the number of births exceeding the number of deaths) between 2020 and 2070, given their young age profile and high fertility.

But migration also is expected to play a role in shaping future Muslim populations, particularly in Europe and North America. If current trends continue, these two regions will gain more than twice as many Muslims through migration as they will gain through natural increase.

For example, by 2070 North America's population is projected to include roughly 5 million additional Muslims via natural increase and 10 million through migration into the region. Together, these increases far outnumber the projected decreases among North American Muslims from religious switching (-460,000).

Estimated change in global Muslim population due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Asia-Pacific	+648,320,000	-2,360,000	-27,060,000	**+618,910,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	+621,090,000	-3,460,000	-6,230,000	**+611,400,000**
Middle East-North Africa	+339,310,000	+10,000	-1,480,000	**+337,840,000**
Europe	+10,940,000	-1,410,000	+24,900,000	**+34,430,000**
North America	+4,640,000	-460,000	+9,770,000	**+13,950,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	+10,000	-10,000*	+100,000	**+100,000**
World	**+1,624,300,000**	**-7,680,000**	–	**+1,616,620,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected losses from switching may be underestimated for this region. Only switching *into* Islam is modeled in countries where Muslims make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Religious switching generally has little impact on the global Muslim population, because almost all Muslims identify with the religion for life. Based on recent surveys, we estimate that 99% of people who were raised Muslim still identify with Islam as adults. That is much higher than the retention rates of Christians or Buddhists, but on par with that of Hindus.[32]

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Muslim retention rates do vary somewhat by region, however. They are lower in Europe (93%) and North America (85%). If the overall retention rate for Muslims were to drop from its exceptionally high level in the coming decades, moving closer to the levels measured in Europe and North America, the global Muslim population could experience slower growth.

[32] Retention and switching rates are based primarily on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 in 112 countries and territories. For places where reliable data on religious switching is not available for a religious group, we assume no switching out of that religious group. Refer to the methodology to learn how we model future religious switching.

Natural population change

The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.

Muslims have a very young age profile (or "age structure"). Six-in-ten Muslims worldwide are under 30, according to our 2020 estimates. By comparison, fewer than half of non-Muslims are this young.


Still, the age profile of Muslims varies considerably around the world. Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest median age (17), according to our 2020 demographic estimates. In other regions, the median age of Muslims is 24 or older. European Muslims are far older than Muslims living elsewhere, with a median age of 34.

Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how Muslims' age structure is projected to change over time.

Muslims also have a much higher total fertility rate than other religious groups, at 3.1 children per woman globally, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

Age structure of Muslims and non-Muslims, 2020

% who are ages ...



Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Muslims' total fertility rates by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Muslims	Non-Muslims	All
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.1	4.0	4.4
Middle East-North Africa	3.1	2.2	3.0
Asia-Pacific	2.5	1.6	1.9
Europe	1.9	1.4	1.4
North America	1.9	1.6	1.6
World	**3.1**	**2.0**	**2.3**

Note: Latin America-Caribbean region is not shown due to insufficient data for Muslims.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
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This fertility rate is well above the rate among non-Muslims (2.0) and above the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[33]


Muslims' high global fertility is driven by sub-Saharan Africa. With a total fertility rate of 5.1 children per woman, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa far surpass Muslims elsewhere in fertility.

Of the 119 countries and territories for which Muslim fertility data is available, 74 have fertility rates of at least 2.1 children per woman. This includes four countries with exceptionally high total fertility rates of 6.0 children or more per Muslim woman, all of which are in sub-Saharan Africa: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.1), Somalia (6.2), Chad (6.2) and Niger (6.1).

[33] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Muslims' total fertility rate by country

Number of children per Muslim woman



Source: Pew Research Center estimates for Muslim fertility rates based on census and survey data available in 119 countries and territories, which are home to 99% of all the world's Muslims as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for more details on how fertility rates are calculated.
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Migration

While migration doesn't have much effect on the size of the *global* Muslim population, it does impact regional populations.[34] More than 112 million Muslims are expected to move between regions by 2070.

Projected Muslim migration by region, 2020-2070

Number of Muslim migrants projected to move into, and out of, each region between 2020 and 2070

	Receiving	Sending	NET Migration
Europe	26,530,000	1,630,000	**+24,900,000**
North America	10,200,000	430,000	**+9,770,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	200,000	100,000	**+100,000**
Middle East-North Africa	42,010,000	43,490,000	**-1,480,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,230,000	9,460,000	**-6,230,000**
Asia-Pacific	30,200,000	57,260,000	**-27,060,000**
World	**112,360,000**	**112,360,000**	**--**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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The Asia-Pacific and Middle East-North Africa regions are expected to see both the largest inflows and the largest outflows. But the number of immigrants leaving those regions is projected to outnumber those entering, leading to net migration *declines* of 27 million Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region and 1 million Muslims in the Middle East-North Africa region.

Europe, meanwhile, is projected to see the largest net *increase* in Muslims from migration, with more Muslim migrants entering (27 million) than leaving (2 million) the region between 2020 and 2070.

[34] Muslims make up a slightly *lower* percentage of the world's total population in 2070 under the main projection scenario than in the "no migration" scenario. This is because the projection models assume that migrants – who often move from countries with relatively high fertility levels to places with lower fertility – will adopt the fertility rates of the receiving countries, resulting in lower population growth, globally, in the main scenario. Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

One way to determine the relative impact of migration on the future size of regional Muslim populations is to compare the main projection scenario with a hypothetical scenario in which there is no international migration.[35]

Muslims would make up a slightly smaller share of North America's population in 2070 without migration than with it

% of each region's population that was/will be Muslim in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Middle East-North Africa	94.2%	95.2%	95.7%	+0.5
Asia-Pacific	26.1	36.7	37.0	+0.2
Latin America-Caribbean	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	32.8	36.1	36.0	-0.1
North America	1.6	4.9	2.2	-2.7
Europe	6.0	12.7	8.8	-4.0
World	**25.6**	**35.8**	**35.9**	**+0.1**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In 2070, Muslims would make up a slightly smaller share of the population in North America if there were no migration after 2020 (2%) than under the main projection scenario (5%). This is because North America is expected to gain a relatively large number of Muslims through migration over the projection period (10 million). The majority of Muslim immigrants to North America are projected to come from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Egypt.

The situation is similar in Europe, where Muslims are projected to make up 9% of the European population in 2070 *without* migration, compared with 13% in the main projection scenario. The region is expected to continue receiving many Muslim migrants from Morocco, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

[35] We acknowledge that this scenario is implausible. There is no realistic possibility that all international migration will stop. The value of this scenario is that it helps to isolate the effect of migration.

The Future of the Global Christian Population


Most Christians are projected to live in sub-Saharan Africa by 2070

Christianity is currently the world's largest religion, with nearly 2.3 billion followers as of 2020. Compared with other religious groups, Christians are fairly evenly dispersed across the globe. But this is changing. **By Pew Research Center's projections, within a few decades a majority of the world's Christians (54%) will live in sub-Saharan Africa.**

If current demographic trends continue, Christians will decline as a percentage of the population in many countries. Between 2020 and 2070, Christians are projected to shrink substantially (by 5 percentage points or more) as a share of residents in 61 countries, and to grow by 5 points or more as a share of the population in only four countries.

Christians are projected to decline as a portion of the population in many countries

Change in the percentage of each country's population that is Christian between 2020 (estimated) and 2070 (projected)



Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Yet, globally, Christians are expected to *increase* in number by about 687 million people over the same projection period, growing roughly on pace with the rest of the world's population. As a result, Christians will account for about the same percentage of the world's total population in 2070 as they did in 2020 (29% in both years, after rounding).

This seeming paradox – global stability despite declining percentages of Christians in many countries – results from a striking geographic shift. Most of the future growth in the world's Christian population is projected to occur in sub-Saharan Africa.

Christians are projected to maintain a stable share of the world's population

	Christians		Non-Christians	
	Count (billions)	% of global pop.	Count (billions)	% of global pop.
2020	2.27 B	28.8%	5.62 B	71.2%
2030	2.44	28.5	6.12	71.5
2040	2.60	28.4	6.56	71.6
2050	2.75	28.5	6.90	71.5
2060	2.86	28.7	7.10	71.3
2070	2.96	29.1	7.20	70.9


Note: Percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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By 2070, the number of Christians living in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to rise by 896 million, while the number of Christians in the rest of the world is expected to fall by 210 million. The relatively young age profile and high fertility rates of African Christians are behind this projected change.

Sub-Saharan Africa will account for most of the growth in the world's Christian population

Projected growth in the number of Christians in each country and territory, 2020-2070 (in millions)



Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Our demographic projections point to several additional changes in the world's Christian population in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo will surpass the United States as the country with the largest number of Christians.
- Christians will no longer form a majority in the U.S. and nine other countries.
- The share of Europeans who are Christian will decline by 15 percentage points.
- Christians will no longer be the world's largest religious group; by 2035, Muslims will exceed Christians both in absolute number and as a percentage of the global population.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for Christians:

- Which regions of the world will have the most Christians?
- Which countries will have the most Christians?
- Where will the Christian share of the population change the most?
- Countries where Christianity will no longer be the majority religion
- Key factors driving change in the Christian population

Which regions of the world will have the most Christians?


In 2020, Christians were fairly evenly dispersed around the globe. But in the coming decades, they are projected to become concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa: By 2070, 54% of all Christians are expected to live on the African continent south of the Sahara Desert and its nearby islands, up from 31% in 2020.

The Middle East-North Africa region is expected to retain the same very small percentage of the world's Christians in 2070 as it held in 2020 (less than 1%), but all other regions will see their shares decline.

The steepest decline is expected to occur in Europe. If current trends continue, by 2070 Europe will be home to 11% of the world's Christian population, down from 22% in 2020.

Majority of world's Christians are projected to live in sub-Saharan Africa by 2070

% of the global Christian population living in each region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Projected change in the Christian population within regions

Another way to analyze change is to look at the Christian population *within* each region. Between 2020 and 2070, Christians are not expected to grow as a percentage of the overall population in any of the world's six major geographic regions.

This is true even in sub-Saharan Africa, where Christians are forecast to more than double in number, from 697 million to 1.6 billion. Despite the numerical increase, Christians are expected to make up a slightly smaller share of sub-Saharan Africa's total population in 2070 (59%) than they did in 2020 (62%) because religiously unaffiliated people and Muslims are expected to grow even faster than Christians there.

The absolute number of Christians also is expected to rise in Asia and the Pacific (+23 million) and the Middle East-North Africa region (+5 million), but Christians will remain relatively stable as a proportion of those regions' populations (at 6% and 2%-3%, respectively).

Christians are projected to *decrease* both in number and as a percentage of the population in all other regions. This includes North America, where Christians will no longer form a majority, though they will still be the largest religious group. If current demographic trends continue, Christians will make up 46% of the North American population in 2070, down from 63% in 2020. (Over the same period, religiously unaffiliated people will grow as a percentage of the region's population, from 30% to 41%.)

Percentage of Europeans who are Christian is expected to decline by 2070

Christian population in each region in …					Christian share of region's population in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Sub-Saharan Africa	697,420,000	1,593,790,000	**+896,380,000**	+128.5%	62.0%	58.7%
Asia-Pacific	268,840,000	291,400,000	**+22,560,000**	+8.4	5.9	5.9
Middle East-North Africa	12,920,000	18,310,000	**+5,390,000**	+41.7	2.9	2.3
Latin America-Caribbean	546,920,000	539,940,000	**-6,990,000**	-1.3	84.6	77.4
North America	237,630,000	188,210,000	**-49,410,000**	-20.8	62.9	46.3
Europe	505,140,000	323,910,000	**-181,230,000**	-35.9	67.1	51.6
World	**2,268,860,000**	**2,955,560,000**	**+686,700,000**	**+30.3**	**28.8**	**29.1**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Which countries will have the most Christians?

The United States currently has the largest Christian population of any country in the world, with an estimated 217 million Christian residents as of 2020. Brazil (168 million), Mexico (113 million), the Philippines (103 million) and Russia (102 million) round out the top five.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is projected to assume the top slot by 2070, when it will have 299 million Christians, or 10% of all Christians globally. Several other sub-Saharan African countries (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Angola) also will climb in the top 10 rankings.

Meanwhile, the two European countries that were in the top 10 as of 2020 (Russia and Italy) are forecast to drop off the list by 2070, and no European countries are projected to join the top 10.

The 10 countries with the largest Christian populations in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	Christian population in 2020	% of global Christian population in 2020		Christian population in 2070	% of global Christian population in 2070
1. United States	217,270,000	9.6%	1. Dem. Rep. Congo	299,080,000	10.1%
2. Brazil	168,300,000	7.4	2. United States	174,290,000	5.9
3. Mexico	113,070,000	5.0	3. Ethiopia	150,290,000	5.1
4. Philippines	102,510,000	4.5	4. Brazil	150,030,000	5.1
5. Russia	102,350,000	4.5	5. Nigeria	131,980,000	4.5
6. Nigeria	92,770,000	4.1	6. Tanzania	123,300,000	4.2
7. Dem. Rep. Congo	92,400,000	4.1	7. Mexico	116,870,000	4.0
8. Ethiopia	73,230,000	3.2	8. Philippines	113,100,000	3.8
9. South Africa	51,630,000	2.3	9. Uganda	109,530,000	3.7
10. Italy	48,210,000	2.1	10. Angola	99,650,000	3.4
Subtotal for 10 countries	**1,061,750,000**	**46.8**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**1,468,120,000**	**49.7**
Subtotal for rest of world	**1,207,110,000**	**53.2**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**1,487,450,000**	**50.3**
World	**2,268,860,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**2,955,560,000**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their Christian populations.

Where will the Christian share of the population change the most?

Between 2020 and 2070, the share of the population that is Christian is expected to change substantially (meaning it will increase or decrease by 5 percentage points or more) in 65 countries and territories, or roughly one-third of all the places studied.

In almost all 65 places, the percentage of Christians in the overall population is projected to decline, ranging from a 28-point drop in Spain to a 5-point decrease in Puerto Rico. Only four countries are expected to see Christians make up a substantially larger percentage of their national populations: Suriname, Guyana, Fiji and Botswana.

The countries where Christians are projected to shrink as a share of the population are scattered across every region, but most are in Europe (30 countries) or Latin America and the Caribbean (13 countries). The two North American countries, Canada and the U.S., are expected to see especially large drops in the portion of their populations that are Christian (down 20 percentage points and 16 points, respectively).

The Christian share of the population is expected to change substantially in 65 countries and territories by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Christian is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Christian share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Spain	69.5%	41.2%	-28.3
Malta	88.6	61.9	-26.7
United Kingdom	49.4	25.4	-24.0
Italy	80.5	58.0	-22.5
Sweden	60.8	38.8	-21.9
France	46.5	24.7	-21.7
Denmark	76.9	56.5	-20.4
Canada	53.3	33.3	-20.0
Belgium	51.0	32.5	-18.4
Australia	46.8	28.8	-18.0
Austria	68.2	51.0	-17.2
Finland	72.3	55.1	-17.2
Iceland	74.9	58.2	-16.7
Switzerland	61.6	44.8	-16.7
Chile	68.3	52.0	-16.3
United States	64.0	47.8	-16.2
Norway	71.4	56.2	-15.2
Greece	89.5	74.9	-14.6
Germany	56.2	41.9	-14.3
Slovenia	65.4	52.0	-13.4
Netherlands	35.1	21.9	-13.2
Ireland	81.2	68.6	-12.6
Mexico	89.2	76.7	-12.5
Nigeria	43.4	31.6	-11.8
Argentina	88.5	77.0	-11.5
New Zealand	40.3	29.0	-11.3
North Macedonia	64.7	53.4	-11.3
Colombia	86.2	75.1	-11.1
Luxembourg	65.9	55.7	-10.2
Martinique	96.0	86.2	-9.8
Lebanon	27.9	18.5	-9.4
Montenegro	76.0	66.8	-9.3
Bosnia & Herz.	44.7	35.4	-9.3
Albania	17.8%	8.5%	-9.3
Nicaragua	84.8	76.0	-8.8
Madagascar	74.2	65.5	-8.7
Portugal	85.1	76.4	-8.7
Dominican Republic	77.6	69.2	-8.5
Gabon	83.7	75.6	-8.2
Kazakhstan	19.3	11.1	-8.2
Ethiopia	61.6	53.7	-7.9
Uruguay	44.5	36.7	-7.8
Slovakia	73.7	66.0	-7.7
Peru	94.5	87.0	-7.5
Togo	56.9	49.4	-7.4
Brazil	80.7	74.0	-6.7
Ivory Coast	44.9	38.3	-6.6
Lithuania	92.2	85.7	-6.5
Venezuela	88.1	82.0	-6.1
Czech Republic	26.4	20.4	-6.1
Hungary	72.4	66.5	-5.9
South Korea	32.0	26.3	-5.7
Latvia	77.3	71.6	-5.7
Cameroon	69.8	64.2	-5.6
Cape Verde	78.3	72.7	-5.6
Curacao	90.6	85.1	-5.6
New Caledonia	85.1	79.6	-5.5
Estonia	52.6	47.1	-5.5
Seychelles	94.0	88.5	-5.5
Liberia	85.2	79.9	-5.3
Puerto Rico	88.8	83.8	-5.0
Botswana	82.3	87.8	+5.5
Fiji	69.5	75.4	+5.9
Guyana	65.9	71.8	+6.0
Suriname	52.8	65.5	+12.7

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Countries where Christianity will no longer be the majority religion

Ten countries that had a Christian majority in 2020 are expected to see Christians fall below 50% of their inhabitants by 2070 – including the U.S., where 48% of the population is projected to be Christian by 2070. In all these places, a growing proportion of people are religiously unaffiliated.

The other 110 countries and territories that were majority-Christian in 2020 are expected to remain so in 2070. Most of these countries have small or midsize populations, but the list includes several highly populous countries, such as Ethiopia, Brazil, Mexico and the Philippines, each of which is home to at least 100 million people.

Christians are not projected to become a majority of the population in any additional countries or territories between 2020 and 2070.

Countries that had a Christian majority in 2020 but won't in 2070, according to projections

% of each country's population that was/will be Christian in …

	2020	2070
Spain	69.5%	41.2%
United States	64.0	47.8
Switzerland	61.6	44.8
Sweden	60.8	38.8
Togo	56.9	49.4
Germany	56.2	41.9
Canada	53.3	33.3
Benin	53.2	48.8
Estonia	52.6	47.1
Belgium	51.0	32.5

Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Key factors driving change in the Christian population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

Globally, Christians are projected to grow in number between 2020 and 2070 because their overall gains via natural increase are expected to offset losses from religious switching. (Natural increase occurs when births outnumber deaths in a population, due to a high fertility rate, a low mortality rate, or both.)

The picture is more varied on the regional level, with major losses expected in Europe and North America from *both* demographic factors (i.e., aging populations with low birth rates) and religious switching. Although these two regions are expected to see large inflows of migrants, they will not be large enough to offset or "cancel out" losses from natural population decrease (i.e., the number of deaths exceeding the number of births) and switching.

For instance, Europe is projected to lose 160 million Christians through natural decrease and an additional 35 million through disaffiliation between 2020 and 2070. The 14 million Christian immigrants the region is expected to gain over this time span will not fill the gap.

In Asia and the Pacific, meanwhile, net gains from natural *increase* are projected to be large enough to offset expected losses from religious switching and Christian emigration.

Estimated change in global Christian population due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Sub-Saharan Africa	+908,580,000	+2,550,000	-14,760,000	**+896,380,000**
Asia-Pacific	+35,890,000	-5,550,000	-7,780,000	**+22,560,000**
Middle East-North Africa	+3,360,000	-10,000	+2,030,000	**+5,390,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	+52,940,000	-39,190,000	-20,730,000	**-6,990,000**
North America	-48,920,000	-27,710,000	+27,220,000	**-49,410,000**
Europe	-160,250,000	-35,000,000	+14,020,000	**-181,230,000**
World	**+791,610,000**	**-104,900,000**	–	**+686,700,000**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Natural population change


The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.

The overall age profile (or "age structure") of Christians largely mirrors that of non-Christians, according to our 2020 demographic estimates. About half of all Christians and non-Christians are under 30. But Christians are slightly more likely than non-Christians to be ages 60 and older (16% vs. 12%).

Still, the age profile of Christians varies considerably around the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, the median age of Christians is 20 – younger than Christians in any other major region, as of 2020. In all other regions for which data is available, the median age of Christians is 30 or older. European Christians are notably older than those elsewhere, with a median age of 45.

Age structure of Christians and non-Christians, 2020

% who are ages ...



Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how Christians' age structure is projected to change over time.

The global Christian population also is buoyed by a relatively high total fertility rate of 2.5 children per woman, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

Christians' total fertility rate is slightly higher than the rate among non-Christians worldwide (2.2) and above the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[36]

Christians' total fertility rates by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Christians	Non-Christians	All
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.0	5.0	4.4
Middle East-North Africa	2.0	3.0	3.0
Asia-Pacific	2.0	1.9	1.9
Latin America-Caribbean	1.8	1.7	1.8
North America	1.7	1.5	1.6
Europe	1.4	1.4	1.4
World	**2.5**	**2.2**	**2.3**

Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Christians' high global fertility is heavily influenced by birth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. Christians in sub-Saharan Africa have more children per woman (4.0) than Christians in any other region of the world, though non-Christians in sub-Saharan Africa – most of whom are Muslims – tend to have even higher fertility, averaging 5.0 children per woman.


Christian fertility rates are particularly high in the sub-Saharan African countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (6.1), Chad (6.1) and the Central African Republic (6.0).

Rates are below 2.1 children per woman in all other major regions, as well as in 77 of the 140 countries and territories around the world for which Christian fertility data is available. This includes three places with Christian fertility rates considered to be ultralow, or below one child per woman: Hong Kong (0.7), South Korea (0.8) and Singapore (0.9).

[36] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Christians' total fertility rate by country

Number of children per Christian woman



Source: Pew Research Center estimates for Christian fertility rates based on census and survey data available in 140 countries and territories, which are home to 93% of all the world's Christians as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for details on how fertility rates are calculated.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Religious switching

Globally, Christians have one of the lowest retention rates of any religious group. Based on recent surveys, we estimate that 85% of people who were raised Christian still identify that way as adults. That compares with more than 90% among all other major religious groups except Buddhists, whose retention rate is 83%. The 15% of people who were raised Christian but no longer identify as Christian have either disaffiliated from religion altogether (13%) or switched to a different religion (2%).[37]

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

In the coming decades, Christians in Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, and North America are projected to experience larger net losses through religious switching than Christians in other regions.

[37] Retention and switching rates are based primarily on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 in 112 countries and territories. For places where reliable data on religious switching is not available for a religious group, we assume no switching out of that religious group. Refer to the methodology to learn how we model future religious switching.

One way to determine the relative impact of religious switching is to compare the main projection scenario with a hypothetical scenario in which there is no switching.[38]

For example, if there were no more religious switching after 2020, Christians would make up 57% of North America's population in 2070 – 11 percentage points higher than in the main projection scenario (46%), which assumes that Christian switching will continue at the same level recently observed.[39]

Christians would account for a slightly larger portion of the population in most regions in 2070 without religious switching than with it

% of each region's population that was/will be Christian in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
North America	62.9%	46.3%	56.9%	+10.6
Europe	67.1	51.6	59.5	+7.9
Latin America-Caribbean	84.6	77.4	85.3	+7.9
Asia-Pacific	5.9	5.9	6.1	+0.2
Middle East-North Africa	2.9	2.3	2.3	0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	62.0	58.7	58.3	-0.5
World	**28.8**	**29.1**	**30.5**	**+1.4**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Data on rates of religious switching is unavailable for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa region. Furthermore, there is little evidence of people leaving or joining religions in the countries there where we *do* have data on switching. As a result, population projections in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa region are similar with and without religious switching.

[38] We acknowledge that this scenario is implausible. There is no realistic possibility that all religious switching will stop. The value of this scenario is that it helps to isolate the effect of switching.
[39] The share of North America's population that is Christian is projected to decline between 2020 and 2070, even in the absence of religious switching, because Christians in this region have a relatively old age profile (with a median age of 44 as of 2020) and a below-replacement-level fertility rate.

Christian populations in certain countries have especially high rates of religious switching. For example, if there were no switching, the United Kingdom would have a much higher share of Christians in 2070: 40%, rather than the 25% projected in the main scenario. And five of the 10 countries where Christians are expected to no longer form a majority by 2070 would *retain* a Christian majority under the hypothetical "no switching" scenario: Spain, the U.S., Switzerland, Germany and Sweden.

Migration

While migration doesn't have much effect on the size of the *global* Christian population, it does impact regional populations.[40] More than 71 million Christians are expected to move between the world's major geographic regions by 2070. Most of them are forecast to move to North America (32 million) or Europe (19 million). The Latin America and Caribbean region, meanwhile, is projected to see the largest outflow of Christians (24 million).

Projected Christian migration by region, 2020-2070

Number of Christian migrants projected to move into, and out of, each region between 2020 and 2070

	Receiving	Sending	NET Migration
North America	31,840,000	4,630,000	**+27,220,000**
Europe	18,970,000	4,950,000	**+14,020,000**
Middle East-North Africa	7,590,000	5,560,000	**+2,030,000**
Asia-Pacific	8,500,000	16,280,000	**-7,780,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	680,000	15,440,000	**-14,760,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	3,740,000	24,470,000	**-20,730,000**
World	**71,320,000**	**71,320,000**	**--**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[40] Christians make up a slightly *lower* percentage of the world's total population in 2070 under the main projection scenario than in the "no migration" scenario. This is because the projection models assume that migrants – who often move from countries with relatively high fertility levels to places with lower fertility – will adopt the fertility rates of the receiving countries, resulting in lower population growth, globally, in the main scenario. Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

One way to illustrate the impact of migration on Christian populations is to compare the main projection scenario with a hypothetical scenario that excludes all migration.[41]

If there were no more migration, Europe would have a larger percentage of Christians in 2070 than it would under the main projection scenario (55% vs. 52%). This is because Europe is expected to gain considerably more non-Christians than Christians through migration over the projection period.

Christians would make up a larger share of Europe's population in 2070 without migration than with it

% of each region's population that was/will be Christian in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Europe	67.1%	51.6%	54.8%	+3.2
Asia-Pacific	5.9	5.9	6.1	+0.1
Latin America-Caribbean	84.6	77.4	77.5	+0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	62.0	58.7	58.8	+0.1
North America	62.9	46.3	46.2	-0.1
Middle East-North Africa	2.9	2.3	2.0	-0.3
World	**28.8**	**29.1**	**29.2**	**+0.1**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[41] We acknowledge that this scenario is implausible. There is no realistic possibility that all international migration will stop. The value of this scenario is that it helps to isolate the effect of migration.

The Future of the Religiously Unaffiliated Population Around the World

The share of the world's population that is not affiliated with a religion is projected to drop in the coming decades

As of 2020, nearly 2 billion people worldwide do not affiliate with any religion, according to Pew Research Center estimates. By 2070, the Center projects that the number of unaffiliated people will rise in most countries and territories. But **our projections suggest that all the increases in unaffiliated people around the world will be entirely offset by declining numbers in one country: China.**


In censuses and surveys, unaffiliated people are those who answer a religious identity question by saying that they are atheist or agnostic, or that they have no religion. Many people in this group – sometimes called religious "nones" – *do* hold some religious or spiritual beliefs and engage in some religious or spiritual practices. But they don't describe themselves as followers or adherents of any religion.[42]

If current trends continue, "nones" will make up 17% of the world population by 2070, down from 24% in 2020. The absolute number of unaffiliated people is projected to decline globally by 181 million.

Over the same period, the number of unaffiliated people is projected to *rise* in 141

The religiously unaffiliated population is projected to decline in China but rise in the rest of the world by 2070

Number of religiously unaffiliated people in each population, 2020-2070 (in billions)



Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[42] Some religiously affiliated people, including some self-identified Jews and Christians, might be considered atheist or agnostic because they don't believe in, or are uncertain about, the existence of God or gods. However, this study categorizes respondents' religious affiliation based

countries and territories, about 70% of all the places analyzed. And 37 countries and territories will see the *percentage* of their population that is religiously unaffiliated increase substantially (i.e., by at least 5 percentage points).

Despite their growth in most countries, "nones" are projected to shrink globally due to population decline in China, where most of the world's "nones" currently live. China is projected to experience a drop of more than 421 million people in its overall population between 2020 and 2070, primarily from what demographers call "natural decrease" (when the number of deaths in a population exceeds the number of births).

China's unaffiliated population is expected to shrink at roughly the same rate as its general population, falling from 1.3 billion to 917 million. As a result, unaffiliated people are expected to make up about the same share of the Chinese population in 2070 (91%) as they did in 2020 (90%).

Measuring religion in China

Previous Pew Research Center studies have noted that in China, where the ruling Communist Party promotes atheism, only about one-in-ten Chinese adults identify with a religion, according to the 2018 Chinese General Social Survey. This survey asked respondents about their *zongjiao*, a term that refers primarily to organized forms of religion, particularly those with professional clergy and institutional or governmental oversight in China.

Although a small percentage of the Chinese population formally identifies with a religion, surveys indicate that many more hold beliefs or engage in behaviors that may be broadly considered religious. For example, about a quarter of Chinese adults (26%) say they burn incense to worship deities at least a few times a year – a ritual that is often tied to a request for blessings – according to the 2016 China Family Panel Studies survey.

on their self-identification (i.e., the response they give when asked a question like "What is your religion?"), not on their religious or spiritual beliefs. Read the methodology for details about how we measure religious affiliation.

Our demographic projections point to several additional changes in the unaffiliated population in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- "Nones" will no longer be the largest religious group in Asia and the Pacific, with Muslims exceeding them in number and as a percentage of the region's population as soon as 2040.

- France, South Korea and the United Kingdom will join 10 other countries and territories with unaffiliated majorities.

- The share of the U.S. population that is unaffiliated will grow by 12 percentage points, narrowing the gap between Americans who identify with no religion (projected at 41% in 2070) and those who identify as Christians (projected at 48%).

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center report examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for the religiously unaffiliated population:

- Which regions of the world will have the most religious "nones"?
- Which countries will have the most religious "nones"?
- Where will the religiously unaffiliated share of the population change the most?
- Countries where religious "nones" will become the majority
- Key factors driving change in the religiously unaffiliated population

Which regions of the world will have the most religious 'nones'?


The Asia-Pacific region currently is the geographic center of the unaffiliated population. In 2020, 78% of "nones" worldwide lived in that region. Most "nones" are still expected to live in the Asia-Pacific region in 2070, but the share is projected to fall to 66%.

North America, the Latin America-Caribbean region and sub-Saharan Africa are all expected to hold slightly larger portions of the world's "nones" in 2070 than they did in 2020.

The percentage of the global unaffiliated population living in Europe also is expected to increase slightly, while the small share living in the Middle East-North Africa region is expected to remain stable.

A smaller majority of the world's religious 'nones' are expected to live in the Asia-Pacific region by 2070

% of the global religiously unaffiliated population living in each region, 2020-2070



Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Projected change in the religiously unaffiliated population within regions

Another way to analyze change is to look at populations *within* regions. Between 2020 and 2070, the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to grow in most large regions of the world.

If current demographic trends continue, 41% of North Americans will be religiously unaffiliated in 2070, up from 30% in 2020. Europe is expected to undergo a similar change: 33% of Europeans are projected to be unaffiliated as of 2070, up from 25% in 2020.

Asia and the Pacific is the only region where the number of religiously unaffiliated people is expected to *decline*, by 359 million. This region also is projected to see a large decline in the percentage of its population that is unaffiliated. About a quarter of all people living in the region are projected to be "nones" by 2070, down from a third in 2020. "Nones" in Asia and the Pacific have exceptionally low fertility rates, especially compared with Muslims, who are expected to surpass unaffiliated people as the largest religious group in the region by 2040.

The Middle East and North Africa is the only other region that is expected to see the portion of its population that is unaffiliated shrink, from 0.4% to 0.3%.

Religious 'nones' are projected to decline as a percentage of the population in the Asia-Pacific region

	Religiously unaffiliated population in each region in …				Unaffiliated share of region's population in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Sub-Saharan Africa	29,140,000	84,040,000	**+54,900,000**	+188.4%	2.6%	3.1%
Latin America-Caribbean	77,150,000	131,810,000	**+54,660,000**	+70.8	11.9	18.9
North America	114,130,000	167,440,000	**+53,310,000**	+46.7	30.2	41.2
Europe	190,320,000	204,670,000	**+14,350,000**	+7.5	25.3	32.6
Middle East-North Africa	1,860,000	2,460,000	**+600,000**	+32.2	0.4	0.3
Asia-Pacific	1,492,750,000	1,133,760,000	**-359,000,000**	-24.0	32.8	23.1
World	**1,905,360,000**	**1,724,180,000**	**-181,180,000**	**-9.5**	**24.2**	**17.0**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Which countries will have the most religious 'nones'?

China currently has by far the largest population of religiously unaffiliated people, with 1.3 billion "nones" as of 2020. The United States (101 million), Japan (73 million), Vietnam (66 million) and Germany (30 million) round out the top five.

If current demographic trends continue, China will retain its first-place rank in 2070, though it will hold a smaller portion of the world's unaffiliated population: 53%, down from 67% in 2020. The three other Asian-Pacific countries on the list of 10 countries with the largest unaffiliated populations (Japan, Vietnam and South Korea) are projected to remain in the top 10, but Japan and Vietnam are expected to swap places in the rankings.

By our projections, the U.S. will still have the second-largest population of "nones" in 2070. The country's unaffiliated population is expected to grow significantly, by 50 million, over the projection period.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is projected to rise from ninth to sixth place, and Russia is expected to drop out of the top 10. Mexico will join the list, ranking as the country with the eighth-largest unaffiliated population in 2070.

Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their unaffiliated populations.

The 10 countries with the largest unaffiliated populations in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	Religiously unaffiliated population in 2020	% of global unaffiliated population in 2020		Religiously unaffiliated population in 2070	% of global unaffiliated population in 2070
1. China	1,278,120,000	67.1%	1. China	917,240,000	53.2%
2. United States	100,910,000	5.3	2. United States	150,490,000	8.7
3. Japan	72,570,000	3.8	3. Vietnam	76,990,000	4.5
4. Vietnam	66,370,000	3.5	4. Japan	59,110,000	3.4
5. Germany	30,230,000	1.6	5. Brazil	37,780,000	2.2
6. Russia	29,560,000	1.6	6. United Kingdom	37,610,000	2.2
7. Brazil	28,110,000	1.5	7. France	36,810,000	2.1
8. France	28,110,000	1.5	8. Mexico	34,600,000	2.0
9. United Kingdom	27,090,000	1.4	9. Germany	31,240,000	1.8
10. South Korea	25,030,000	1.3	10. South Korea	21,610,000	1.3
Subtotal for 10 countries	**1,686,110,000**	**88.5**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**1,403,470,000**	**81.4**
Subtotal for rest of world	**219,250,000**	**11.5**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**320,710,000**	**18.6**
World	**1,905,360,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**1,724,180,000**	**100.0**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Where will the religiously unaffiliated share of the population change the most?

In 40 countries and territories around the world, the share of people who are unaffiliated is expected to change substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) by 2070. In nearly all these places, the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to grow, ranging from a 5-point increase in Venezuela to a 19-point increase in Spain.

Only three countries will see substantial *decreases*: Albania, Russia and Belarus. In these three former Soviet bloc countries, the decline in the unaffiliated share of the population is partially driven by religious switching, mostly from the unaffiliated category into Christianity.

Most countries where a rising percentage of the population is religiously unaffiliated are in Europe (19) or Latin America and the Caribbean (11). The two North American countries, the U.S. and Canada, also are projected to see substantial increases in the share of their inhabitants who are unaffiliated (up 12 percentage points in the U.S. and 6 points in Canada).

The unaffiliated share of the population is expected to change substantially in 40 countries and territories by 2070

Countries and territories where the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Unaffiliated share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Spain	26.4%	45.1%	+18.8
Chile	30.3	45.7	+15.4
Colombia	9.9	24.0	+14.1
Malta	5.2	19.0	+13.8
United Kingdom	40.2	52.3	+12.1
Mexico	10.6	22.7	+12.1
Japan	57.5	69.2	+11.7
South Korea	48.3	59.9	+11.7
United States	29.7	41.3	+11.6
Denmark	16.6	27.7	+11.1
Iceland	19.8	30.6	+10.8
France	42.6	53.2	+10.6
Argentina	9.2	19.6	+10.4
Italy	13.3	23.5	+10.3
Finland	25.0	34.8	+9.7
Dominican Republic	19.6	28.6	+9.0
Slovenia	32.3	41.1	+8.9
Madagascar	22.3	30.8	+8.6
Nicaragua	13.3	21.0	+7.7
Norway	22.5	30.0	+7.5
Switzerland	30.8	38.2	+7.5
Peru	5.1	12.5	+7.4
Martinique	2.7%	10.0%	+7.2
Netherlands	54.1	61.1	+7.0
Greece	4.7	11.7	+7.0
Uruguay	52.4	59.2	+6.8
Portugal	13.8	20.3	+6.5
Sweden	28.9	35.2	+6.3
Vietnam	67.7	74.0	+6.3
Slovakia	25.3	31.5	+6.2
Austria	22.4	28.5	+6.1
Taiwan	23.1	29.1	+6.0
Luxembourg	25.3	31.3	+6.0
Lithuania	7.1	13.0	+5.9
Canada	34.6	40.5	+5.9
Brazil	13.5	18.6	+5.2
Venezuela	9.7	14.8	+5.1
Belarus	13.8	8.7	-5.1
Russia	20.2	13.8	-6.4
Albania	7.7	1.1	-6.5

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Countries where religious 'nones' will become the majority

Religiously unaffiliated people are projected to grow into a majority in three countries:

- **South Korea,** where 60% of people are projected to identify with no religion in 2070
- **France,** where 53% of the population will be unaffiliated
- **The U.K.,** where "nones" are expected to make up 52% of the population by the end of the projection period

Ten other countries and territories had unaffiliated majorities in 2020 and are expected to remain majority-unaffiliated in 2070.

Most of these countries have small or midsize populations, but the list also includes the highly populous countries of China, Vietnam and Japan.

Countries projected to have a religiously unaffiliated majority in 2070

% of each country's population that was/will be religiously unaffiliated in …

	2020	2070
China	89.6%	91.3%
Czech Republic	72.8	77.1
Hong Kong	71.4	74.6
Vietnam	67.7	74.0
North Korea	72.9	72.8
Japan	57.5	69.2
Macao	67.6	66.5
Netherlands	54.1	61.1
South Korea	48.3	59.9
Uruguay	52.4	59.2
France	42.6	53.2
United Kingdom	40.2	52.3
New Zealand	51.4	51.6

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Key factors driving change in the religiously unaffiliated population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

The global unaffiliated population is projected to decline between 2020 and 2070, largely because of a drop in the overall population of East Asia (including China and Japan, where deaths outnumber births).

The unaffiliated population is projected to grow in every other region. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the number of "nones" is expected to rise by nearly 51 million through natural increase (i.e., births exceeding deaths) and by an additional 5 million through religious switching (in this case, disaffiliation from religion altogether).

Estimated change in global religiously unaffiliated population due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Sub-Saharan Africa	+50,750,000	+5,390,000*	-1,240,000	**+54,900,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	+24,830,000	+34,670,000	-4,840,000	**+54,660,000**
North America	+20,680,000	+25,940,000	+6,690,000	**+53,310,000**
Europe	-24,010,000	+33,710,000	+4,640,000	**+14,350,000**
Middle East-North Africa	+890,000	+10,000*	-300,000	**+600,000**
Asia-Pacific	-371,800,000	+17,750,000	-4,950,000	**-359,000,000**
World	**-298,650,000**	**+117,470,000**	**–**	**-181,180,000**

* For the religiously unaffiliated category, religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who join a religion from the number of people who become religiously unaffiliated. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated for these regions. Only switching *into* the unaffiliated category is modeled in countries where people with no religion make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths only.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Natural population change

The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.

Globally, unaffiliated people tend to be older than people who self-identify with a religion. As of 2020, about four-in-ten "nones" (39%) are under 30, compared with 52% of religiously affiliated people.


The age profile (or "age structure") of religious "nones" varies somewhat around the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, the median age of unaffiliated people as of 2020 is 19 – younger than "nones" in other regions. European "nones" (with a median age of 39) are older than "nones" living elsewhere.

Within most regions, "nones" tend to be *younger* than religiously affiliated people. In North America, for example, the median age of unaffiliated (31) and affiliated people (43) differs by more than a decade. The Asia-Pacific region is an exception: "Nones" have a higher median age than people who affiliate with a religion in that region (38 vs. 29).

Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how the age structure of the religiously unaffiliated population is projected to change over time.

Age structure among the religiously unaffiliated and affiliated, 2020

% who are ages ...



Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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How the age structure of religious 'nones' and affiliated people varies regionally

Median age in each region, as of 2020

	Unaffiliated	Affiliated
Europe	39	44
Asia-Pacific	38	29
North America	31	43
Latin America-Caribbean	28	31
Sub-Saharan Africa	19	19
World	**37**	**28**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Middle East-North Africa region is not shown due to insufficient data for religiously unaffiliated people.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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The global population of "nones" also has a low total fertility rate at 1.3 children per woman, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

This is significantly lower than the rate among all religiously affiliated people worldwide (2.5) and below the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[43]

Religiously unaffiliated people's total fertility rate by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Unaffiliated	Affiliated	All
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.9	4.4	4.4
Latin America-Caribbean	1.7	1.8	1.8
North America	1.5	1.7	1.6
Europe	1.3	1.5	1.4
Asia-Pacific	1.1	2.1	1.9
World	**1.3**	**2.5**	**2.3**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Middle East-North Africa region is not shown due to insufficient data for religiously unaffiliated people.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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
"Nones" in sub-Saharan Africa stand out for having a high fertility rate, averaging 4.9 children per woman. Fertility rates are particularly high among unaffiliated people in the sub-Saharan African countries of Mali (7.0), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (6.8), Chad (6.4) and Burundi (6.2).[44]

The unaffiliated population's fertility rate is below 2.1 children per woman in all other regions, as well as in 61 of the 95 countries and territories for which reliable fertility data is available for "nones." This includes eight places with fertility rates considered to be ultralow, or below one child per religiously unaffiliated woman: Croatia, Malta, Taiwan, Ukraine, Italy, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore.

[43] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.
[44] In many countries – especially in North America and Europe – religiously unaffiliated people tend to be younger and have lower fertility rates than people who affiliate with a religion. However, this pattern does not appear to hold in sub-Saharan Africa, where religiously unaffiliated people have fertility rates similar to, or even higher than, religiously affiliated people. Some scholars suggest that people living in this region who report having no religion may, in fact, adhere to traditional or tribal belief systems and be deeply religious. Our main sources for estimating fertility in sub-Saharan Africa are surveys by the Demographic and Health Surveys project. People answering these surveys typically can choose from religion options including Christian, Muslim and no religion. Additionally, these surveys usually include one response option labeled "traditional religion," "animism" or "traditional/animist." It is unclear how many people who follow traditional or tribal belief systems in the region nonetheless answer "no religion" in surveys and thus are included in the unaffiliated category.

Religiously unaffiliated people's total fertility rate by country

Number of children per religiously unaffiliated woman



Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for religiously unaffiliated fertility rates based on census and survey data available in 95 countries and territories, which are home to 98% of all the world's "nones" as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for details on how fertility rates are calculated.
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Religious switching

Religiously unaffiliated people have a relatively high retention rate, globally. Based on recent surveys, we estimate that 92% of people who were raised with no religion are still unaffiliated as adults. (Muslims and Hindus are the only major religious groups with higher retention rates, at 99% each.) Worldwide, we estimate that about 8% of people who were raised as "nones" now affiliate with a religious group as adults.[45]

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

In the coming decades, "nones" living in the Latin America-Caribbean region, Europe and North America are projected to experience especially large gains from religious switching. If current trends continue, then between 2020 and 2070, more people in Latin America and the Caribbean will disaffiliate from religion (61 million) than join a religion after being raised as "nones" (27 million).

[45] Retention and switching rates are based primarily on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 in 112 countries and territories. For places where reliable data on religious switching is not available for a religious group, we assume no switching out of that religious group. Refer to the methodology to learn how we model future religious switching.

One way to illustrate the relative impact of religious switching in population projections is to compare the main projection scenario, which models religious switching, with a hypothetical scenario in which there is no switching.[46]

For instance, in the main projection scenario – which assumes that switching into the unaffiliated category (in other words, disaffiliating from religion) will continue at the same rate observed in 2020 – "nones" are expected to make up 41% of North America's population in 2070. If there were no more religious switching after 2020, "nones" would make up a much smaller share of the North American population in 2070 (31%).

'Nones' would make up a smaller share of the population in several regions in 2070 without switching than with it

% of each region's population that was/will be religiously unaffiliated in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Middle East-North Africa	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	3.1	2.9	-0.2
Asia-Pacific	32.8	23.1	22.6	-0.5
Latin America-Caribbean	11.9	18.9	12.0	-6.9
Europe	25.3	32.6	25.0	-7.6
North America	30.2	41.2	31.4	-9.8
World	**24.2**	**17.0**	**15.4**	**-1.6**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Unaffiliated populations especially benefit from religious switching in certain countries. For instance, Chile's overall population would have a much smaller proportion of "nones" if there were no more switching: 27% in 2070, rather than the 46% in the main projection scenario. The unaffiliated population in Spain similarly would be smaller in 2070 under the hypothetical "no switching" scenario (28%) than in the main projection scenario (45%).

Our main projection scenario assumes that recently observed switching rates will continue. However, changes in religious switching patterns could be very consequential for the religiously unaffiliated. For example, in most Muslim-majority countries, it is extremely rare for people to publicly report leaving Islam. Doing so can have severe social and legal consequences. But if people were to begin disaffiliating from Islam at a significant rate, religiously unaffiliated populations could decline at a slower rate or even grow.

[46] We acknowledge that this scenario is implausible. There is no realistic possibility that all religious switching will stop. The value of this scenario is that it helps to isolate the effect of switching.

Migration

While migration doesn't have much effect on the size of the *global* unaffiliated population, it does impact regional populations.[47] More than 19 million "nones" are expected to move between regions by 2070. Most of them are forecast to move to North America (9 million) or Europe (7 million).

Asia and the Pacific, meanwhile, is projected to see the largest number of unaffiliated people *leave* the region (7 million).

Projected migration of religiously unaffiliated people by region, 2020-2070

Number of religiously unaffiliated migrants projected to move into, and out of, each region between 2020 and 2070

	Receiving	Sending	NET Migration
North America	8,570,000	1,890,000	**+6,690,000**
Europe	6,830,000	2,190,000	**+4,640,000**
Middle East-North Africa	360,000	660,000	**-300,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	250,000	1,490,000	**-1,240,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	1,290,000	6,130,000	**-4,840,000**
Asia-Pacific	1,720,000	6,670,000	**-4,950,000**
World	**19,030,000**	**19,030,000**	**--**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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[47] Religiously unaffiliated people make up a slightly *higher* percentage of the world's total population in 2070 under the main projection scenario than in the "no migration" scenario. This is because the projection models assume that migrants, who often move from countries with relatively high levels of religious affiliation to countries with lower levels, will gradually adopt the religious norms of the receiving countries and be more likely to disaffiliate. Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

One way to illustrate the impact of migration on unaffiliated populations is to compare the main projection scenario with an alternative scenario that excludes all migration.[48]

In North America and Europe, "nones" would make up a larger percentage of the population in 2070 if there were no migration than they would in the main projection scenario. This is because migrants moving into these two regions are much more likely than the overall population to be religiously affiliated.

Migration is expected to temper the growth of 'nones' in North America and Europe

% of each region's population that was/will be religiously unaffiliated in ...

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
North America	30.2%	41.2%	45.1%	+3.9
Europe	25.3	32.6	34.0	+1.4
Middle East-North Africa	0.4	0.3	0.4	+0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	3.1	3.1	0.0
Latin America-Caribbean	11.9	18.9	18.9	0.0
Asia-Pacific	32.8	23.1	22.8	-0.2
World	**24.2**	**17.0**	**16.8**	**-0.1**

Note: The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[48] We acknowledge that this scenario is implausible. There is no realistic possibility that all international migration will stop. The value of this scenario is that it helps to isolate the effect of migration.

The Future of the Global Hindu Population

In the coming decades, Hindu population growth will lag behind that of other religious groups in India and the world overall


The vast majority of Hindus live in India, which is currently the most populous country in the world. More than 1 billion Hindus lived there in 2020, while 65 million lived elsewhere, primarily in Nepal and Bangladesh. By Pew Research Center's projections, the absolute number of Hindus both in India and around the world will rise in the coming decades. But **Hindus will grow at a slower pace than other religious groups and make up a slightly smaller percentage of the global population.**

If current demographic trends continue, the number of Hindus in India will increase by 176 million between 2020 and 2070.[49] While India's overall fertility rate has fallen rapidly in recent decades, Muslims in India still have more children per woman than Hindus do. Given this fertility gap and Muslims' younger age profile, **Hindus are projected to decline as a portion of the Indian population,** while Muslims are expected to rise.

Despite this change, we project that Hindus will continue to make up more than three-quarters of the country's population.

How India's religious composition will change by 2070

Religious groups as a percentage of India's population in 2020 and 2070



Note: Jews and unaffiliated people make up less than 0.1% of the Indian population and are not shown. "Other religions" includes Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and followers of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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[49] India's 2021 census was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and was still underway when this study was written in 2026. Therefore, to form the 2020 baseline estimates of the country's religious composition, Pew Research Center made a projection from India's last census, conducted in 2011, to the 2020 baseline year.

The number of Hindus around the world is projected to increase by 199 million between 2020 and 2070, reaching a total of nearly 1.4 billion. But the rest of the world's population – i.e., all non-Hindus – will grow at an even faster rate. As a result, Hindus will shrink slightly as a share of the global population, falling from 15% in 2020 to 14% in 2070.

Non-Hindus are projected to grow faster than Hindus both in India and worldwide

Projected change in the number of Hindus and non-Hindus, 2020-2070



Note: Data in the "World" row includes figures for India. Percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Outside of India, much of the growth that is projected to occur among Hindus will come from Pakistan (+5 million) and the United States (+4 million). Pakistan's Hindu population is expected to grow quickly through natural increase (in other words, births outnumbering deaths). The U.S., meanwhile, is projected to see its Hindu population grow primarily through immigration.

Projected change in countries with the largest Hindu populations in 2020

Number of Hindus living in each country in ... (in millions)

	2020	2070	% change
U.S.	3.0M	7.4M	+145.1%
Pakistan	5.0	10.3	+104.6
U.K.	1.1	1.9	+63.5
UAE	1.1	1.6	+48.5
Malaysia	2.1	2.8	+37.1
Bangladesh	13.1	16.1	+22.7
India	1,113.2	1,289.0	+15.8
Nepal	23.5	26.5	+12.5
Sri Lanka	3.3	3.3	+0.4
Indonesia	4.4	4.3	-0.6

Note: Percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Our demographic projections point to several additional changes in the global Hindu population in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- The United States will have the world's fifth-largest number of Hindus.
- Nepal and India will remain the only two countries with a Hindu majority.
- The portion of the population in Suriname, Fiji and Mauritius that is Hindu will decline by 5 percentage points or more.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for Hindus:

- What portion of each region's population will be Hindu?
- Which countries will have the most Hindus?
- Where will the Hindu share of the population change the most?
- Key factors driving change in the Hindu population

What portion of each region's population will be Hindu?

The percentage of each region's population that is Hindu is expected to change modestly in the coming decades. In Asia and the Pacific – where 99% of all Hindus live – the Hindu population is expected to grow by 191 million. By the Center's projections, Hindus will make up 28% of the Asia-Pacific population in 2070, up from 26% in 2020.

In North America, Hindus are projected to more than double in number, from 4 million to 9 million. As a result, they will make up a slightly larger share of the North American population in 2070 (2%) than in 2020 (1%).

Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are the only regions where Hindus are projected to *decrease* in absolute number. If current trends continue, in these two regions, Hindus will make up less than 0.1% of the overall population in 2070.

About 3 in 10 people in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to be Hindu in 2070

	Hindu population in each region in ...				Hindu share of region's population in ...	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Asia-Pacific	1,166,710,000	1,357,880,000	**+191,170,000**	+16.4%	25.7%	27.6%
North America	3,620,000	8,920,000	**+5,300,000**	+146.5	1.0	2.2
Europe	2,150,000	3,850,000	**+1,690,000**	+78.6	0.3	0.6
Middle East-North Africa	3,220,000	4,880,000	**+1,660,000**	+51.5	0.7	0.6
Latin America-Caribbean	700,000	580,000	**-110,000**	-16.4	0.1	<0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,460,000	1,060,000	**-400,000**	-27.5	0.1	<0.1
World	**1,177,860,000**	**1,377,160,000**	**+199,300,000**	**+16.9**	**14.9**	**13.6**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Which countries will have the most Hindus?

India is home to the vast majority of the world's Hindus, with 1.1 billion (or 95% of the global Hindu population) living there as of 2020. Nepal (24 million), Bangladesh (13 million), Pakistan (5 million) and Indonesia (4 million) round out the top five countries with the largest Hindu populations.

The rankings are expected to shift in a few ways between 2020 and 2070:

- The U.S. will grow to have the fifth-largest Hindu population.
- Australia will join the top 10 list, ranking ninth with about 3 million Hindus.
- The United Arab Emirates will drop off the list.

Pakistan's Hindu population is projected to double (to 10 million), but it will still rank fourth.

The 10 countries with the largest Hindu populations in 2020 and 2070

	Hindu population in 2020	% of global Hindu population in 2020		Hindu population in 2070	% of global Hindu population in 2070
1. India	1,113,200,000	94.5%	1. India	1,289,000,000	93.6%
2. Nepal	23,520,000	2.0	2. Nepal	26,470,000	1.9
3. Bangladesh	13,140,000	1.1	3. Bangladesh	16,130,000	1.2
4. Pakistan	5,030,000	0.4	4. Pakistan	10,290,000	0.7
5. Indonesia	4,350,000	0.4	5. United States	7,440,000	0.5
6. Sri Lanka	3,280,000	0.3	6. Indonesia	4,330,000	0.3
7. United States	3,040,000	0.3	7. Sri Lanka	3,290,000	0.2
8. Malaysia	2,070,000	0.2	8. Malaysia	2,840,000	0.2
9. United Kingdom	1,140,000	<0.1	9. Australia	2,700,000	0.2
10. United Arab Emirates	1,110,000	<0.1	10. United Kingdom	1,870,000	0.1
Subtotal for 10 countries	**1,169,890,000**	**99.3**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**1,364,360,000**	**99.1**
Subtotal for rest of world	**7,970,000**	**0.7**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**12,810,000**	**0.9**
World	**1,177,860,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**1,377,160,000**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their Hindu populations.

Where will the Hindu share of the population change the most?

Between 2020 and 2070, the share of the population that is Hindu is expected to decline substantially (by 5 percentage points or more) in three countries: Mauritius, Fiji and Suriname.

In Mauritius and Suriname, Hindus are older, on average, and have lower fertility rates than non-Hindus, causing them to decline as a share of the population.

For example, Hindus in Suriname have a much lower total fertility rate than the Christian majority there (1.4 children per woman vs. 2.6 in 2020-2025). This is an important reason why Hindus are projected to decline from 22% of the country's population in 2020 to 15% in 2070, while Christians are projected to increase from 53% to 66%.

Countries projected to see substantial change in their Hindu share by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Hindu is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Hindu share of country's population in ...		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Suriname	22.5%	15.2%	-7.3
Fiji	24.1	19.0	-5.1
Mauritius	48.3	43.3	-5.0

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Key factors driving change in the Hindu population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

If current trends continue, the world will gain more than 200 million Hindus via natural increase (i.e., the number of births exceeding the number of deaths) over the projection period. Nearly all this growth is projected to occur in Asia and the Pacific.

Estimated change in global Hindu population due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Asia-Pacific	+200,270,000	-830,000	-8,280,000	**+191,170,000**
North America	+760,000	-360,000	+4,900,000	**+5,300,000**
Europe	-50,000	+80,000*	+1,660,000	**+1,690,000**
Middle East-North Africa	-180,000	0*	+1,840,000	**+1,660,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	-110,000	+30,000*	-30,000	**-110,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	-350,000	+40,000*	-80,000	**-400,000**
World	**+200,340,000**	**-1,040,000**	**–**	**+199,300,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated for these regions. Only switching *into* Hinduism is modeled in countries where Hindus make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Religious switching will have little impact on the global Hindu population, in part because Hindus have a very high retention rate. Based on recent surveys, we estimate that 99% of people who were raised Hindu still identify with Hinduism as adults. That compares with 85% among Christians and 83% among Buddhists.[50] (Globally, Muslims have a retention rate on par with Hindus, at 99%.)

[50] Retention and switching rates are based primarily on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 in 112 countries and territories. For places where reliable data on religious switching is not available for a religious group, we assume no switching out of that religious group. Refer to the methodology to learn how we model future religious switching.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Overall, the global Hindu population is expected to shrink by 1 million people through religious switching between 2020 and 2070, with losses primarily concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region.

Migration

Migration is expected to play a large role in Hindu population growth in North America, the Middle East-North Africa region, and Europe. These three regions are projected to collectively gain over 8 million Hindus via migration by 2070. Asia and the Pacific, meanwhile, is projected to see the largest losses through migration.[51] (Even so, the Asia-Pacific region is projected to gain far more Hindus through natural increase than it will lose via emigration.)

Projected Hindu migration by region, 2020-2070

Number of Hindu migrants projected to move into, and out of, each region between 2020 and 2070

	Receiving	Sending	NET Migration
North America	4,980,000	80,000	**+4,900,000**
Middle East-North Africa	4,900,000	3,070,000	**+1,840,000**
Europe	1,720,000	60,000	**+1,660,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	70,000	100,000	**-30,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	50,000	130,000	**-80,000**
Asia-Pacific	3,060,000	11,350,000	**-8,280,000**
World	**14,780,000**	**14,780,000**	**--**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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[51] Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

Natural population change

The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.


Globally, Hindus have a slightly younger age profile (or "age structure") than the rest of the world's population. As of 2020, 52% of Hindus are under 30, compared with 49% of all non-Hindus.

The age profile of Hindus varies somewhat around the world. For example, the median age of Hindus in Asia and the Pacific is 29, compared with 36 in Europe.

Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how the age structure of Hindus is projected to change over time.

Age structure of Hindus and non-Hindus, 2020

% who are ages ...



Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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The global Hindu population has a total fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

This is lower than the rate of non-Hindus worldwide (2.3) and below the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[52]

Hindus' total fertility rates by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Hindus	Non-Hindus	All
Asia-Pacific	1.9	1.8	1.9
Latin America-Caribbean	1.5	1.8	1.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.5	4.4	4.4
Europe	1.3	1.4	1.4
North America	1.2	1.6	1.6
World	**1.9**	**2.3**	**2.3**

Note: Middle East-North Africa region is not shown due to insufficient data for Hindus.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
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
[52] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-

Hindu fertility is below 2.1 children per woman in all regions where Hindu fertility data is available; the rate is particularly low in North America (1.2).

Hindu fertility rates are relatively higher in the Asian countries of Nepal (2.0), India (1.9) and Bangladesh (1.9), which all have large Hindu populations. Fertility rates in India have declined rapidly in recent decades, including for Hindus, whose rate was as high as 3.3 children per woman just three decades ago.

Hindus' total fertility rate by country

Number of children per Hindu woman



Source: Pew Research Center estimates for Hindu fertility rates based on census and survey data available in 19 countries and territories, which are home to 99% of all the world's Hindus as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for details on how fertility rates are calculated.
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level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

The Future of the Global Buddhist Population

The number of Buddhists worldwide is expected to continue shrinking through 2070


The global Buddhist population is on a downward trajectory. Between 2010 and 2020, the number of Buddhists around the world dropped by roughly 19 million. **By Pew Research Center's projections, the Buddhist population is expected to continue shrinking steadily through 2070.**

If current demographic trends continue, Buddhists will decline by an additional 74 million people, from 324 million in 2020 to 250 million in 2070. By the end of that period, they will make up 2.5% of the world's total population, down from 4.1% in 2020.

Most of the contraction is expected to occur in Asia and the Pacific, where 98% of all Buddhists lived in 2020. The number of Buddhists in the Asia-Pacific region is projected to decrease by 76 million due to a combination of religious disaffiliation and the older age profile and low fertility of Buddhists living there.

Buddhists are expected to decrease in many Asia-Pacific countries, often reflecting overall population decline

Projected % change in the number of Buddhists vs. the overall population between 2020 and 2070



Note: Myanmar is also called Burma.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Buddhists also are expected to decline as a proportion of the region's overall population, from 7% to 5%.

Three East Asian countries, in particular, are expected to drive the decline in the global Buddhist population: Japan, China and South Korea. The overall populations of these countries are shrinking, and Buddhists are expected to decline at an even faster pace.

This pattern also holds for Thailand, which has more Buddhists than any other nation but is expected to have 14 million fewer Buddhists in 2070 than it did in 2020. Buddhist populations in other major geographic regions are projected to change little, or even to grow somewhat, but not enough to offset the declines in Asia and the Pacific.

Challenges of measuring Buddhist identity

The 2020 estimates for Buddhists in this analysis are based primarily on censuses and surveys that ask about religious identity, typically with the question "What is your religion, if any?" In several East Asian places, common translations of "religion" often refer to organized, hierarchical forms of religion, such as Christianity.

Yet many people who do not affiliate with Buddhism still engage in Buddhist beliefs or practices. In places such as China, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam, Buddhism tends to be deeply embedded with local folk religions, and the lines between Buddhism and other religious traditions are blurry – both to practitioners of these traditions and to scholars who study them.

For more on the characteristics of self-identified Buddhists, read our reports "Measuring Religion in China" and "Religion and Spirituality in East Asian Societies."

Our demographic projections point to several other changes in the Buddhist population in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- Buddhists will remain the world's fifth-largest religious group (out of the seven religious categories this study analyzes).
- The number of Buddhists living in China, Japan and South Korea will drop by more than half.
- Buddhists will no longer make up a majority of the population in Mongolia or Laos.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends

continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for Buddhists:

- Which regions of the world will have the most Buddhists?
- Which countries will have the most Buddhists?
- Where will the Buddhist share of the population change the most?
- Countries where Buddhism will no longer be the majority religion
- Key factors driving change in the Buddhist population


Which regions of the world will have the most Buddhists?

As of 2020, the vast majority of the world's Buddhists live in the Asia-Pacific region. This will still be the case in 2070, when 96% of all Buddhists are projected to live in Asia and the Pacific.

The small share of the global Buddhist population living in other regions is expected to change modestly by 2070. For example, Europe is expected to hold 2% of the world's Buddhists in 2070, compared with 1% in 2020.

Majority of world's Buddhists are projected to continue living in the Asia-Pacific region

% of the global Buddhist population living in each region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Projected change in the Buddhist population within regions

Another way to analyze change is to look at populations *within* regions. Between 2020 and 2070, the share of the population in the Asia-Pacific region that is Buddhist is projected to decline from 7% to 5%. The absolute number of Buddhists there is expected to decrease by 76 million.

Buddhists also are projected to decline slightly as a share of the population in North America, where the group is relatively old and has a low fertility rate. If current trends continue, Buddhists will make up 1.1% of the North American population in 2070, a slight decline from 1.3% in 2020. The number of Buddhists in that region is projected to decrease by 380,000.

Meanwhile, the European Buddhist population is projected to *grow* in number by 2 million, largely through immigration. As a result, Buddhists will make up a slightly larger portion of the region's population in 2070 (0.7%) than they did in 2020 (0.3%).

Percentage of the population that is Buddhist is not expected to change very much in any region by 2070

Buddhist population in each region in …					Buddhist share of region's population in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Europe	2,540,000	4,340,000	**+1,800,000**	+70.8%	0.3%	0.7%
Latin America-Caribbean	330,000	530,000	**+210,000**	+62.9	<0.1	<0.1
Middle East-North Africa	90,000	160,000	**+70,000**	+80.5	<0.1	<0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	70,000	140,000	**+70,000**	+97.5	<0.1	<0.1
North America	5,050,000	4,670,000	**-380,000**	-7.5	1.3	1.1
Asia-Pacific	316,110,000	240,250,000	**-75,870,000**	-24.0	7.0	4.9
World	**324,190,000**	**250,090,000**	**-74,100,000**	**-22.9**	**4.1**	**2.5**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Which countries will have the most Buddhists?

As of 2020, Thailand has the world's largest Buddhist population, with 68 million people. China (53 million); Myanmar, also known as Burma (47 million); Japan (47 million); and Vietnam (23 million) round out the top five. These five countries collectively hold 73% of the world's Buddhists.

The number of Buddhists in Thailand is projected to decline to 53 million by 2070, but the country still is expected to have the world's largest Buddhist population. If current demographic trends continue, China's Buddhist population will shrink by roughly half, from 53 million in 2020 to 26 million by 2070. China is projected to fall to third place in the rankings as a result.

Laos will rise to rank ninth with 5 million Buddhists, while Malaysia will fall off the list of places with the 10 largest Buddhist populations.

The 10 countries with the largest Buddhist populations in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	Buddhist population in 2020	% of global Buddhist population in 2020		Buddhist population in 2070	% of global Buddhist population in 2070
1. Thailand	67,620,000	20.9%	1. Thailand	53,360,000	21.3%
2. China	53,380,000	16.5	2. Myanmar	46,570,000	18.6
3. Myanmar	47,210,000	14.6	3. China	25,860,000	10.3
4. Japan	46,990,000	14.5	4. Cambodia	23,030,000	9.2
5. Vietnam	22,580,000	7.0	5. Japan	18,980,000	7.6
6. Cambodia	16,240,000	5.0	6. Sri Lanka	16,620,000	6.6
7. Sri Lanka	15,700,000	4.8	7. Vietnam	16,460,000	6.6
8. South Korea	9,850,000	3.0	8. India	9,950,000	4.0
9. India	9,550,000	2.9	9. Laos	5,000,000	2.0
10. Malaysia	6,400,000	2.0	10. South Korea	4,120,000	1.6
Subtotal for 10 countries	**295,530,000**	**91.2**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**219,940,000**	**87.9**
Subtotal for rest of world	**28,660,000**	**8.8**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**30,150,000**	**12.1**
World	**324,190,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**250,090,000**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding. Myanmar is also called Burma.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their Buddhist populations.

Where will the Buddhist share of the population change the most?

In six countries, the portion of the population that is Buddhist is expected to change substantially (i.e., by at least 5 percentage points) by 2070. In all these places, the Buddhist share of the population is projected to decline, ranging from a 15-point drop in Laos to a 7-point decrease in Vietnam.

The portion of Malaysia's population that is Buddhist will shrink from 19% to 10% by 2070. Along the way, the country will fall off the list of the top 10 places with the most Buddhists.

The Buddhist share of the population is projected to change substantially in 6 countries by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Buddhist is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Buddhist share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Laos	64.2%	48.8%	-15.4
Japan	37.2	22.2	-15.0
Malaysia	18.9	9.6	-9.3
Singapore	30.8	22.2	-8.6
South Korea	19.0	11.4	-7.6
Vietnam	23.0	15.8	-7.2

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Countries where Buddhism will no longer be the majority religion

Two countries that had a Buddhist majority in 2020 are projected to see their Buddhist populations drop below 50% by 2070: Mongolia and Laos.

The other five countries that were majority-Buddhist in 2020 are expected to remain so in 2070. In Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar, Buddhists are projected to make up 90% or more of the population. Buddhists in Bhutan and Sri Lanka, meanwhile, will live alongside relatively large Hindu populations in 2070.

Buddhists are not projected to grow into a majority in any additional countries over the projection period.

How countries with a Buddhist majority in 2020 will change by 2070

% of each country's population that was/will be Buddhist in ...

	2020	2070
Cambodia	97.1%	96.7%
Thailand	94.4	90.6
Myanmar	89.1	90.4
Bhutan	74.7	70.6
Sri Lanka	69.6	67.9
Laos	64.2	48.8
Mongolia	51.1	48.9

Note: Myanmar is also called Burma.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Key factors driving change in the Buddhist population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

Buddhists are projected to decrease in number around the world between 2020 and 2070, with both religious switching and natural decrease playing large roles. (Natural decrease occurs when deaths outnumber births in a population.)

Estimated change in global Buddhist population due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Europe	+40,000	+730,000*	+1,030,000	**+1,800,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	-100,000	+230,000*	+70,000	**+210,000**
Middle East-North Africa	+10,000	0*	+60,000	**+70,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	+30,000	+40,000*	-10,000	**+70,000**
North America	-1,470,000	-180,000	+1,270,000	**-380,000**
Asia-Pacific	-66,700,000	-6,740,000	-2,430,000	**-75,870,000**
World	**-68,180,000**	**-5,910,000**	**–**	**-74,100,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated for these regions. Only switching *into* Buddhism is modeled in countries where Buddhists make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Religious switching

Based on recent surveys, we estimate that 83% of all people who were raised Buddhist still identify that way as adults. The only group analyzed in this study that has a lower global retention rate is the "other religions" umbrella category, at 78%. Buddhists' retention rate is similar to the rate for Christians (85%), but lower than the rates of Hindus and Muslims (99% each).

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have switched their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Among people who were raised Buddhist, 17% no longer identify with the religion. This includes 15% who have disaffiliated from religion altogether and 2% who have "switched into" (or joined) another religion.[53] Religious disaffiliation is particularly common among Buddhists in East Asia.

Losses from religious switching will be especially pronounced in Asia and the Pacific, which is projected to see a decrease of nearly 7 million Buddhists through switching over the projection period.

[53] Retention and switching rates are based primarily on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 in 112 countries and territories. For places where reliable data on religious switching is not available for a religious group, we assume no switching out of that religious group. Refer to the methodology to learn how we model future religious switching.

Natural population change

The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.

Globally, Buddhists have a relatively old age profile (or "age structure"). For example, 22% of Buddhists worldwide are ages 60 and older, compared with 13% of non-Buddhists, according to our 2020 demographic estimates. An additional 21% of Buddhists are ages 45 to 59.


The age profile of Buddhists varies little around the world. In most regions where data is available, Buddhists' median age is 40 or older. North American Buddhists are slightly older than Buddhists living elsewhere, with a median age of 43.

Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how the age structure of Buddhists is projected to change over time.

Buddhists also have a low total fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

Age structure of Buddhists and non-Buddhists, 2020

% who are ages ...



Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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How the age profiles of Buddhists and non-Buddhists vary regionally

Median age in each region, as of 2020

	Buddhists	Non-Buddhists
North America	43	38
Latin America-Caribbean	41	31
Europe	40	42
Asia-Pacific	40	31
World	**40**	**30**

Note: Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa region are not shown due to insufficient data for Buddhists.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Buddhists' global fertility rate is lower than the rate for non-Buddhists (2.3) and below the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[54]

Of the 23 countries and territories for which Buddhist fertility data is available, just three have Buddhist fertility rates above 2.1 children per woman: Mongolia (2.7), Cambodia (2.6) and Indonesia (2.3).

Buddhist fertility rates are ultralow (i.e., below one child per woman) in Taiwan (0.9), New Zealand (0.8), South Korea (0.8), Singapore (0.8) and Hong Kong (0.7).

Buddhists' total fertility rates by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Buddhists	Non-Buddhists	All
Asia-Pacific	1.6	1.9	1.9
North America	1.4	1.6	1.6
World	**1.6**	**2.3**	**2.3**


Note: The four other regions analyzed in this study are not shown due to insufficient data for Buddhists.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[54] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Buddhists' total fertility rate by country

Number of children per Buddhist woman



Source: Pew Research Center estimates for Buddhist fertility rates based on census and survey data available in 23 countries and territories, which are home to 84% of all the world's Buddhists as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for details on how fertility rates are calculated. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Migration

While migration doesn't have much effect on the size of the *global* Buddhist population, it does impact regional populations.[55] Nearly 3 million Buddhists are expected to move between regions by 2070.

Projected Buddhist migration by region, 2020-2070

Number of Buddhist migrants projected to move into, and out of, each region between 2020 and 2070

	Receiving	Sending	NET Migration
North America	1,380,000	110,000	**+1,270,000**
Europe	1,100,000	70,000	**+1,030,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	110,000	40,000	**+70,000**
Middle East-North Africa	150,000	90,000	**+60,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	10,000	20,000	**-10,000**
Asia-Pacific	180,000	2,610,000	**-2,430,000**
World	**2,930,000**	**2,930,000**	**–**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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North America is expected to experience the largest net increase through migration, with roughly 1.3 million more Buddhists projected to move into the region than to leave between 2020 and 2070. Europe also is set to gain more than 1 million Buddhist immigrants, most of whom are expected to come from China, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

The Asia-Pacific region, meanwhile, is projected to see the largest net loss, with far more Buddhists leaving (2.6 million) than entering (180,000) the region.

[55] Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

The Future of the Global Jewish Population

The world's Jewish population is projected to become increasingly concentrated in Israel

As of 2020, Pew Research Center estimates there were about 15 million Jews by religion around the world, 12.5 million of whom lived in Israel and the United States. **By the Center's projections, Israel alone will hold the majority of the world's Jews within a few decades.**


If recent demographic trends continue, Israel will be home to 62% of the global Jewish population in 2070, up from 46% in 2020. During this 50-year time span, the number of Jews living in Israel is forecast to grow from 6.8 million to 11.1 million, due primarily to what demographers call "natural increase": the number of births exceeding the number of deaths in a population.

Unlike Jews in many other parts of the world, Israeli Jews are relatively young and have a high fertility rate, allowing the population to grow quickly.[56]

The opposite pattern is expected to emerge in the U.S., since Jewish Americans, on average, are much older and have lower fertility. America's Jewish population is projected to decrease by about 1.2 million between 2020 and 2070.

Roughly 6 in 10 Jews worldwide are projected to live in Israel in 2070

% of all the world's Jews living in each place, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on data from censuses and surveys, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and Sergio DellaPergola's annual "World Jewish Population" chapters in the American Jewish Year Book. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[56] While fertility rates for other religious groups in Israel (Muslims, Christians and Druze) have declined in the last 20 years, Jewish fertility rates have risen, according to an analysis by demographer Alex Weinreb at the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. Jewish fertility is highest among Haredi (or "ultra-Orthodox") Jews in Israel.

Because of these divergent trends in the U.S. and Israel, the share of the global Jewish population living in America is projected to shrink, from 39% in 2020 to 26% in 2070.

(Like the other major religious groups analyzed in this study, Jews are defined here *on the basis of religion*, not ethnicity. The Jewish numbers generally do not include people who identify as Jewish for reasons other than religion, such as ethnically, culturally or because of their family background. This definition of Jewishness particularly affects the figures for Jews in the U.S. Read the box below for more details.)

How we measure Jewish identity

For consistency with our 2020 baseline estimates of other religious groups worldwide, we rely wherever possible on censuses and surveys that measure religious affiliation with Judaism (rather than cultural or ethnic identification as Jewish). This is possible for the United States, where 1.7% of adults say they are Jewish when asked about their religion.

According to Pew Research Center's report, "Jewish Americans in 2020," an additional 0.6% of U.S. adults are "Jews of no religion" who describe themselves, when asked about their religion, as atheist, agnostic or "nothing in particular" but who identify as Jewish aside from religion and who have at least one Jewish parent or were raised Jewish. These "Jews of no religion" are not included in the Jewish population figures in this study. Rather, they are counted as religiously unaffiliated.

Our estimate of Israel's Jewish population is based on the Israeli Ministry of Interior's population register of Jews in Israel, which counts a person as Jewish only if they meet *halakhic* (religious) legal criteria: matrilineal Jewish descent or formal conversion recognized by Israel's Chief Rabbinate.

To measure Jewish populations in other countries, we often rely on "core Jewish population" estimates from Professor Sergio DellaPergola, a leading expert on the demography of global Jewry. DellaPergola's estimates are based on Jewish community records and surveys, as well as national census and survey data on religion and ethnicity. They include people who identify as Jewish by religion, as well as people who do not identify with any religion but nonetheless identify otherwise as Jewish.

Outside of Israel and the U.S., the rest of the world's Jewish population also is projected to decline modestly both in absolute number (from 2.3 million to 2.1 million) and in percentage terms (from holding 15% to 12% of all Jews worldwide).

But the growth in Israel will offset all Jewish population losses elsewhere. Globally, the number of Jews is projected to rise from 15 million in 2020 to 18 million in 2070.[57]

At the same time, because the global Jewish population is expected to grow at a slower pace than other religious groups analyzed in this study, Jews will make up a slightly smaller percentage of all the people in the world in 2070 (0.17%) than they did in 2020 (0.19%).

Our demographic projections point to several additional changes in the Jewish population in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- Canada will become the third country where Jews make up more than 1% of the population.
- The portion of the world's Jews living in Europe will decline from 9% to 5%.
- Russia, which currently has the world's seventh-largest Jewish population, will fall out of the top 10 ranking of countries with the most Jews.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for the Jewish population:

- Which regions of the world will have the most Jews?
- Which countries will have the most Jews?
- Key factors driving change in the Jewish population

[57] In a chapter in the 2000 American Jewish Yearbook, Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun and Mark Tolts projected Jewish populations from the year 2000 to 2080. They projected that in a high-fertility scenario, the Jewish population would grow from roughly 13 million in 2000 to nearly 15 million people in 2020. In the same high-fertility scenario, they projected the Jewish population will exceed 21 million people in 2080.


Which regions of the world will have the most Jews?

Most of the world's Jews live in the Middle East-North Africa region and North America – primarily in Israel and the United States. This will still be the case in coming decades, though the Middle East-North Africa region is projected to hold a growing share of the world's Jews (63% in 2070 vs. 46% in 2020).

If current trends continue, North America's share of the global Jewish population will decline from 41% to 28%. Europe also is projected to see its share decline from 9% to 5%, largely driven by natural decrease (i.e., the number of deaths exceeding the number of births in a population).

North America's share of global Jewish population is projected to decline by 2070

% of the global Jewish population living in each region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on data from censuses and surveys, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and Sergio DellaPergola's annual "World Jewish Population" chapters in the American Jewish Year Book. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The percentage of the global Jewish population living in other regions will change little, given that relatively few Jews currently live in these regions.

Projected change in the Jewish population within regions

Another way to analyze change is to look at populations *within* regions. Between 2020 and 2070, no major geographic region is expected to see growth in the percentage of its population that is Jewish.

This is true even in the Middle East-North Africa region, where Jews are forecast to grow in number by about 4 million. They will make up roughly the same share of the Middle East and North Africa's population in 2070 as they did in 2020 because Jews are expected to grow in number more slowly than Muslims (who constitute the vast majority of the region's population).[58]

Meanwhile, the number of Jews of all ages in North America is expected to decline by about 1 million between 2020 and 2070. This change will be entirely driven by decline projected in the United States. If these changes occur as projected, people who identify with Judaism will make up a slightly smaller portion of the total U.S. population in 2070 (1.2%) than they did in 2020 (1.7%).

Jews are not expected to change much as a proportion of the overall population in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Asia-Pacific region, or sub-Saharan Africa in the coming decades.

Jews are expected to decline as a percentage of the total population in North America between 2020 and 2070

Jewish population in each region in …					Jewish share of region's population in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Middle East-North Africa	6,790,000	11,130,000	**+4,340,000**	+64.0%	1.5%	1.4%
Latin America-Caribbean	390,000	420,000	**+30,000**	+7.0	<0.1	<0.1
Asia-Pacific	190,000	200,000	**+10,000**	+7.8	<0.1	<0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	50,000	50,000	**0**	-1.7	<0.1	<0.1
Europe	1,280,000	910,000	**-370,000**	-28.6	0.2	0.1
North America	6,090,000	5,040,000	**-1,050,000**	-17.2	1.6	1.2
World	**14,780,000**	**17,750,000**	**+2,970,000**	**+20.1**	**0.19**	**0.17**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on data from censuses and surveys, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and Sergio DellaPergola's annual "World Jewish Population" chapters in the American Jewish Year Book. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[58] The number of Jews in the Middle East-North Africa region is projected to grow by 64% over this time span, while Muslims are projected to increase in number by 82%.

Which countries will have the most Jews?

Israel has the world's largest Jewish population: 6.8 million as of 2020. The United States (5.7 million), France (460,000), Canada (350,000) and the United Kingdom (300,000) round out the top five.[59]

Israel and the U.S. are projected to continue to have the largest Jewish populations in 2070. But several changes are expected to occur between 2020 and 2070, including:

- France will fall from third to fifth place.
- Russia will drop off the list of countries with the 10 largest Jewish populations.
- Mexico will join the top 10.

Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their Jewish populations.

[59] If Jews are undercounted in official country censuses, then Jewish population estimates based on a country's census data will be conservative. Refer to Staetsky, Daniel. 2025. "The strictly Orthodox Jewish population in the United Kingdom: Assessment of the census undercount using an alternative estimation system." Population Studies.

The 10 countries with the largest Jewish populations in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	Jewish population in 2020	% of global Jewish population in 2020		Jewish population in 2070	% of global Jewish population in 2070
1. Israel	6,780,000	45.9%	1. Israel	11,090,000	62.5%
2. United States	5,730,000	38.8	2. United States	4,530,000	25.5
3. France	460,000	3.1	3. Canada	500,000	2.8
4. Canada	350,000	2.4	4. United Kingdom	280,000	1.6
5. United Kingdom	300,000	2.0	5. France	180,000	1.0
6. Argentina	170,000	1.2	6. Australia	140,000	0.8
7. Russia	120,000	0.8	7. Germany	130,000	0.7
8. Germany	120,000	0.8	8. Brazil	130,000	0.7
9. Australia	110,000	0.7	9. Argentina	120,000	0.7
10. Brazil	90,000	0.6	10. Mexico	60,000	0.3
Subtotal for 10 countries	**14,240,000**	**96.3**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**17,160,000**	**96.7**
Subtotal for rest of world	**540,000**	**3.7**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**590,000**	**3.3**
World	**14,780,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**17,750,000**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on data from censuses and surveys, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and Sergio DellaPergola's annual "World Jewish Population" chapters in the American Jewish Year Book. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Key factors driving change in the Jewish population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).[60]

Globally, Jews are projected to grow in number by nearly 3 million people between 2020 and 2070, primarily through natural population increase. Natural increase occurs when births outnumber deaths in a population.

The Middle East-North Africa region is projected to see the largest growth in its Jewish population through natural increase. Over the projection period, the region is expected to gain about 4.2 million Jews this way. Israeli Jews, who are relatively young and have a high fertility rate of 3.0 children per woman (as of 2020-2025), will drive the projected growth.

Estimated change in global Jewish population due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching*	Migration	NET Change
Middle East-North Africa	+4,240,000	-10,000	+110,000	**+4,340,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	+10,000	+130,000	-120,000	**+30,000**
Asia-Pacific	-10,000	+10,000	+10,000	**+10,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	+10,000	0	-10,000	**0**
Europe	-440,000	+150,000	-70,000	**-370,000**
North America	-1,390,000	+270,000	+70,000	**-1,050,000**
World	**+2,420,000**	**+550,000**	**–**	**+2,970,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated for all regions except the Middle East and North Africa. Only switching *into* Judaism is modeled in countries where Jews make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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North America as a whole is expected to see a decline in its Jewish population by way of natural *decrease* (i.e., deaths exceeding births). This change will be driven by the U.S., which has a much

[60] Migration estimates in this report are based on movement from country of birth. By contrast, counts of Israeli emigrants tabulated by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) include many people who were born outside Israel, lived in Israel for a period, and now live outside of Israel once again. There are other differences between our migration estimation methods and those used by CBS. For background, read Staetsky, Daniel. 2025. "Israelis abroad: Transformation of the Jewish Diaspora?" Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

larger Jewish population than Canada (5.7 million Jews vs. 350,000, as of 2020). If current trends continue, the U.S. Jewish population will contract by 1.4 million via natural decrease between 2020 and 2070 because Jewish Americans are relatively old and have a low fertility rate of 1.5 children per woman (as of 2020-2025). While Canadian Jews are projected to modestly *grow* by 60,000 via natural increase, these gains will not be enough to offset losses in the U.S.

Jewish population losses in North America are expected to be slightly tempered, however, by migration into the region. Between 2020 and 2070, North America is projected to gain roughly 70,000 Jews through migration into the region.[61]

Europe is the only region where the Jewish population is expected to contract through *both* migration and natural decrease.

Religious switching also plays a small role in shaping the size of Jewish populations. The global Jewish population is projected to gain roughly 550,000 people through switching between 2020 and 2070, including 270,000 in North America (140,000 in the U.S. and 130,000 in Canada).[62]

[61] While the U.S. is projected to gain roughly 110,000 Jews through migration over this time period, Canada's Jewish population is projected to *shrink* by 30,000 from Jews leaving the country. Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

[62] We do not have reliable data on patterns of Jewish retention in Canada. Therefore, we model that 100% of Canadian Jews retain their religious identity. This may upwardly bias our Canadian Jewish projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

However, in most countries we lack data to model movement out of Judaism. Because Jews make up a tiny share of most countries' populations, we do not have enough survey data in many countries and territories to provide reliable estimates of the percentage of people who have left Judaism since childhood. For this reason, our study may underestimate the number of people who will cease to identify as Jewish by religion in the coming decades.

In Israel, nearly all adults who were raised Jewish continue to identify as Jewish in adulthood; in the U.S., roughly three-quarters do so.[63]

[63] Refer to the methodology to learn how we model religious switching.

Natural population change


The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.

Overall, Jews have an older age profile (or "age structure") than the rest of the global population. Globally, about four-in-ten Jews (42%) are ages 45 and older, as of 2020, compared with about three-in-ten non-Jews. And a smaller proportion of Jews (39%) than non-Jews (49%) are under 30.

However, the age profile of Jews varies around the world. As of 2020, Jews have higher median ages in Europe (53) and North America (44) than do Jews living elsewhere. In all other regions for which data is available, the median age is 40 or younger. Jews living in the Middle East and North Africa are the youngest, with a median age of 31.

Age structure of Jews and non-Jews, 2020

% who are ages ...



Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how the age structure of Jews is projected to change over time.

Globally, Jews have a total fertility rate of 2.3 children per woman, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. This matches the total fertility rate among non-Jews around the world. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

Jews' total fertility rates by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Jews	Non-Jews	All
Middle East-North Africa	3.0	3.0	3.0
North America	1.5	1.6	1.6
World	**2.3**	**2.3**	**2.3**

Note: The four other regions analyzed in this study are not shown due to insufficient data for Jews.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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Jews living in the Middle East-North Africa region have a relatively high fertility rate (3.0). But the fertility rate of Jews in North America (1.5) is well below the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[64]

Of the seven countries for which reliable Jewish fertility data is available, Israel is the only one with a rate above 2.1 children per woman (3.0).[65]

Jews' total fertility rate by country

Number of children per Jewish woman



Source: Pew Research Center estimates for Jewish fertility rates based on census and survey data available in seven countries and territories, which are home to 90% of all the world's Jews as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for details on how fertility rates are calculated.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[64] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.
[65] Fertility is higher among Haredi Jews than other Jews. Daniel Staetsky writes in "A "Demographic Hybrid": Haredi Demography in the Early Twenty-first Century" that "the total fertility rate of Haredim is 6.5 children per woman, on average."

The Future of the Global Population of Other Religions

Followers of other religions are projected to grow more geographically dispersed in the coming decades

Pew Research Center recently made demographic projections for the future of six religious groups: Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and religiously unaffiliated people. Many other religious groups have a large presence in one country or a handful of countries but are not consistently measured in censuses and surveys around the world. Consequently, there is not enough data to project the global growth of each of these religions separately.

Instead, we have made population projections for a catch-all category called "other religions." This group makes up roughly 2% of the global population. It includes people who identify as Baha'i, Daoist (also spelled Taoist), Jain, Rastafarian, Shinto, Sikh, Wiccan, Zoroastrian, or as followers of many other faiths, some of which are commonly described as a folk or traditional religion.

As of 2020, the 172 million people in this diverse category of "other religions" are heavily concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. But **according to the Center's projections, this population will become more geographically widespread in the coming decades.**

Who makes up the global ‘other religions’ population? In 2020 …



Photos, clockwise from top left: People burn paper money to pay tribute to the deceased during the Hungry Ghost Festival in Yichang, China, in 2025. Devotees light candles while paying respect at the Golden Temple on the Sikh festival of Bandi Chhor Divas in Amritsar, India, in 2022. A high priest during the Lughnasadh Wicca ritual at a temple in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2020. Taiwanese pray and burn incense at a Daoist temple in Taipei on Lunar New Year in 2010. (VCG, Narinder Nanu/AFP, Andre Coelho, and Sam Yeh/AFP, all via Getty Images)
Note: Individual religions within the “other religions” category sometimes have a large presence in one or several countries. But since these religions individually tend to be rare in most countries, they are not consistently measured in censuses and surveys globally. Daoism is also spelled Taoism.
Source: Pew Research Center’s 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
“The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070”


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More than six-in-ten followers of other religions live in the Asia-Pacific region as of 2020. By 2070, this share is projected to fall to 47%. Meanwhile, 29% of the global population of other religions is projected to live in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the projection period, up from 16% in 2020.[66] Another 12% are expected to live in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The percentage of all followers of other religions who live in North America and Europe will increase modestly over the projection period, while the small percentage living in the Middle East-North Africa region is expected to remain unchanged.

Followers of other religions will be less geographically concentrated in Asia and the Pacific by 2070

% of the global population of followers of other religions living in each region, 2020-2070



Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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If current trends continue, other religions will have a total of 188 million followers in 2070, up from an estimated 172 million in 2020. However, this group is projected to grow more slowly than the global population. In 2020, followers of other religions made up 2.2% of the global population. In 2070, they are projected to make up 1.9%.

[66] Measuring traditional religion populations in sub-Saharan Africa can be difficult because beliefs and practices associated with African traditional religions are often combined with the monotheistic religions that are common in the region, making it hard to separate Christians and Muslims from people who might otherwise fit in the "other religions" category. Further, there is evidence that some people in sub-Saharan Africa who say in surveys that they have no religion are still deeply religious and follow African traditional religions.

Our demographic projections point to several other changes among followers of other religions in the decades ahead. By 2070, we project …

- Followers of other religions will more than double in absolute number in North America, from 5 million to 12 million.

- The United States will have the world's fourth-largest population of other religions.

- People who belong to other religions will no longer form a majority of the population in Taiwan.

These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Read more about our projections for other religions:

- What portion of each region's population will be followers of other religions?
- Which countries will have the most followers of other religions?
- Where will the "other religions" share of the population change the most?
- Key factors driving change in the "other religions" population

What portion of each region's population will be followers of other religions?

Between 2020 and 2070, there will be fairly modest changes in the share of each major geographic region's population that belongs to other religions.

This is true even in North America, where followers of other religions are forecast to more than double in number, from 5 million to 12 million. This group is projected to make up a larger share of the North American population in 2070 (about 3.0%) than in 2020 (1.4%), but the region is expected to continue to have far more Christians and religiously unaffiliated people than followers of other religions.

Meanwhile, the absolute number of followers of other religions is expected to *decrease* by 25 million in Asia and the Pacific. Their share of the region's population is likewise projected to shrink, falling from about 2.5% in 2020 to 1.8% in 2070.

Other religions are projected to rise as a share of the overall population in North America between 2020 and 2070

	Other religions population in each region in …				Other religions share of region's population in …	
	2020	**2070**	***Diff***	**% change**	**2020**	**2070**
Sub-Saharan Africa	27,730,000	54,430,000	**+26,700,000**	+96.3%	2.5%	2.0%
North America	5,180,000	12,140,000	**+6,950,000**	+134.1	1.4	3.0
Europe	6,020,000	10,080,000	**+4,060,000**	+67.5	0.8	1.6
Latin America-Caribbean	20,000,000	23,140,000	**+3,140,000**	+15.7	3.1	3.3
Middle East-North Africa	700,000	820,000	**+130,000**	+18.1	0.2	0.1
Asia-Pacific	112,540,000	87,580,000	**-24,960,000**	-22.2	2.5	1.8
World	**172,170,000**	**188,190,000**	**+16,020,000**	**+9.3**	**2.2**	**1.9**

Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Which countries will have the most followers of other religions?

China has the largest population of people who follow other religions, most of whom identify with Confucianism, Daoism or folk religions. As of 2020, an estimated 43 million adherents of other religions, or 25% of the global population of other religions, resided in China. India (36 million), Taiwan (12 million), Brazil (12 million) and North Korea (7 million) round out the top five places with the most followers of other religions.

India is projected to surpass China in the rankings by 2070, when it will have 31 million followers of other religions, including many Jains and Sikhs. The United States will rise from having the world's seventh-largest to having the fourth-largest population of people who belong to other religions.

In Taiwan, many people are Daoists or practice traditional folk religions. The overall number of followers of other religions in Taiwan is projected to fall roughly by half, from 12 million to 6 million, over the projection period.[67] As a result, Taiwan will drop from third to sixth on the list of 10 places with the most followers of other religions by 2070.

Meanwhile, Japan is projected to drop off the list by 2070, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo is forecast to join the list.

[67] Taiwan's overall population is projected to shrink significantly over this time span, from 24 million to 16 million. The territory has a very low total fertility rate of 0.9 children per woman (as of 2020-2025) and a high median age of 43 (as of 2020).

The 10 countries with the largest populations that identify with other religions in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	Other religions population in 2020	% of global other religions population in 2020		Other religions population in 2070	% of global other religions population in 2070
1. China	43,140,000	25.1%	1. India	30,500,000	16.2%
2. India	35,700,000	20.7	2. China	24,970,000	13.3
3. Taiwan	12,230,000	7.1	3. Brazil	14,440,000	7.7
4. Brazil	11,910,000	6.9	4. United States	10,230,000	5.4
5. North Korea	6,590,000	3.8	5. South Sudan	6,830,000	3.6
6. South Africa	5,360,000	3.1	6. Taiwan	6,020,000	3.2
7. United States	4,050,000	2.4	7. North Korea	5,980,000	3.2
8. Japan	3,640,000	2.1	8. South Africa	5,460,000	2.9
9. South Sudan	3,510,000	2.0	9. Laos	5,100,000	2.7
10. Laos	2,510,000	1.5	10. Dem. Rep. Congo	5,000,000	2.7
Subtotal for 10 countries	**128,640,000**	**74.7**	**Subtotal for 10 countries**	**114,540,000**	**60.9**
Subtotal for rest of world	**43,530,000**	**25.3**	**Subtotal for rest of world**	**73,650,000**	**39.1**
World	**172,170,000**	**100.0**	**World**	**188,190,000**	**100.0**

Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Refer to our sortable table to see how 201 countries and territories rank in the size of their populations of followers of other religions.

Where the 'other religions' share of the population will change the most

In three countries and territories, the share of the population that is comprised of followers of other religions is expected to change substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) between 2020 and 2070.

In Laos, followers of other religions (including many Tai folk religionists) are projected to *increase* as a proportion of the overall population by 16 percentage points between 2020 and 2070. At the end of that period, they will make up about half of the population in Laos.

If recent trends continue, followers of other religions will *decrease* as a percentage of the total population in Singapore (-6 points) and Taiwan (-13 points). In both places, Daoists are the largest group in the "other religions" category.

Places projected to see substantial change in share of the population who are followers of other religions by 2070

Countries and territories where the percentage of the population that identifies with other religions is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Other religions share of country's population in ...		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Taiwan	51.7%	38.7%	-13.0
Singapore	9.1	3.4	-5.7
Laos	34.2	49.8	+15.6

Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Key factors driving change in the 'other religions' population

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

Globally, followers of other religions are projected to grow in number between 2020 and 2070 through religious switching and natural increase, which occurs when births exceed deaths in a population due to low mortality rates, high fertility rates or both.

Estimated change in global population of followers of other religions due to each factor, 2020-2070

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Sub-Saharan Africa	+31,540,000	-4,570,000	-270,000	**+26,700,000**
North America	+2,310,000	+2,490,000	+2,150,000	**+6,950,000**
Europe	+530,000	+1,740,000*	+1,790,000	**+4,060,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	-560,000	+4,150,000	-450,000	**+3,140,000**
Middle East-North Africa	+150,000	-10,000*	-10,000	**+130,000**
Asia-Pacific	-19,450,000	-2,300,000	-3,210,000	**-24,960,000**
World	**+14,510,000**	**+1,510,000**	**–**	**+16,020,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated, and the losses *underestimated,* for these regions. Only switching *into* the "other religions" category is modeled in countries where followers of other religions make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Religious switching

Globally, other religions have a relatively low retention rate. Based on recent surveys, we estimate that 78% of people who were raised in one of the religious traditions that is included in the "other religions" category still identify with one of these traditions as adults.[68]

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups, or from Jainism to Zoroastrianism, both of which fall under the umbrella category of "other religions").

This rate compares with a retention rate of 83% or higher among all the major religious groups this study analyzes. The 22% of people who were raised in a faith in the "other religions" category, but who no longer identify with one of those religions, have either disaffiliated from religion altogether (12%) or joined Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism or Buddhism (10%).

Three of the six geographic regions included in this study are projected to *gain* more followers of other religions through religious switching between 2020 and 2070. But sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region – where most of the world's followers of other religions live – are projected to *lose* followers of other religions via religious switching.

[68] Retention and switching rates are based primarily on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 in 112 countries and territories. For places where reliable data on religious switching is not available for a religious group, we assume no switching out of that religious group. Because "other religions" is an umbrella category, the retention rate estimated for this group may include people who switched from one religious tradition that falls within the umbrella category of "other religions" into another religious tradition within the same category (for example, from Jainism to a folk religion). Global retention rates for the "other religions" category also vary widely depending on which countries are included in the analysis, as religious groups constituting the "other religions" category differ from one place to another. For instance, in India, most of the adherents of other religions are Sikhs and Jains, and there is little religious switching – roughly nine-in-ten people raised in other religions have remained in their childhood faith – according to our 2021 study on religion in India. On the other hand, in Taiwan, this category includes many Daoists (or Taoists), and about half of Taiwanese people who say they were raised Daoist no longer identify as Daoist, according to our 2023 study "Religion and Spirituality in East Asian Societies." Refer to the methodology to learn how we model future religious switching.


Natural population change

The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else being equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that is older.

Other religions have an older age profile (or "age structure") than the rest of the world's population. As of 2020, 44% of followers of other religions were under 30, compared with 49% of the rest of the global population. And followers of other religions were slightly more likely than other people to be ages 60 and older (15% vs. 13%).

Age structure of followers of other religions and the rest of the world, 2020

% who are ages ...



Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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The age profile of followers of other religions varies considerably around the world. The median age of followers of other religions ranges from 20 in sub-Saharan Africa to 39 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Refer to our accompanying data explorer to see how the age structure of followers of other religions is projected to change over time.

Overall, followers of other religions have a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman, according to our demographic estimates for the 2020-2025 period. (The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025.)

How the age profiles of followers of other religions, and of the rest of the world's population, vary regionally

Median age in each region, as of 2020

	Other religions	Rest of population
Sub-Saharan Africa	20	19
Asia-Pacific	36	32
North America	37	39
Latin America-Caribbean	39	31
World	**34**	**31**

Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Europe and the Middle East-North Africa region are not shown due to insufficient data for followers of other religions.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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This is slightly lower than the fertility rate among the rest of the world's population (2.3) but on par with the replacement level, which is generally estimated at 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[69]

The global fertility rate of followers of other religions is driven up by sub-Saharan Africa (4.4). Fertility rates among followers of other religions in Mali (6.8) and Ethiopia (6.0) are especially high.

But their fertility rates are below replacement level in all other regions where fertility data for other religions is available, including in several countries and territories that have relatively large populations of followers of other religions, such as India (1.8), Brazil (1.3) and Taiwan (0.8).[70]

Followers of other religions' total fertility rates by region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Other religions	Rest of world pop.	All
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.4	4.4	4.4
North America	1.6	1.6	1.6
Asia-Pacific	1.6	1.9	1.9
Latin America-Caribbean	1.6	1.8	1.8
World	**2.1**	**2.3**	**2.3**


Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Europe and the Middle East-North Africa region are not shown due to insufficient data for followers of other religions.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
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[69] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.
[70] In Brazil, the "other religions" category includes followers of Afro-Brazilian religious traditions, such as Candomblé.

Followers of other religions' total fertility rate by country

Number of children per woman in the "other religions" category



Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for fertility rates of people who identify with other religions based on census and survey data available in 43 countries and territories, which are home to 53% of all the world's followers of other religions as of 2020. Refer to the methodology for details on how fertility rates are calculated.
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Migration

While migration does not have much effect on the size of the *global* population of other religions, it can impact regional populations.[71] About 5 million followers of other religions are expected to move between regions by 2070. Most of them are forecast to move to North America (2 million) or Europe (2 million). Within Europe, the U.K. and Italy are expected to gain the most immigrants who identify with other religions.

The Asia-Pacific region, meanwhile, is projected to see the largest number of followers of other religions *leave* the region (3 million). India in particular is expected to lose many followers of other religions through migration.

Projected migration of followers of other religions by region, 2020-2070

Number of migrants who are followers of other religions that are projected to move into, and out of, each region between 2020 and 2070

	Receiving	Sending	NET Migration
North America	2,330,000	170,000	**+2,150,000**
Europe	1,900,000	110,000	**+1,790,000**
Middle East-North Africa	220,000	230,000	**-10,000**
Sub-Saharan Africa	10,000	280,000	**-270,000**
Latin America-Caribbean	150,000	600,000	**-450,000**
Asia-Pacific	220,000	3,430,000	**-3,210,000**
World	**4,820,000**	**4,820,000**	**–**

Note: Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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[71] Migration can sometimes have a small impact on the projected size of religious groups globally. This can be the result of differences in fertility, mortality and switching patterns between sending and destination countries. For example, due to the culture and infrastructure in a destination country, migrants may have fewer children or live longer than people who shared their religion in their sending country. Furthermore, in the destination country, migrants may be more likely to switch to a different religion, or to no religion. Our estimates of current migration flows between origin-destination pairs for 201 countries and territories come from Professor Guy Abel at the University of Hong Kong, a leading global migration expert. Refer to the methodology for more details on our migration input data.

The Future of Religion in the Asia-Pacific Region

By 2040, Muslims will surpass religious 'nones' as the largest religious group in the region

In 2020, the Asia-Pacific region had more people than any other part of the world – about 4.5 billion, more than half of the global population.


The largest religious category in this region is made up of people who don't identify with any religion. Religiously unaffiliated people – sometimes called religious "nones" because they answer questions in censuses and surveys by saying they have no religion – make up about one-third of the Asia-Pacific population.

Religious "nones" across the region are expected to have many more deaths than births in the decades ahead. Consequently, their population will decrease from 1.5 billion to 1.1 billion from 2020 to 2070, according to Pew Research Center's projections.

Most of the world's "nones" live in China, and that country's overall decline in population is a key reason why we project a global decrease in "nones." The number of religiously unaffiliated people in China is expected to decrease from 1.3 billion in 2020 to 900 million in 2070.

In Asia-Pacific region, Muslims are projected to grow faster than other religions between 2020 and 2070

Religious groups as a percentage of the Asia-Pacific region's population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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By 2040, **Muslims** are expected to surpass religiously unaffiliated people to become the largest group in the region. The Muslim population will increase to 1.8 billion in 2070, up about 619 million in 50 years. The region includes countries with four of the five largest Muslim populations in the world: Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh.

Hindus in the Asia-Pacific region will grow steadily to reach a population of nearly 1.4 billion in 2070, up 191 million since 2020. This will make Hinduism the region's second-largest religion, after Islam. The region is home to the world's only Hindu-majority countries, India and Nepal.

Like "nones," **Buddhists** in Asia and the Pacific also are projected to decrease in population, dropping by about 76 million from an estimated 316 million in 2020 to 240 million in 2070. The region's **Christian** population, on the other hand, is expected to rise by 23 million to reach 291 million in 2070, surpassing Buddhists to become the region's fourth-largest religious group.

In 2070, Muslims will be the largest religious group in the Asia-Pacific region, making up 37% of the population, up from 26% in 2020

Population of __ in the Asia-Pacific region in ...					Share of the region's population who are __ in ...	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Muslims	1,187,660,000	1,806,570,000	**+618,910,000**	+52.1%	26.1%	36.7%
Hindus	1,166,710,000	1,357,880,000	**+191,170,000**	+16.4	25.7	27.6
Christians	268,840,000	291,400,000	**+22,560,000**	+8.4	5.9	5.9
Jews	190,000	200,000	**+10,000**	+7.8	<0.1	<0.1
Other religions	112,540,000	87,580,000	**-24,960,000**	-22.2	2.5	1.8
Buddhists	316,110,000	240,250,000	**-75,870,000**	-24.0	7.0	4.9
Religiously unaffiliated	1,492,750,000	1,133,760,000	**-359,000,000**	-24.0	32.8	23.1
All in Asia-Pacific	**4,544,800,000**	**4,917,630,000**	**+372,830,000**	**+8.2**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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These findings are part of a broader Pew Research Center study examining how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

The Asia-Pacific region is the historic birthplace of many religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism and a variety of groups that are in our study's **other religions** category, including Daoism (also spelled Taoism), Shintoism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism and many other faiths, some of which may be described as folk or traditional religions.

Most of the world's Hindus, Buddhists and religious 'nones' live in the Asia-Pacific region

% of global total of ___ who live in the Asia-Pacific region



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The region has remained the center of gravity for these religions' populations throughout their histories, and that will still be the case in 2070, when most Hindus (99%) and Buddhists (96%) and nearly half (47%) of all people around the world who follow other religions will live in Asia and the Pacific.[72]

The region will also remain home to most of the world's religious "nones" (66%) and about half of the world's Muslims, according to the projections.

(The "other religions" category does not include Christians or Jews, who are measured separately. **Jews** make up only a very small fraction of the region's population, and the Jewish population there is not projected to change appreciably between 2020 and 2070.)

The overall population in the Asia-Pacific region is expected to rise 8% between 2020 and 2070.[73] Within the region, some countries' populations are expected to increase because births will exceed

[72] The 50 countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region are: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, East Timor (also called Timor-Leste), Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar (also called Burma), Nepal, New Caledonia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Vietnam.
[73] The region's 8% growth rate is similar to the rate projected for the Latin America-Caribbean region and North America, but lower than what's projected for sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa region. It is higher than the expected population growth rate for Europe.

deaths, while in other countries the opposite pattern (more deaths than births) will lead to shrinking populations.

For example, in East Asian nations such as China, Japan and South Korea, where "nones" are the largest religious group, the total populations are projected to decline by more than a quarter between 2020 and 2070. On the other hand, in Pakistan, Indonesia and India, which have large Muslim populations, the overall populations are expected to increase substantially (especially in Pakistan, whose population is projected to double).

Here are some other key projections:

- In India, Hindus will decline from 79% of the national population to 76%, while the percentage of Indians who are Muslim will rise from 15% to 20%, mostly because Muslims are younger and have more children than Hindus.[74]

- In Australia, religious "nones" will replace Christians as the largest religious group in the country. "Nones" are projected to rise from 42% of the population to 47%, while Christians are expected to decline from 47% to 29%.

- In Laos, people in the "other religions" category will make up about half the population (up from 34%), supplanting Buddhists as the country's largest religious group. Buddhists will drop from 64% to 49% of the population.

Prior research suggests that many people who say in surveys and censuses that they have "no religion" do *not* mean they have no religious or spiritual beliefs and practices. For example, in China, the percentage of people saying they have "no religion" is much higher than the share who reject belief in any gods or say they never engage in spiritual activities. For more about the beliefs and practices of "nones," refer to the chapter on nonreligion in our 2023 report "Measuring Religion in China" and go to our 2024 report "Religion and Spirituality in East Asian Societies" or our 2025 report "Many Religious 'Nones' Around the World Hold Spiritual Beliefs."

[74] In India, as of 2020, the median age of Muslims was 24, compared with 29 for Hindus.

In this study, you can read more about:

- Asia-Pacific countries where religious populations are expected to change the most
- Asia-Pacific countries where the religious majority is expected to change
- Key factors driving religious change in the Asia-Pacific region

Asia-Pacific countries where religious populations are expected to change the most

This section looks at countries in the Asia-Pacific region where various religious groups are projected to rise or fall substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) as a share of the national population between 2020 and 2070.

Changes in Buddhist populations

There are six Asia-Pacific countries (four in Southeast Asia and two in East Asia) where Buddhists are expected to decline substantially as a proportion of the overall population. The Buddhist share of the population is not expected to rise substantially in any Asia-Pacific countries.

The biggest projected decreases are in Laos and Japan, where 15-point drops would bring Buddhists down to 49% and 22% of those countries' total populations, respectively.

6 countries in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to see substantial change in their share who are Buddhist by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Buddhist is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Buddhist share of country's population in …		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Laos	64.2%	48.8%	-15.4
Japan	37.2	22.2	-15.0
Malaysia	18.9	9.6	-9.3
Singapore	30.8	22.2	-8.6
South Korea	19.0	11.4	-7.6
Vietnam	23.0	15.8	-7.2

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in Christian populations

Five countries (three in the South Pacific, one in Central Asia and one in East Asia) will see Christians drop, as a share of the overall population, by at least 5 percentage points between 2020 and 2070.

The biggest decreases will be in Australia (where Christians are projected to make up 29% of the population in 2070, down 18 points from 2020) and New Zealand (where Christians will also be at 29%, down 11 points from 2020). In Australia, Christians were the largest religious group in 2020; if current trends continue, the largest religious category in 2070 will be religious "nones," accounting for 47% of all Australians.

One country is expected to see substantial growth in Christians. In Fiji, Christians are expected to make up 75% of the population in 2070, an increase of 6 points from 2020.

Changes in Muslim populations

In four Asia-Pacific countries, Muslims will rise by at least 5 percentage points as a share of the total population. Two of these countries, Malaysia and Singapore, are in Southeast Asia.

In Singapore, which in 2020 was the most religiously diverse country in the world, the Muslim percentage of the population will rise 9 points by 2070, to 25%. Muslims will then have supplanted Buddhists as the largest religious group in the country, according to the projections.

6 countries in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to see substantial change in their share who are Christian by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Christian is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Christian share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Australia	46.8%	28.8%	-18.0
New Zealand	40.3	29.0	-11.3
Kazakhstan	19.3	11.1	-8.2
South Korea	32.0	26.3	-5.7
New Caledonia	85.1	79.6	-5.5
Fiji	69.5	75.4	+5.9

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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4 countries in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to see substantial change in the share who are Muslim by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Muslim is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Muslim share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Singapore	16.1%	25.4%	+9.3
Kazakhstan	77.9	86.2	+8.3
Malaysia	64.1	72.2	+8.1
Australia	3.5	9.8	+6.3

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In Malaysia and Kazakhstan, which had Muslim majorities in 2020, the increases will raise the share of Muslims in the countries' 2070 populations to 72% and 86%, respectively. In Australia, religious "nones" and Christians will be the largest and second-largest religious groups in 2070; the Muslim share of the population there is forecast to rise to 10% by 2070, a 6-point increase from 2020.

Changes in populations of religious 'nones'

In four Asia-Pacific countries, the percentage of religiously unaffiliated people in the population will grow by at least 5 percentage points. The largest increases will be in South Korea – where "nones" will rise 12 points to 60% of the population by 2070 – and in Japan, where they will rise 12 points to 69% of the population, according to the projections.

In South Korea, the increase in "nones" between 2020 and 2070 will be accompanied by long-term declines in the country's Buddhist and Christian communities. In Vietnam and Japan, the increase in "nones" will occur alongside a decline in the Buddhist share of the population. And in Taiwan, it will happen alongside a declining share of people in the "other religions" category.

4 places in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to see substantial change in religiously unaffiliated share by 2070

Countries and territories where the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Religiously unaffiliated share of country's population in …		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Japan	57.5%	69.2%	+11.7
South Korea	48.3	59.9	+11.7
Vietnam	67.7	74.0	+6.3
Taiwan	23.1	29.1	+6.0

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. The religiously unaffiliated category includes people who do not identify with any religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in populations that follow other religions

Many religious groups cannot be presented separately in this study due to their relatively small size and a shortage of data on them in many national censuses and surveys. In Asia, these groups include Shintoists, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Sikhs, Jains and Zoroastrians, among others.[75]

Because the groups in this category are very diverse, people in this category may not share the same beliefs and practices. Still, combining these groups into the umbrella category of "other religions" allows us to describe overall trends among people who are not Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish or religiously unaffiliated.

3 places in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to see substantial change in share following other religions by 2070

Countries and territories where the percentage of the population that identifies with other religions is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Other religions share of country's population in …		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Taiwan	51.7%	38.7%	-13.0
Singapore	9.1	3.4	-5.7
Laos	34.2	49.8	+15.6

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Zoroastrians and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Three Asia-Pacific countries are expected to see substantial changes in the share of residents who identify with other religions. In Laos, people who follow other religions (including folk religions) will make up about half the population in 2070, 16 percentage points higher than in 2020. In Taiwan, where people in this category (many of whom practice Daoism or Chinese folk religions) made up just over half the population in 2020, they will *decrease* 13 points, to make up 39% of the population in 2070. And in Singapore, followers of other religions (including Daoism) will decrease 6 points and make up 3% of the population.

Refer to our sortable table to see how religious populations in 50 countries in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to change over time.

[75] Some of the religions in the "other religions" category have a large presence in one country or a handful of countries, but because each of these religions is rare in most countries, they are not consistently measured in censuses and surveys around the world.

Changes in Hindu populations

Fiji is the only country in the Asia-Pacific region where the percentage of Hindus in the population will change by at least 5 percentage points. Hindus made up nearly a quarter (24%) of Fiji's population in 2020 but are projected to be 19% in 2070.

Hindu population in Fiji is projected to decline by 2070

	Hindu share of country's population in ...		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Fiji	24.1%	19.0%	-5.1

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Asia-Pacific countries where the religious majority is expected to change

In four Asia-Pacific countries and territories, a religion (or nonreligion) will either lose or gain majority status between 2020 and 2070.

Two countries will no longer have a Buddhist majority. In Laos, where 64% of the population was Buddhist in 2020, just under half (49%) will be Buddhist in 2070. In Mongolia, where 51% of the population was Buddhist in 2020, Buddhists are projected to make up 49% of the population in 2070.

Places in the Asia-Pacific region where the religious majority is projected to change by 2070

	Country	Share in 2020	Share in 2070
Losing Buddhist majority	Mongolia	51.1%	48.9%
	Laos	64.2	48.8
Losing majority followers of other religions	Taiwan	51.7	38.7
Gaining religiously unaffiliated majority	South Korea	48.3	59.9

Note: Percentages shown are for the religious group that made up the majority of each country's population in 2020 or is projected to do so in 2070. Religiously unaffiliated people identify with no religion in censuses and surveys. Followers of other religions include Baha'is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Zoroastrians and members of numerous other faith groups, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In Taiwan, followers of other religions will go from being a majority (52%) in 2020 to a minority (39%) in 2070 – though they will remain the largest religious category in Taiwan.

In South Korea, where just under half the population was religiously unaffiliated in 2020, unaffiliated people are expected to become a majority (60%) by 2070.

Refer to Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world for a global look at countries where the religious majority is expected to change.

Key factors driving religious change in the Asia-Pacific region

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

In the Asia-Pacific region, the main reason Muslims are expected to grow so much faster than other religious groups is "natural increase" (births outnumbering deaths). Natural increase is expected to bolster the Muslim population in Asia and the Pacific by 648 million people between 2020 and 2070.

Two factors will partially offset this increase. Net migration of Muslims away from the Asia-Pacific region – more moving out than moving in – will reduce the Muslim population by a projected 27 million people. Meanwhile, religious switching is expected to reduce the number of Muslims in the region by an additional 2 million.

Considering all these factors together, the overall population of Asia-Pacific Muslims is expected to go up by 619 million, from 1.2 billion to 1.8 billion. That's a rise of 52% between 2020 and 2070.

By 2070, Muslim, Hindu and Christian populations will increase in the Asia-Pacific region due to births far exceeding deaths

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Muslims	+648,320,000	-2,360,000	-27,060,000	**+618,910,000**
Hindus	+200,270,000	-830,000	-8,280,000	**+191,170,000**
Christians	+35,890,000	-5,550,000	-7,780,000	**+22,560,000**
Jews	-10,000	+10,000*	+10,000	**+10,000**
Other religions	-19,450,000	-2,300,000	-3,210,000	**-24,960,000**
Buddhists	-66,700,000	-6,740,000	-2,430,000	**-75,870,000**
Religiously unaffiliated	-371,800,000	+17,750,000	-4,950,000	**-359,000,000**
All in Asia-Pacific	**+426,520,000**	--	**-53,690,000**	**+372,830,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching for Jews may be overestimated. Only switching *into* Judaism is modeled in countries where Jews make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Hindus will have the second-largest growth rate in the region during this period. Most of it will result from natural increase, which is projected to add 200 million people to the Hindu population by 2070. Net migration will cost the Hindu population about 8 million people between 2020 and 2070, while religious switching will reduce it by less than a million. All told, the region's Hindu population is expected to rise to nearly 1.4 billion – an increase of 191 million, or about 16%.

The projected decline in Buddhists and religiously unaffiliated people across the region between 2020 and 2070 will owe largely to these groups' natural *decrease* (which occurs when deaths outnumber births). Natural decrease will account for a decline in the Buddhist population of 67 million by 2070, adding to losses from religious switching (7 million) and migration (2 million) for an overall drop of 76 million.

Natural decrease also will cause the population of religious "nones" in the Asia-Pacific region to drop by 372 million, and net migration will result in an additional reduction of about 5 million "nones." Religious switching – in this case, people across the region leaving their childhood religion to become religiously unaffiliated – will partially offset the losses (+18 million). But when all factors are combined, the population of "nones" in the region is projected to decline by 359 million between 2020 and 2070.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Natural population growth

Fertility

In our projections, we assume that children will inherit their mother's religion. All else being equal, religions in which women have higher total fertility rates will experience more population growth than other religions.

The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. To maintain its size from generation to generation, a population typically needs a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman (the "replacement level") in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children, independent of other factors like migration and religious switching.[76]

In the Asia-Pacific region, Muslims were the only religious group with a total fertility rate above 2.1 children per woman during the 2020-2025 period. Muslims averaged 2.5 children per woman. Total fertility rates are lower among the region's Christians (2.0), Hindus (1.9), Buddhists (1.6) and religiously unaffiliated (1.1).

Total fertility rate by religion in the Asia-Pacific region, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Asia-Pacific	Elsewhere
Muslims	2.5	3.9
Christians	2.0	2.6
Hindus	1.9	1.2
Buddhists	1.6	1.4
Religiously unaffiliated	1.1	1.7
All	**1.9**	**2.8**

Note: Jews and people of other religions are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The fertility rates of Muslims, Christians and religious "nones" in the Asia-Pacific region also are lower than among women in the same religious groups who live elsewhere in the world. However, Hindus and Buddhists across the region have higher average fertility than their counterparts in other parts of the world where we have data on Hindu and Buddhist fertility. The total fertility rate in Asia-Pacific region was 1.9 children per woman, nearly one less than the rate for women elsewhere in the world (2.8).

These fertility rates are estimates for the 2020-2025 period.

[76] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Age patterns

The age structure of each religious group also factors into our projections. Among Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region, the median age is 26, the youngest of any religious group in the region as of 2020.

Meanwhile, the highest median ages are found among Jews (40), Buddhists (40) and religious "nones" (38).

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

Median age by religion in Asia-Pacific region, 2020

	Asia-Pacific	Elsewhere
Muslims	26.0	21.3
Hindus	28.6	32.8
Christians	30.5	30.9
Other religions	36.2	29.3
Religiously unaffiliated	38.1	32.9
Buddhists	39.8	41.5
Jews	40.3	38.2
All	**32.0**	**28.5**

Note: Other religions" is an umbrella category that includes Sikhs, Jains, Baha'is, and Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Brazilian and followers of many other faiths.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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The Future of Religion in Europe

A slim majority of Europeans will be Christian in 2070, while the percentage who are Muslim will double, to 13%


Europe has long had a Christian majority. In 2020, 67% of Europeans were Christians. But if recent demographic trends continue, the Christian proportion of Europe's overall population will shrink to 52% by 2070, due primarily to low fertility rates, high median ages and religious switching (mostly by people leaving Christianity).

Migration is expected to *increase* the number of Christians in Europe, but not by enough to offset the losses of an aging population with a low birth rate.

These projections are part of a broader Pew Research Center study on the future of religion around the world. The study anticipates that Europe's **Christian** population will decrease by more than a third in absolute numbers in coming decades, from 505 million in 2020 to 324 million in 2070.

Christians are projected to decline as a share of Europe's population; religious 'nones' and Muslims will increase

Religious groups as a percentage of Europe's population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In 2070, the second-largest religious category in Europe will continue to be **religiously unaffiliated people,** also called religious "nones." These are people who say they have "no religion" in surveys and censuses, some of whom are atheists and agnostics.

"Nones" are projected to grow from a quarter of Europe's population in 2020 to about a third in 2070, with most of the increase coming from people who were raised as Christians but no longer identify as having any religion.

Meanwhile, **Muslims** are expected to rise from 6% of the European population in 2020 to 13% in 2070. Though outnumbered by religious "nones," Muslims will continue to be the second-largest

category among Europeans *who identify with a religion*, rising from 46 million to 80 million people.

Europe's **Jewish** population is expected to decline in size, while we project some growth in numbers of **Hindus** and **Buddhists,** though each of these groups is expected to remain under 1% of the continent's overall population in 2070.

Over the same period, followers of all **other religions** – an umbrella category that includes Sikhs, Baha'is and followers of many other faiths – are anticipated to grow from 0.8% to 1.6% of Europe's population.

Not all countries will be equally affected by these trends. The religious makeup of some European countries may change relatively little. For example, we project that at least 90% of the population of four countries in Central and Eastern Europe – Moldova, Romania, Croatia and Serbia – will remain Christian from 2020 through 2070.[77]

In 2070, a little over half of Europeans will be Christian, down from 67% in 2020

Population of __ in Europe in …					Share of the region's population who are __ in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Muslims	45,510,000	79,930,000	**+34,430,000**	+75.7%	6.0%	12.7%
Religiously unaffiliated	190,320,000	204,670,000	**+14,350,000**	+7.5	25.3	32.6
Other religions	6,020,000	10,080,000	**+4,060,000**	+67.5	0.8	1.6
Buddhists	2,540,000	4,340,000	**+1,800,000**	+70.8	0.3	0.7
Hindus	2,150,000	3,850,000	**+1,690,000**	+78.6	0.3	0.6
Jews	1,280,000	910,000	**-370,000**	-28.6	0.2	0.1
Christians	505,140,000	323,910,000	**-181,230,000**	-35.9	67.1	51.6
All in Europe	**752,960,000**	**627,690,000**	**-125,270,000**	**-16.6**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[77] The 42 countries and territories in Europe are: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.

The broader Center study examines how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

By 2070, we also project:

- In Europe, Christians will *decline* by at least 5 percentage points as a share of the population in 30 countries, while the Muslim share of the population will *rise* by 5 points or more in 21 countries.

- The religiously unaffiliated share of the population will rise by at least 5 points in 19 European countries.

- Eight European countries will either lose their previous religious majority or have a new one.

Due to lower fertility rates and an older population than other regions, Europe is the only major region in the world that we project will have a smaller total population in 2070 than it did in 2020. We anticipate a 17% drop in Europe's population during this 50-year period, from 753 million in 2020 to 628 million in 2070.

Read more about:

- European countries where religious populations are expected to change the most
- European countries where the religious majority is expected to change
- Key factors driving religious change in Europe

European countries where religious populations are expected to change the most

This section looks at countries in Europe where various religious groups are projected to rise or fall substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) as a share of the overall population between 2020 and 2070.

Changes in Christian populations

There are 30 European countries where we expect the share of **Christians** in the overall population to drop substantially by 2070. In no European country is the percentage of people who are Christians expected to rise by 5 points or more.

The declines will be mostly concentrated in Western European countries. For example, in Spain, the Christian share will drop 28 percentage points to 41%, and in France, it will fall 22 points to 25%, according to the projections.

30 countries in Europe are projected to see substantial change in the Christian share of their population

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Christian is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Christian share of country's population in ...				Christian share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*		2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Spain	69.5%	41.2%	-28.3	Slovenia	65.4%	52.0%	-13.4
Malta	88.6	61.9	-26.7	Netherlands	35.1	21.9	-13.2
U.K.	49.4	25.4	-24.0	Ireland	81.2	68.6	-12.6
Italy	80.5	58.0	-22.5	N. Macedonia	64.7	53.4	-11.3
Sweden	60.8	38.8	-21.9	Luxembourg	65.9	55.7	-10.2
France	46.5	24.7	-21.7	Montenegro	76.0	66.8	-9.3
Denmark	76.9	56.5	-20.4	Bosnia & Herz.	44.7	35.4	-9.3
Belgium	51.0	32.5	-18.4	Albania	17.8	8.5	-9.3
Austria	68.2	51.0	-17.2	Portugal	85.1	76.4	-8.7
Finland	72.3	55.1	-17.2	Slovakia	73.7	66.0	-7.7
Iceland	74.9	58.2	-16.7	Lithuania	92.2	85.7	-6.5
Switzerland	61.6	44.8	-16.7	Czech Rep.	26.4	20.4	-6.1
Norway	71.4	56.2	-15.2	Hungary	72.4	66.5	-5.9
Greece	89.5	74.9	-14.6	Latvia	77.3	71.6	-5.7
Germany	56.2	41.9	-14.3	Estonia	52.6	47.1	-5.5

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The Central and Eastern European countries with large projected declines include Greece, where the Christian share of the population will drop 15 percentage points to 75%, and Austria, where it will drop 17 points to 51%, if recent trends continue.

There are 20 European countries where Christians are expected to decline by at least 10 points as a share of the national population.

Changes in populations of religious 'nones'

In 22 European countries, the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated – which includes atheists, agnostics and other people who say in surveys and censuses that they have "no religion" – is projected to rise (19 countries) or fall (three countries) by at least 5 percentage points. Religiously unaffiliated people are also known as religious "nones."

The three countries where "nones" are expected to grow the most as a share of the overall population are the same countries where the *Christian* share of the population is projected to *decline* the most: Spain, Malta and the United Kingdom.

For example, in the U.K., "nones" are expected to rise by 12 percentage points to 52% of the population, the third-highest increase in any European country. Meanwhile, the *Christian* share of the British population is expected to decline by 24 points to 25%, the third-largest *decrease* in any European country.

22 countries in Europe are projected to see substantial change in the religiously unaffiliated share of population by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Religiously unaffiliated share of country's population in …		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Spain	26.4%	45.1%	+18.8
Malta	5.2	19.0	+13.8
United Kingdom	40.2	52.3	+12.1
Denmark	16.6	27.7	+11.1
Iceland	19.8	30.6	+10.8
France	42.6	53.2	+10.6
Italy	13.3	23.5	+10.3
Finland	25.0	34.8	+9.7
Slovenia	32.3	41.1	+8.9
Norway	22.5	30.0	+7.5
Switzerland	30.8	38.2	+7.5
Netherlands	54.1	61.1	+7.0
Greece	4.7	11.7	+7.0
Portugal	13.8	20.3	+6.5
Sweden	28.9	35.2	+6.3
Slovakia	25.3	31.5	+6.2
Austria	22.4	28.5	+6.1
Luxembourg	25.3	31.3	+6.0
Lithuania	7.1	13.0	+5.9
Belarus	13.8	8.7	-5.1
Russia	20.2	13.8	-6.4
Albania	7.7	1.1	-6.5

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. The religiously unaffiliated population includes people who identify with no religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The three European countries where "nones" are projected to decrease as a share of the population are Albania, Russia and Belarus.

Changes in Muslim populations

In 21 European countries, Muslims are expected to increase as a share of the national population by at least 5 percentage points. And in 13 countries, Muslims are projected to rise from single-digit to double-digit percentages of all inhabitants (i.e., to more than 10%). For example:

- In France, where Muslims made up an estimated 9% of the population in 2020, we project they will make up 20% in 2070.
- In Germany, Muslims are projected to go from 7% of the population to 14% during the same time span.

Muslims are expected to rise by at least 10 percentage points as a share of the population in eight European countries.

Refer to our sortable table to see how religious populations in 42 countries in Europe are projected to change over time.

21 countries in Europe are projected to see substantial change in the Muslim share of their population by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Muslim is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Muslim share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Albania	74.5%	90.3%	+15.8
Sweden	8.1	19.3	+11.2
North Macedonia	34.7	45.8	+11.1
France	9.1	20.0	+10.9
Malta	3.6	14.5	+10.8
Belgium	6.8	17.5	+10.7
Austria	8.3	18.9	+10.6
Italy	4.4	14.5	+10.1
Bosnia & Herz.	53.6	63.4	+9.8
Montenegro	21.3	31.0	+9.7
United Kingdom	6.4	16.0	+9.6
Spain	3.6	12.0	+8.4
Germany	6.5	14.3	+7.8
Netherlands	5.5	12.8	+7.3
Denmark	4.2	10.7	+6.5
Greece	5.1	11.5	+6.4
Switzerland	6.1	12.4	+6.3
Ireland	1.7	7.3	+5.6
Finland	1.6	7.2	+5.6
Luxembourg	1.8	7.4	+5.6
Norway	4.1	9.2	+5.1

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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European countries where the religious majority is expected to change

If recent trends continue, six European countries that had a Christian majority in 2020 will no longer have one by 2070, while religiously unaffiliated people will become a majority in two countries. For example:

- In Germany, the Christian share of the population will decrease from 56% in 2020 to 42% in 2070.
- In Spain, the Christian share will drop from nearly 70% in 2020 to 41% in 2070.
- In Sweden, the Christian share will drop from 61% to 39%.

In these countries, the percentage of religious "nones" generally will rise, but not to a majority level. In Sweden, Germany and Spain, for example, "nones" will reach 35%, 40% and 45% of the country's overall population, respectively.

The situation will be different in France and the U.K. Neither of these countries had a majority religion in 2020. (Christians had already declined to less than 50% of each population.) By 2070, however, religious "nones" are expected to become slim majorities in these countries (53% in France, 52% in the U.K.).

Majority religion will change in several European countries by 2070

*Countries with a 2020 Christian majority that are projected to **not** have a Christian majority by 2070*

	Christian share of country's population in ...	
	2020	**2070**
Belgium	51.0%	32.5%
Germany	56.2	41.9
Estonia	52.6	47.1
Sweden	60.8	38.8
Switzerland	61.6	44.8
Spain	69.5	41.2

*Countries with **no** 2020 religious majority where religious "nones" are projected to be a majority by 2070*

	Religiously unaffiliated share of country's population in ...	
	2020	**2070**
France	42.6%	53.2%
United Kingdom	40.2	52.3

Note: The religiously unaffiliated population includes people who identify with no religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Refer to Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world for a global look at countries where the religious majority is expected to change.

Key factors driving religious change in Europe

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

The main reason we expect Europe's Christian and Jewish populations to decline from 2020 to 2070 is that they are aging populations with relatively low fertility rates. When the number of deaths exceeds the number of births in a population, demographers call it "natural decrease." In Europe, natural decrease is projected to be responsible for a decline of 160 million Christians and about 440,000 Jews between 2020 and 2070.

From 2020 to 2070, Europe's Christian population will decrease due to deaths far exceeding births and due to religious switching

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Muslims	+10,940,000	-1,410,000	+24,900,000	**+34,430,000**
Religiously unaffiliated	-24,010,000	+33,710,000	+4,640,000	**+14,350,000**
Other religions	+530,000	+1,740,000*	+1,790,000	**+4,060,000**
Buddhists	+40,000	+730,000*	+1,030,000	**+1,800,000**
Hindus	-50,000	+80,000*	+1,660,000	**+1,690,000**
Jews	-440,000	+150,000*	-70,000	**-370,000**
Christians	-160,250,000	-35,000,000	+14,020,000	**-181,230,000**
All in Europe	**-173,240,000**	--	**+47,970,000**	**-125,270,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching for Buddhists, Hindus, Jews and people in the "other religions" category may be overestimated; only switching *into* these religions is modeled in countries where these religions make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Moreover, Europe's Christian population is expected to lose an additional 35 million people by 2070 due to religious switching, with most former Christians becoming "nones." Migration to Europe will partially offset those declines by adding a net 14 million Christians to Europe's population. Taking into account all these factors – natural decrease, religious switching and migration – the number of European Christians is projected to decline by 181 million from 2020 to 2070, while the number of European Jews is projected to decline by 370,000.

Muslims, by contrast, are expected to *increase* both in absolute numbers and as a share of Europe's population, mainly because of migration from outside Europe but also because of natural increase. Like Christians, Muslims are projected to lose more people than they gain through religious switching in Europe, especially in Sweden and France.

Natural population growth

Fertility

In our projections, we assume that children will inherit their mother's religion. All else being equal, religions in which women have higher total fertility rates will experience more population growth.

The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. To maintain its size from generation to generation, a population typically needs a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman (the "replacement level") in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children, independent of other factors like migration and religious switching.[78]

Total fertility rate by religion in Europe, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Europe	Elsewhere
Muslims	1.9	3.1
Christians	1.4	2.7
Religiously unaffiliated	1.3	1.3
Hindus	1.3	1.9
All	**1.4**	**2.3**

Note: Buddhists, Jews and people of other religions are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
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All religious groups in Europe currently have fertility rates *below* the replacement level. However, Muslims have the highest rate of any religious group in Europe, at 1.9 children per woman. Fertility is lower among European Christians (1.4), religiously unaffiliated people (1.3) and Hindus (1.3). All these rates are estimates for the 2020-2025 period.

The average woman in Europe has nearly a full child less than the average non-European woman (1.4 vs. 2.3). And the fertility rates for most of the individual religious groups we measure are lower in Europe than they are for the same religious groups elsewhere in the world. This is a major reason why Europe's total population is expected to decline by 2070.

[78] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Age patterns

The age structures of religious groups in 2020 also factor into the projections. The median age of Muslims in Europe is 34, the youngest of any religious group in the region.

The European religious groups with the *highest* median ages are Jews (53) and Christians (45).

Median age by religion in Europe, 2020

	Europe	Elsewhere
Muslims	34.1	23.8
Hindus	36.4	28.6
Religiously unaffiliated	38.9	36.6
Buddhists	40.4	39.8
Christians	45.1	27.2
Jews	52.9	37.2
All	**42.5**	**29.5**

Note: "Other religions" category is not shown due to insufficient data for this group in the region.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Religious switching

In Europe, many people are expected to leave their childhood religion. Religious switching is the main reason why religious "nones" are projected to rise from 25% of Europe's population in 2020 to 33% in 2070, if recent trends continue.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Indeed, without "religious switching" – that is, in a hypothetical scenario where we remove it from the equation – we estimate that the share of "nones" in Europe would remain roughly the same in 2070 as it was in 2020 (25%).

Without religious switching, Europe's Christian population still would decrease, but somewhat less – dropping to 60% in 2070 without switching, rather than to 52% with switching. (We acknowledge that a halt to religious switching is unrealistic. The point of this alternative scenario is to isolate the impact of religious switching on the projections.)

Projected scenarios for Europe with and without religious switching between 2020 and 2070

% of Europe's population that identified/will identify as the following in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Christians	67.1%	51.6%	59.5%	+7.9
Muslims	6.0	12.7	13.1	+0.4
Hindus	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.0
Jews	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Buddhists	0.3	0.7	0.5	-0.2
Other religions	0.8	1.6	1.2	-0.4
Religiously unaffiliated	25.3	32.6	25.0	-7.6
All in Europe	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**0.0**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Switching affects the future Christian population in Spain more than in any other European country. In 2020, Christians made up 69% of Spain's population. If religious switching continues to occur at its existing rate, Christians are projected to decrease to 41% of Spain's population by 2070. Hypothetically, if all switching stopped in 2020, 60% of Spain's population would be Christian in 2070.

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

Migration

Migration is an important factor in the projected rise of Muslims from 6% of Europe's population in 2020 to 13% in 2070.

In a hypothetical scenario in which we imagine no further migration either into or out of Europe from 2020 to 2070, the share of Muslims in Europe's overall population *would still rise* over the coming decades, due to their low median age and their fertility rates, which are higher than the rates for other religious groups in Europe. But instead of 13%, Muslims would make up 9% of Europe's projected population in 2070.

Projected scenarios for Europe with and without migration between 2020 and 2070

% of Europe's population that identified/will identify as the following in ...

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Christians	67.1%	51.6%	54.8%	+3.2
Religiously unaffiliated	25.3	32.6	34.0	+1.4
Jews	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0
Buddhists	0.3	0.7	0.6	-0.1
Other religions	0.8	1.6	1.4	-0.2
Hindus	0.3	0.6	0.3	-0.3
Muslims	6.0	12.7	8.8	-4.0
All in Europe	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**0.0**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Assuming no migration between 2020 and 2070 would erase projected population gains for Hindus, who made up 0.3% of the European population in 2020 and are projected to double to 0.6%, largely because of immigration. In an imaginary situation in which all migration stopped in 2020, Hindus would remain 0.3% of the European population through 2070.[79]

Refer to the methodology to learn how these new projections vary from ones we made a decade ago.

[79] In reality, migration did not stop in 2020. The point of this alternative scenario is to isolate the effects of migration on the projections, not to suggest that a halt to migration is likely.

The Future of Religion in Latin America and the Caribbean

The number of religiously unaffiliated people is expected to grow steadily, but Christianity will remain the majority religion


If recent trends continue, **Christians** will gradually decline as a share of the overall population of Latin America and the Caribbean in the coming decades, falling from 85% in 2020 to 77% in 2070, according to Pew Research Center's projections.

The category that will increase the most is the **religiously unaffiliated.** These are people who say in surveys and national censuses that they have "no religion," some of whom are atheists and agnostics. This group, sometimes called religious "nones," is projected to rise from 12% of the region's population to 19%.

These projections come from a broader Pew Research Center study on the future of religion around the world. They show that Christians and religious "nones," together, will continue to make up the vast majority of people in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2070, as they did in 2020.

Christians projected to remain majority in Latin America and the Caribbean

Religious groups as a percentage of the Latin America-Caribbean population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The world's other major religions are expected to have only a small presence in the region. **Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists** and **Jews** are projected to make up fewer than 1% of the region's residents in 2070, as they did in 2020.

About 3% of people in the region currently identify with all **other religions,** an umbrella category that includes Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous religious traditions. This group's share of the population is expected to remain roughly stable through 2070.

Christians are projected to make up 77% of the population in the Latin America-Caribbean region in 2070, down from 85% in 2020

Population of __ in Latin America and the Caribbean in ...					Share of the region's population who are __ in ...	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Religiously unaffiliated	77,150,000	131,810,000	**+54,660,000**	+70.8%	11.9%	18.9%
Other religions	20,000,000	23,140,000	**+3,140,000**	+15.7	3.1	3.3
Buddhists	330,000	530,000	**+210,000**	+62.9	<0.1	<0.1
Muslims	750,000	850,000	**+100,000**	+13.0	0.1	0.1
Jews	390,000	420,000	**+30,000**	+7.0	<0.1	<0.1
Hindus	700,000	580,000	**-110,000**	-16.4	0.1	<0.1
Christians	546,920,000	539,940,000	**-6,990,000**	-1.3	84.6	77.4
All in Latin America-Caribbean	**646,240,000**	**697,260,000**	**+51,020,000**	**+7.9**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Fully 36 out of 37 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had a Christian majority in 2020, and that will still be the case in 2070.[80] The Christian shares of the population will either decline or remain stable in about three-quarters (29) of the countries.

Uruguay, the region's only country without a Christian majority in 2020, also will not have one in 2070. Nearly six-in-ten people there (59%) will be religious "nones" in 2070, up from 52% in 2020, according to the projections.

The broader Center study examines how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same

[80] The 37 countries and territories in Latin America and the Caribbean in this study are: Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S. Virgin Islands, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

By 2070, we also project:

- Christians will rise or fall, as a share of the overall population, by at least 5 percentage points in 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries (including 13 countries with decreases and two countries with increases).

- Religious "nones" will increase by at least 5 percentage points as a share of the overall population in 11 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

- No country in the Latin America-Caribbean region will have a change in its religious majority.

The region's overall population is expected to rise 8% from 646 million in 2020 to 697 million in 2070. That is about the same population growth rate we project for North America and for the Asia-Pacific region, but much lower than for sub-Saharan Africa or for the Middle East and North Africa.

Read more about:

- Latin America-Caribbean countries where religious populations are expected to change the most
- Key factors driving religious change in Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America-Caribbean countries where religious populations are expected to change the most

This section looks at Latin American and Caribbean countries where various religious groups are projected to rise or fall substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) as a share of the national population between 2020 and 2070.

Changes in Christian populations

There are 13 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean where Christians are expected to decline substantially by 2070. These include populous countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Chile.

Chile will see the region's steepest decline in the Christian share of the population (16 percentage points), while in three other countries – Mexico, Argentina and Colombia – Christians will drop by at least 10 points.

Meanwhile, two countries – Suriname and Guyana, both on the northeast coast of South America – are projected to have Christians *rise* as a share of the population.

15 Latin America-Caribbean countries will see substantial change in Christian share of their populations by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Christian is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Christian share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Chile	68.3%	52.0%	-16.3
Mexico	89.2	76.7	-12.5
Argentina	88.5	77.0	-11.5
Colombia	86.2	75.1	-11.1
Martinique	96.0	86.2	-9.8
Nicaragua	84.8	76.0	-8.8
Dominican Republic	77.6	69.2	-8.5
Uruguay	44.5	36.7	-7.8
Peru	94.5	87.0	-7.5
Brazil	80.7	74.0	-6.7
Venezuela	88.1	82.0	-6.1
Curacao	90.6	85.1	-5.6
Puerto Rico	88.8	83.8	-5.0
Guyana	65.9	71.8	+6.0
Suriname	52.8	65.5	+12.7

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in populations of religious 'nones'

In 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries, religiously unaffiliated people are projected to rise by at least 5 percentage points as a share of the national population.

The four countries where the percentage of "nones" will increase the most – Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Argentina – are the same countries where the percentage of Christians is expected to *decrease* the most.

For example, in Argentina, "nones" are expected to rise by 10 percentage points to 20% of the population in 2070. Meanwhile, the Christian share of Argentina's population is expected to fall by 11 points to 77%.

11 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean will see substantial change in the share of religious 'nones'

Countries where the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Religiously unaffiliated share of country's population in …		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Chile	30.3%	45.7%	+15.4
Colombia	9.9	24.0	+14.1
Mexico	10.6	22.7	+12.1
Argentina	9.2	19.6	+10.4
Dominican Republic	19.6	28.6	+9.0
Nicaragua	13.3	21.0	+7.7
Peru	5.1	12.5	+7.4
Martinique	2.7	10.0	+7.2
Uruguay	52.4	59.2	+6.8
Brazil	13.5	18.6	+5.2
Venezuela	9.7	14.8	+5.1

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. The religiously unaffiliated population includes people who identify with no religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in populations of Hindus and Muslims

Suriname is the only country in the region where Muslims or Hindus will decline, as a proportion of the national population, by at least 5 percentage points, according to the projections.

The proportion of Hindus in Suriname's population is expected to decline 7 points to 15%, while Muslims are expected to go down 6 points, to 8%.

Refer to our sortable table to see how religious populations in 37 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to change over time.

Suriname is expected to see substantial decrease in Hindus and Muslims as a share of its population

% of ___ in Suriname's population in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	2020	2070	Diff (pct. pts.)
Hindus	22.5%	15.2%	-7.3
Muslims	13.1	7.5	-5.6

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Key factors driving religious change in Latin America and the Caribbean

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

We expect the Christian population of the Latin America-Caribbean region to decline by 2070 because religious switching and migration are projected to *subtract* 39 million and 21 million Christians, respectively, by 2070.

Christian losses from migration and switching are expected to more than offset "natural increase" (the number of births minus the number of deaths), which is expected to *add* 53 million Christians to the region's population. When all these factors are considered, we project there will be 7 million fewer Christians in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2070 (540 million) than there were in 2020 (547 million).

From 2020 to 2070, Christians are projected to decrease in Latin America and the Caribbean due to migration and religious switching

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Religiously unaffiliated	+24,830,000	+34,670,000	-4,840,000	**+54,660,000**
Other religions	-560,000	+4,150,000	-450,000	**+3,140,000**
Buddhists	-100,000	+230,000*	+70,000	**+210,000**
Muslims	+10,000	-10,000*	+100,000	**+100,000**
Jews	+10,000	+130,000*	-120,000	**+30,000**
Hindus	-110,000	+30,000*	-30,000	**-110,000**
Christians	+52,940,000	-39,190,000	-20,730,000	**-6,990,000**
All in Latin America-Caribbean	**+77,030,000**	--	**-26,000,000**	**+51,020,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated, and the losses *underestimated*, for these groups. Only switching *into* these religions is modeled in countries where these religions make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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"Nones" will experience much more growth than any other major religious group in the region, mainly due to religious switching, which will add about 35 million people to the religiously unaffiliated population. Natural increase will bolster the "nones" by an additional 25 million, while migration will cause the population of "nones" to *decrease* by about 5 million, if recent trends continue. In sum, the population of "nones" is projected to increase by about 55 million between 2020 and 2070, going from 77 million to 132 million people.

Natural population growth

Fertility

In our projections, we assume that children will inherit their mother's religion. All else being equal, religions in which women have higher total fertility rates will experience more population growth than other religions.

The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. To maintain its size from generation to generation, a population typically needs a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman (the "replacement level") in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children, independent of other factors like migration and religious switching.[81]

All religious groups in Latin America and the Caribbean have estimated 2020-2025 total fertility rates below the global average of 2.3 children per woman and below the replacement level.

Total fertility rate by religion in Latin America-Caribbean, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Latin America-Caribbean	Elsewhere
Christians	1.8	2.8
Religiously unaffiliated	1.7	1.2
Other religions	1.6	2.2
Hindus	1.5	1.9
All	**1.8**	**2.3**

Note: Buddhists, Jews and Muslims are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region. "Other religions" is an umbrella category that includes Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous religious traditions.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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As a result of its relatively low fertility rate, the region's population is projected to grow at a slower pace than the global population in the coming decades. Between 2020 and 2070, the number of people living in Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to rise by 8%, compared with worldwide population growth of 29%.

[81] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Christians (1.8) are estimated to have the region's highest 2020-2025 total fertility rate, followed by "nones" (1.7).

Christians in Latin America and the Caribbean, on average, have fewer children than Christians living elsewhere. At the same time, unaffiliated women in the region have more children than unaffiliated women living elsewhere.

These fertility rates are estimates for the 2020-2025 period.

Age patterns

Religious "nones" are the youngest group in the region, with a median age of 28 in 2020. The median age of Christians is higher (31) and is closer to the region's average (31).

Religiously unaffiliated people in Latin America and the Caribbean are younger than "nones" who live elsewhere in the world (median age of 28 vs. median age of 37).

Median age by religion in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2020

	Latin America-Caribbean	Elsewhere
Religiously unaffiliated	28.4	37.3
Christians	31.0	30.7
Hindus	35.6	28.6
Other religions	38.6	33.3
Buddhists	40.8	39.8
All	**30.9**	**30.6**

Note: Jews and Muslims are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region. "Other religions" is an umbrella category that includes Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous religious traditions.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Religious switching

Tens of millions of people in Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to leave their childhood religion at some point in their lives. This is a key reason Christians will decline from 85% of the population to 77%, and why religious "nones" will rise from 12% to 19% in 2070.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Indeed, if there were no "religious switching" – that is, in a hypothetical scenario where we imagine it stops entirely – the percentages of Christians and "nones" in the region's population would stay virtually the same as they were in 2020 (85% Christians, 12% "nones"). We acknowledge that this alternative scenario is unrealistic; the point of the scenario is to isolate the effect of religious switching on the projections, not to suggest that all switching will end.

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

Projected scenarios for Latin America and the Caribbean with and without religious switching

% of the Latin America-Caribbean region's population that identified/will identify as the following in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Christians	84.6%	77.4%	85.3%	+7.9
Muslims	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Hindus	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
Jews	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
Buddhists	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.0
Other religions	3.1	3.3	2.4	-0.9
Religiously unaffiliated	11.9	18.9	12.0	-6.9
All in Latin America-Caribbean	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**0.0**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The Future of Religion in the Middle East-North Africa Region


The overwhelming majority of the region's population will remain Muslim

The Middle East and North Africa region is the birthplace of all three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Yet in 2020, it was the world's most religiously uniform region, with 94% of its population identifying as Muslim. And by 2070, if recent demographic trends continue, the Muslim percentage will tick upward to 95%.

Despite the high concentration of Muslims in the region, most of the world's Muslim population lives (and will continue to live) elsewhere. In 2070, the Middle East-North Africa region will be home to 21% of the global Muslim population. More Muslims will live in the Asia-Pacific region (50%), and somewhat more will reside in sub-Saharan Africa (27%).

Rapid Muslim population growth expected in the Middle East and North Africa

Expected change in the count and percentage of Muslims and non-Muslims in the Middle East-North Africa region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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These projections come from Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world. The Middle East-North Africa region is the only part of the world where every religious group we measure will increase in absolute numbers in the coming decades. Most dramatically, the region's **Muslim** population is projected to increase by 338 million, to more than 750 million in 2070. Due to the scale of Muslim growth, even though other groups will grow in size, all the other groups except for Buddhists will decline *as a percentage* of the total

population in the Middle East and North Africa. **Buddhists** will remain less than 0.1% of the population.[82]

The region's **Christian** population, for example, is expected to increase from 13 million in 2020 to 18 million in 2070, yet to drop from 2.9% to 2.3% of the region's overall population. And the number of **Jews** living in the Middle East and North Africa – mainly in one country, Israel – is projected to rise from about 7 million to 11 million, while falling slightly from 1.5% of the region's population to 1.4%.

By 2070, Muslims are projected to make up 95% of population in the Middle East-North Africa region, up from 94% in 2020

Population of __ in Middle East-North Africa region in …					Share of the region's population who are __ in …	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Muslims	414,110,000	751,960,000	**+337,840,000**	+81.6%	94.2%	95.2%
Christians	12,920,000	18,310,000	**+5,390,000**	+41.7	2.9	2.3
Jews	6,790,000	11,130,000	**+4,340,000**	+64.0	1.5	1.4
Hindus	3,220,000	4,880,000	**+1,660,000**	+51.5	0.7	0.6
Religiously unaffiliated	1,860,000	2,460,000	**+600,000**	+32.2	0.4	0.3
Other religions	700,000	820,000	**+130,000**	+18.1	0.2	0.1
Buddhists	90,000	160,000	**+70,000**	+80.5	<0.1	<0.1
All in Middle East-North Africa	**439,690,000**	**789,720,000**	**+350,030,000**	**+79.6**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Nevertheless, the expected increase will make the region home to a majority of all the Jews in the world (63%), up from an estimated 46% in 2020.[83] Most of the world's other Jews will continue to live in North America.

Israel will remain the only country in the region (and in the world) with a Jewish majority. Even so, the Jewish share of the population *within* Israel will decline slightly from 77% in 2020 to 76%

[82] The 20 countries and territories in the Middle East and North Africa are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara and Yemen.
[83] Religious identity is measured differently in Israel than elsewhere. Read "The Future of the Global Jewish Population" for more information.

in 2070, while the Muslim share will go up 2 percentage points, from 15% to 17%, if recent demographic trends continue.[84]

Other than Israel, all the region's countries and territories had a Muslim majority in 2020. That will continue to be the case in 2070. Muslims will make up at least 98% of the population both at the start and end of this 50-year period in nine of those countries and territories: Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen.

In 2070, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the region will have somewhat smaller Muslim majorities – 88% when their populations are combined – than most other countries in the region. (Many Muslims and non-Muslims come to these countries as laborers.) By comparison, in the *non*-GCC countries in the region, Muslims make up 96% of the overall population (or 98% if Israel is excluded).[85]

For example, in Oman, Muslims are projected to make up 86% of all residents in 2070, up from 82% in 2020. This increase will primarily result from natural population growth among Muslims.

In most GCC countries, **Hindus** are projected to be between 7% and 11% of the overall population in 2070, while Christians will make up slightly more. In Qatar, for example, Hindus will make up 11% of the population, and Christians will make up 13%, just as both groups did in 2020.

In Lebanon, Christians are projected to decline from an estimated 28% of the population in 2020 to 19% in 2070. The percentage of Muslims in Lebanon is expected to rise, from 68% in 2020 to 77% in 2070, largely because Muslim women have a higher fertility rate than Christian women.

The broader Center study examines how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

[84] In Israel, Muslim fertility was higher than Jewish fertility in previous decades and, as a result, Israeli Muslims are younger, on average, than Israeli Jews, which will contribute to their higher rate of population growth. In 2020, the median age of Israeli Muslims (23) was eight years younger than that of Israeli Jews (31). On the other hand, in recent years the total fertility rate of Israeli Jewish women has risen slightly higher than the corresponding rate for Muslim women. Weinreb, Alex. "Israel 2025: A Demographic Fork in the Road." Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, State of the Nation Report.

[85] The Gulf Cooperation Council countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

The overall population in the Middle East-North Africa is expected to nearly double from 440 million in 2020 to 790 million in 2070.

Read more about:

- Middle East-North Africa countries where religious populations are expected to change the most
- Key factors driving religious change in the Middle East and North Africa

Middle East-North Africa countries where religious populations are expected to change the most

Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East and North Africa where Christians or Muslims are projected to rise or fall substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) as a share of the overall population between 2020 and 2070.

The percentage of Lebanon's residents who are Christian is expected to decline by 9 points to 19%, while the Muslim share of Lebanon's population is expected to climb 9 points, to 77%.

Lebanon will have substantial change in its Christian and Muslim shares by 2070

% of __ in Lebanon's population in 2020 (actual) and 2070 (projected)

	2020	2070	Diff (pct. pts.)
Christians	27.9%	18.5%	-9.4
Muslims	67.8	76.9	+9.1

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In Egypt, meanwhile, the absolute number of Christians is projected to rise from 5 million in 2020 to 8 million in 2070, though the percentage of Christians in Egypt's population is expected to decrease from 5% to 4% over that time period, due to faster population growth among the country's Muslim majority. Most Christians in Egypt are part of the Coptic Orthodox Church.

In Israel, Christians are projected to hold steady in percentage terms, at about 2% of the population.

Refer to our sortable table to see how religious populations in 20 countries in the Middle East and North Africa are projected to change over time.

Key factors driving religious change in the Middle East and North Africa

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

The main reason most religious groups in the Middle East and North Africa – especially Muslims – will increase in population between 2020 and 2070 is "natural increase," which occurs when births exceed deaths in a population due to low mortality rates, high fertility rates or both.

Natural increase is projected to be responsible for the addition of about 339 million Muslims to the region's population over the coming decades.

From 2020 to 2070, the Muslim population in the Middle East-North Africa region will increase due to births far exceeding deaths

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Muslims	+339,310,000	+10,000	-1,480,000	**+337,840,000**
Christians	+3,360,000	-10,000	+2,030,000	**+5,390,000**
Jews	+4,240,000	-10,000	+110,000	**+4,340,000**
Hindus	-180,000	0*	+1,840,000	**+1,660,000**
Religiously unaffiliated	+890,000	+10,000*	-300,000	**+600,000**
Other religions	+150,000	-10,000*	-10,000	**+130,000**
Buddhists	+10,000	0*	+60,000	**+70,000**
All in Middle East-North Africa	**+347,790,000**	**–**	**+2,240,000**	**+350,030,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching may be overestimated, and the losses *underestimated*, for these groups. Only switching *into* these religions is modeled in countries where these religions make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Natural increase also plays a primary role in the projected size of most other religious groups in the region. For example, births are expected to outnumber deaths among Jews in the region, bolstering the Jewish population by 4 million people between 2020 and 2070.

Natural increase will add about 3 million people to the region's Christian population, which also will grow from migration. Although some Christians will leave the region, a larger number are

expected to move into the Middle East and North Africa, producing a net increase of 2 million Christians by 2070. Net migration also is expected to add 110,000 Jews to the region.

Hindus are the only religious group of the seven we studied that is projected to experience natural *decrease* (deaths exceeding births) in the Middle East and North Africa between 2020 and 2070. Still, the net migration of nearly 2 million people to the region will lead to an overall increase of nearly 1.7 million Hindus between 2020 and 2070. Many Hindus (and Christians) migrate to the region's Gulf Cooperation Council countries for work.

Natural population growth

Fertility

In our projections, we assume that children will inherit their mother's religion. All else being equal, religions in which women have higher total fertility rates will experience more population growth.

The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. To maintain its size from generation to generation, a population typically needs a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman (the "replacement level") in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children, independent of other factors like migration and religious switching.[86]

In the Middle East-North Africa region, Muslims had the highest total fertility rate of any religious group in the 2020-2025 period – an average of 3.1 children per woman – followed by Jews (3.0) and Christians (2.0).

Total fertility rate by religion in Middle East-North Africa, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Middle East-North Africa	Elsewhere
Muslims	3.1	3.1
Jews	3.0	1.6
Christians	2.0	2.5
All	**3.0**	**2.2**

Note: Buddhists, Hindus, religiously unaffiliated people and people of other religions are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
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Muslims in the Middle East-North Africa region have the same fertility rate, on average, as Muslims living elsewhere. Jews in the region have a *higher* average fertility rate than Jews who

[86] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

live outside the region, while the region's Christians have a *lower* fertility rate than Christians elsewhere.

Age structure

The median age of Muslims across the Middle East and North Africa is 24, the youngest of any religious group in the region in 2020. The median age of Jews is higher (31), though not as high as among Jews who live elsewhere (45).

Median age by religion in the Middle East-North Africa region, 2020

	Middle East-North Africa	Elsewhere
Muslims	24.5	24.0
Jews	31.2	44.6
All	**24.8**	**31.0**

Note: Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, religiously unaffiliated people and people of other religions are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Religious switching

In recent decades, there was very little religious switching between the main religious groups in the Middle East and North Africa.[87] If this trend continues, we project religious switching will continue to have little effect on the region's future religious composition. No religious group in the region is expected to lose or gain more than 10,000 followers due to switching between 2020 and 2070.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

The region's Muslim-majority countries have strong norms against leaving Islam, and many countries in the region have formal laws prohibiting Muslims from leaving their faith. If the social and legal impediments to religious switching change in the decades ahead, Muslim retention rates may drop. The growth of Muslim populations could be reduced and other groups, such as the religiously unaffiliated, may attract more people than we currently project.

[87] Based on available survey data, we project that everyone raised Muslim in the Middle East-North Africa region will continue to identify with Islam as an adult. In Europe, we project a Muslim retention rate of 93%, and in North America, 85%.

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

The Future of Religion in North America

Christianity is projected to remain the region's largest faith, but to no longer be a majority religion in either the U.S. or Canada

In 2020, most people in North America were Christians (63%). But we project that by 2070, Christians will decline to 46% of the population. And although Christianity will remain the region's most common religion, growth in the religiously unaffiliated population – from 30% of all North Americans in 2020 to a projected 41% in 2070 – will narrow the gap considerably.


These projections for religion in North America, which includes the United States and Canada, come from Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world.[88]

We expect North America's **Christian** population to decrease in absolute numbers from 238 million in 2020 to 188 million in 2070. Over the same period, the number of **religiously unaffiliated people** is projected to rise from 114 million to 167 million.

(The religiously unaffiliated – also called religious "nones" – do not identify with any religion. Their population includes people who identify as atheist or agnostic.)

About 4 in 10 North Americans are projected to be religious 'nones' in 2070

Religious groups as a percentage of North America's population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In 2020, no other religious group in North America made up more than 2% of the population. But if recent trends continue, by 2070 North America will be home to about 20 million **Muslims,** representing nearly 5% of the region's population, as well as about 9 million Hindus,

[88] This definition of North America corresponds to the United Nations' category of "Northern America." Because this analysis covers only countries and territories with populations exceeding 100,000 in 2020 or 2010, we omit Bermuda, Greenland, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon, which have populations of less than 100,000 each. In this study, Mexico is included in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Puerto Rico also is included in the Latin America-Caribbean region. For details on this study's regional classifications of all countries, refer to the methodology.

making up roughly 2% of the population.

By 2070, Christians are projected to make up 46% of North America's population, down from 63% in 2020

Population of __ in North America in ...					Share of the region's population who are __ in ...	
	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	2020	2070
Religiously unaffiliated	114,130,000	167,440,000	**+53,310,000**	+46.7%	30.2%	41.2%
Muslims	5,910,000	19,860,000	**+13,950,000**	+235.9	1.6	4.9
Other religions	5,180,000	12,140,000	**+6,950,000**	+134.1	1.4	3.0
Hindus	3,620,000	8,920,000	**+5,300,000**	+146.5	1.0	2.2
Buddhists	5,050,000	4,670,000	**-380,000**	-7.5	1.3	1.1
Jews	6,090,000	5,040,000	**-1,050,000**	-17.2	1.6	1.2
Christians	237,630,000	188,210,000	**-49,410,000**	-20.8	62.9	46.3
All in North America	**377,610,000**	**406,280,000**	**+28,670,000**	**+7.6**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The region's populations of **Jews** and **Buddhists** appear to be headed in the other direction. People who identify as Jewish by religion are projected to go from 1.6% of the population in 2020 to 1.2% in 2070, while Buddhists will go from 1.3% to 1.1%.[89]

People who identify with all **other religions** – an umbrella category that includes followers of Native American/Indigenous religious traditions as well as Sikhs, Baha'is, Wiccans and many other religious groups – are expected to more than double in number to about 12 million, or 3% of all North Americans.

The broader Center study examines how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same

[89] Because this is a global study of *religious* groups, the North American Jewish numbers in this study do not include people who identify as Jewish for reasons other than religion, such as ethnically, culturally or because of their family background. For more details, read "The Future of the Global Jewish Population."

rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Overall, the population of North America is expected to grow about 8% over this time period, from 378 million in 2020 to 406 million in 2070. In absolute numbers, that's an increase of 28.7 million people. By itself, net migration is projected to add 52 million people to the region's population by 2070, but the long-term effects of low fertility rates and high median ages will subtract 23 million people from the projected size of North America's population.

We also project that by 2070:

- Christians will fall by at least 5 percentage points as a share of the total populations in both the U.S. and Canada.

- Religiously unaffiliated people will rise by at least 5 points as a share of inhabitants in both countries. The Muslim population also will rise by that amount in Canada.

- By 2070, neither Canada nor the United States will have a majority religion. Christians will still be the largest group among people who identify with a religion, but they will no longer constitute a majority of residents in either country.

Read more about:

- North American countries where religious populations are expected to change the most
- North American countries where the religious majority is expected to change
- Key factors driving religious change in North America

North American countries where religious populations are expected to change the most

This section looks at countries in North America where religious groups are projected to rise or fall substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) as a share of the overall population between 2020 and 2070.

Changes in Christian populations

In the United States, Christians are expected to go from nearly two-thirds of the population (64%) to a little less than half (48%), a drop of 16 percentage points.

Meanwhile, in Canada, Christians are expected to go from a little over half the population (53%) in 2020 to about one-third in 2070, a drop of 20 points.

Changes in Muslim populations

In Canada, the percentage of Muslims in the overall population is expected to rise by 11 points. In 2020, 5% of Canada's population was Muslim. In 2070, Muslims are projected to make up 16% of the country's residents.

(In the U.S., the share of the population that is Muslim also is expected to increase. Muslims are projected to go from 1.2% of U.S. residents in 2020 to 3.7% in 2070.)

Both the U.S. and Canada are projected to see substantial declines in Christians as a share of their population

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Christian is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Christian share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Canada	53.3%	33.3%	-20.0
United States	64.0	47.8	-16.2

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Canada is projected to have a substantial rise in the Muslim share of its population

	Muslim share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Canada	4.9%	15.6%	+10.7

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in the population of religious 'nones'

The religiously unaffiliated population is expected to rise substantially in both Canada and the U.S.

By 2070, "nones" are projected to make up approximately 41% of residents in each country, up from 35% of Canadians and 30% of Americans in 2020.

Refer to our sortable table to see how religious populations in both countries in North America are projected to change over time.

The U.S. and Canada are projected to have substantial change in share of religious 'nones' by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is religiously unaffiliated is projected to change by 5 percentage points or more

	Religiously unaffiliated share of country's population in ...		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
United States	29.7%	41.3%	+11.6
Canada	34.6	40.5	+5.9

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. The religiously unaffiliated population includes people who identify with no religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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North American countries where the religious majority is expected to change

In 2020, most people in both the United States and Canada were Christians, but we project that neither country will have a Christian majority in 2070. This is due mainly to an expected decline of Christians and a concurrent rise of religious "nones" in the populations of both countries.

In the U.S., Christians will stop being a religious majority by 2065, according to our projections. In Canada, Christians are expected to drop below 50% of the population much sooner, by 2030.

Christians will remain the largest religious group in the U.S., while religious "nones" will outnumber Christians in Canada in 2070.

Refer to Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world for a global look at countries where the religious majority is expected to change.

Key factors driving religious change in North America

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

North America's Christian, Jewish and Buddhist populations are expected to decline between 2020 and 2070 due to a combination of low fertility rates and relatively high median ages. These factors are expected to result in more deaths than births in coming decades, a situation demographers call "natural decrease."

From 2020 to 2070, the Christian population in North America will decrease through natural population change and religious switching

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Religiously unaffiliated	+20,680,000	+25,940,000	+6,690,000	**+53,310,000**
Muslims	+4,640,000	-460,000	+9,770,000	**+13,950,000**
Other religions	+2,310,000	+2,490,000	+2,150,000	**+6,950,000**
Hindus	+760,000	-360,000	+4,900,000	**+5,300,000**
Buddhists	-1,470,000	-180,000	+1,270,000	**-380,000**
Jews	-1,390,000	+270,000*	+70,000	**-1,050,000**
Christians	-48,920,000	-27,710,000	+27,220,000	**-49,410,000**
All in North America	**-23,400,000**	–	**+52,070,000**	**+28,670,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching for Jews may be overestimated; only switching *into* Judaism is modeled in countries where Jews make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Natural decrease is projected to be responsible for a loss of about 49 million Christians between 2020 and 2070. The other two factors we analyze – migration and religious switching – are expected to come very close to canceling each other out among Christians in North America. If recent trends continue, religious switching will reduce the region's Christian population by about 28 million people by 2070 (with most of the former Christians becoming religious "nones"), but this drop will be almost completely offset by net migration (the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants), which will add 27 million Christians in North America by 2070.

Accounting for all these factors, the regional population of Christians is projected to decline by about 49 million, so that there will be 188 million Christians in North America in 2070. Christians will then make up 46% of the region's population.

Religious "nones," by contrast, are expected to be bolstered by all three of these factors, which will collectively add 53 million people to their population. If recent trends continue, there will be 167 million "nones" in North America in 2070, making up 41% of the regional population.

And while religious switching will reduce the Muslim population in North America by about 460,000 people by 2070, migration will add 9.8 million, and natural population change will produce an additional 4.6 million. The net increase of 14 million will bring North America's Muslim population to 20 million, about 5% of the region's overall population.

Hindus are also projected to see net growth in North America, mainly because of migration. The Jewish and Buddhist populations are expected to decline, mostly because of natural decrease (more deaths than births).

Natural population growth

Fertility

In our projections, we assume that children will inherit their mother's religion. All else being equal, religions in which women have higher total fertility rates will experience more population growth.

The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. To maintain its size from generation to generation, a group typically needs a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman (the "replacement level") in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children, independent of other factors like migration and religious switching.[90]

Total fertility rate by religion in North America, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	North America	Elsewhere
Muslims	1.9	3.1
Christians	1.7	2.6
Other religions	1.6	2.1
Jews	1.5	2.8
Religiously unaffiliated	1.5	1.3
Buddhists	1.4	1.6
Hindus	1.2	1.9
All	**1.6**	**2.3**

Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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[90] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high rates of infant and child mortality, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan

Muslims (1.9) have the highest total fertility rate of any religious group in North America, followed by Christians (1.7).

North American women have lower fertility rates than women elsewhere in the world (1.6 vs. 2.3). This is true for most religious groups in the region. For example, the total fertility rate among Muslims in North America is 1.9 children per woman, compared with 3.1 among Muslims living elsewhere.

These fertility rates are estimates for the 2020-2025 period.

Age structure

The age structures of religious groups in 2020 also factor into the projections. Among Muslims in North America, the median age is 28, the youngest of any major religious groups in the region.

Christians (44) and Jews (44), meanwhile, have the *highest* median ages of all North American religious groups. This is one reason why their populations are projected to decline by 2070.

Median age by religion in North America, 2020

	North America	Elsewhere
Muslims	27.9	24.0
Hindus	30.2	28.6
Religiously unaffiliated	30.7	37.3
Other religions	36.9	33.8
Buddhists	42.7	39.8
Jews	44.0	34.2
Christians	44.2	29.5
All	**38.5**	**30.2**

Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Religious switching

Many people in North America have been leaving their childhood religions, in most cases becoming unaffiliated. This is the main reason that religious "nones" are projected to rise from 30% of the population in 2020 to 41% in 2070.

What is religious switching?

Throughout this study, religious switching refers to a change between the religious group in which a person was raised (during their childhood) and their religious identity now (in adulthood).

We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people have changed their religious identity by leaving their childhood religion and becoming religiously unaffiliated.

In this study, our definition of switching includes changes between broad religious categories (such as from Buddhist to Christian, or from Hindu to religiously unaffiliated) but does not include changes *within the same category* (such as from Protestant to Catholic, both of which are Christian subgroups).

Without this religious switching – that is, in a hypothetical projection scenario where switching stopped entirely in 2020 – we estimate that the share of "nones" in North America would rise just 1 percentage point (from 30% to 31% of the population) rather than 11 points (from 30% to 41%).

Religious switching also plays an important role in the expected decline of the Christian share of North America's population, from 63% in 2020 to 46% in 2070. Without religious switching, the Christian population still would decrease – but less so, to 57%.

Projected scenarios for North America with and without religious switching between 2020 and 2070

% of North America's population that identified/will identify as the following in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH switching)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT switching)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Christians	62.9%	46.3%	56.9%	+10.6
Muslims	1.6	4.9	5.0	+0.1
Hindus	1.0	2.2	2.3	+0.1
Buddhists	1.3	1.1	1.3	+0.1
Jews	1.6	1.2	1.2	-0.1
Other religions	1.4	3.0	1.9	-1.1
Religiously unaffiliated	30.2	41.2	31.4	-9.8
All in North America	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**0.0**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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(We acknowledge that this alternative scenario, in which there is no religious switching between 2020 and 2070, is unrealistic. The point of the scenario is to isolate the effect of religious switching on the projections, not to suggest that all switching will end.)

Both Canada and the United States would have more Christians in 2070 if there were no religious switching. For example, in Canada, without religious switching, the Christian percentage of the national population would drop 9 percentage points to 44% in 2070. *With* religious switching, we expect the Christian percentage to drop an additional 11 points, to 33%. In the U.S., the Christian share of the national population would decline 6 points to 58% without switching. *With* religious switching, we expect the Christian share to drop another 10 points, to 48%.

Meanwhile, our main projection is for religious "nones" to make up a nearly identical 41% of the populations in both countries in 2070 (up from 30% in the U.S. and 35% in Canada in 2020). Hypothetically, if all switching stopped, "nones" would make up 32% of the U.S. population and 30% of the Canadian population in 2070.

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

Migration

Continuing migration to North America is an important factor in the projected rise of Muslims from 1.6% of the region's population in 2020 to 4.9% in 2070.

Projected scenarios for North America with and without migration between 2020 and 2070

% of North America's population that identified/will identify as the following in …

	2020	2070 (scenario WITH migration)	2070 (scenario WITHOUT migration)	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Religiously unaffiliated	30.2%	41.2%	45.1%	+3.9
Jews	1.6	1.2	1.4	+0.2
Christians	62.9	46.3	46.2	-0.1
Buddhists	1.3	1.1	1.0	-0.1
Other religions	1.4	3.0	2.8	-0.1
Hindus	1.0	2.2	1.1	-1.1
Muslims	1.6	4.9	2.2	-2.7
All in North America	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**0.0**

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In a hypothetical scenario, if we were to remove *all* migration from the equation, the share of Muslims in North America would still rise – mainly due to natural population change – but only to 2.2% by 2070. The Muslim share in Canada would rise from 4.9% in 2020 to 8.4% in 2070 *without* migration, rather than to the 16% we project if migration continues. And in the U.S., the percentage of people who are Muslim would rise from 1.2% in 2020 to 1.6% in 2070 without migration, rather than to 3.7% if migration continues at recent rates.

(Again, we acknowledge that an alternative scenario with no migration between 2020 and 2070 is unrealistic. The point of it is to isolate migration's effect on the projections, not to suggest all migration will end.)

The size of the region's Hindu population also depends in large part on migration. In a hypothetical scenario involving no migration from 2020 to 2070, the number of Hindus in North America would grow modestly, remaining close to 1% of the region's total population throughout the period from 2020 to 2070. With ongoing migration, the Hindu share of North America's population would more than double, from 1.0% to 2.2%.

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

The Future of Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa

By 2070, most of the world's Christians will live in this region


In 2020, there were about 700 million Christians in sub-Saharan Africa, which was 31% of all Christians in the world. By 2070, the region's Christian population will more than double to 1.6 billion, mainly due to the region's high fertility rates. More than half (54%) of the world's Christians will live there, according to Pew Research Center's projections.

Muslims will grow at an even faster rate. The Muslim population will increase more than 2.5 times in size, from 369 million in 2020 to 980 million in 2070. As a result, the percentage of people in sub-Saharan Africa who are **Muslim** will rise from 33% in 2020 to 36% in 2070, while the percentage who are **Christian** will drop from 62% to 59%.

Overall, the population of sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow much faster than the population of any other region of the world.[91] This rapid growth will increase the absolute number of people in most religious groups across the region.

Majority of world's Christians are projected to live in sub-Saharan Africa by 2070

% of the global Christian population living in each region, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"


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[91] The projected rates of *overall* population growth from 2020 to 2070 for each region in this study are: sub-Saharan Africa, 141%; Middle East-North Africa, 80%; Asia-Pacific, 8%; Latin America-Caribbean, 8%; North America, 8%; and Europe, -17%.

These projections come from Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world. The study also anticipates that the number of **religiously unaffiliated people** (those who indicate in surveys and national censuses that they have no religion) will nearly triple across sub-Saharan Africa in coming decades, from 29 million in 2020 to 84 million in 2070. Because the region's overall population is also growing rapidly, the unaffiliated share of the population is expected to rise just slightly, from 2.6% in 2020 to 3.1% in 2070.

Sub-Saharan Africa's growing population projected to become slightly less Christian, more Muslim by 2070

Religious groups as a percentage of sub-Saharan Africa's population, 2020-2070



Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for subsequent years are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Modest change is expected among Buddhists, Hindus and Jews, each of whom make up a small portion (0.1% or less) of the region's population. People in our **other religions** category are projected to decline slightly as a share of the region's overall population, from 2.5% to 2.0%. This category is an umbrella group that includes African traditional religions and many other small groups.

Together, Christians and Muslims are projected to make up about 95% of all residents of sub-Saharan Africa in 2070, about the same as in 2020.

Christians will continue to make up a majority of sub-Saharan Africans at least through 2070, while Muslims will grow as a share of the region's population

Population of __ in sub-Saharan Africa in …	2020	2070	*Diff*	% change	Share of the region's population who are __ in … 2020	2070
Christians	697,420,000	1,593,790,000	**+896,380,000**	+128.5%	62.0%	58.7%
Muslims	368,640,000	980,040,000	**+611,400,000**	+165.9	32.8	36.1
Religiously unaffiliated	29,140,000	84,040,000	**+54,900,000**	+188.4	2.6	3.1
Other religions	27,730,000	54,430,000	**+26,700,000**	+96.3	2.5	2.0
Buddhists	70,000	140,000	**+70,000**	+97.5	<0.1	<0.1
Jews	50,000	50,000	**0**	-1.7	<0.1	<0.1
Hindus	1,460,000	1,060,000	**-400,000**	-27.5	0.1	<0.1
All in sub-Saharan Africa	**1,124,520,000**	**2,713,570,000**	**+1,589,050,000**	**+141.3**	**100.0**	**100.0**


Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; percentages and differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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In 2070, most countries in the region – 30 out of 50, including all countries in the *southern* portion of sub-Saharan Africa – will have Christian majorities, down from 32 in 2020. Seventeen countries (including most in the *northern* parts of the region) will have Muslim majorities, up from 16 in 2020.

At the same time, in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Christian percentage of the population will *drop*, while Muslim percentages will *rise*.[92]

Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to have same general pattern of religious majorities in 2070 as in 2020



Note: Countries in green have Muslim majorities. Countries in red have Christian majorities.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In Ethiopia, for example, Christians will make up 54% of the population in 2070, a decrease of 8 percentage points, while Muslims will make up 46% of Ethiopians, an increase of 10 points. And in Ivory Coast, the Christian percentage will drop 7 points to 38% of the population, while the Muslim percentage will rise 5 points to 51%.

The religious makeup of most countries in the region will be similar in 2070 to what it was in 2020. For example, in four countries – Lesotho, Zambia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the population will remain at least 95% Christian throughout the 50-year projection period. And Muslims will be at least 95% of the population from 2020 through 2070 in seven countries: Somalia, Mauritania, Senegal, Comoros, Mayotte, Gambia and Niger.

Three countries in sub-Saharan Africa will see a change in their religious majority: Benin, Ivory Coast and Togo.

[92] The 50 countries and territories of sub-Saharan Africa in this study are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast (also called Cote d'Ivoire), Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The broader Center study examines how the size of seven religious groups will change globally between 2020 and 2070 if recent demographic trends continue. Our projections take into account the differences between religious groups' age profiles, fertility rates, and patterns of religious switching and migration. (Religious switching and migration are assumed to continue at the same levels that have been recently observed.) We also incorporate mortality rates, applying the same rate to each religious group within a country. Read the methodology for more details about these projections and their limitations.

Because it has younger populations and higher fertility than other regions, sub-Saharan Africa will have the world's highest rate of population growth between 2020 and 2070, according to our projections. We project a 141% increase in the region's population during this period. The highest increase in any other region will be 80% (Middle East-North Africa), and the overall global population is expected to rise 29% between 2020 and 2070.

Read more about:

- Countries in sub-Saharan Africa where religious populations are expected to change the most
- Countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the religious majority is expected to change
- Key factors driving religious change in sub-Saharan Africa

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa where religious populations are expected to change the most

This section looks at countries where various religious groups are projected to rise or fall substantially (by at least 5 percentage points) as a share of the overall population between 2020 and 2070.

Changes in Christian populations

There are 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the proportion of the population that is Christian is expected to change substantially. In all but one, the Christian share is projected to fall.

Several of these countries are in West Africa. In Nigeria, located on the Gulf of Guinea, the Christian share of the population is expected to decline 12 percentage points to 32% in 2070, while in Togo the corresponding share will go down 7 points to 49%.

In East Africa, the Christian share is expected to drop 8 points in Ethiopia. In the island countries off the East African coast, the Christian share is expected to drop 9 points in Madagascar and 5 points in Seychelles.

Botswana is the only country in the region where the Christian share of the population is expected to rise substantially.

11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to have substantial change in Christian share of population by 2070

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Christian is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Christian share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Nigeria	43.4%	31.6%	-11.8
Madagascar	74.2	65.5	-8.7
Gabon	83.7	75.6	-8.2
Ethiopia	61.6	53.7	-7.9
Togo	56.9	49.4	-7.4
Ivory Coast	44.9	38.3	-6.6
Cameroon	69.8	64.2	-5.6
Cape Verde	78.3	72.7	-5.6
Seychelles	94.0	88.5	-5.5
Liberia	85.2	79.9	-5.3
Botswana	82.3	87.8	+5.5

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in Muslim populations

In four countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims are expected to increase substantially as a share of the national population by 2070. At the same time, the Christian share of the population will decrease substantially in all four countries (by at least 5 percentage points).

For example, in Nigeria, the Muslim share of the population is projected to rise 11 points to 67% in 2070, while the Christian share is expected to fall 12 points to 32%.

Changes in Hindu populations

The Hindu share of the population is expected to change substantially in just one place in sub-Saharan Africa – the island nation of Mauritius, where it is expected to decline from 48% in 2020 to 43% in 2070.

4 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to see substantial change in the Muslim share of their population

Countries where the percentage of the population that is Muslim is projected to change by 5 points or more

	Muslim share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Nigeria	56.1%	67.5%	+11.4
Ethiopia	36.2	45.8	+9.6
Gabon	8.6	15.9	+7.3
Ivory Coast	46.3	51.3	+5.0

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Mauritius is only country in sub-Saharan Africa projected to see substantial change in its Hindu population

	Hindu share of country's population in ...		
	2020	2070	*Diff (pct. pts.)*
Mauritius	48.3%	43.3%	-5.0

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Changes in populations of religious 'nones'

Madagascar is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa where the share of religiously unaffiliated people – those who identify with no religion in surveys and national censuses – will change substantially, according to the projections.

In Madagascar, the share of "nones" will increase by 9 percentage points, to 31% in 2070.

Refer to our sortable table to see how religious populations in 50 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to change over time.

Madagascar is expected to see substantial change in its religiously unaffiliated population

	Religiously unaffiliated share of country's population in ...		
	2020	**2070**	***Diff (pct. pts.)***
Madagascar	22.3%	30.8%	+8.6

Note: Differences are calculated before rounding. The religiously unaffiliated population includes people who identify with no religion; some identify as atheist or agnostic.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the religious majority is expected to change

Three countries in sub-Saharan Africa (all in West Africa) are projected to have a different religious majority in 2070 than they did in 2020.

Two of these countries, Togo and Benin, will no longer have Christian majorities in 2070. At that point, no religious group will constitute a majority in those countries.

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the religious majority is projected to change by 2070

	Country	Share in 2020	Share in 2070
Gaining Muslim majority	Ivory Coast	46.3%	51.3%
Losing Christian majority	Togo	56.9	49.4
	Benin	53.2	48.8

Note: Percentages shown are for the religious group that made up the majority of each country's population in 2020 or is projected to do so in 2070.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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For example, in Togo, Christians are projected to decline from 57% of the population in 2020 to less than half (49%) in 2070. Christians will remain the largest religious group in the country.

Meanwhile, if recent trends continue, Ivory Coast will go from having no religious majority in 2020 to having a Muslim majority in 2070. The share of Muslims in the population is projected to rise from 46% to 51% over those five decades.

Refer to Pew Research Center's broader study of the future of religion around the world for a global look at countries where the religious majority is expected to change.

Key factors driving religious change in sub-Saharan Africa

Several dynamics determine whether a religious group grows or shrinks in size. Demographic factors – such as age structure, fertility and mortality – shape populations through births and deaths. International migration also plays a role, as does "religious switching," or people moving into and out of religious groups (including disaffiliation from religion altogether).

Most population growth in the region will result from "natural increase" (i.e., when the number of births exceeds the number of deaths). Natural increase is projected to add about 909 million Christians, 621 million Muslims and 51 million religious "nones" to the region's population between 2020 and 2070. These three groups will make up 98% of all people living in the region in 2070 (up from 97% in 2020), and natural increase will far outweigh the impact of migration and religious switching on their future size.

For example, the net effects of religious switching (which includes people leaving and joining each religious group) are projected to add about 2.6 million people to the region's Christian population by 2070. Over the same period, net migration (counting both immigration into the region and emigration away from it) is expected to reduce the Christian population by about 15 million. By comparison, natural increase is projected to add hundreds of millions of Christians in sub-Saharan

From 2020 to 2070, the Christian and Muslim populations in sub-Saharan Africa will increase mainly due to births far exceeding deaths

	Natural population change	Religious switching	Migration	NET Change
Christians	+908,580,000	+2,550,000	-14,760,000	**+896,380,000**
Muslims	+621,090,000	-3,460,000	-6,230,000	**+611,400,000**
Religiously unaffiliated	+50,750,000	+5,390,000*	-1,240,000	**+54,900,000**
Other religions	+31,540,000	-4,570,000	-270,000	**+26,700,000**
Buddhists	+30,000	+40,000*	-10,000	**+70,000**
Jews	+10,000	0*	-10,000	**0**
Hindus	-350,000	+40,000*	-80,000	**-400,000**
All in sub-Saharan Africa	**+1,611,640,000**	**–**	**-22,590,000**	**+1,589,050,000**

* Religious switching is calculated by subtracting the number of people who leave a religious group from the number who enter it. The projected gains from switching for these groups may be overestimated; only switching *into* these religions is modeled in countries where these religions make up a small percentage of the population.
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 10,000; NETs are calculated before rounding. "Natural population change" refers to net population change through births and deaths.
Source: Pew Research Center demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Africa. Combining all these factors, we project an increase of nearly 900 million Christians across the region between 2020 and 2070.

The number of Muslims is growing for similar reasons. If recent trends continue, more people will leave Islam than will convert to the faith in sub-Saharan Africa in the coming decades, resulting in a net decline of 3.5 million Muslims from religious switching. Migration also is expected to diminish the number of Muslims in the region, with more emigrating than immigrating. But the huge impact of natural increase – producing an additional 621 million Muslims – will more than offset the effects of religious switching and migration. All told, we project an increase of more than 600 million Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa by 2070.

Overall, net migration will subtract about 23 million people from sub-Saharan Africa between 2020 and 2070, but that will have a negligible impact on the region's projected population – less than 1%. Similarly, the impact of religious switching on the region's projected religious makeup is modest.

Natural population growth

Fertility

In our projections, we assume that children will inherit their mother's religion. All else being equal, religions with higher total fertility rates will experience more population growth.

The total fertility rate is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. To maintain its size from generation to generation, a population typically needs a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per

Total fertility rate by religion in sub-Saharan Africa, 2020-2025

Number of children per woman

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Elsewhere
Muslims	5.1	2.6
Religiously unaffiliated	4.9	1.2
Other religions	4.4	1.6
Christians	4.0	1.8
Hindus	1.5	1.9
All	**4.4**	**1.9**

Note: Jews and Buddhists are not shown due to insufficient data for these groups in the region. "Other religions" is an umbrella category that includes African traditional religions and many other small groups.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. For details on how fertility rates are calculated, refer to the methodology.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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woman (the "replacement level") in countries with low mortality rates for infants and children.[93]

Muslims have the highest total fertility rate of any major religious group in sub-Saharan Africa, with 5.1 children per woman estimated for the 2020-2025 period.

Fertility rates are lower among religious "nones" (4.9), Christians (4.0), Hindus (1.5) and followers of other religions (4.4) across the region.

The total fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa for the 2020-2025 period was 4.4 children per woman, more than double the rate for women elsewhere in the world (1.9). And the fertility rates within most religious groups are higher in sub-Saharan Africa than those religious groups experience elsewhere in the world.

[93] "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Age structure

The age structures of religious groups in 2020 also factor into the projections. Among Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa, the median age is 17, the youngest of any religious group in the region.

The *highest* median ages belong to Hindus (38) and Jews (36).

Overall, the two groups that make up the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa's population – Christians and Muslims – have much lower median ages than people living elsewhere in the world who share those identities. For example, the median age of Christians in sub-Saharan Africa is 20, compared with 37 among Christians living elsewhere.

For more details, read "Key Factors Shaping the Global Future of Religions" in the broader study.

Median age by religion in sub-Saharan Africa, 2020

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Elsewhere
Muslims	17.1	25.9
Religiously unaffiliated	18.6	37.2
Christians	19.6	37.0
Other religions	20.2	36.6
Jews	36.4	38.2
Hindus	38.0	28.6
All	**18.7**	**32.7**

Note: Buddhists are not shown due to insufficient data for Buddhists in the region. "Other religions" is an umbrella category that includes African traditional religions and many other small groups.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on census and survey data. Refer to the methodology for more details.
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This study is a collaborative effort between Pew Research Center and the Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion (CASPAR) at Krakow University of Economics. It is based on input from and analysis by the following individuals:

Primary researchers

Conrad Hackett, *Associate Director of Research and Senior Demographer, Pew Research Center*
Marcin Stonawski, *Director of CASPAR*
Yunping Tong, *Senior Researcher, Pew Research Center*
Stephanie Kramer, *Senior Researcher, Pew Research Center*
Rebecca Leppert, *Writer/Editor, Pew Research Center*
Jeff Diamant, *Senior Writer/Editor, Pew Research Center*

Research team

Alan Cooperman, *Director of Religion Research, Pew Research Center*
Anne Fengyan Shi, *Senior Researcher, Pew Research Center*
Isaac Lamoreaux, *Research Assistant, Pew Research Center*
Michał Bożek, *Lead Projection Software Developer, CASPAR*
Krzysztof Kiecoń, *Research Assistant, CASPAR*
Joanna Sikorska, *Research Assistant, CASPAR*
Krystian Fejkiel, *Research Assistant, CASPAR*
Maciej Laburda, *Research Assistant, CASPAR*
Michaela Potančoková, *Senior Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis*

Additional contributions were made by the following Pew Research Center staff:

Communications and editorial

Hannah Taber, *Communications Manager*
DeVonte Smith, *Communications Associate*
David Kent, *Senior Editorial Specialist*

Graphic design and web publishing

Peter Bell, *Associate Director, Design and Production*
Bill Webster, *Senior Information Graphics Designer*
Seth Rubenstein, *Head of Engineering*
Jess Ludwig, *Head of Product Management*
Janakee Chavda, *Associate Digital Producer*
Justine Coleman, *Content Strategy Analyst*
Christopher Baronavski, *Lead Engineer*
Nick Zanetti, *Associate Engineer*
Robert Hampton, *User Experience Specialist*
Benjamin Wormald, *Senior Web Developer*
Avriana Allen, *Junior Tooling and Support Engineer*
Joy Li, *Assistant Digital Producer*
Andrea Caumont, *Associate Director, Digital Outreach*
Elisabeth Slaughter, *Associate Social Media Editor*
Paulina Duque, *Associate Social Media Editor*

The Future of World Religions data explorer and sortable table were produced by the graphic design and web publishing teams.

Others at Pew Research Center who provided study guidance include Neha Sahgal, vice president of research; Gregory A. Smith, senior associate director of research; Blythe Thomas, director of communications strategy; Anna Schiller, associate director of communications; Jonathan Evans, senior researcher; Kirsten Lesage, research associate; Asta Kallo, research analyst; Meghan Rustemeyer, research assistant; K. Caileigh Stirling, former research analyst; Matthew Conrad, former graduate intern; and José Henrique Costa Monteiro da Silva, former graduate intern.

The CASPAR team developed the projection model and the R software package used in these projections. The software package was reviewed by Samir K.C., Senior Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and Víctor Manuel García Guerrero,

Associate Professor, El Colegio de México A.C. The following former research assistants at CASPAR helped to collect and standardize religious composition data: Małgorzata Jedynak, Gisella Lopez, Przemysław Wojno, Bartosz Tyrała and Karolina Kosmala.

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Methodology

This section details how Pew Research Center used data on age, fertility, mortality, migration and religious switching from 201 countries and territories around the world to make estimates of global religious populations in 2020, and to project how those populations will change in the years up to and including 2070.

It uses a question-and-answer format to go through the methods used by Center researchers in the Future of World Religions report. Click the links for more information:

Q1: How did Pew Research Center estimate baseline figures for 2020?

- Estimating religious composition
- Estimating age and sex structure by religion
- Estimating fertility by religion
- Estimating mortality by religion
- Estimating migration rates by religion
- Estimating religious switching

Q2: How does Pew Research Center's projection model work?

Q3: How do the results in this study compare with prior Pew Research Center studies?

- The 2015 "Future of World Religions" projections
- The 2017 "Europe's Growing Muslim Population" projections
- The 2022 "Modeling the Future of Religion in America" projections

Q4: How do you define regions, countries and territories?

This work was a collaboration between researchers at Pew Research Center and the Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion (CASPAR) at Krakow University of Economics.

Q1: How did Pew Research Center estimate baseline figures for 2020?

The starting point of a population projection is called a baseline, and in this study the baseline is the year 2020. The demographic methods we used to project populations of religious groups required collecting and standardizing massive amounts of input data about these groups (in each country and territory) *for the baseline year,* including each group's population size as well as its age and sex composition. We also needed data for each group (in each country and territory) on patterns of fertility, mortality, migration and religious switching.

The next sections describe how we measured these baseline characteristics.

Estimating religious composition

Using census and survey data information about religious identities, we sorted the global population into seven religious groups: Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, followers of other religions and religiously unaffiliated people. The "other religions" category includes Baha'is, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Wiccans, Zoroastrians and many small groups, some of which can be described as folk or traditional religions. The religiously unaffiliated population – sometimes called "nones" – includes people who in surveys and censuses answer a religious affiliation question by saying they do not identify with any religion or that they are atheist or agnostic.

Most of the census and survey data came from questions that measure religion using a direct question like "What is your religion, if any?" The census and survey questions either ask this question by itself, or, less often, they first ask a filter question such as "Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination?"[94]

It's worth noting that we rely on how people describe their own religious identity, *regardless of whether that identity lines up perfectly with belief or practice*. When someone identifies with a particular religious group, we classify them as being part of that group regardless of their beliefs and practices. For example, if someone identifies as Christian, we classify them as Christian whether or not they hold Christian beliefs that may be considered orthodox or attend worship services. Similarly, if someone identifies with no religion, we classify them as religiously unaffiliated even if they hold at least some religious beliefs and attend worship services.

[94] The United Nations Secretariat recommends that countries measure religious identity directly rather than using a filter question "in an effort to ensure international comparability as far as possible." Religious affiliations of people with lower levels of religious belief and practice are less likely to be captured in two-step religion measures. For more information, read Hackett, Conrad. 2014. "Seven things to consider when measuring religious identity." Religion. Also refer to Brenner, Philip S., Jill LaPlante and Tracy L. Reed. 2023. "Sources of Inconsistency in the Measurement of Religious Affiliation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment and Cognitive Interviews." Sociology of Religion.

The censuses and surveys we use classify the religious identity of respondents at varying levels of specificity. For example, depending on the source, the most specific level of affiliation measured for a Southern Baptist could be Christian, Protestant, Baptist or Southern Baptist. Researchers coded all religious identities into one of the seven categories used in this study.

Sources used to measure religious composition

The baseline estimates of the 2020 religious population, which we used as the starting point for our projections through 2070, were first published in Pew Research Center's 2025 report "How the Global Religious Landscape Changed from 2010 to 2020." That report was based on more than 2,700 data sources, including censuses; large-scale demographic surveys (which often survey more than 10,000 people); general population surveys (which typically survey 1,000 to 3,000 people); information from population registers; the World Religion Database; and government reports.

The vast majority of data underlying the 2020 baseline estimates came from four main types of primary sources: general population surveys; censuses; large-scale demographic surveys; and the World Religion Database.

General population surveys were our primary source to measure the religious composition of an assortment of countries and territories that make up 44% of the world's population.

Census data was our primary source in countries where 42% of the global population lives. We relied on **large-scale demographic surveys,** including Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), as our primary sources for 10% of the world's people in 2020.

Additionally, we used **World Religion Database** (WRD) estimates as our primary source in places that are home to 3% of the world's people. Among the many types of information used to create WRD estimates are statistics gathered from religious communities and assessments from country experts. This type of information is especially valuable for countries like Cuba and North Korea, which have little or no nationally representative census or survey data on religious composition that is publicly available.

Type of primary sources used to estimate 2020 religious composition of the world

% of world population represented by each source type

General population surveys	44.4%
Censuses	41.7
Large-scale demographic surveys	9.7
World Religion Database	3.4
Other	0.8

Note: "Other" sources include population register data and data from Pew Research Center's study "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants," which was used for the large migrant populations in Gulf Cooperation Council countries. "Large-scale demographic surveys" include Demographic and Health Surveys, Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and Malaria Indicator Surveys.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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In a relatively small number of countries and territories that together are home to less than 1% of the world's people, we used **some other kind of primary source**. In Finland and Israel, for example, we drew from population registers maintained by the governments of those countries. (In Israel, religion data from the population register also is merged into census reports.) In Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, we relied on estimates produced for our 2024 report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" to describe the religious makeup of immigrants in the six GCC states, who made up about half their overall population as of 2020.

For more information on the sources used for each country, read Appendix A.

Special procedures for estimating the size of small religious groups

Religious groups that make up a small share of a population are not necessarily measured reliably in surveys, which generally lack the capacity to measure groups that, for example, may have only a few thousand members in a country of many millions. Additionally, some foreign-born populations may be underrepresented in surveys for various reasons, including that immigrants may not be fluent in the languages in which a survey is conducted. And a survey's sample frame may exclude refugee camps (or other areas) where foreign-born populations are concentrated.

In a given country, when any of the seven groups in our study made up a small share of the national population, we consulted a range of sources to refine our estimates. These sources included, but were not limited to, the World Religion Database, the religious demography sections of International Religious Freedom Reports from the U.S. State Department, the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, and world Jewish population estimates published in annual editions of the American Jewish Year Book.

In some Western European countries, we used surveys to measure the religious composition of the native-born population and a separate procedure to estimate the religious composition of the foreign-born population. In these cases, our foreign-born population estimates frequently rely on estimates we made for the 2024 Center report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants." Read that report's methodology for details on how we estimated the religious makeup of international migrants.

Children's religion

While *censuses* often collect information on the religion of people of all ages, most *surveys* collect information only on adults. In countries where our primary sources provide direct information about the religious composition only of adults, we use indirect demographic estimation methods to estimate the religious composition of children. In many of these countries, we use data on the age

structure and fertility rates of different religious groups to estimate the religious composition of children. This approach assumes that children share their mother's religion.

Using surveys of people of reproductive age to make general population estimates

Some demographic surveys, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys, gather data on everyone living in a household but measure religious affiliation only among the household members who are in their reproductive years. We used imputation methods to estimate the religious identities of other household members and of households that didn't include anyone of reproductive age.

In most cases, all the adults who are surveyed in a household share the same religious identity. In these cases, our research team assigned a matching religious identity to other household members. In cases where multiple religions were measured among multiple adults of reproductive age, assignment was based on a hierarchy of relationship closeness (in order: spouse, parent, child, other relative). For instance, if a male head of household was not asked about his religion because he was too old to be included in the fertility survey, but he lived with his Christian reproductive-age wife and his religiously unaffiliated nephew, we classified his religious affiliation as Christian.

For households in which there were no members of reproductive age, and therefore no information about religious identity was gathered, multiple imputation was applied using the multivariate imputation by chained equations (MICE) algorithm in Stata. There was enough information about adults not of reproductive age in households *with* adults of reproductive age to allow us to identify age, sex, marital status, educational attainment, household size, region and urbanicity as predictors of religion and to use them in the imputation. Five iterations were executed with these predictors (independent variables) for the missing data on religion. One place where we did this was Nigeria. In the 2018 DHS survey of Nigeria, 11% of individuals lived in households without anyone of reproductive age, and we imputed their religious identities using the MICE approach.

Why does Pew Research Center use projections for some 2020 numbers?

Generally speaking, the Center uses the term "estimates" to describe population statistics for a year in the past and "projections" to describe demographic modeling of what a population is expected to be in the future.

However, in some cases we created projections using older data to make 2020 estimates, because reliable data for 2020 was not available for all countries. For more information about methods

used in projections of religious populations, read "How does Pew Research Center's projection model work?"

Why do Pew Research Center 2020 numbers sometimes vary from published census numbers?

One reason our numbers may differ from published census figures is that we exclude responses from people who do not answer a religious identity question. Some countries that measure religion in their census make clear that answering the religion question is optional. Yet census agencies in these countries often report results based on the overall population, rather than just on the people who answered the religion question. For example, published religion results from the 2021 census of England and Wales show that 6% of people fell into the "not answered" category.[95] However, since we don't have a "not answered" category in this study, our numbers vary from these published census statistics.[96] We don't know which mix of our seven religion categories best describes the people who don't answer religion questions. By treating this missing data as invalid, we effectively assume that the people who don't answer census religion questions have a similar mix of religious identities as those who *do* provide answers.

Another reason for variation in results is that we use the United Nations' World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of the number of residents in each country or territory, and these vary modestly from census population counts.

[95] Both religiously devout and secular people may choose to keep their religious identity private from the government. In the case of the 2021 census of England and Wales, the first response category to the religion question was "no religion."
[96] Another reason for variation is that although census data is gathered and published separately for England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, we aggregate this data together to make estimates for the United Kingdom overall.

Estimating age and sex structure by religion

To estimate the religious composition of each five-year, age-and-sex cohort in a population (e.g., men ages 25 to 29, women ages 40 to 44), we begin with data on age, sex and religious affiliation from surveys and censuses. In many countries, individual general population surveys have relatively modest numbers of respondents in each five-year cohort. In those cases, we make age structure estimates using a combination of multiple datasets and demographic smoothing techniques.

Estimating fertility by religion

We estimated fertility rates using a combination of direct and indirect measures. Some censuses and surveys directly measure recent births or provide data on how many children a woman has ever given birth to (at the time of the survey). In other countries, we had to gather fertility data indirectly – for example, by using information on the current age of a mother's children to estimate her past birth patterns. These varying sources of fertility data were used to calculate both age-specific fertility rates and total fertility rates for religious groups in each country.[97]

In many countries, religion-specific fertility data is available for the largest religious groups, but it is *not* available in sufficient detail for minority religious groups. In Nigeria, for example, more than 98% of women of reproductive age are either Christian or Muslim, and there is sufficient data to estimate the fertility rates of those two groups. For all other religious groups in Nigeria, researchers had to use the country's overall fertility rate as a proxy.

In some countries, there was no religion-specific fertility data available at all. In these cases, researchers applied prevailing national fertility rates to all religious groups equally.

Refer to Appendix A for a list of the sources used in each country and territory.

[97] The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have over her lifetime if she experienced the birth rates that were estimated for women of reproductive age during a particular period, such as 2020 to 2025. It is a kind of snapshot of fertility patterns at one place and time. The total fertility rate calculation does not account for mortality. "Replacement-level" fertility is the total fertility rate that allows one generation to replace itself. A total fertility rate must be higher than 2.0 children per woman to achieve replacement level, in part because of premature deaths. In countries with high mortality rates, replacement-level fertility can be considerably greater than 2.1 children per woman. For more information, read Espenshade, Thomas J., Juan Carlos Guzman, and Charles F. Westoff. 2003. "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility." Population Research and Policy Review.

Estimating mortality by religion

Mortality patterns are measured with data on the death rates experienced by various age groups in a population over a given period. We can transform these period death rates into statistics about the *expected longevity* (or life expectancy) of people at birth.

Because no global data is available on how life expectancy varies by religion within countries, we estimate global life expectancy at birth for each religious group by assuming that people in all religious groups have the average life expectancy of the country in which they live.

Therefore, global differences in life expectancy between religious groups reflect their geographic concentrations. For instance, the relatively high life expectancy of Jews reflects the fact that the vast majority of Jewish people in the world live in either the United States or Israel – both of which are places where life expectancy is above the global average.[98]

Estimating migration rates by religion

Pew Research Center's projections of the populations of religious groups incorporate assumptions about future migration – specifically, our estimates of the rates at which people in each country in the world will migrate to every other country during five-year periods. We then break that down into estimates by age and sex for each religious group (Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, followers of other religions and the religiously unaffiliated).

How does Pew Research Center estimate migration rates for its projections?

We used several steps to estimate migration rates. First, we looked backward in time and produced estimates of migrant "flows" (the *number* of migrants who moved from each country in the world to every other country, by origin-destination pair) by age, sex and religion in recent years. To produce these figures, we began with some of the most conservative estimates of recent migration from Guy Abel, a demographer at the University of Hong Kong and a leading expert on migration flows.[99]

For more than a decade, Abel and his colleagues have published estimates of migration flows in consecutive five-year periods (e.g., 2000-2005, 2005-2010). Over the years, these researchers

[98] In fact, the life expectancy of Jews in Israel and the United States may differ from the life expectancy of non-Jews in those countries. Since we don't have adequate data to estimate differences in mortality for each religious group within countries, we do not attempt to make separate mortality estimates for any group.

[99] Specifically, we relied on estimates that distinguish male and female migrant flows based on what migration scholars call the demographic accounting of an open system with a minimization approach to migrant transitions (abbreviated da_min_open in datasets). For more details, refer to Abel, Guy. "Bilateral international migrant flow estimates, v.7." Other methods applied by Abel and his colleagues tend to produce higher estimates of migrant flows because they include more short-term migration, but our research project is interested in the enduring effects of longer-term migration.

have expanded their methods and have published additional estimates in publicly available datasets.[100]

All estimates of migrant flows are based on what demographers call "migrant stocks" – the number of people living outside their country of birth at a given time. The UN Population Division regularly produces estimates of international migrant stocks for each five-year period since 1990, broken down for each pair of origin and destination countries in the world. For example, the UN publishes estimates of the number of migrants who were born in Canada and lived in the U.S. and, separately, the number who were born in the U.S. and lived in Canada, as of mid-1990, mid-1995, and so on for every five years through mid-2020.[101]

The size of migrant populations in a given country changes over time, as migrants born elsewhere arrive and people born in that country move to other countries. Additionally, some migrants living in their destination country decide to return home to their birth country ("return migrants"). Deaths within immigrant populations also change migration numbers. The various methods that Abel uses to produce flow estimates vary in how they account for changes in migrant stocks over time due to return migration and deaths.

Abel provides separate estimates of migration flows for male and female migrants moving between each possible origin-destination country pair in each five-year period since 1990. We built on that approach, using information about the *age compositions* of the overall populations of sending countries to estimate the number of migrants moving between country pairs by sex *and* five-year age group (ages 25 to 29, 30 to 34, etc.).[102] The migration flows we used in our projections therefore include, for example, estimates of the number of female children under the age of 5 who moved from Canada to the U.S. between 2020 and 2025.

For most origin-destination country pairs, we took the average of Abel's 2010-2015 and 2015-2020 flow estimates to calculate future migration rates. However, we reduced some of Abel's estimates to account for large migrant flows from those years that reflected refugee surges caused by wars and other crisis events that are not expected to continue indefinitely. (These include crisis events

[100] For a recent review of methods for estimating the size of migrant flows and how they compare, read Beyer, Robert M., Jacob Schew, Guy J. Abel, Koko Warner and Stuart R. Campo. 2026. "Annual Migration Flow Estimates by Sex between all Countries since 1960." Scientific Data.
[101] "International Migrant Stock 2024" is the most recent edition of stock estimates available from the UN as of late 2026. Since 2015-2020 is the most recent five-year period with complete data, estimates of past migrant flows end in mid-2020.
[102] Certain migrant flows estimated in our source data were overwhelmingly female or male to such an extent that the sex differences seemed unlikely to continue at pace for five decades. We adjusted the sex composition of flows so that they were never projected to be more than 75% male or female.

in Myanmar, Syria and Venezuela.) We substituted average flows out of these countries from earlier time periods.[103]

We also accounted for complex return migration flows between certain origin-destination country pairs. While we judged conservative flow estimates to be most appropriate for the vast majority of country pairs, there are some origin-destination country pairs that are well known to include many migrants who return home. This was particularly important to migration estimates in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which attract large numbers of temporary migrant laborers. The flow estimates from our method – which maximize the number of migrants staying in their country of destination – produced some return flows from the GCC countries back to migrants' home countries that appeared unrealistically small. Based on information about the relevant immigration and labor policies in these countries, as well as surveys of migrants who had worked in the region and later returned home, we increased the number of return migrants from GCC countries to origin countries outside the Middle East-North Africa region to equal 60% of inflows from outside the region.[104]

When migrants move from one country to another, they bring their religious identities with them. So, the next step in the process was to estimate the religious composition of each flow from origin countries to destinations. To do this, we applied estimates of the religious composition of immigrant populations for most origin-destination country pairs by using data prepared for our 2024 report "Religious Composition of the World's Migrants."[105]

When analyzing the flow of return migrants – who are moving back home from a country they've lived in temporarily – the projections assume that they retain the religion they had when they initially migrated. For example, while data on the religious composition of migrants to and from GCC countries is incomplete, we have reason to believe that temporary migrants who return home to India after working in the United Arab Emirates will have a religious composition more similar

[103] Assuming that crisis-era flows will continue for decades could have improbable downstream effects like the depopulation of some countries and significant impacts on the religious compositions of neighboring ones. Myanmar is also called Burma.
[104] We imposed an 80% return rate for migrants from Southeast Asian countries to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, to account for temporary migrant labor patterns. Similar to GCC countries, these countries in East Asia allow for short-term stays without a legal path to permanent residency for most migrant workers. For migrants to Hong Kong and Macao from Southeast Asian countries, we applied a return rate of 65% based on similar, well-documented patterns of temporary migration. In line with recent patterns of migration between the U.S. and countries in the Latin America-Caribbean region, we ensured that return flows to Latin American countries from the U.S. are at least 15% of the size of inflows from countries in the region.
[105] Abel's flow estimates are based on UN counts of migrant stocks that were released after our 2024 report. Some migrant flows in his estimates are not reflected in the stocks we analyzed for methodological reasons. Therefore, our Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset does not include estimates of the religious composition of migrants for every combination of origin and destination country in the migrant flow estimates used in projections. For migrant flows from origin-destination country pairs not included in the 2024 dataset, we assumed that the religious composition of migrant flows mirrored migrants' countries of birth.

to India's than to the religious composition of migrants who were born in the UAE and move to India.

As we did for countries where we adjusted the size of some migrant flows to account for crises, temporary labor patterns and other issues, there were some cases when we found it necessary to modify future *religious compositions* of migrants, including from some sending countries with low populations of the migrants' religion, so that projected flows would be plausible. For example, in our 2024 report we estimated that almost 3% of all migrants who were born in Pakistan are Buddhist. If this share were applied to our 2020-2025 migrant flows out of Pakistan, though, it would result in more Buddhists leaving the country during those years than we estimated lived there in 2020. To avoid projecting migration patterns that are implausible, we capped outmigration for all religious groups from all origin countries to never exceed 10% of a group's estimated population size in any five-year period.[106]

Finally, once we had a complete set of estimates of the number of people in each migrant flow from country to country *by religion, age and sex*, we transformed these counts into rates of migration (the percentage of people of each religion in a given country who migrate to another country in each five-year period). For example, we estimated that nearly 139,000 Christians and about 6,000 Muslims moved from Nigeria to the U.S. between 2020 and 2025. As there are 93 million Christians and 120 million Muslims living in Nigeria in 2020, the Christian migration rate out of the country to the United States was roughly 1,500 per million between 2020 and 2025, and the Muslim migration rate to the U.S. was 50 per million. Using this approach, we calculated migration rates from each sending country for each of the seven religious groups.

A conservative assumption about future migration rates

It is impossible to know the future of migration patterns. Migration is influenced by government policies, economic opportunities, family reunifications, and harder-to-predict calamities like wars and natural disasters. Given the difficulties of anticipating these phenomena, our projections are based on conservative estimates of the number of migrants who've moved in the recent past. We assume, then, that migration *rates* will remain constant during each five-year period.

Assuming that migration rates will remain constant is not equivalent to assuming that the *size* of migrant flows will remain constant. Consider, for example, the flow of Christian and Muslim migrants from Nigeria to the U.S. that was discussed above. The Christian and Muslim

[106] This assumption may underestimate the number of migrants who will leave a country due to severe religious persecution. For example, it's possible that more than 10% of Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims will flee within a single five-year period to avoid the violence directed toward their group. We take this conservative approach because we cannot know which combinations of origin and destination countries are likely to see large refugee surges specifically due to religious persecution in the future.

populations in Nigeria will change in size over the coming decades, but at different speeds. Consequently, when we apply a constant rate of migration to these populations in the projections, it results in different numbers of Nigerian migrants going to the U.S. in different five-year periods. For instance, we project that 175,000 Christians will move from Nigeria to the U.S. from 2065 to 2070, more than the count from 2020 to 2025 (139,000). For Muslims, the 2065-2070 figure is 12,000 (vs. 6,000 in 2020-2025).

Measuring religious switching

In this study, **religious switching** refers to a change from the religious group in which a person says they were raised (during their childhood) to their religious identity now (in adulthood). We use the term "switching" rather than "conversion" because many people who switch identities leave a religion and become religiously unaffiliated, and also because the changes often take place without any formal declaration or ritual.

For our analysis we use nationally representative survey data on switching from 112 countries and territories. These surveys ask adults about both their current religion and the religion in which they were raised. These include 93 Pew Research Center surveys conducted between 2009 and 2024; 18 studies carried out under the auspice of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 2008 and 2018; and the 2018 Chinese General Social Survey.[107]

As we are interested in capturing data on recent patterns of religious switching, we exclude responses from the oldest respondents in a survey, who tend to have made any changes in their religious identities further back in time than younger respondents. We focus on the switching experiences of adults ages 18 to 54 at the time of the survey. In several places, including **Belarus, Russia** and **Ukraine,** we use the switching experiences of adults under 30 (at the time of the survey) as our input data, because the experiences of slightly older adults in these countries seem to reflect a period effect, perhaps connected to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, because men and women often follow somewhat different switching patterns, we calculated rates of switching separately for men and women. In most cases, available surveys include enough respondents to estimate switching rates for both men and women of the same religious group. But in some cases, the sample size is sufficient for one sex but not the other in a particular age group, or only for both sexes combined. In such cases, we use switching information from all respondents ages 18 to 54 as a proxy for the sex group(s) with insufficient sample sizes. For instance, in **Germany,** due to sample size constraints, we use pooled switching information from all Muslims 18 to 54 to estimate switching patterns for Muslim men and Muslim women alike.

For places with multiple surveys available, sources were chosen based on considerations including data recency, sample size and consistency with estimates from other surveys. How we prioritized

[107] Rates of religious switching are calculated using responses to two questions that have been consistently included in Pew Research Center surveys ("What is your current religion, if any?" and "Thinking about when you were a child, in what religion were you raised?"). ISSP surveys also measure current and childhood religion. For China, we rely on the 2018 Chinese General Social Survey, which asked respondents about their religious upbringing. Specifically, it asked respondents about their parent(s)' religion when the respondents were 14, and we used the *mother's* religion as a proxy for the respondent's childhood religion.

these considerations (say, data recency vs. sample size) depended on the circumstances. For example, to estimate rates of religious switching in the **United States**, we used data from the 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study instead of the 2024 American Trends Panel because the former has a larger sample size, allowing us to estimate switching patterns among U.S. Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Jews. (Refer to Appendix A for list of sources in each country.)

We also considered whether the switching patterns observed in the survey align with recent religious trends. For instance, in **Germany,** we chose to use switching data from the Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey rather than the Center's 2017 Western European Survey, despite the latter's larger sample size. We selected the former because its lower Christian retention rates are more consistent with the recent pace of decline in Christian affiliation in Germany. We chose the Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey as the final data source for **Italy** for the same reason.

In **Mongolia**, **Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda,** results from the only survey available in each country that measures switching did not match what other surveys (and national censuses) reveal about religious trends in those countries. As a result, we took a conservative approach and assumed no switching (i.e., 100% retention rate) in these countries for both men and women. For example, in Mongolia, the only publicly available data on religious switching – a 2018 study conducted with the ISSP – suggests that Buddhism in Mongolia has recently experienced considerable net growth through religious switching, enough to offset any declines due to other factors. However, larger-scale census data indicates a slight decline in Buddhists as a share of the population. Due to concern that the Mongolia survey data could be misleading, our projections assume no switching for Mongolia.[108]

In **Vietnam,** the two available surveys, the Center's 2023 East Asia Survey and the 2018 ISSP survey, produce conflicting accounts of religious switching patterns. Furthermore, neither dataset aligns with the country's moderate decline in the share of Buddhists and increase in the religiously unaffiliated population, as measured by Vietnam's two most recent national censuses. Given these mixed signals, we took a conservative approach and assumed no religious switching in the country.

In addition, estimates of religious switching patterns often can be rough due to small sample sizes. Many national surveys with switching data have a total sample size of 1,000 to 3,000 respondents ages 18 and older, and the estimated percentages of people 18 to 54 who were raised in, left,

[108] The 2018 survey finds that respondents who currently identify as Buddhist outnumber those who say they were raised Buddhists, suggesting Buddhism in Mongolia has experienced net growth through religious switching. However, Mongolian censuses indicate that the Buddhist share of the population shrank slightly, from 54% in 2010 to 51% in 2020. Given that the survey may fail to adequately capture the country's nomadic population, which constitutes a quarter or more of all Mongolians, we consider the census results to be more credible due to their more complete population coverage.

entered or currently are in a religion can be imprecise even for major religious groups. This is especially true for estimating the rates of people who were raised in small religious groups.

In places where the sample size is insufficient to reliably estimate movement out of small groups, we assumed there was no switching out of that religion (i.e., a 100% retention rate). This assumption factored into our switching estimates for Jews in the vast majority of countries and territories. Outside of the U.S. and Israel, Jews made up less than 1% of each place's population in 2020. Consequently, we applied this "no switching out" assumption to Jews in 199 countries and territories because the available surveys did not include enough respondents who were raised Jewish. As a result, our projections likely underestimate the losses, or overestimate the gains, that Jews are expected to experience through religious switching.[109]

Imprecise estimates also present challenges for estimating the rate of *entering* a small religious group among people raised in a *major* group in a country. One example is estimating the percentages of men and women in **Paraguay** who were raised Christian and now identify as Muslim. Although the survey we used includes a sufficiently large sample of respondents who were raised Christian, cases of conversion to Islam were relatively uncommon, and it remains unclear to what extent the observed switching patterns are attributable to random error, particularly in cases when similar rates are not observed in other age groups or in the opposite-sex group. Because Christians make up more than 90% of Paraguay's population while Muslims account for less than 1%, a few misreports of Christians becoming Muslims would have an outsize impact on the projected size of the country's Muslim population.

To reduce the noise resulting from potential outliers, we carefully evaluated estimates of movement into smaller religious groups by comparing results across sex and age groups, examining consistency across available surveys, and corroborating the findings against additional evidence, including news articles and missionary reports, regarding the prevalence or rarity of such switching cases. In the case of Paraguay**,** survey data included a single case of switching into

[109] Reliable data on switching patterns is available in far fewer countries for Jews than for any other group in this study. Yet the two countries with reliable switching data for Jews – Israel and the U.S. – are home to 86% of all Jews. This percentage is higher than the population coverage we have for switching data for some other groups. There are two reasons why we emphasize the possibility that our projections may be particularly likely to underestimate the losses, or overestimate the gains, that Jews will experience through religious switching.
First, in all the countries where we lack reliable data for Jews, there are usually no strong norms or laws prohibiting Jews from religious switching. Moreover, the modest survey samples of people raised Jewish in countries other than Israel and the U.S. suggest that discernible religious disaffiliation (i.e., switching from Judaism to the religiously unaffiliated) is taking place. However, since we have insufficient sample sizes to reliably quantify disaffiliation patterns, our projections conservatively assume that nobody raised Jewish switches out of the faith in these countries.
Second, in countries where we lack switching data on other religious groups, such as Christians and Muslims, we often lack data to model religious switching for *any* religious group (e.g., in Saudi Arabia and D.R. Congo). As a result, there are no losses or gains via religious switching for any group in those countries. However, for Jews, in countries where we lack data to reliably estimate patterns of switching *out* of Judaism (e.g., New Zealand and the United Kingdom), we often *do* have reliable estimates of the rates at which people switch *into* Judaism from other, larger religious groups, potentially resulting in a net gain of Jews. In other words, in such countries we can estimate religious switching into Judaism but not switching out of Judaism.

Islam from Christianity by one young man (and zero cases among women of any age). Because this pattern was not observed among men in other age groups, and because there is little documented evidence of Paraguayan Christian men converting to Islam, we decided to manually adjust the rate of switching into Islam from Christianity among men to 0%. We made similar adjustments in several other countries. For example, in **Zambia**, we manually adjusted the rate of switching into Judaism from Christianity to zero.

Data on religious switching is available from countries and territories where most religions are concentrated

Among all adults ages 18 to 54, share of each religious category residing in countries and territories with available switching data

	# countries	% pop. coverage
Jews	2	86%
Hindus	13	99
Buddhists	15	71
Other religions	28	77
Muslims	66	80
Religiously unaffiliated	73	94
Christians	99	85

Note: Data availability refers to having a sufficient number of respondents who were raised in each religious group to reliably estimate rates of switching out of that group. Sample coverage is estimated based on the religious composition by country in 2020 of adults ages 18-54.
Source: Based on surveys conducted between 2008 and 2024 among adults in 112 countries and territories around the world. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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Sample coverage of religious switching input data

Our religious switching input data is based on surveys conducted in 112 countries and territories, encompassing 88% of the global adult population in 2020. For the remaining 12%, or 89 countries and territories, our figures assume that no switching takes place because we have no data measuring religious switching in these places. This may be fairly accurate in some of the places with no available data, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, where laws penalize citizens for leaving Islam for a different religion.

Our ability to analyze switching varies considerably by religion, ranging from nearly all Hindus worldwide to 71% of Buddhists. The difference is more pronounced when looking at the *number of countries* with data on switching by religion. For instance, there is sufficient data on people who were raised as Jews to reliably estimate rates of switching out of Judaism in only two countries, Israel and the U.S. In countries where such data is not available, we assume that no Jews leave the faith.

Q2: How does Pew Research Center's projection model work?

The technical calculations for the projections in this study were made in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion (CASPAR) and its director, Marcin Stonawski, using an advanced variation of the standard demographic method of making population projections. The standard approach is called the cohort-component method, and it takes the age and sex structure of a population into account when projecting the population forward in time. This has the advantage of recognizing that an initial baseline population can be relatively "young," with a high proportion of people in younger age groups (such as Muslims), or relatively "old," with a high proportion of older people (such as Buddhists).

Cohorts are groups of people that had a collective experience in a particular time. A birth cohort, the type of cohort referenced in this context, is composed of people born during the same period. Birth cohorts can also be described as males or females who have reached a certain age in a particular year. For example, the separate cohorts of females ages 15 to 19 in the year 2020, and of males ages 15 to 19 in the year 2020, shared the experience of being born between 2001 and 2005.

Components are the three ways in which populations grow or shrink: new entrants via births, exits via deaths, and net changes from migration. Each cohort of the population is projected into the future by adding likely gains (from births and people immigrating to the country) and subtracting likely losses (from deaths and people emigrating from the country) year by year. The very youngest cohorts, those ages 0 to 4, are created by applying age-specific fertility rates to each female cohort in the childbearing years (ages 15 to 49).[110]

The cohort-component method has been in existence for more than a century. First suggested by the English economist Edwin Cannan in 1895, then further improved by demographers in the 1930s and '40s, it has been widely adopted since World War II. It is used by the UN Population Division, the U.S. Census Bureau, other national statistical offices, and numerous academic and research institutions.

An advanced variant of this approach, known as multistate cohort-component projection, became viable starting in the 1970s thanks to the availability of mainframe computers and work by the American geographer Andrei Rogers, among others. The multistate approach permits simultaneous projection of the religious groups included in this study, taking into account variation by religious group in age, sex, childbearing patterns, and propensity and direction of

[110] The number of children ages 0 to 4 projected to join a population is also influenced by infant and child mortality rates and migration rates, which are incorporated in the projection model.

migration. This approach also enables modeling of religious switching as a transition between religious groups.[111]

For this study, we made projections for 201 countries and territories that had populations of at least 100,000 people in 2010 or 2020. Collectively, these places were home to 99.98% of the world's population in 2020.

Projection inputs for each country – including data for each religious group on fertility, age structure, migration and religious switching rates – were used for multistate cohort component projections going out to the year 2070. The country-level 2020 population data and fertility trajectories are based on the 2024 revision of the UN's World Population Prospects.

The projection model assumes that fertility differences within countries between religious groups will gradually converge by the year 2100, as educational differentials between the groups diminish. The main projection scenario extends the recently observed (estimated) religious switching rates into the future.

This report focuses on the main scenario with fertility convergence (i.e., narrowing fertility differentials between religious groups); constant religion-specific out-migration rates by age, sex and destination; and constant religious switching rates. To illustrate the relative influence of demographic factors, the report also presents alternative, hypothetical scenarios with: (1) no differences in fertility by religious groups; (2) no migration flows between countries; and (3) no religious switching between religious groups.

Fertility

In the main scenario, all religious groups within each country are assumed to see their fertility levels slowly converging toward identical fertility rates by 2100 – 80 years from the baseline year of the projections. The assumption that fertility differences gradually will diminish within countries is based on evidence that when people live in the same economic and social milieu, their fertility patterns tend to become increasingly similar over time. The adoption of a relatively conservative, 80-year time frame for within-country convergence reflects the assumption that geographic clustering, differing education levels and other factors may perpetuate distinctive childbearing patterns among some religious groups. At each step of the main projection scenario,

[111] The seven religious groups in this study are the "states" that people transition between. The "states" in multistate projections could also be geographic or education categories. For further discussion, read Lutz, Wolfgang and Anne Goujon. 2001. "The World's Changing Human Capital Stock: Multistate Population Projections by Educational Attainment." Population and Development Review.

fertility for the total population of a country follows the U.N. Population Division's medium variant assumptions from its 2024 Revision of World Population Prospects.

An alternative scenario assumes that there are no religion-specific differentials in fertility. In this scenario, all religious groups are assumed to have the same level and pattern of fertility as the total population of a country throughout the projection period. By comparing the results of this alternative scenario with the main scenario, we can highlight the expected effects of differences in fertility.

Migration

The main scenario assumes constant religion-specific out-migration rates by age, sex and destination calculated for the baseline period. In each iterative time period of the projections, out-migration and immigration flows are calculated by age, sex and religion based on the baseline rates and destination matrices.

An alternative, hypothetical migration scenario assumes no international migration anywhere in the world. Though clearly implausible, this scenario enables comparisons that show the expected effect of migration on the religious composition of countries and territories.

Religious switching

The main projection scenario includes constant religious switching rates starting from the 2020 baseline estimates. These switching rates are used to calculate the number of people in certain age and sex groups who move from one religion to another at each five-year interval of the projections. For comparison purposes, an alternative scenario models what would happen if nobody changed their religion during their lifetimes.

In countries for which switching data is available, researchers generated recent rates of switching. The main projection scenario assumes that emerging cohorts will switch from their childhood status at the same rate observed in recent survey data. As new cohorts progress from ages 15 to 29 in the projections, they experience these rates of change. For example, if 20% of the adults measured in a recent survey say that they grew up Christian but are now religiously unaffiliated, the model projects that 20% of Christian children ages 10 to 14 going forward will disaffiliate by the time they are 30 to 34.[112] The model takes into account recent patterns of switching in all directions.

[112] Switching rates are applied to rising cohorts of 10- to 14-year-olds at three intervals (the transition to ages 15 to 19, to ages 20 to 24 and to ages 25 to 29). For example, if a survey indicated 87.5% of adults who grew up affiliated are now unaffiliated, this rate of disaffiliation

For projection purposes, each person was allowed one switch in their lifetime, which is all that is directly measured in the surveys this method draws upon. Though this does not capture the complexity of individual religious identity and switching, it captures aggregate patterns of change.

Mortality

Based on the UN's medium scenario assumptions, this study projects that life expectancy at birth will gradually increase in all countries. This scenario assumes that each country, regardless of its current economic condition, is moving toward better living standards and, therefore, longer life expectancy at birth. We use the UN's data on the different mortality patterns of men and women in each country.

Projections software package

The R software package "Measuring Religious Change" (*measuringreligiouschange*), developed by a team from CASPAR, is a tool for generating demographic projections of religious group populations around the world. It is available at https://github.com/CASPAR-PL/measuringreligiouschange. The software package includes the input data used in this study.

The software package can generate religious group population projections at the global, regional and national level resulting from initial age-sex composition of populations, demographic processes (fertility, mortality and migration) and religious processes (transmission of religion between generations and religious switching). The package is a flexible tool that can be used to numerically reproduce the projections presented in this study, generate other projection variants based on the included input data, or create projections from user-supplied input data and adjustments to demographic and religious processes.

This software may be most useful for users with training in demographic analysis and some experience using and programming in R.[113]

Disclaimers

Due to the difficulty of anticipating future trends, some cautionary words are in order. Population projections are estimates built on current population data and assumptions about demographic trends, such as declining birth rates and rising life expectancies. The projections are what will

would be modeled for a cohort in three steps by switching 50% of affiliated people to unaffiliated status at each of three five-year steps. With 1,000 affiliated 10- to 14-year-olds at the first step, 50% disaffiliation in five years leaves 500 affiliated 15- to 19-year-olds. In the next five years, 50% disaffiliation leaves 250 affiliated 20- to 24-year-olds. In the final step, 50% disaffiliation leaves 125 affiliated 25- to 29-year-olds (87.5% of the original 1,000 children have disaffiliated). Such high rates of disaffiliation are not common and are used here only for ease of explanation.

[113] The R package includes a manual to assist users who wish to replicate and extend these projections.

occur if the current data is accurate and the trends play out as expected. But many events – scientific discoveries, armed conflicts, social movements, political upheavals, natural disasters and changing economic conditions, to name just a few – can shift demographic trends in unforeseen ways.

This study does not attempt to model how religious switching patterns may change in the future as countries experience changes in education, urbanization, political governance and economic development. It is uncertain how economic growth might impact levels of religious affiliation. Economic development could be accompanied by increasing rates of religious disaffiliation in countries that currently show little movement toward disaffiliation. Conversely, countries that currently have large numbers of religiously unaffiliated people could experience circumstances that lead to a rise in religious affiliation.

Q3: How do the results in this study compare with prior Pew Research Center studies?

The 2015 'Future of World Religions' projections

The Center published its first global demographic projections of the world's religious groups in 2015, projecting global religious change between 2010 and 2050. Our latest projections, focusing on global religious changes between 2020 and 2070, differ from the earlier effort in several aspects.

The religious landscape of many countries shifted considerably from 2010 to 2020, and our new baseline data reflects these changes as well as updated measures of recent fertility, religious switching and migration patterns for each religious group.

We also have made some methodological changes. These changes were instituted for our previous report "How the Global Religious Landscape Changed from 2010 to 2020." We adjusted our data sources and methods to make our estimates for 2010 and 2020 as reliable and comparable as possible.

Most consequentially, our estimates of the size of religious groups in China – a country that holds roughly one-sixth of the world's population – rely on different measurements in the two studies. In the latest study, our baseline estimates for China are based on religious *(zongjiao)* affiliation, as these are the most comparable with what we use in every other country, as well as the most readily comparable over time in China. In our 2015 projections report, we took a broader approach and relied not only on zongjiao affiliation but also on non-zongjiao belief and practice when estimating the size of China's religious groups. Our old estimates of China's 2010 religious composition relied on analysis of questions asked in a 2007 survey that have not been asked in a comparable manner in subsequent years. Starting with our 2025 report on global religious change, we have used our new approach to measuring religion in China for both 2010 and 2020.

As a result, the estimates from these two approaches differ considerably. For example, using the earlier approach, we estimated that religiously unaffiliated people made up 52% of China's population in 2010, compared with 87% under our revised approach. Given China's large population, this difference has a substantial impact on global estimates of the religiously unaffiliated population. (For more details on our earlier and revised approaches, read "Our new approach to measuring religion in China" and "Our previous estimates of China's religious composition." For general background, read our report "Measuring Religion in China.")

Another change in our measurement approach in all countries is that we no longer include a separate category for people who practice what some scholars call "folk religions," because they are not consistently captured in surveys and censuses, and because the religious beliefs and practices of followers of folk religions vary widely from place to place. Due to the limited comparability of this category across countries, they are instead included in the "other religions" category. Read "Why we revised our estimates for 2010" for more details.

Our latest projections also incorporate improvements in our input data. For example, in this 2026 study, we estimated religious switching in 112 countries, up from 70 countries in the 2015 report due to increased data availability over the past decade. For example, we now incorporate switching data from China, which we did not do in our earlier study.

Because of the changes in the methods and data used in the religion projections published in 2015 and those published in 2026, *the results of the two studies are not directly comparable*.

The 2017 'Europe's Growing Muslim Population' projections

In this study, we project that Europe's Muslim population will continue to grow over the coming decades. The expansion of the Muslim population is particularly pronounced in some parts of Europe.

In our 2017 study "Europe's Growing Muslim Population," we projected Muslim population growth in the 27 member states of the European Union, plus Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.[114] For shorthand, we will refer to this group of nations as "Western and Central Europe," though we acknowledge that this term is inexact.[115]

In the medium scenario of our 2017 projections, Muslims were expected to account for 11.2% of these nations' populations combined in 2050. In our new projections, Muslims are projected to reach 9.6% of these nations' populations combined in 2050, up from 5.0% in 2020.

The difference looks even larger when it comes to the projected *number* of Muslims. In the earlier report, we estimated that under the hypothetical scenario that all refugee flows into Western and Central Europe were to stop as of mid-2016 but that recent levels of "regular" migration to Europe (i.e., migration of those who come for reasons other than seeking asylum) would continue, there would be 58 million Muslims in Europe in 2050. This figure is higher than our latest projection of 49 million.

Earlier projections estimated faster Muslim population growth in Western and Central Europe

	Count		Percent	
	2017 report	2026 report	2017 report	2026 report
2016	25.8M	--	4.9%	--
2020	28.9M	26.5M	5.5%	5.0%
2050	57.9M	48.9M	11.2%	9.6%

Note: Western and Central Europe in this analysis is defined as the 27 EU nations plus Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Figures displayed in shaded areas are projected values.
Source: 2020 and 2050 numbers in the "2017 report" columns are medium projection scenario results from Pew Research Center's "Europe's Growing Muslim Population" study, and "2026 report" figures are the Center's latest estimates and projections. "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"

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The discrepancy between our earlier and latest estimates of the Muslim population in Western and Central Europe can be explained by differences in the input data we relied on for the projections. It also highlights the fact that projections are not predictions; their accuracy depends on how closely

[114] Our 2017 projections aimed to explore the impact of migration, especially the Syrian refugee crisis, on Europe's religious landscape. Therefore, the analysis focused on a selection of European nations that experienced an influx of Syrian migrants and for which migration data was available through Eurostat. When the 2017 report was published, the U.K. had begun the process of formally withdrawing from the EU.
[115] Our 2017 report includes Cyprus, which is a member of the EU. Except in the report result comparisons presented in this section, Cyprus is included in the Asia-Pacific region in this 2026 Future of World Religions report. Meanwhile, the 2026 report includes 13 countries and territories in Europe that were not included in the 2017 report: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Channel Islands, Georgia, Iceland, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. Refer to "How do you define regions, countries and territories?" for a list of countries included in each region.

our assumptions about demographic patterns that were observed in the past align with those that unfold in the future.

For example, many European countries have adopted more restrictive immigration policies since the surge of migration in 2015 and 2016. In some cases, countries have tightened their rules for admitting not only asylum seekers, but also migrants who move to Europe for economic, educational or family reasons. The earlier projections to 2020 and beyond assumed that levels of regular migration would continue. Our new 2020 baseline estimates for Muslim populations in Western and Central Europe are based on new data that captures variation from our earlier projection.

Our new projections also reflect updated estimates of fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in Western and Central Europe.

In the 2017 report, we estimated a total fertility rate in the 2015-2020 period of 2.6 children per woman for Muslims and 1.6 children per woman for non-Muslims. Our current estimate, based on more recent measures of fertility patterns, is that the 2020-2025 total fertility rate for Muslim women in this region is 2.0 children per woman, compared with 1.4 children per non-Muslim woman.

The 2022 'Modeling the Future of Religion in America' projections

Our latest projections indicate that the United States will no longer have a Christian majority by 2070. In the coming decades, Christians are expected to decline to less than half of the U.S. population, while the percentage of religiously unaffiliated people will rise substantially (though remaining smaller than the Christian share of the U.S. population).

These findings about the future U.S. religious landscape largely align with projections we published in the 2022 study "Modeling the Future of Religion in America." In the earlier report, we presented projection results from a "steady switching" scenario that assumed the switching patterns observed among Christians, religiously unaffiliated people and followers of all other religions would continue in the future at the same rates observed at the time of the study. This projection scenario is similar to the "main" projections scenario in our 2026 study, which also assumes that recently observed switching rates among religious groups continue.

In the current study, we project under the "main" scenario that Christians will make up 48% of the U.S. population in 2070, while religiously unaffiliated "nones" will constitute 41%. By comparison, in the 2022 study, we projected (under the "steady switching" scenario) that Christians would make up 46% of the U.S. population in 2070, while "nones" would reach 41%.

Although these two studies appear to share the same 2020 estimates and arrive at the same figure for the religiously unaffiliated share of the U.S. population in 2070, they are *not* directly comparable. The studies differ in many respects, including the input data used to model religious switching, intergenerational transmission and fertility differences among religious groups. Moreover, the 2022 report focused only on the two largest religious groups – Christians and the religiously unaffiliated – while collapsing Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and other smaller groups into the broader category of "other religions." By contrast, the latest study considers the future trajectories of more groups (including Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists) individually.

On the other hand, in the 2022 study, focusing only on the largest religious groups in a single country (the United States) allowed us to explore a wide range of projections scenarios, including scenarios with different assumptions about switching patterns and rates of religious transmission from mother to child. This was possible because of the availability of repeated, detailed measures of religious switching in the United States. Due to data limitations, it is not feasible to extend such scenarios to all other countries.

Q4: How do you define regions, countries and territories?

The word "country" in this study refers to all countries recognized as such by the United Nations. The word "territory" in this study does not have a technical definition. Rather, it is a general term for distinct geographical entities that the UN doesn't recognize as countries, but for which it provides separate population estimates. Territories in this study include such entities as Hong Kong and Macao (special administrative regions of China), Greenland (an autonomous constituent country within the Kingdom of Denmark) and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (an unincorporated territory of the United States).

List of countries and territories in each region

This study groups 201 countries and territories into six major regions: Asia and the Pacific; Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; North America; and sub-Saharan Africa.

The 50 countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region are: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, East Timor (also called Timor-Leste), Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar (also called Burma), Nepal, New Caledonia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

The 42 countries and territories in Europe are: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.

The 37 countries and territories in Latin America and the Caribbean are: Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S. Virgin Islands, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The 20 countries and territories in the Middle East and North Africa are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara, and Yemen.

The two countries of North America are: Canada and the United States.

The 50 countries and territories of sub-Saharan Africa are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast (also called Cote d'Ivoire), Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

A note on rounding

In most countries, it is not possible to precisely count the number of people who identify with each religion. Because our estimates are not precise, the tables in this report and accompanying data files show rounded population counts (often to the nearest 10,000) and show counts below 10,000 as "<10,000." In the text, many estimates are rounded to the nearest million or percentage point.

Appendix A: Sources

Pew Research Center's Future of World Religions projections use several types of data on religious groups around the world. These data include estimates of the religious composition of each country and the age and sex structure of each religious group for the year 2020, which is the baseline year for our projections through 2070. We also use data on fertility, migration and religious switching for each religious group in each country.

The first section of this appendix broadly discusses the sources we used for each type of data. It is followed by a list of additional sources we used to estimate each country's religious composition and a table detailing the primary sources for each country or territory.

Data on countries' religious compositions

The 2020 baseline estimates for the religious composition of the 201 countries and territories we studied are primarily based on our evaluation of thousands of sources, including censuses, surveys and population registers. These estimates were discussed in the 2025 Pew Research Center report "How the Global Religious Landscape Changed from 2010 to 2020."

For each country, we sought to maximize the direct comparability of sources used in the same country in 2010. We also sought the best nationally representative sources that were collected in or around the year 2020. For example, national censuses were generally our primary source for countries where census data on religion is available. In countries where multiple surveys are available, we evaluated characteristics of the sources, including how they measured religious identity, how samples were drawn, the mode of data collection and the size of samples. We chose sources that collected data close to 2010 and 2020 using sound methods and robust samples.

For migrants and members of small religious groups, who are not always measured or included on censuses and surveys, researchers consulted other sources to evaluate and refine 2020 estimates. These sources included the World Religion Database and more than a decade of International Religious Freedom country reports from the U.S. State Department.

For the religious composition of children, who are not included in many sources (including most surveys), we made estimates indirectly based on information about the fertility patterns and age structure of adults in each religious group.

In some countries where recent sources are unavailable or unreliable, we used projections of population size or age structure from an earlier source. For example, India's 2011 census gathered

data on the religious composition of more than 1 billion people. Unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors, the Indian census initially scheduled for 2021 had not yet been completed as of fall 2026. Therefore, this study relies on population projections from the 2011 Indian census for the country's 2020 estimates.

The main source used for estimating religious composition in each country can be found in the source table below.

Data on age structure

Whenever possible, we used the same sources to estimate the age structure of a country's religious groups that we used to estimate that country's religious composition. In many cases, we used national censuses for this, since they generally provide counts of people in each religious category by age and sex. In some countries, publicly available census data does not include age and sex breakdowns; in those cases, we relied on surveys to estimate the age structure of religious groups.

Data on religious switching

We estimated global rates of religious switching using surveys covering 112 countries and territories, which together account for 88% of the world's population. These surveys were carried out between 2008 and 2024 by Pew Research Center and other organizations and include surveys conducted under the auspices of the International Social Survey Programme. The collection of switching data presented in this study provides the most comprehensive picture available to date of global switching patterns among major religious categories, including movement both into and out of the religiously unaffiliated category.

In countries where data on religious switching was unavailable, no religious switching was modeled in the main projection scenario presented in this report. There were five additional countries where we did not use available switching information due to data reliability concerns.[116]

[116] In four countries – Mongolia, Mozambique, D.R. Congo and Uganda – the only survey available that measures switching shows different religious trends than those observed in other surveys or censuses. We took a conservative approach and assumed no switching (i.e., 100% retention rate) for both men and women. For example, in Mongolia, the only publicly available data on religious switching – a 2018 study conducted with the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – suggested that Buddhism in Mongolia had recently experienced net growth through religious switching. However, the much larger-scale census indicated a slight decline in Buddhists as a share of the population. Due to concern that the Mongolia survey data could be misleading, our projections assume no switching for Mongolia. The 2018 survey conducted with the ISSP found that respondents who currently identified as Buddhist outnumbered those who said they were raised Buddhists, suggesting Buddhism in Mongolia had experienced net growth through religious switching. However, Mongolian censuses indicated that Buddhists had shrunk slightly as a share of the population, from 54% in 2010 to 51% in 2020. Given that the survey may fail to adequately capture the country's nomadic population, which constitutes a quarter or more of all Mongolians, we consider the census results to be more credible.
In the fifth country, Vietnam, the two available surveys with switching data (the 2023 East Asia Survey and the 2018 ISSP) produced conflicting accounts of religious switching patterns. And neither dataset aligns with the country's moderate decline in the share of Buddhists

The sources used for this analysis can be found in the source table for each country below.

Data on fertility

Our estimates of fertility rates by religion for 2020-2025 drew from data for 172 countries and territories. These places together account for 95% of the world's 2020 population.

In 119 of those countries, fertility rates for religious groups were calculated using data from censuses and surveys.

In five European countries, fertility differences by religion were not directly available, so we imputed fertility differentials for Christians, Muslims and the religiously unaffiliated using information from countries with similar economic and demographic characteristics. Specifically, fertility differentials in Greece and Malta were estimated using the average of the differentials in Italy, Spain and Portugal (countries with similar demographic conditions, including relatively low fertility and aging populations). Other cases include Iceland (from differential averages in Sweden and Denmark), Luxembourg (Belgium, the Netherlands and France) and Lithuania (Latvia).

The sources of information about fertility differences by religion typically provide data on the most common religious groups in a country, but they do not always provide reliable estimates for minority religions. When data on fertility rates for a minority religious group was unavailable or unreliable, we generally assigned the country's overall fertility rate to that group. In several countries, we addressed this data limitation by borrowing information about fertility for one minority group from other countries with similar demographic backgrounds. We did this to estimate Muslim fertility patterns in Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Slovenia and Switzerland, and to estimate the fertility pattern of religiously unaffiliated people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[117]

and increase in the religiously unaffiliated population, as measured by the two most recent national censuses. Given these mixed signals, we took a conservative approach and assumed no religious switching for both men and women.

[117] For example, in Switzerland, our primary source for fertility differential data is the 2018 wave of the European Social Survey, the basis for our estimates of differentials for Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. However, the survey does not provide a sufficient sample to estimate fertility differentials for Muslims. Since Muslims in Switzerland seem to have different fertility patterns than non-Muslims, we imputed the differential between Muslims and non-Muslims using countries that have Muslim populations with similar ethnic compositions and immigrant backgrounds. In Switzerland's case, the Muslim differential was estimated using information from Germany and Austria. This imputation method was used to estimate Muslims' fertility differentials in Belgium (using data from Germany and the Netherlands), Croatia (Serbia and Montenegro), Slovenia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Finland (Denmark and Sweden). The same method was used to impute the fertility differential for the sizable minority of religiously unaffiliated people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (using data from Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia).

In China, we assumed all religious groups have the same country-level fertility rate after considering evidence from the latest 2020 census and the government's revised birth policies.[118]

In four Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries where fertility data lacks religious breakdowns (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia), we used the fertility rate of citizens overall – most of whom are Muslim – as a proxy for the fertility rate of Muslims.

In 43 countries and territories, we used this proxy approach to estimate the fertility rate for the majority religious group if that group accounted for at least 90% of the country's population. For example, in Afghanistan, where Muslims make up more than 99% of the population, we considered United Nations estimates of the country's overall fertility rate to be a reliable proxy for Muslim fertility.

In the remaining 29 countries, where data on fertility by religion is unavailable, we assumed that all religious groups have the same overall country-level fertility rates estimated by the UN.

The sources used for estimating fertility rates by religion can be found in the source table for each country below.

Data on migration

The religious composition of migrants often differs from that of people who still live in the countries where they were born, as well as from as the overall populations of countries where they currently reside. For example, people who were born in India and now live elsewhere are about half as likely to be Hindu as those who remain (41% vs. 79%). Since India is one of only three

[118] In China, we do not have reliable estimates of current differences in fertility rates between religious groups. This represents a break from the past. For decades, there has been a substantial fertility gap between Muslims – who are predominantly members of the Hui and Uyghur ethnic groups – and non-Muslims. This gap was influenced by the Chinese government's "one-child policy," which applied strictly to the Han majority and provided more flexibility for ethnic minorities.
Beginning in 2016, the government relaxed birth restrictions nationwide, eventually allowing up to three children per couple across all ethnic groups in 2021. Despite these changes, China's overall fertility rate has continued to decline. At the same time, the government has tightened birth policies in Xinjiang – home to most Uyghurs in China, with stricter enforcement of birth controls among ethnic minorities, allegedly to bring down the high fertility rates of Uyghurs and other traditionally Muslim ethnic groups.
According to analysis that was published in the Chinese Journal of Sociology, in the 2020 census, the largest predominantly Muslim ethnic group (Uyghurs) had lower fertility than the Han majority, while the second-largest predominantly Muslim ethnic group (Hui) had higher fertility. The total fertility rate was about 1.3 children per Han woman, below 1 child per Uyghur woman, and around 1.8 children per Hui woman. In the 2010 census, Uyghur women had a total fertility rate of 2.0 children per woman.
Little data is publicly available about recent fertility patterns in Xinjiang. Based on data released in the article mentioned above, the weighted average of fertility rates of various predominantly Muslim ethnic groups seems to have been roughly on par with the Han majority in 2020. It remains unclear whether the low fertility rates observed among Uyghurs will persist or rebound in response to future policy shifts. Given this uncertainty and the government's revised nationwide birth policy, we take a conservative approach and assume no fertility differences among religious groups in China.
China's census does not directly measure religion, and its large-scale demographic surveys generally do not include measures of both religion and fertility. Some general population surveys do include measures of religion and fertility. Based on our analysis of the available data, we have not found evidence of reliable fertility differences between non-Muslim religious groups, including the religiously unaffiliated.

nations where Hindus make up more than 40% of the population, Hinduism is still much more common among immigrants from India compared with the populations in any country except for Nepal (where 81% of people are Hindu) and Mauritius (48%).

When estimating the religious mix of migrants for projections, we generally relied on our 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset, which we compiled based on migrants' responses to 270 different censuses and surveys.[119] For origin-destination country pairs not included in this dataset, we usually assumed that migrants have the same religious composition as the population of their country of birth.

Some people migrate temporarily and then return home. For populations of migrants returning to their country of birth after living elsewhere, we used the same religious composition for them that they had when they migrated to the country of temporary residence. In other words, we applied the same religious composition for migrants returning to their birthplace as we did for migrants moving in the opposite direction between the same two countries by reversing origin and destination.

[119] Note that there are two versions of the dataset. The more complete one, which was used to develop projection model inputs, includes estimates of the religious composition of thousands of distinct origin-destination country pairs. The public version, "Dataset: Religious Composition of the World's Migrants, 1990-2020," contains estimates of the religious composition of all migrants for each origin country and, separately, estimates of the religious composition of all migrants for each destination country.

Additional sources

The rest of this appendix contains lists for additional sources we used for estimating the religious composition of each country:

- Multicountry and single-country sources
- Public data archives
- Statistical agencies that prepared custom tabulations
- Data used for migrants and small group estimates

In addition, the table at the end provides a detailed list, organized by country or territory, of the primary sources used to determine the size and age structure of religious groups in each place for 2020. This table also includes the main sources used to estimate recent rates of religious switching, fertility differences among religious groups and religious composition of incoming migrants in each place.

Sources: Multicountry

Afrobarometer. The pan-African research network.

AmericasBarometer. LAPOP, Center for Global Democracy, Vanderbilt University.

Central Asia Barometer. Central Asia Barometer Institution.

Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS Program, USAID.

East Asian Societies Survey. Pew Research Center.

Eurobarometer. European Commission.

European Social Survey (ESS). European Research Infrastructure Consortium.

European Values Study (EVS). European Value Systems Study Group.

Generations and Gender Survey. Generations and Gender Programme.

Global Attitudes Surveys. Pew Research Center.

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). International Social Survey Programme.

Latinobarómetro. Latinobarómetro Corporation.

Life in Transition Survey. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS). World Bank.

Malaria Indicators Survey (MIS). The DHS Program, USAID.

Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). UNICEF.

Religion in Latin America. Pew Research Center.

South and Southeast Asia Survey. Pew Research Center.

Survey of the World's Muslims. Pew Research Center.

World Values Survey. World Values Survey Association.

World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision. United Nations Population Division.

Survey sources: Single country

Argentina: National Survey on Religious Beliefs and Attitudes in Argentina. Society, Culture and Religion Program of the Center for Labor Studies and Research.

China: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS). National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China.

Germany: German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

India: India Survey. Pew Research Center; National Family Health Survey (NFHS). Ministry of Health & Family Welfare.

South Africa: General Household Survey (GHS). Statistics South Africa.

South Korea: Korean General Social Survey (KGSS). Survey Research Center at Sung Kyun Kwan University.

Spain: CIS Barometer. Center for Sociological Research.

Taiwan: Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). Institute of Sociology and the Center for Survey Research at the Academia Sinica.

Ukraine: Specifics of Religious and Church Self-Determination of Citizens of Ukraine: Trends 2000-2021. Razumkov Centre.

United Kingdom: Understanding Society: The UK Household Longitudinal Study. UK Data Service.

United States: American Trends Panel; Religious Landscape Study. Pew Research Center.

Public data archives

GESIS. Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

IPUMS International. University of Minnesota.

National Registry in Iceland. Statistics Iceland.

Personal Records Database (Netherlands). Statistics Netherlands (CBS).

Population Information System (Finland). Digital and Population Data Services Agency.

Statistical Abstract of Israel 2022. Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel).

World Religion Database (WRD). Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University.

Statistical agencies that provided custom tabulations

Customized census data tabulations measuring religious composition, age structure and fertility rates were provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, National Statistical Institute (Bulgaria), Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Czech Statistical Office, Statistics Estonia, National Statistics Office of Georgia, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Statistical Office of Montenegro, Statistics New Zealand, National Statistical Office (Papua New Guinea), Statistics Portugal, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Singapore Department of Statistics, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, and Statistics South Africa.

Data used for migrants and other small groups

Data for migrants and small religious minorities is often unreliable or unavailable. For example, not every census or survey includes a response option for each of the religious groups we analyze, so followers of smaller religions in that country may be combined into the "other" category. As another example, some surveys only have small samples for small groups, which can skew results. Sometimes, certain populations – such as people living in remote communities or refugee camps – are harder to reach.

Even for countries with a considerable presence of immigrants, census or survey data on the religious composition of the foreign-born population can sometimes be unreliable or unavailable. For these cases, we relied on separate sources to estimate the religious composition for the country's native- and foreign-born populations. For instance, in five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – we applied the assumption that all native-born citizens are Muslim and used data from our 2024 study "Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" to estimate the religious composition of migrants. Similarly, in several Western European countries, we employed a separate procedure to estimate the religious composition of the foreign-born population, often relying on information from the same 2024 study.

For each country or territory, we took a close look at our estimates of the size of small religious groups and compared them against estimates produced by global experts and specialty surveys.

Below is a list of the specialty sources we consulted:

International Religious Freedom Reports. U.S. State Department.

Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook. Jerusalem Institute.

Jewish Americans in 2020. Pew Research Center.

2022-23 Survey of Asian Americans. Pew Research Center.

The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants. Pew Research Center.

2017 Survey of U.S. Muslims. Pew Research Center.

World Jewish Population. Sergio DellaPergola. In Dashefsky, Arnold and Ira M. Sheskin, eds. "American Jewish Year Book 2020."

World Religion Database (WRD). Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University.

Data sources by country

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Afghanistan	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Albania	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2017-18).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Algeria	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme* (2018)
Angola	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Argentina	National Survey on Religious Beliefs and Attitudes in Argentina (2019)	National Survey on Religious Beliefs and Attitudes in Argentina (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Armenia	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2011).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Aruba	Projection of census (2010)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Australia	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2021).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Austria	Mikrocensus (2021)	Mikrocensus (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Azerbaijan	European Values Survey (2017)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2006)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Bahamas	Projection of census (2010)	Projection of census (2000)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Bahrain	Census (2020) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims based on census (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Bangladesh	Census (2022)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Barbados	Projection of census (2010)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Belarus	Life in Transition Survey (2016)	Generations and Gender Survey (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2017).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Belgium	International Social Survey Programme (2016) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	International Social Survey Programme (2016) and Pew Research Center's Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018); Muslim differential was estimated using the average of the differentials in Germany and the Netherlands.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)
Belize	Projection of census (2010)	Projection of census (2000)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2000).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Benin	Demographic and Health Surveys (2017-18)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2017-18)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2017-18).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Bhutan	Projection of census (2005)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Bolivia	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Projection of census (2013)	Projection of Living Standards Measurement Study (2002) and European Values Survey (2008)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16); Religiously unaffiliated differential estimated using average of differentials in Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Botswana	Afrobarometer Survey (2019)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2011).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Brazil	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2010).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Brunei	Census (2021)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Bulgaria	International Social Survey Programme (2018)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Burkina Faso	Malaria Indicators Survey (2017-18)	Malaria Indicators Survey (2017-18)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2021).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Burundi	Demographic and Health Surveys (2016-17)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2016-17)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2016-17).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Cambodia	Census (2019)	Census (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2014).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022)
Cameroon	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Canada	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2011).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Myanmar is based on the religious composition of Myanmar.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Cape Verde	Afrobarometer Survey (2017 and 2019)	Afrobarometer Survey (2017 and 2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Central African Republic	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2006).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Chad	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2014-15).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Channel Islands	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	Migration into and out of the Channel Islands was not modeled in the projections because migration data for this country is unavailable.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Chile	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14).	Religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Venezuela is based on religious composition of Venezuela.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
China	Chinese General Social Survey (2018)	Chinese General Social Survey (2018)	Same fertility rate used for all religions based on analysis of available sources, including Chinese General Social Survey and census data on fertility patterns of ethnic minority groups.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Chinese General Social Survey (2018)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Colombia	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Comoros	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Congo, Democratic Republic	Demographic and Health Surveys (2013-14)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2013-14)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2013-14).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Congo, Republic	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2011-12)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2011-12)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2011-12).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Costa Rica	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Croatia	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2023); Muslim differential was estimated using the average of the differentials in Serbia and Montenegro.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Cuba	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Curacao	Census (2010)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Cyprus	World Values Survey (2019)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2008)
Czech Republic	International Social Survey Programme (2019)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2020-22).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Denmark	International Social Survey Programme (2018) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	International Social Survey Programme (2017, 2018 and 2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2020) and Population register (2020-23).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)
Djibouti	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Dominican Republic	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2013).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
East Timor	Census (2022)	Census (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2016).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Ecuador	AmericasBarometer Survey (2016 and 2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2016 and 2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Egypt	Projection of census (2006)	Projection of census (2006)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2014).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Israel is based on the religious composition of Egypt.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
El Salvador	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Reproductive Health Survey (2008).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Equatorial Guinea	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Eritrea	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Estonia	International Social Survey Programme (2019)	International Social Survey Programme (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2021-22).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Eswatini	Afrobarometer Survey (2021)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2006-07).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Ethiopia	Projection of census (2007)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2005)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2019).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Fiji	Census (2017)	Projection of census (2007)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2007).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Finland	Finnish Population Register (2020) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	Finnish Population Register (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2021-22); Muslim differential was estimated using the average of the differentials in Denmark and Sweden.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
France	Trajectories and Origins Survey (2019-20)	Trajectories and Origins Survey (2019-20)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Madagascar based on religious composition of Madagascar.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
French Guiana	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
French Polynesia	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Gabon	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-21)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-21)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-21).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Gambia	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2006).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Georgia	International Social Survey Programme (2018)	Projection of census (2014)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2006) and European Values Survey (2008).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Germany	German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) (2021)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2021).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Ghana	Census (2021)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme* (2018)
Greece	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey	Fertility differences are imputed using data from similar countries; differentials for Christians, Muslims, and the religiously unaffiliated are estimated using the average of the differentials in Italy, Spain and Portugal.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Grenada	Census (2011)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Guadeloupe	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Guam	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Guatemala	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2014-15)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2014-15).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Guinea	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Guinea-Bissau	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2006).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Guyana	Projection of census (2012)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2009)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2009).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Haiti	Demographic and Health Surveys (2017-18)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2017-18)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2016-17).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Honduras	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2011-12).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Hong Kong	World Values Survey (2018)	World Values Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's East Asian Societies Survey (2023).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's East Asian Societies Survey (2023)
Hungary	Census (2022)	Census (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Iceland	International Social Survey Programme (2018) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	International Social Survey Programme (2018)	Fertility differences are imputed using data from similar countries; differentials for Christians, Muslims and the religiously unaffiliated estimated using the average of differentials in Sweden and Denmark.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
India	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on National Family Health Survey (2019-21).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's India Survey (2019-20)
Indonesia	Projection of census (2010)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2007).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022)
Iran	Projection of census (2016)	Projection of census (2006)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Iraq	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Ireland	Census (2022)	Census (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2016).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)
Israel	Census (2022) estimates, adjusted to UN boundaries. For the vast majority of Israeli residents, census religion results are drawn from Population Registry data.	Census (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Population Registry (2023).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Italy	International Social Survey Programme (2018)	International Social Survey Programme (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Ivory Coast	Demographic and Health Surveys (2021)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2021).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Jamaica	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of AmericasBarometer Survey (2014 and 2016)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Japan	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018, Spring 2019 and Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Surveys	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018, Spring 2019 and Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Surveys	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Japanese General Social Survey (2012, 2015 and 2017-18).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's East Asian Societies Survey (2023)
Jordan	Pew Research Center's Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey	Pew Research Center's Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2002).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Kazakhstan	Census (2021)	Projection of census (2009)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from China is based on the religious composition of China.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Kenya	Census (2019)	Census (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Kiribati	Census (2020)	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Kosovo	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of Living Standards Measurement Study (2000) and Demographic and Health Surveys (2009) and European Values Survey (2008).	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2009) and European Values Survey (2008).	Migration into and out of Kosovo was not modeled in the projections because migration data for this country is unavailable.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Kuwait	Native born: assumed to be Muslim. Foreign born: Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Kyrgyzstan	Both waves of the Central Asia Barometer Survey (2019)	Projection of Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2014)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Laos	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2017)	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2017)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2015).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Latvia	Projection of Life in Transition Survey (2016)	Projection of Life in Transition Survey (2016)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Lebanon	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018 and Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Surveys and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018 and Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Surveys	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Lesotho	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2014)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2014)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2014).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Liberia	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Libya	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Lithuania	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Fertility differences are imputed using data from a similar country; differentials for Christians and religiously unaffiliated are imputed using information from Latvia.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Luxembourg	Eurobarometer (2019)	Eurobarometer (2019)	Fertility differences are imputed using data from similar countries; differentials for Christians, Muslims and religiously unaffiliated are estimated using average of differentials in Belgium, the Netherlands and France.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Macao	World Values Survey (2019)	Projection of census (1991)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Madagascar	Demographic and Health Surveys (2021)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2021).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Malawi	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme* (2018)
Malaysia	Census (2020)	Projection of census (2000)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2000).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022)
Maldives	Projection of census (2014)	Projection of census (2014)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Mali	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Malta	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Fertility differences are imputed using data from similar countries; differentials for Christians, Muslims and the religiously unaffiliated are estimated using the average of the differentials in Italy, Spain and Portugal.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Martinique	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Mauritania	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Mali is based on the religious composition of Mali.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Mauritius	Afrobarometer Survey (2018)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2011).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Mayotte	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Mexico	Census (2020)	Census (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2020).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Micronesia, Federated States	Projection of census (2010)	Projection of census (2000)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Moldova	Projection of census (2014)	Projection of census (2014)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Mongolia	Census (2020)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2005).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Montenegro	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2023).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Morocco	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Mozambique	Census (2017)	Census (2017)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2022-23).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Myanmar	Projection of census (2014)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Namibia	Afrobarometer Survey (2021)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2013).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Nepal	Census (2021)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme* (2018)
Netherlands	Social Cohesion and Wellbeing Survey (2020)	Social Cohesion and Wellbeing Survey (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2023).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
New Caledonia	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
New Zealand	Census (2018)	Census (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2018) and census (2023).	Religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from China is based on composition of those from China to Australia, and religion of migrants from Fiji is based on religious composition of Fiji.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Nicaragua	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Projection of census (2005)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2005).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Niger	Afrobarometer Survey (2021)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Nigeria	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
North Korea	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
North Macedonia	Census (2020)	Projection of census (2002)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (2005).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Norway	International Social Survey Programme (2018) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	International Social Survey Programme (2016 and 2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2020).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Oman	Native born: assumed to be Muslim. Foreign born: Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims based on census (2022); fertility differentials available for Muslims and non-Muslims.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Pakistan	Census (2017)	Projection of census (1998)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Palestinian territories	Census (2017)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Panama	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Papua New Guinea	Demographic and Health Surveys (2016-18)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2016-18)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Paraguay	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	AmericasBarometer Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Reproductive Health Survey (2008).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Peru	Census (2017)	Census (2017)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2017).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Philippines	Census (2020)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Poland	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Portugal	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)
Puerto Rico	Projection of Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)	Projection of Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Qatar	Native born: assumed to be Muslim. Foreign born: Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	Census (2020)	Data on fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims based on census (2022); fertility differentials available for Muslims and non-Muslims.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Reunion	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Romania	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Russia	International Social Survey Programme (2019)	International Social Survey Programme (2017, 2018 and 2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Rwanda	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2019-20).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Samoa	Census (2021)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Sao Tome and Principe	Afrobarometer Survey (2019)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2009)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2008-09).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Saudi Arabia	Native born assumed to be Muslim. Foreign born: Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between Muslims and non-Muslims based on census (2022); fertility differentials available for Muslims and non-Muslims.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Senegal	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2023).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Serbia	Census (2022)	Census (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
Seychelles	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Sierra Leone	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2019).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Singapore	Census (2020)	Census (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022).	Religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Malaysia is based on adjusted census estimates of religious composition among citizens and permanent residents, assuming that Malaysia-born nonresident immigrants reflect the religious composition of Malaysia.	Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022)
Slovakia	Census (2021)	Census (2021)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2021).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)
Slovenia	International Social Survey Programme (2019) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	International Social Survey Programme (2017, 2018 and 2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018); Muslim differential was estimated using the average of the differentials in Serbia and Montenegro.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Solomon Islands	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Somalia	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
South Africa	Census (2022)	Census (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Community Surveys (2016).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
South Korea	Korean General Social Survey (2018)	Korean General Social Survey (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2015).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
South Sudan	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	Migration in and out of this recently established country was not modeled in projections due to insufficient data on past trends.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Spain	Merged surveys of Barometros Mensuales (2019-20) and Spanish General Social Survey (2017)	Merged surveys of Barometros Mensuales (2019-20) and Spanish General Social Survey (2017)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Spanish Fertility Survey (2018).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Sri Lanka	International Social Survey Programme (2019)	Projection of census (2001)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
St. Lucia	Projection of census (2010)	Projection of census (2010)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2001).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Census (2012)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision), with sex differences from census (2012)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Sudan	Afrobarometer Survey (2018)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Suriname	Projection of census (2012)	Projection of census (2012)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2012).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Sweden	International Social Survey Programme (2020) and Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	International Social Survey Programme (2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2020).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Western Europe Survey (2017)
Switzerland	Structural Survey (2020)	Structural Survey (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on European Social Survey (2018); Muslim differential estimated using the average of differentials in Germany and Austria.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Syria	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Taiwan	Taiwan Social Change Survey (2019 and 2020)	Projection of Taiwan Social Change Survey (2009, 2010 and 2012)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's East Asian Societies Survey (2023).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's East Asian Societies Survey (2023)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Tajikistan	Pew Research Center's Survey of World's Muslims (2011-12)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Tanzania	Afrobarometer Survey (2019)	Afrobarometer Survey (2019)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)
Thailand	Projection of Population Change Survey (2015-16)	Projection of census (2000)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2000).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's South and Southeast Asia Survey (2022)
Togo	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2014)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2014)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2013-14).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Tonga	Census (2021)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Trinidad and Tobago	Projection of census (2011)	Projection of census (2011)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2011).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Tunisia	Pew Research Center's Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
Turkey	Pew Research Center's Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (1998)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Turkmenistan	Central Asia Barometer Survey (both 2019 waves)	Projection of Demographic and Health Surveys (2000)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
U.S. Virgin Islands	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Uganda	Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2015-16)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2016).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Ukraine	Razumkov Survey (2020)	Razumkov Survey (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2007).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Central and Eastern Europe Survey (2015-16)
United Arab Emirates	Native born: assumed to be Muslim. Foreign born: Pew Research Center's report "The Religious Composition of the World's Migrants" (2024)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
United Kingdom	Censuses of Northern Ireland, England and Wales (2021) and Scotland (2022)	Censuses of Northern Ireland, England and Wales (2021) and Scotland (2022)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Understanding Society: The UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009-11).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
United States	Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel (2020)	Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Pew Research Center's Religious Landscape Study (2023-24).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset. Religion of migrants from Myanmar, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica and Puerto Rico is based on the religious composition of the sending country.	Pew Research Center's Religious Landscape Study (2023-24)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Uruguay	Generations and Gender Survey (2020)	Generations and Gender Survey (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Generations and Gender Survey (2020-21).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Latin America Survey (2013-14)
Uzbekistan	Both waves of the Central Asia Barometer Survey (2019)	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2002).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Survey of the World's Muslims (2011-12)
Vanuatu	Census (2020)	Census (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Venezuela	Latinobarometro Survey (2020)	Latinobarometro Survey (2020)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	International Social Survey Programme (2018)
Vietnam	Pew Research Center's Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey	Projection of census (1999)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on census (2019).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Western Sahara	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Yemen	World Religion Database	UN World Population Prospects (2024 Revision)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.
Zambia	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2018)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups unavailable; same fertility rate used for all religions.	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Pew Research Center's Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Survey (2009)

Country	Composition	Age and sex	Fertility	Migration	Switching
Zimbabwe	Demographic and Health Surveys (2015)	Demographic and Health Surveys (2015)	Data on fertility differences between religious groups based on Demographic and Health Surveys (2015).	The religious mix of migrants from each sending country is generally based on Pew Research Center's 2024 Religious Composition of the World's Migrants dataset.	Data unavailable; no religious switching modeled in main projection scenario.

* The official name of this source is "Based on 2018 International Social Survey Programme: A Cross-national and Comparative Study of Religion of Additional 14 Countries."
Note: Cape Verde is also called Cabo Verde; Eswatini was formerly known as Swaziland; Ivory Coast is also called Cote d'Ivoire; and Myanmar is also called Burma.
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Appendix B: Religious Composition by Country

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
World	2020	7,885,810,000	28.8%	25.6%	24.2%	4.1%	14.9%	0.2%	2.2%
World	2070	10,152,150,000	29.1	35.8	17.0	2.5	13.6	0.2	1.9
Asia-Pacific	2020	4,544,800,000	5.9	26.1	32.8	7.0	25.7	<0.1	2.5
Asia-Pacific	2070	4,917,630,000	5.9	36.7	23.1	4.9	27.6	<0.1	1.8
Europe	2020	752,960,000	67.1	6.0	25.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.8
Europe	2070	627,690,000	51.6	12.7	32.6	0.7	0.6	0.1	1.6
Latin America-Caribbean	2020	646,240,000	84.6	0.1	11.9	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	3.1
Latin America-Caribbean	2070	697,260,000	77.4	0.1	18.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.3
Middle East-North Africa	2020	439,690,000	2.9	94.2	0.4	<0.1	0.7	1.5	0.2
Middle East-North Africa	2070	789,720,000	2.3	95.2	0.3	<0.1	0.6	1.4	0.1
North America	2020	377,610,000	62.9	1.6	30.2	1.3	1.0	1.6	1.4
North America	2070	406,280,000	46.3	4.9	41.2	1.1	2.2	1.2	3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	2020	1,124,520,000	62.0	32.8	2.6	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	2070	2,713,570,000	58.7	36.1	3.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.0
Afghanistan	2020	39,070,000	<0.1	99.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Afghanistan	2070	99,390,000	<0.1	99.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Albania	2020	2,870,000	17.8	74.5	7.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Albania	2070	1,760,000	8.5	90.3	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Algeria	2020	44,040,000	0.3	98.4	1.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Algeria	2070	64,010,000	<0.1	99.3	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Angola	2020	33,450,000	93.0	0.3	6.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Angola	2070	107,130,000	93.0	0.5	5.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Argentina	2020	45,190,000	88.5	0.9	9.2	<0.1	<0.1	0.4	1.0
Argentina	2070	44,860,000	77.0	0.9	19.6	<0.1	<0.1	0.3	2.1

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Armenia	2020	2,890,000	97.3%	0.3%	1.2%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	1.2%
Armenia	2070	2,540,000	97.4	0.3	0.8	<0.1	<0.1	0.1	1.4
Aruba	2020	110,000	81.4	0.3	5.9	0.5	0.3	0.4	11.2
Aruba	2070	80,000	76.6	0.7	8.3	0.8	0.4	0.2	13.0
Australia	2020	25,740,000	46.8	3.5	42.3	2.6	3.0	0.4	1.4
Australia	2070	38,990,000	28.8	9.8	46.8	3.8	6.9	0.4	3.6
Austria	2020	8,920,000	68.2	8.3	22.4	0.3	0.1	<0.1	0.6
Austria	2070	8,990,000	51.0	18.9	28.5	0.5	0.2	<0.1	0.8
Azerbaijan	2020	10,180,000	0.4	94.7	4.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Azerbaijan	2070	10,190,000	0.3	95.8	3.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Bahamas	2020	400,000	97.6	<0.1	1.9	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.3
Bahamas	2070	400,000	94.0	0.4	4.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.8
Bahrain	2020	1,480,000	13.7	74.0	0.3	0.2	11.2	<0.1	0.6
Bahrain	2070	2,260,000	11.5	78.4	0.2	0.2	9.4	<0.1	0.4
Bangladesh	2020	166,300,000	0.3	91.1	<0.1	0.6	7.9	<0.1	0.1
Bangladesh	2070	237,230,000	0.3	92.0	<0.1	0.7	6.8	<0.1	0.1
Barbados	2020	280,000	77.3	0.7	20.1	0.1	0.5	<0.1	1.2
Barbados	2070	260,000	79.7	0.8	17.6	0.1	0.5	<0.1	1.3
Belarus	2020	9,350,000	85.1	0.3	13.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Belarus	2070	7,530,000	89.2	0.9	8.7	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
Belgium	2020	11,540,000	51.0	6.8	39.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	2.6
Belgium	2070	12,700,000	32.5	17.5	43.8	1.7	0.7	0.2	3.6
Belize	2020	390,000	74.4	0.2	15.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	9.2
Belize	2070	650,000	73.8	0.3	15.7	0.4	0.3	0.3	9.2
Benin	2020	13,070,000	53.2	31.4	4.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	10.5
Benin	2070	31,170,000	48.8	33.9	5.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	11.3

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Bhutan	2020	770,000	0.6%	0.2%	<0.1%	74.7%	22.5%	<0.1%	1.9%
Bhutan	2070	830,000	0.8	1.4	<0.1	70.6	25.3	<0.1	1.9
Bolivia	2020	11,820,000	88.9	<0.1	9.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.5
Bolivia	2070	16,730,000	92.2	<0.1	5.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2020	3,300,000	44.7	53.6	1.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2070	1,420,000	35.4	63.4	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Botswana	2020	2,370,000	82.3	0.3	14.7	0.2	0.1	<0.1	2.3
Botswana	2070	4,220,000	87.8	1.0	10.0	0.2	0.2	<0.1	0.8
Brazil	2020	208,660,000	80.7	<0.1	13.5	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	5.7
Brazil	2070	202,840,000	74.0	<0.1	18.6	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	7.1
Brunei	2020	450,000	6.7	82.2	0.2	6.3	1.3	<0.1	3.4
Brunei	2070	540,000	7.2	82.4	0.2	5.8	1.9	<0.1	2.4
Bulgaria	2020	6,930,000	79.5	10.3	10.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Bulgaria	2070	4,140,000	80.5	10.9	8.1	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Burkina Faso	2020	21,480,000	28.0	67.4	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.0
Burkina Faso	2070	44,570,000	27.8	67.4	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.5
Burundi	2020	12,620,000	95.0	3.0	1.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.8
Burundi	2070	30,960,000	94.7	3.0	1.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.9
Cambodia	2020	16,730,000	0.3	2.0	<0.1	97.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Cambodia	2070	23,820,000	0.6	1.9	<0.1	96.7	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Cameroon	2020	26,210,000	69.8	25.2	2.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.9
Cameroon	2070	71,850,000	64.2	29.9	3.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.7
Canada	2020	38,170,000	53.3	4.9	34.6	1.7	1.5	0.9	3.0
Canada	2070	41,850,000	33.3	15.6	40.5	1.4	3.5	1.2	4.6
Cape Verde	2020	510,000	78.3	0.3	20.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.8
Cape Verde	2070	380,000	72.7	1.4	25.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Central African Republic	2020	5,030,000	90.7%	6.2%	0.5%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	2.6%
Central African Republic	2070	8,140,000	94.5	3.9	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.4
Chad	2020	17,220,000	38.9	56.4	3.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.6
Chad	2070	57,050,000	37.1	58.5	2.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.7
Channel Islands	2020	170,000	85.2	<0.1	14.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Channel Islands	2070	120,000	85.2	<0.1	14.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Chile	2020	19,370,000	68.3	<0.1	30.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.2
Chile	2070	21,070,000	52.0	0.2	45.7	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.9
China	2020	1,426,110,000	1.8	1.8	89.6	3.7	<0.1	<0.1	3.0
China	2070	1,005,020,000	1.1	2.6	91.3	2.6	<0.1	<0.1	2.5
Colombia	2020	50,630,000	86.2	<0.1	9.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.8
Colombia	2070	50,060,000	75.1	<0.1	24.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.9
Comoros	2020	800,000	0.5	98.3	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.1
Comoros	2070	650,000	0.6	98.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Congo, Democratic Republic	2020	95,990,000	96.3	1.3	1.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.3
Congo, Democratic Republic	2070	311,910,000	95.9	1.3	1.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.6
Congo, Republic	2020	5,750,000	92.2	1.5	5.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.1
Congo, Republic	2070	14,010,000	92.2	2.3	4.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
Costa Rica	2020	5,030,000	87.9	<0.1	10.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.9
Costa Rica	2070	5,470,000	84.8	<0.1	12.6	<0.1	<0.1	0.2	2.3
Croatia	2020	3,950,000	90.9	1.4	6.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.1
Croatia	2070	2,580,000	91.0	1.3	6.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.2
Cuba	2020	11,180,000	60.7	<0.1	21.6	<0.1	0.2	<0.1	17.4
Cuba	2070	6,880,000	58.4	<0.1	20.5	<0.1	0.2	<0.1	20.9
Curacao	2020	190,000	90.6	0.5	5.9	0.3	2.0	0.2	0.4
Curacao	2070	170,000	85.1	1.2	9.1	0.7	2.1	0.3	1.6

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Cyprus	2020	1,300,000	67.7%	24.4%	6.6%	0.6%	0.3%	<0.1%	0.5%
Cyprus	2070	1,170,000	66.6	25.1	6.8	0.7	0.4	<0.1	0.5
Czech Republic	2020	10,550,000	26.4	0.3	72.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Czech Republic	2070	8,300,000	20.4	1.3	77.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.7
Denmark	2020	5,830,000	76.9	4.2	16.6	0.7	0.4	0.1	1.0
Denmark	2070	6,290,000	56.5	10.7	27.7	1.6	1.0	0.2	2.3
Djibouti	2020	1,110,000	1.1	97.7	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Djibouti	2070	1,940,000	3.3	94.5	1.2	<0.1	<0.1	0.2	0.7
Dominican Republic	2020	11,010,000	77.6	<0.1	19.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.7
Dominican Republic	2070	12,050,000	69.2	<0.1	28.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
East Timor	2020	1,330,000	99.5	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
East Timor	2070	1,700,000	99.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Ecuador	2020	17,550,000	88.5	<0.1	8.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.0
Ecuador	2070	21,100,000	86.5	<0.1	10.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.1
Egypt	2020	109,320,000	4.8	95.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Egypt	2070	180,060,000	4.2	95.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
El Salvador	2020	6,230,000	87.1	<0.1	11.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
El Salvador	2070	5,300,000	85.3	<0.1	13.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.2
Equatorial Guinea	2020	1,720,000	88.7	4.0	5.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.1
Equatorial Guinea	2070	3,470,000	91.0	2.1	5.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.6
Eritrea	2020	3,290,000	46.7	51.7	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Eritrea	2070	7,280,000	46.1	52.5	0.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Estonia	2020	1,330,000	52.6	0.6	43.6	0.2	<0.1	0.1	2.8
Estonia	2070	910,000	47.1	2.3	47.2	0.5	0.3	<0.1	2.5
Eswatini	2020	1,190,000	93.2	0.1	6.2	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.3
Eswatini	2070	2,010,000	92.4	0.9	5.9	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.6

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Ethiopia	2020	118,920,000	61.6%	36.2%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	2.1%
Ethiopia	2070	280,100,000	53.7	45.8	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Fiji	2020	910,000	69.5	5.8	0.3	<0.1	24.1	<0.1	0.3
Fiji	2070	870,000	75.4	5.2	0.1	<0.1	19.0	<0.1	0.2
Finland	2020	5,530,000	72.3	1.6	25.0	0.3	0.1	<0.1	0.5
Finland	2070	5,070,000	55.1	7.2	34.8	1.2	0.5	<0.1	1.0
France	2020	65,910,000	46.5	9.1	42.6	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.3
France	2070	69,180,000	24.7	20.0	53.2	0.6	0.2	0.3	1.0
French Guiana	2020	290,000	84.2	0.9	3.4	0.6	1.6	<0.1	9.2
French Guiana	2070	730,000	81.0	1.2	6.9	1.1	1.3	<0.1	8.5
French Polynesia	2020	280,000	93.4	0.3	5.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
French Polynesia	2070	290,000	92.4	0.5	5.8	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
Gabon	2020	2,320,000	83.7	8.6	5.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.9
Gabon	2070	6,290,000	75.6	15.9	5.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.9
Gambia	2020	2,520,000	2.9	97.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Gambia	2070	5,620,000	1.7	98.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Georgia	2020	3,800,000	88.2	10.5	1.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Georgia	2070	3,570,000	87.5	10.2	1.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Germany	2020	83,630,000	56.2	6.5	36.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4
Germany	2070	77,740,000	41.9	14.3	40.2	0.5	0.5	0.2	2.4
Ghana	2020	31,890,000	71.3	19.9	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	7.8
Ghana	2070	61,070,000	70.2	21.0	1.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	7.3
Greece	2020	10,700,000	89.5	5.1	4.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Greece	2070	7,600,000	74.9	11.5	11.7	<0.1	0.2	0.1	1.5
Grenada	2020	120,000	87.5	0.4	5.8	<0.1	0.2	<0.1	6.2
Grenada	2070	100,000	88.4	0.2	4.8	<0.1	0.2	<0.1	6.3

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Guadeloupe	2020	410,000	95.9%	0.4%	2.5%	0.2%	0.5%	0.4%	0.2%
Guadeloupe	2070	410,000	93.2	0.3	4.7	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5
Guam	2020	160,000	94.0	<0.1	1.8	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.1
Guam	2070	290,000	90.1	0.9	4.7	1.4	0.3	<0.1	2.6
Guatemala	2020	17,360,000	92.0	<0.1	6.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.0
Guatemala	2070	24,310,000	90.3	<0.1	6.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.9
Guinea	2020	13,370,000	11.7	86.8	1.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Guinea	2070	28,740,000	9.1	89.1	1.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Guinea-Bissau	2020	2,010,000	21.7	56.0	11.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	10.7
Guinea-Bissau	2070	4,040,000	17.0	60.2	11.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	11.1
Guyana	2020	810,000	65.9	6.5	2.9	<0.1	23.4	<0.1	1.2
Guyana	2070	800,000	71.8	6.3	1.6	<0.1	19.2	<0.1	1.0
Haiti	2020	11,240,000	88.7	<0.1	9.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.8
Haiti	2070	12,690,000	89.0	<0.1	9.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.3
Honduras	2020	10,120,000	88.5	<0.1	9.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.8
Honduras	2070	13,060,000	88.6	<0.1	10.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.3
Hong Kong	2020	7,490,000	18.7	0.3	71.4	8.4	0.3	<0.1	0.9
Hong Kong	2070	4,970,000	16.4	1.6	74.6	5.5	1.0	<0.1	0.8
Hungary	2020	9,750,000	72.4	0.1	27.0	0.2	<0.1	0.1	0.1
Hungary	2070	7,050,000	66.5	2.1	30.4	0.3	0.1	<0.1	0.5
Iceland	2020	370,000	74.9	1.2	19.8	1.3	0.2	0.2	2.4
Iceland	2070	470,000	58.2	3.4	30.6	2.0	0.4	0.3	5.2
India	2020	1,402,620,000	2.2	15.2	<0.1	0.7	79.4	<0.1	2.5
India	2070	1,700,270,000	2.2	19.6	<0.1	0.6	75.8	<0.1	1.8
Indonesia	2020	274,810,000	10.3	87.0	<0.1	0.7	1.6	<0.1	0.4
Indonesia	2070	324,500,000	13.1	84.4	<0.1	0.6	1.3	<0.1	0.5

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Iran	2020	87,720,000	0.1%	99.8%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%
Iran	2070	96,420,000	<0.1	100.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Iraq	2020	42,120,000	0.4	99.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Iraq	2070	85,310,000	0.2	99.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Ireland	2020	4,980,000	81.2	1.7	15.6	0.2	0.7	<0.1	0.5
Ireland	2070	5,590,000	68.6	7.3	19.3	0.3	2.7	0.2	1.5
Israel	2020	8,800,000	1.9	14.7	4.4	<0.1	0.2	77.0	1.8
Israel	2070	14,600,000	1.5	17.4	3.7	<0.1	0.2	75.9	1.3
Italy	2020	59,910,000	80.5	4.4	13.3	0.6	0.4	<0.1	0.7
Italy	2070	49,530,000	58.0	14.5	23.5	1.6	0.6	<0.1	1.7
Ivory Coast	2020	28,920,000	44.9	46.3	5.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.2
Ivory Coast	2070	73,920,000	38.3	51.3	6.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.0
Jamaica	2020	2,830,000	68.6	<0.1	23.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	7.6
Jamaica	2070	1,770,000	68.4	<0.1	23.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	8.2
Japan	2020	126,300,000	2.2	0.2	57.5	37.2	<0.1	<0.1	2.9
Japan	2070	85,420,000	3.0	0.8	69.2	22.2	0.8	<0.1	4.0
Jordan	2020	10,870,000	2.8	97.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Jordan	2070	26,070,000	2.8	97.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Kazakhstan	2020	19,480,000	19.3	77.9	2.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Kazakhstan	2070	34,040,000	11.1	86.2	2.1	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	0.2
Kenya	2020	52,220,000	85.7	10.9	1.6	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	1.7
Kenya	2070	102,990,000	80.7	15.4	1.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.0
Kiribati	2020	130,000	97.6	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Kiribati	2070	220,000	97.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.4
Kosovo	2020	1,750,000	5.6	94.3	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Kosovo	2070	1,890,000	4.3	95.5	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Kuwait	2020	4,400,000	10.5%	80.2%	0.2%	0.1%	8.5%	<0.1%	0.3%
Kuwait	2070	7,440,000	10.1	81.3	0.2	0.2	7.9	<0.1	0.3
Kyrgyzstan	2020	6,660,000	5.8	91.7	1.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.3
Kyrgyzstan	2070	11,160,000	3.4	94.8	0.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.2
Laos	2020	7,350,000	1.5	<0.1	<0.1	64.2	<0.1	<0.1	34.2
Laos	2070	10,250,000	1.1	0.1	0.1	48.8	<0.1	<0.1	49.8
Latvia	2020	1,900,000	77.3	0.7	17.0	<0.1	<0.1	0.2	4.7
Latvia	2070	1,100,000	71.6	0.9	21.9	0.2	0.2	<0.1	5.2
Lebanon	2020	5,700,000	27.9	67.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.3
Lebanon	2070	5,770,000	18.5	76.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.5
Lesotho	2020	2,240,000	97.3	0.2	1.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Lesotho	2070	2,910,000	98.5	0.3	0.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Liberia	2020	5,150,000	85.2	12.7	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
Liberia	2070	11,590,000	79.9	16.4	1.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.9
Libya	2020	7,050,000	0.5	99.0	<0.1	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Libya	2070	10,270,000	1.4	98.1	<0.1	0.2	0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Lithuania	2020	2,800,000	92.2	<0.1	7.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Lithuania	2070	1,400,000	85.7	0.5	13.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.6
Luxembourg	2020	630,000	65.9	1.8	25.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	5.7
Luxembourg	2070	1,150,000	55.7	7.4	31.3	0.6	1.1	0.3	3.7
Macao	2020	680,000	10.1	0.5	67.6	19.6	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Macao	2070	630,000	14.5	1.9	66.5	15.5	0.3	<0.1	1.3
Madagascar	2020	28,950,000	74.2	1.2	22.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Madagascar	2070	68,940,000	65.5	0.8	30.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.8
Malawi	2020	19,530,000	87.4	11.6	0.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Malawi	2070	47,130,000	84.6	14.7	0.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Malaysia	2020	33,890,000	9.2%	64.1%	0.8%	18.9%	6.1%	<0.1%	0.9%
Malaysia	2070	39,280,000	9.1	72.2	1.1	9.6	7.2	<0.1	0.7
Maldives	2020	500,000	1.6	94.1	<0.1	1.3	2.5	<0.1	0.3
Maldives	2070	700,000	1.6	94.4	<0.1	0.9	2.7	<0.1	0.4
Mali	2020	21,710,000	2.6	94.1	2.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.8
Mali	2070	65,390,000	2.0	94.4	3.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.4
Malta	2020	520,000	88.6	3.6	5.2	0.6	1.4	0.3	0.2
Malta	2070	840,000	61.9	14.5	19.0	1.0	1.7	0.6	1.3
Martinique	2020	360,000	96.0	0.2	2.7	<0.1	0.2	<0.1	0.7
Martinique	2070	390,000	86.2	1.4	10.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	1.8
Mauritania	2020	4,600,000	0.2	99.2	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Mauritania	2070	15,270,000	0.3	98.8	0.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Mauritius	2020	1,280,000	32.9	17.5	0.8	0.4	48.3	<0.1	0.2
Mauritius	2070	940,000	37.3	18.0	0.8	0.4	43.3	<0.1	0.2
Mayotte	2020	280,000	0.5	98.8	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Mayotte	2070	1,230,000	0.9	98.3	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Mexico	2020	126,800,000	89.2	<0.1	10.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Mexico	2070	152,380,000	76.7	<0.1	22.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Micronesia, Federated States	2020	110,000	98.8	<0.1	0.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.4
Micronesia, Federated States	2070	160,000	99.4	<0.1	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.4
Moldova	2020	3,070,000	99.5	0.2	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Moldova	2070	1,440,000	98.4	0.7	0.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Mongolia	2020	3,290,000	1.3	3.5	40.8	51.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.2
Mongolia	2070	4,510,000	1.1	5.0	42.0	48.9	<0.1	<0.1	3.0
Montenegro	2020	610,000	76.0	21.3	1.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.5
Montenegro	2070	500,000	66.8	31.0	0.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.6

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Morocco	2020	36,580,000	<0.1%	99.7%	0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	0.1%
Morocco	2070	42,540,000	<0.1	99.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Mozambique	2020	30,780,000	61.3	19.4	14.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.9
Mozambique	2070	89,130,000	58.6	22.8	13.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	4.8
Myanmar	2020	53,020,000	6.1	3.3	<0.1	89.1	0.4	<0.1	1.0
Myanmar	2070	51,500,000	6.2	1.9	<0.1	90.4	0.4	<0.1	1.1
Namibia	2020	2,730,000	90.5	0.1	5.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.6
Namibia	2070	5,580,000	88.0	0.6	8.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.1
Nepal	2020	28,970,000	1.8	5.1	<0.1	8.2	81.2	<0.1	3.8
Nepal	2070	32,850,000	3.4	5.3	<0.1	7.5	80.6	<0.1	3.3
Netherlands	2020	17,640,000	35.1	5.5	54.1	0.3	0.6	0.2	4.2
Netherlands	2070	17,280,000	21.9	12.8	61.1	1.1	0.8	0.2	2.2
New Caledonia	2020	280,000	85.1	2.8	10.5	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
New Caledonia	2070	380,000	79.6	3.6	14.6	0.8	0.2	0.2	1.0
New Zealand	2020	5,070,000	40.3	1.4	51.4	1.2	2.8	0.1	2.9
New Zealand	2070	7,120,000	29.0	5.9	51.6	3.5	5.9	0.1	4.0
Nicaragua	2020	6,570,000	84.8	<0.1	13.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.9
Nicaragua	2070	8,420,000	76.0	<0.1	21.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.9
Niger	2020	23,720,000	0.6	98.1	1.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Niger	2070	73,900,000	1.1	97.6	1.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Nigeria	2020	214,000,000	43.4	56.1	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.2
Nigeria	2070	418,100,000	31.6	67.5	0.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.2
North Korea	2020	26,140,000	0.4	<0.1	72.9	1.5	<0.1	<0.1	25.2
North Korea	2070	23,750,000	0.4	<0.1	72.8	1.5	<0.1	<0.1	25.2
North Macedonia	2020	1,870,000	64.7	34.7	0.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
North Macedonia	2070	1,090,000	53.4	45.8	0.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Norway	2020	5,380,000	71.4%	4.1%	22.5%	0.7%	0.2%	<0.1%	1.0%
Norway	2070	6,430,000	56.2	9.2	30.0	2.0	0.6	0.2	1.7
Oman	2020	4,520,000	8.1	81.8	0.1	0.1	9.5	<0.1	0.4
Oman	2070	9,040,000	7.1	85.7	<0.1	0.1	6.8	<0.1	0.2
Pakistan	2020	235,000,000	1.3	96.5	<0.1	<0.1	2.1	<0.1	<0.1
Pakistan	2070	476,430,000	1.0	96.8	<0.1	<0.1	2.2	<0.1	<0.1
Palestinian territories	2020	5,070,000	1.0	99.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Palestinian territories	2070	6,250,000	0.7	99.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.2	<0.1
Panama	2020	4,290,000	91.2	<0.1	6.2	0.2	<0.1	0.2	2.1
Panama	2070	5,920,000	87.4	0.2	10.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	1.2
Papua New Guinea	2020	9,820,000	99.1	<0.1	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Papua New Guinea	2070	17,110,000	98.9	0.1	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
Paraguay	2020	6,600,000	93.5	<0.1	4.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Paraguay	2070	9,210,000	93.5	<0.1	4.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Peru	2020	32,840,000	94.5	<0.1	5.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Peru	2070	39,530,000	87.0	<0.1	12.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.4
Philippines	2020	112,080,000	91.5	6.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.0
Philippines	2070	129,660,000	87.2	10.4	0.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Poland	2020	38,170,000	91.2	<0.1	8.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Poland	2070	24,320,000	88.4	0.4	10.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.2
Portugal	2020	10,370,000	85.1	0.4	13.8	0.2	0.2	<0.1	0.3
Portugal	2070	9,350,000	76.4	1.6	20.3	0.3	0.5	<0.1	0.8
Puerto Rico	2020	3,280,000	88.8	0.1	10.4	0.2	0.1	<0.1	0.3
Puerto Rico	2070	1,170,000	83.8	0.2	15.1	0.3	0.1	<0.1	0.5
Qatar	2020	2,800,000	12.5	75.9	0.3	0.2	10.6	<0.1	0.4
Qatar	2070	4,870,000	12.8	75.1	0.3	0.3	11.0	<0.1	0.5

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Reunion	2020	860,000	87.5%	4.2%	2.1%	0.2%	4.5%	<0.1%	1.4%
Reunion	2070	1,150,000	82.8	7.6	3.4	0.2	4.1	<0.1	1.8
Romania	2020	19,390,000	98.5	0.4	0.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Romania	2070	10,360,000	96.3	0.7	2.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.2
Russia	2020	146,370,000	69.9	8.2	20.2	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	1.2
Russia	2070	97,490,000	72.6	11.2	13.8	0.5	<0.1	<0.1	1.8
Rwanda	2020	13,070,000	97.0	1.8	1.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Rwanda	2070	28,790,000	96.8	2.2	0.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Samoa	2020	210,000	97.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.2
Samoa	2070	240,000	96.2	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.7
Sao Tome and Principe	2020	220,000	84.4	<0.1	9.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	5.8
Sao Tome and Principe	2070	370,000	79.6	<0.1	13.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	7.0
Saudi Arabia	2020	30,990,000	4.4	92.7	0.1	<0.1	2.6	<0.1	0.1
Saudi Arabia	2070	58,120,000	4.1	93.5	<0.1	<0.1	2.1	<0.1	<0.1
Senegal	2020	16,790,000	2.4	97.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Senegal	2070	39,360,000	1.1	98.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Serbia	2020	6,910,000	91.5	4.4	4.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Serbia	2070	3,850,000	90.2	7.7	1.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Seychelles	2020	120,000	94.0	0.9	2.4	0.8	1.4	<0.1	0.6
Seychelles	2070	140,000	88.5	4.5	2.2	1.2	3.1	<0.1	0.6
Sierra Leone	2020	7,910,000	19.8	80.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Sierra Leone	2070	15,810,000	17.6	82.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Singapore	2020	5,620,000	18.8	16.1	19.9	30.8	5.3	<0.1	9.1
Singapore	2070	6,780,000	18.8	25.4	21.1	22.2	9.1	<0.1	3.4
Slovakia	2020	5,460,000	73.7	<0.1	25.3	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Slovakia	2070	4,430,000	66.0	0.6	31.5	1.2	<0.1	0.1	0.5

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Slovenia	2020	2,100,000	65.4%	1.6%	32.3%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	0.6%
Slovenia	2070	1,800,000	52.0	5.5	41.1	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	0.9
Solomon Islands	2020	740,000	95.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	4.0
Solomon Islands	2070	1,620,000	95.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	4.0
Somalia	2020	16,650,000	<0.1	99.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Somalia	2070	45,540,000	0.1	99.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
South Africa	2020	60,560,000	85.3	1.6	3.1	<0.1	1.1	<0.1	8.9
South Africa	2070	81,200,000	85.9	2.8	4.1	<0.1	0.5	<0.1	6.7
South Korea	2020	51,860,000	32.0	0.3	48.3	19.0	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
South Korea	2070	36,050,000	26.3	1.4	59.9	11.4	0.5	<0.1	0.5
South Sudan	2020	10,700,000	60.5	6.2	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	32.8
South Sudan	2070	20,790,000	60.5	6.2	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	32.8
Spain	2020	47,680,000	69.5	3.6	26.4	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.4
Spain	2070	40,830,000	41.2	12.0	45.1	0.1	0.3	<0.1	1.2
Sri Lanka	2020	22,560,000	5.6	10.2	<0.1	69.6	14.5	<0.1	<0.1
Sri Lanka	2070	24,460,000	6.0	12.3	0.2	67.9	13.5	<0.1	<0.1
St. Lucia	2020	180,000	91.7	<0.1	5.9	<0.1	0.3	<0.1	2.0
St. Lucia	2070	140,000	95.2	0.2	3.4	<0.1	0.3	<0.1	0.9
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2020	100,000	86.3	0.1	7.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	5.6
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2070	70,000	89.4	0.1	4.0	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	6.2
Sudan	2020	46,790,000	0.5	98.9	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Sudan	2070	117,220,000	0.3	99.1	0.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Suriname	2020	610,000	52.8	13.1	8.1	0.4	22.5	<0.1	3.1
Suriname	2070	670,000	65.5	7.5	8.8	0.7	15.2	<0.1	2.2
Sweden	2020	10,350,000	60.8	8.1	28.9	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.8
Sweden	2070	11,820,000	38.8	19.3	35.2	2.4	1.2	0.2	3.0

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Switzerland	2020	8,640,000	61.6%	6.1%	30.8%	0.6%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%
Switzerland	2070	9,640,000	44.8	12.4	38.2	1.9	0.8	0.3	1.5
Syria	2020	21,050,000	3.8	94.2	2.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Syria	2070	30,540,000	3.9	93.7	2.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Taiwan	2020	23,660,000	5.5	0.5	23.1	19.2	<0.1	<0.1	51.7
Taiwan	2070	15,570,000	8.8	1.7	29.1	21.4	0.3	<0.1	38.7
Tajikistan	2020	9,750,000	1.0	98.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Tajikistan	2070	19,610,000	0.5	99.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Tanzania	2020	60,970,000	64.7	29.9	3.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.0
Tanzania	2070	188,770,000	65.3	30.6	3.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Thailand	2020	71,640,000	1.0	4.5	<0.1	94.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Thailand	2070	58,880,000	1.6	7.3	0.4	90.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Togo	2020	8,670,000	56.9	16.1	8.0	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	19.0
Togo	2070	19,840,000	49.4	16.2	10.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	23.6
Tonga	2020	110,000	97.8	<0.1	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.5
Tonga	2070	90,000	97.0	<0.1	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.5
Trinidad and Tobago	2020	1,480,000	70.0	5.5	2.4	<0.1	20.6	<0.1	1.4
Trinidad and Tobago	2070	1,170,000	72.2	5.2	2.9	<0.1	17.8	<0.1	1.8
Tunisia	2020	11,970,000	0.2	99.3	0.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Tunisia	2070	12,760,000	0.1	99.8	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Turkey	2020	86,090,000	0.1	97.1	2.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Turkey	2070	104,580,000	0.1	95.0	4.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.3
Turkmenistan	2020	6,950,000	5.6	94.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Turkmenistan	2070	10,090,000	6.0	93.8	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
U.S. Virgin Islands	2020	90,000	94.5	0.1	4.0	<0.1	0.4	0.3	0.6
U.S. Virgin Islands	2070	90,000	89.7	0.5	6.1	0.4	0.6	0.5	2.1

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Uganda	2020	44,460,000	87.7%	11.4%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	0.7%
Uganda	2070	128,150,000	85.5	13.4	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
Ukraine	2020	44,680,000	83.4	0.6	15.1	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	0.4
Ukraine	2070	28,270,000	84.6	2.9	11.3	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	0.5
United Arab Emirates	2020	9,450,000	14.3	72.9	0.3	0.2	11.8	<0.1	0.5
United Arab Emirates	2070	16,830,000	12.0	77.4	0.2	0.2	9.8	<0.1	0.3
United Kingdom	2020	67,350,000	49.4	6.4	40.2	0.5	1.7	0.4	1.4
United Kingdom	2070	71,850,000	25.4	16.0	52.3	0.8	2.6	0.4	2.5
United States	2020	339,440,000	64.0	1.2	29.7	1.3	0.9	1.7	1.2
United States	2070	364,430,000	47.8	3.7	41.3	1.1	2.0	1.2	2.8
Uruguay	2020	3,400,000	44.5	<0.1	52.4	<0.1	<0.1	0.5	2.5
Uruguay	2070	3,050,000	36.7	0.1	59.2	<0.1	<0.1	0.4	3.5
Uzbekistan	2020	33,590,000	2.8	95.6	0.6	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.0
Uzbekistan	2070	60,650,000	2.1	96.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.1
Vanuatu	2020	300,000	83.5	<0.1	1.4	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	15.1
Vanuatu	2070	700,000	83.1	<0.1	0.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	15.9
Venezuela	2020	28,440,000	88.1	<0.1	9.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	2.1
Venezuela	2070	33,260,000	82.0	<0.1	14.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	3.1
Vietnam	2020	98,080,000	8.3	<0.1	67.7	23.0	<0.1	<0.1	0.9
Vietnam	2070	104,100,000	9.4	<0.1	74.0	15.8	<0.1	<0.1	0.7
Western Sahara	2020	550,000	0.2	99.6	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Western Sahara	2070	630,000	0.4	99.3	0.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Yemen	2020	36,130,000	<0.1	99.9	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Yemen	2070	95,130,000	<0.1	99.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Zambia	2020	19,060,000	98.3	0.5	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.1
Zambia	2070	52,340,000	98.1	0.7	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	1.1

Place	Year	Population	% Christian	% Muslim	% religiously unaffiliated	% Buddhist	% Hindu	% Jewish	% other religions
Zimbabwe	2020	15,530,000	87.2%	0.5%	10.5%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	1.7%
Zimbabwe	2070	31,680,000	86.4	0.9	11.8	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.9

Note: "Other religions" includes Baha'is, Sikhs and many other religious groups that cannot be analyzed separately because of insufficient data. Cape Verde is also called Cabo Verde; Eswatini was formerly known as Swaziland; Ivory Coast is also called Cote d'Ivoire; and Myanmar is also called Burma.
Source: Pew Research Center's 2020 estimates are based on census and survey data. Figures for 2070 are demographic projections. Refer to the methodology for more details.
"The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2020-2070"
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

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