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Religion Remains Stable in the U.S., With Mixed Signals for Young Adults

A closer look at recent religious trends in the United States

BY *Gregory A. Smith, Chip Rotolo and Alan Cooperman*

FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:

Gregory A. Smith, Senior Associate Director,
Research

Chip Rotolo, Senior Researcher

Hannah Taber, Communications Manager

202.419.4372

www.pewresearch.org

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About the Pew-Knight Initiative

The [Pew-Knight Initiative](#) supports new research on how Americans absorb civic information, form beliefs and identities, and engage in their communities. [Pew Research Center](#) is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping the world. [Knight Foundation](#) is a social investor committed to supporting informed and engaged communities.

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About this research

This report from [the Pew-Knight Initiative](#) summarizes the latest trends in American religion and takes a close look at what is happening with religion among young adults.

Why did we do this?

Pew Research Center conducts high-quality research to inform the public, journalists and leaders. Studying [trends in U.S. religion](#) is a key part of the Center's long-standing research agenda.

[Learn more about Pew Research Center.](#)

How did we do this?

This analysis reports new data from the Center's probability-based, nationally representative 2026 [National Public Opinion Reference Survey \(NPORS\)](#) and the Center's [2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey](#). Both surveys were conducted over several months using address-based sampling. Respondents had the option of participating online, on paper or by telephone. They were not required to join a survey panel to participate. Both surveys feature much higher response rates than those obtained in most polls today (30% for the NPORS, 28% for the Cross-Sectional Engagement survey).

This analysis combines the new data with the 2025 NPORS and compares the aggregated 2025 and 2026 results with NPORS studies conducted from 2020 to 2024 and with the Center's Religious Landscape Studies (RLS) from 2007, 2014 and 2023-24.

This report also draws from a survey of the Center's American Trends Panel, conducted online and by telephone from May 26 to June 1, 2026.

Details about how these surveys were conducted and about sample sizes and margins of error for groups analyzed in this report are available in the [methodology](#).

Some of the charts in this report display margins of error with confidence intervals. For information on how to interpret confidence intervals, refer to our [Decoded post](#) on the subject.

For a broader look at how religious participation fits with other forms of engagement in public life, read the Pew-Knight Initiative's report "[How Americans Are Engaged With News, Politics, Religion and Civic Life](#)."

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
By Gregory A. Smith, Chip Rotolo and Alan Cooperman

After a prolonged decline, religion in the United States has shown signs of strength and stability in recent years.

Since 2020, steady percentages of U.S. adults have said they identify with a religion, pray daily, consider religion to be very important in their lives and attend religious services at least monthly, according to the newest Pew Research Center surveys.

In the U.S., key indicators of religiousness have held steady since 2020

% who say they ...



Note: Estimates of religious attendance from 2007 and 2014 cannot be compared with the newer data because of changes in how the surveys were conducted. For details, refer to [“Comparing Results Across Religious Landscape Studies.”](#)

Source: 2026 estimates based on Pew Research Center’s 2026 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026; 2025 estimates based on aggregated results from the 2025 NPORS (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025) and the Center’s 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025). All other results come from previous iterations of the NPORS (2020-23 and 2024) or the Center’s Religious Landscape Studies (conducted in 2007, 2014 and 2023-24).

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
And the percentage of Americans who say they went to religious services in the last month continues to climb following a pandemic-era low point.

In a June 2026 survey, 34% of U.S. adults say “yes” when asked whether they went to religious services in person during the last month, and a total of 45% say they *either* attended religious services in person *or* watched them online or on TV in the last month. Both numbers are at their highest levels since the Center started asking these questions in July 2020, during the early months of the COVID-19 outbreak.¹

Related: [*How Americans Are Engaged With News, Politics, Religion and Civic Life*](#)

Recent religious service participation

In the last month, did you attend religious services in person? In the last month, have you watched religious services online or on TV? (%)



Note: Estimates for July 2020 and March 2021 based on respondents who participated in both surveys.

Source: American Trends Panel survey of U.S. adults conducted May 26-June 1, 2026.

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¹ Since we did not ask these questions prior to 2020, we do not know whether the percentage of people who now say they have gone to services recently is higher, lower or about the same as in the years and months just before the COVID-19 pandemic.

These new findings come amid media reports suggesting that a religious resurgence might be underway among young U.S. adults, especially young conservative men.


The Center's latest surveys contain mixed signals about what is happening among young adults.

On the one hand, as **the very youngest adults** (born from 2004 to 2008, now roughly ages 18 to 22) come of age, they are reporting relatively high rates of attendance at religious services. Overall, 41% say they go to services at a church, synagogue, mosque or other house of worship at least once or twice a month, which is higher than in the U.S. public as a whole (33%).

On the other hand, **young adults who are only slightly older** (born from 2000 to 2003, now roughly 23 to 26) are the *least* religious age group when it comes to how often they pray, how important religion is in their lives and how many of them identify with a religion. And the share who say they attend religious services at least monthly (27%) is among the lowest of any age group.

Comparing the religiousness of young and older adults

% who say they ...



Source: Aggregated results from Pew Research Center's 2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025), the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025), and the 2026 NPORS (conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026).
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The youngest adults (ages 18 to 22) are no more religious today than young adults in this age range were in 2014. And young adults between 23 and 26 today are less religious than people in this age

range were in 2014. People in both of these young age categories are significantly less religious than young adults of the same ages were in 2007, roughly two decades ago.²

In addition, there is no clear evidence in Pew Research Center surveys that any birth cohort of Americans that can be tracked over time has become more religious in recent years. Since our recent surveys include only people 18 and older, we don't know how religious the 2004-08 birth cohort was a few years ago, when its members were still minors. But all the preceding birth cohorts have been fairly stable over the last six years.

When it comes to religion and politics among young adults, the youngest Republicans report attending religious services more often than the youngest Democrats, which is not unusual.³

Additionally, the youngest Republicans attend religious services at fairly high rates compared with older Republicans. But they are not solely responsible for the high levels of religious attendance among the youngest adults. The youngest Democrats *also* attend services at relatively high rates compared with Democrats in some older age groups.

In the Center's recent surveys, the youngest *men* report attending religious services more often than the youngest *women*. This is something we have not seen before in our surveys. In the past, American women have tended to be more religious than American men.

Yet the youngest women also say they go to services at relatively high rates, compared with women in the immediately preceding age groups.

A complicated picture of religion among young adults

In sum, recent Pew Research Center surveys paint a complicated picture of religion among young U.S. adults. The youngest (roughly ages 18 to 22) stand out as especially religious in one respect – their self-reported rate of attendance at religious services. But they are less distinctive in other ways, such as their rates of religious affiliation and how often they say they pray.

² We analyzed how the religiousness of young people today compares with 2014 and 2007 by comparing the percentages who identify with a religion, say religion is very important in their lives and pray daily. Due to changes in the [mode used to conduct our surveys](#), we cannot compare rates of religious attendance from 2014 and earlier to new estimates of religious attendance.

³ The same pattern is evident among older adults and in prior surveys. Across all age groups, Republicans are more religious than Democrats, on average.

Higher religious attendance is especially evident among young men and young Republicans, but it is not limited to these groups. And young adults roughly ages 23 to 26 – today’s second-youngest adults – are among the *least* religious cohorts we have seen in our surveys.

Moreover, this is not the first time in recent decades that surveys have shown the youngest Americans [entering adulthood with relatively high rates of religiousness](#). When this has happened in the past, the religiousness of the youngest adults has tended to fade with time, leaving them less religious than people in the preceding birth cohort.⁴ We have no way of knowing whether today’s youngest adults will follow that pattern or break it.

Historically, a major driver of long-term declines in American religion has been cohort replacement – the gradual passing away of older generations of adults, who have tended to be more religious, and the coming of age of younger adults who have been less religious, on average, than their parents and grandparents.⁵ This is one reason why it is important to pay attention to what is happening with religion among young people.

But Americans who have just recently become adults are a difficult group to study in surveys. Some still live in their childhood homes. Others have left home for college, and still others have joined the workforce and set off on their own. They can be hard to reach in surveys. And if the surveys don’t get a representative mix of young adults, then the findings may be biased.⁶

Furthermore, since the nation’s youngest adults make up a relatively small share of the country’s population, they also make up a small share of our survey respondents. Overall, the Center’s aggregated 2025-26 surveys used in this analysis include a total of 443 respondents who were born between 2004 and 2008, and who are roughly between the ages of 18 and 22 today. The margin of error for this group is plus or minus 5.7 percentage points.

⁴ For more on this topic, refer to [“Is there a resurgence of religion among young adults in the United States?”](#) by David Voas.

⁵ For more on generational changes in American religion, read Hout, Michael, and Claude S. Fischer. 2014. [“Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012.”](#) Sociological Science. Also refer to Voas, David, and Mark Chaves. 2016. [“Is the United States a Counterexample to the Secularization Thesis?”](#) American Journal of Sociology.

⁶ The religiousness of young adults may be related to their transition from adolescence to adulthood. If high religiousness among young adults is tied to staying in their childhood home, and if our surveys include too high a proportion of young people who still live with their parents, it could bias our results.

Conversely, if high religiousness is tied to going to college and participating in campus ministries, and if our surveys include too many young people who have left home for college, that also could bias our results.

Most of the surveys we analyze in this report do not include detailed questions about where respondents live, so we cannot directly assess whether we have too many or too few young adults who still live in their childhood home. However, we do ask respondents about their educational attainment. The data shows that the young adults in our sample who have no college experience and those who have completed at least some college exhibit similar levels of religiousness. This gives us some confidence that the religiousness of the youngest adults in our sample is not caused by bias in the share of the sample who have college experience.

The size of the sample gets even smaller, and the margin of error gets even larger, when the youngest group is divided into subcategories like men and women, or Republicans and Democrats.

Additionally, researchers are still measuring and [trying to understand](#) the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Comparisons across many national surveys suggest that heightened levels of religiousness among young people may reflect a rebound from the pandemic.⁷

For all these reasons, it's prudent to take a long view. Scholars of religion tend to study religious change over decades. Time will tell whether the relatively high religiousness of today's youngest adults is a turning point or a blip in the data.

In the meantime, the rest of this analysis provides a closer look at recent trends in U.S. religion, with a focus on what is happening among young people.

Skip ahead to read about:

- [How young adults compare with older adults today](#)
- [How the religiousness of U.S. adults has changed over recent years](#)
- [How the gender gap in American religion is changing](#)
- [How the religiousness of young Republicans compares with young Democrats](#)
- [What surveys by other organizations show about religion among young Americans](#)

⁷ For more on this subject, refer to Eagle, David and Josh Gaghan. "[Still Secularizing: Cohort Replacement, Rebound, Overreporting, and Gender Convergence in a Pooled Analysis of Eight National Surveys.](#)"


How young adults compare with older adults today

For this analysis of religion among young adults, we focus on people born in the 2000s, now ages 18 to 26. We further divide this group roughly in half, because the estimates for the youngest subset (born between 2004 and 2008, now roughly ages 18 to 22) are quite different from the estimates for the slightly older subset (born 2000-03, now roughly 23 to 26).

Today, 41% of adults ages 18 to 22 say they attend religious services at least once or twice a month, which is higher than among adults born in the 1990s, 1980s, 1970s and 1960s.

Religious attendance, prayer frequency, religion's importance and identifying with a religion by birth cohort

% who say they ...



Source: Aggregated results from Pew Research Center's 2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025), the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025), and the 2026 NPORS (conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026).

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By contrast, religious service attendance among young adults ages 23 to 26 is among the *lowest* of any age group in the U.S. population. About a quarter (27%) say they attend services at a church, synagogue, mosque or other house of worship at least monthly.

Today's youngest adults do not stand out as much when it comes to how often they pray, how important they say religion is in their lives or whether they identify with a religion.

On all three of these measures, the youngest adults (roughly ages 18 to 22) report higher levels of religiousness than the second-youngest adults (roughly 23 to 26).⁸ But the youngest adults tend to be *less* religious on these other measures than are many older cohorts and the overall U.S. public.

And the second-youngest adults are the *least* religious age group on all core measures of religiousness.

⁸ This is not the first time Pew Research Center surveys have seen the youngest people enter adulthood with levels of religiousness that match or exceed the second-youngest adults. In the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, for instance, the percentage of people ages 18 to 22 who said they regularly attend religious services was 6 percentage points higher than among people 23 to 26. But the Center's 2025-26 surveys are the first in which the youngest group has significantly exceeded the second-youngest group on all four of these key indicators of religiousness. In the past, the very youngest cohort has been more religious than the second youngest cohort on one or two of these measures, but not all four.

How the religiousness of U.S. adults has changed over recent years

We have no clear evidence that any birth cohort we can track over time has become more religious in recent years.

The youngest group we can track is young adults born between 2000 and 2003, who are roughly ages 23 to 26 today.


We can observe this group as far back as 2022 in our surveys. But many of the data points are based on small samples of less than 200 respondents. This means that the estimates are volatile and can bounce around from year to year without signaling any real, statistically significant change.

In recent years, religious attendance has been slightly higher among the 2000-03 birth cohort than it was in 2022. The 2022 reading may reflect a pandemic-era low point in religious attendance among members of this group.⁹

All the other indicators show no notable change in either direction. Estimates vary from year to year, but the percentages of people who say they pray daily,

Religion trends among people born 2000-03 (now roughly ages 23-26)

% who say they ...



Source: 2026 estimates based on Pew Research Center's 2026 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026; 2025 estimates based on aggregated results from the 2025 NPORS (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025) and the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025). All other results come from previous iterations of the NPORS (2022-23 and 2024) or the Center's 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study.

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⁹ Among respondents of all ages, 30% said in our 2022 survey that they attend religious services at least once a month. The 30% estimate from 2022 is significantly lower than the estimates from 2020, the 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study, 2025 and 2026. It is also lower – though not by a statistically significant margin – than the estimates from 2021 and from the 2023 and 2024 NPORS.


that religion is very important to them and that they identify with a religion are all about the same today as in 2022.¹⁰

The next youngest cohort – people born in the 1990s, who are roughly 27 to 36 today – can be tracked back to 2020. Compared with 2020, people in this group are now somewhat more likely to say religion is very important in their lives.

But on the study's other indicators of religiousness, the recent data shows more stability than change, with no clear evidence of either religious growth or decline.

Religion trends among people born in the 1990s (now roughly ages 27-36)

% who say they ...



Source: 2026 estimates based on Pew Research Center's 2026 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026; 2025 estimates based on aggregated results from the 2025 NPORS (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025) and the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025). All other results come from previous iterations of the NPORS (2020-23 and 2024) or the Center's 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study.

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¹⁰ We also drew on our 2019 survey of teens ages 13 to 17 to get a sense of how some of today's youngest adults have changed in their religiousness in recent years. Respondents in the 2019 survey were born between 2002 and 2006 and are roughly 20 to 24 today. We see no clear evidence that this group has become more religious as they have entered adulthood. The share who say religion is very important is slightly higher today than in 2019 (29% today vs. 24% in 2019). But the share who say they attend religious services at least monthly has fallen since 2019 (from 44% to 33%), as has the share who identify with a religion (from 67% to 52%). The share who say they pray daily is similar to 2019 (28% today vs. 27% in 2019).

Many factors can impact respondents' religiousness between ages 13 and 17 and roughly 20 and 24, such as potentially moving away from one's childhood home. Still, the numbers are a useful comparison point.


A similar pattern appears for older cohorts. In general there is no indication that respondents born in the 1980s or earlier have become significantly more religious or less religious in recent years.

We also conducted an analysis of religious change over time using *longitudinal data* from our American Trends Panel surveys. Longitudinal analyses look at the same survey respondents at different points in time.

In this case, we compared how 5,835 U.S. adults answered religion questions in 2020 with how the same people answered the same questions in 2025. The analysis shows no clear signs of growing or declining religiousness in any birth cohort. For detailed findings from the analysis, read “[Most Americans’ Religious Lives Haven’t Changed Much in Recent Years.](#)”

Religion trends among older adults, by decade born

% who say they ...



Source: 2026 estimates based on Pew Research Center's 2026 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026; 2025 estimates based on aggregated results from the 2025 NPORS (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025) and the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025). All other results come from previous iterations of the NPORS (2020-23 and 2024) or the Center's 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study.

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How the gender gap in American religion is changing


Historically, going back decades in surveys, women have been more religious than men in the United States. That's still true today, at least when it comes to prayer frequency and the importance people attach to religion in their lives.¹¹ But the differences are less stark than they used to be.

For instance, when the Center first conducted the Religious Landscape Study (RLS) in 2007, the percentage of people who said religion was very important in their lives was 14 percentage points higher among women than men. By the time of the Center's 2023-24 RLS, the gap had shrunk to 9 points. In the 2026 NPORS, it stands at 6 points.

The long-term narrowing of the gender gap in the percentage of people who pray regularly, say religion is very important to them and identify with a religion is not caused by an increase in the religiousness of men. Rather, both women and men in the U.S. have become less religious over time by these measures, with women's

Trends in religion among men and women of all ages

% who say they ...



Note: Estimates of religious attendance from 2007 and 2014 cannot be compared with the newer data because of changes in how the surveys were conducted. For details, refer to [“Comparing Results Across Religious Landscape Studies.”](#)

Source: 2026 estimates based on Pew Research Center's 2026 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026; 2025 estimates based on aggregated results from the 2025 NPORS (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025) and the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025). All other results come from previous iterations of the NPORS (2020-23 and 2024) or the Center's Religious Landscape Studies (conducted in 2007, 2014 and 2023-24).

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¹¹ In our 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study, we also found that women were 10 percentage points more likely than men to say they believe in God or a universal spirit with absolute certainty. We have not repeated the questions about belief in God in our subsequent surveys.

religious engagement [declining more](#).

The data show, furthermore, that the gender gap in religion is much smaller among young adults born in the 2000s than it is among older people born in the 1960s or earlier.

In our most recent surveys, the youngest men report attending religious services at higher rates than the youngest women. Additionally, the youngest men report attending religious services at significantly higher rates than almost all older age groups of men.¹²

The youngest women *also* report attending religious services at fairly high rates, compared with older women. The 35% of the youngest women (born from 2004 to 2008, now roughly ages 18 to 22) who say they go to services at least monthly is higher than among women born in the 1990s and early 2000s, and roughly on par with women born from the 1950s through the 1980s.


So, although the relatively high rate of religious attendance among the youngest men is noteworthy, men alone are not responsible for the elevated religious service attendance we see among the youngest U.S. adults.

¹² The difference between the youngest men and the oldest men (born before 1950, now roughly ages 77 and older) is not statistically significant once margins of error are taken into account.

How religious service attendance, prayer frequency, religion's importance and identifying with a religion vary by birth decade and gender

% who say they ...

● Men ● Women



Source: Aggregated results from Pew Research Center's 2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025), and the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025), and the 2026 NPORS (conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026).
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Both the youngest men and the youngest women look less distinctive compared with their elders on our other core measures of religiousness. The youngest men and women say they pray daily, that religion is very important in their lives and that they identify with a religion at rates that roughly match or exceed their slightly older predecessors (born between 2000 and 2003). But these slightly older adults, currently ages 23 to 26, have especially low levels of religiousness. On these measures, the youngest men and women appear less religious than several older age groups.

How the religiousness of young Republicans and young Democrats compare

Some observers have hypothesized that any religious upsurge taking place among young adults could be connected to politics. Perhaps involvement with religion is especially appealing to [young conservatives and Republicans](#), they suggest.

Among the youngest adults, Republicans and those who lean toward the Republican Party are substantially more religious than Democrats and Democratic leaners. Republicans are also more religious than Democrats in every older age group, but the gaps between the youngest Republicans and Democrats tend to be larger than among some older age groups, at least on some measures.

Additionally, the youngest Republicans attend religious services at high rates compared with older Republicans: 55% of the youngest Republicans say they attend services at least monthly, which is more than in any other age group of Republicans except the very oldest.¹³


But the youngest Democrats *also* report attending services at relatively high rates compared with other Democrats. Regular religious attendance is more common among the youngest Democrats (born between 2004 and 2008, now roughly 18 to 22) than it is among Democrats born from the 1970s through the early 2000s, and about the same as among older Democrats born in the 1960s or earlier.

So we cannot conclude that the relatively high attendance rate of young adults is an exclusively Republican phenomenon. Both the youngest Republicans and youngest Democrats report attending religious services at relatively high rates compared with older people who share their partisan orientation.

¹³ The 47% of Republicans born before 1950 who say they attend services at least monthly is not significantly different than the 55% of the youngest Republicans who say this once margins of error are factored in.

How religious service attendance, prayer frequency, religion's importance and identifying with a religion vary by birth decade and political party

% who say they ...



Source: Aggregated results from Pew Research Center's 2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025), and the Center's 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025), and the 2026 NPORS (conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026).
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The percentage of the youngest Republicans who say they pray regularly and that religion is very important in their lives is on par with the share of Republicans as a whole who say these things. By contrast, the youngest Democrats say they pray daily and that religion is very important in their lives at lower rates than among Democrats as a whole.

And both the youngest Republicans and youngest Democrats identify with a religion at below-average rates when compared with people of all ages within their respective parties.

More broadly, the surveys find no evidence that today's youngest adults are any more likely than older people to be Republicans or to lean toward the GOP. In our 2025-26 surveys, the percentage of the youngest adults (born between 2004 and 2008, now roughly ages 18 to 22) who say they identify with or lean toward the Republican Party is 34%, which is roughly on par with people born in the early 2000s (39%) and significantly lower than in every older age group. In this youngest group, 56% identify as or lean Democratic, while 10% do not identify with or lean toward either party.

What surveys by other organizations show about religion among young Americans

Findings from other high-quality surveys show some similarities with recent Pew Research Center results in terms of the religious characteristics of young adults. But there are also some key differences, which add to the difficulty in interpreting the signals in the data.

Gallup

Recent [Gallup polls](#) show an increase in the percentage of 18- to 29-year-old men who say religion is very important in their lives and that they attend religious services regularly.

The Gallup surveys also find that there are now more young men than young women who say religion is very important to them, and that equal shares of young men and women say they attend religious services at least monthly.

By contrast, an aggregation of Pew Research Center surveys from 2025 and 2026 finds that among people ages 18 to 29, more young men than women attend services regularly, while roughly equal shares of young men and women say religion is very important to them.

American Time Use Survey

We also examined the [American Time Use Survey](#) (ATUS). The ATUS is sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. It is a “diary study,” meaning that it asks respondents to describe how they spent their time during the previous day as if they were chronicling it in a diary.

In our analysis of the ATUS, we focus mainly on data from 2021 through 2025, to match the rest of the analysis in this report. We exclude 2020 since many churches were closed or open only on a limited basis during a portion of that year because of the COVID-19 pandemic. ATUS data collection was also [significantly impacted](#) by the pandemic in 2020, leading to estimates that are not representative of the full year. We include data from 2019 as a pre-pandemic reference point.

There are not enough adult respondents in the ATUS born in 2000 or later for us to be able to track their religious attendance over time. Similarly, there are too few people born after 2000 in the 2025 ATUS for us to subdivide them into older and younger subcategories (e.g., those born between 2000 and 2003 vs. those born in 2004 or later) the way we do with Pew Research Center data.

But the 2025 ATUS does include enough interviews with respondents born in 2000 or later to compare them with older adults.¹⁴ The 2025 ATUS finds that 14% of young adults born in 2000 or later say

Trend in religious service attendance, American Time Use Survey

% who say they attended religious services on the prior Sunday

	2019	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
All U.S. adults	21	14	16	16	17	16
<i>Among those born ...</i>						
2000-07	--	--	--	--	--	14
1990s	10	11	13	13	8	11
1980s	15	11	13	14	15	14
1970s	22	11	16	15	18	14
1960s	21	13	17	17	20	20
1950s	25	19	19	19	23	23
Before 1950	33	22	32	27	23	20

Note: The ATUS interviews respondents who are as young as 15. This analysis is based on adults who were age 18 or older at the time they were surveyed. The 2025 ATUS included 102 interviews with adult respondents born between 2000 and 2007, with an effective sample size of 68 and a 95% confidence level margin of error of plus or minus 11.9 percentage points (conservatively assuming a reported percentage of 50%). All other estimates reported here are based on groups with effective sample sizes greater than 100. Prior to 2025, the ATUS did not have enough adult respondents born in 2000 or later to include them in this analysis.

Source: American Time Use Survey (ATUS).

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¹⁴ The 2025 ATUS results should also be treated with some caution because data collection was suspended from Oct. 1 through Nov. 12, 2025, due to the federal government shutdown. That means there’s no data on people’s activities from Sept. 30 through Nov. 11 of that year (because the ATUS questions asked about people’s activities on the previous day). Analysis of multiple years of the ATUS suggests that in

they attended religious services on the prior Sunday.¹⁵ That's about the same as among people in older age groups; none of the differences between people born in 2000 or later and those born in prior decades are statistically significant, once margins of error are taken into account.

Among respondents born in the 1970s and those born before 1950, the 2025 ATUS finds that religious attendance is somewhat lower now than in 2019, just before the pandemic. In the other birth cohorts that can be tracked over time, the 2025 ATUS finds that religious attendance is about the same now as in 2019.

general, the exclusion of data on activities from the Sept. 30-Nov. 11 timeframe does not bias the overall results. For additional discussion of long-term trends in religious attendance based on the ATUS, refer to Eagle, David and Josh Gaghan. "[Still Secularizing: Cohort Replacement, Rebound, Overreporting, and Gender Convergence in a Pooled Analysis of Eight National Surveys.](#)"

¹⁵ We looked at respondents who completed diary entries about Sunday because that is the most common day for religious attendance in the U.S. Of course, looking only at Sunday means this analysis does not capture most religious service attendance among Jews, Muslims, Seventh-day Adventists and other groups who traditionally attend services on another day of the week. To account for this, we also examined overall results including every day of the week. When we include all days of the week, we find that estimates of religious attendance are much lower than estimates for Sundays, and there is no indication that young adults attend services at higher rates than older people or that any birth cohort attends services more now than before the pandemic.

Tracking changes in how people participated in religious services during the COVID-19 pandemic

In July 2020, about four months after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Pew Research Center asked two new survey questions.

In the last month, did you attend religious services in person at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other house of worship?

And

In the last month, have you watched religious services online or on TV?

Respondents could answer “yes” to one question, both questions or neither.

At the time of the July 2020 survey, many religious congregations were open only on a limited basis or were closed altogether because of the pandemic. We found that the number of people who had recently watched religious services online or on TV (36%) was far larger than the share who had recently attended services in person (13%).

Since then, the Center has repeated these questions on six surveys over the past six years. The surveys show that as the public health situation improved and congregations reopened their doors, the percentage of people saying they had attended services in person during the prior month has risen over time. In our most recent reading, from June 2026, it stands at 34%.

By contrast, the percentage of people who say they have recently watched religious services online or on TV is lower now (26%) than it was in the early days of the pandemic.

This basic pattern is echoed across birth cohorts. The percentage of people who say they have recently attended religious services in person is higher now than in 2020 within every birth cohort that can be tracked back that far, from the oldest to the youngest. And the percentage of people who say they have recently watched services online or on TV is lower now than in 2020 within every birth cohort.

Unfortunately, since the Center did not ask these questions before the COVID-19 pandemic, we do not know whether the percentage of Americans who have recently attended religious services in person has now reached pre-pandemic levels, exceeded these levels, or still has room to go before reaching the pre-pandemic level. Before the pandemic, we asked people how often, in general, they attended religious services. We did not ask specifically about attendance in the prior month, nor did we ask separately about attending in person versus watching online or on TV.

Compared with early months of COVID-19 pandemic, in-person religious attendance is higher now and virtual participation is lower

% who say they attended religious services or watched them online or on TV in the past month

Among those born in...		Jul 2020	Mar 2021	Sep 2021	Mar 2022	Nov 2022	Oct 2024	Jun 2026
2000-03	NET one or the other						41	43
	Watched religious services online/on TV						29	28
	Attended religious services in person						29	36
1990s	NET one or the other	31	33	32	33	28	35	39
	Watched religious services online/on TV	26	25	19	23	16	22	21
	Attended religious services in person	12	17	24	21	21	28	29
1980s	NET one or the other	36	35	34	34	35	38	42
	Watched religious services online/on TV	31	28	20	21	18	22	23
	Attended religious services in person	12	16	22	24	27	29	33
1970s	NET one or the other	39	39	42	42	40	41	43
	Watched religious services online/on TV	35	30	29	29	24	26	25
	Attended religious services in person	12	17	24	25	30	31	33
1960s	NET one or the other	45	44	48	49	44	47	47
	Watched religious services online/on TV	40	37	36	35	28	30	27
	Attended religious services in person	15	18	26	29	29	32	33
1950s	NET one or the other	48	47	49	50	48	49	52
	Watched religious services online/on TV	45	41	36	37	31	33	30
	Attended religious services in person	13	16	27	30	31	34	39
Before 1950	NET one or the other	51	51	51	55	52	57	58
	Watched religious services online/on TV	46	44	34	37	32	36	33
	Attended religious services in person	18	19	33	36	36	38	44
All U.S. adults	NET one or the other	41	41	42	43	40	43	45
	Watched religious services online/on TV	36	33	28	30	24	27	26
	Attended religious services in person	13	17	26	27	28	32	34

Note: Estimates for July 2020 and March 2021 are based on respondents who participated in both surveys.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted May 26-June 1, 2026. Data for the 2004-08 birth cohort are unavailable due to limited sample size. Data for the 2000-03 birth cohort are unavailable prior to 2024 due to limited sample size.

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This report is based on Pew Research Center’s [National Public Opinion Reference Surveys \(NPORS\)](#) (conducted annually from 2020 through 2026), the Center’s [2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey](#), the Center’s three [Religious Landscape Studies \(RLS\)](#) (conducted in 2007, 2014 and 2023-24), and several surveys conducted on the Center’s [American Trends Panel \(ATP\)](#).

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This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals. Find related reports online at [pewresearch.org/religion](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion).

Research team

Gregory A. Smith, *Senior Associate Director, Religion Research*

Chip Rotolo, *Senior Researcher*

Alan Cooperman, *Director, Religion Research*

Becka A. Alper, *Senior Researcher*

Besheer Mohamed, *Principal Researcher*

Patricia Tevington, *Research Associate*

Asta Kallo, *Research Analyst*

Meghan Rustemeyer, *Research Assistant*

Methods team

Ashley Amaya, *Associate Director, Survey Methods*

Scott Keeter, *Senior Survey Advisor*

Andrew Mercer, *Principal Methodologist*

Anna Brown, *Senior Survey Manager*

Deji Suolang, *Research Methodologist*

Dorene Asare-Marfo, *Senior Panel Manager*

Dana Popky, *Associate Panel Manager*

Editorial and graphic design

Jeff Diamant, *Senior Writer/Editor*

Bill Webster, *Senior Information Graphics Designer*

David Kent, *Senior Editorial Specialist*

Communications and web publishing

Hannah Taber, *Communications Manager*

DeVonte Smith, *Communications Associate*

Joy Li, *Assistant Digital Producer*

Others at Pew Research Center who contributed to this report include Neha Sahgal, vice president of research; Conrad Hackett, associate director of religion research and senior demographer; Courtney Kennedy, former vice president, methods and innovation; Jocelyn Kiley, director of politics research; and Arnold Lau, former research methodologist.

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Methodology

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National Cross-Sectional Surveys

Most of this report focuses on how often U.S. adults say they go to religious services, how often they pray, how important they say religion is in their lives, and whether they identify with a religion. The analysis is based on Pew Research Center’s [National Public Opinion Reference Surveys \(NPORS\)](#) (conducted annually from 2020 through 2026), the Center’s [2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey](#), and the Center’s three [Religious Landscape Studies \(RLS\)](#) (conducted in 2007, 2014 and 2023-24).

All of the NPORS, the 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey and the 2023-24 RLS were conducted with similar methodologies, using address-based sampling and a multimode protocol. The sample for each survey was a national, stratified random sample drawn from the U.S. Postal Service Computerized Delivery Sequence File. Participants were first mailed an invitation to complete an online survey. A paper survey was later mailed to those who did not respond. Beginning in 2024, NPORS participants were also given the option of calling a toll-free number to take the survey over the phone with a live interviewer. The 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey and the 2023-24 RLS also offered respondents the option of participating by phone. Most respondents choose to participate online or on paper even when a telephone option is offered.

All of these surveys were conducted over several months, featured multiple mailings to invite and remind respondents to participate, and offered monetary incentives for participation. None of them required participants to join a survey panel to participate. They feature much higher response rates than those obtained in most polls today. For example, the 2026 NPORS has a 30% response rate, and the 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey has a 28% response rate.

The 2014 and 2007 Religious Landscape Studies were conducted by telephone using a random-digit-dialing (RDD) approach.

For an analysis of the impact of switching from telephone surveys (in the 2007 and 2014 studies) to surveys conducted mainly online and on paper, refer to Appendix A of the 2023-24 RLS report, “[Comparing results across Religious Landscape Studies](#).”

All of the surveys were conducted in English and Spanish.

Complete details about how each of these surveys were conducted are available at the links below.

2026 NPORS (conducted Jan. 30-June 18, 2026)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online/telephone](#))

2025 Pew-Knight Initiative’s Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey (conducted July 9-Dec. 5, 2025)

- [Methodology](#)
- [Questionnaire](#)

2025 NPORS (conducted Feb. 5-June 18, 2025)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online/telephone](#))

2024 NPORS (conducted Feb. 1-June 10, 2024)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online/telephone](#))

2023-24 RLS (conducted July 17, 2023-March 4, 2024)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online/telephone](#))

2023 NPORS (conducted May 19-Sept. 5, 2023)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online](#))

2022 NPORS (conducted May 23-Sept. 6, 2022)

- [Methodology](#)

- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online](#))

2021 NPORS (conducted May 29-Aug. 25, 2021)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online](#))

2020 NPORS (conducted June 1-Aug. 11, 2020)

- [Methodology](#)
- Questionnaire ([paper](#), [online](#))

2014 RLS (conducted June 4-Sept. 30, 2014)

- [Methodology](#)
- [Questionnaire](#)

2007 RLS (conducted May 8-Aug. 13, 2007)

- [Methodology](#) (begins on page 174)
- [Topline](#) (with questions)

Sample sizes and margins of error

The following tables show the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the cross-sectional surveys.

Sample sizes and margins of error (trend analysis)

Margins of error are reported as +/- ____ percentage points

		2007	2014	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023-	2024	Aggregated 2025	2026
		RLS	RLS	NPORS	NPORS	NPORS	NPORS	24 RLS	NPORS	NPORS and 2025	NPORS
		Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey									
Full sample	Sample size	35,556	35,071	4,108	3,937	4,043	5,733	36,908	5,626	10,415	5,511
	Margin of error	0.6	0.6	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.8	0.8	1.8	1.3	1.8
Born 2000-03	Sample size	--	--	--	--	107	155	975	135	341	196
	Margin of error	--	--	--	--	11.5	9.5	4.0	10.6	6.8	8.9
Born in 1990s	Sample size	--	--	405	428	476	606	4,327	641	1,246	677
	Margin of error	--	--	6.0	6.4	5.8	5.2	2.0	5.0	3.6	4.8
Born in 1980s	Sample size	--	--	584	539	569	836	5,400	800	1,516	824
	Margin of error	--	--	5.1	5.5	5.3	4.5	1.8	4.4	3.3	4.5
Born in 1970s	Sample size	--	--	635	602	539	841	5,000	854	1,521	813
	Margin of error	--	--	4.8	5.4	5.4	4.5	2.0	4.5	3.3	4.5
Born in 1960s	Sample size	--	--	777	750	756	1,108	6,389	1,048	1,953	1,049
	Margin of error	--	--	4.2	4.6	4.5	3.9	1.7	3.9	2.9	3.9
Born in 1950s	Sample size	--	--	764	774	807	1,187	7,811	1,136	2,039	1,050
	Margin of error	--	--	4.2	4.3	4.3	3.7	1.6	3.6	2.9	3.8
Born before 1950	Sample size	--	--	680	653	667	844	6,155	802	1,401	672
	Margin of error	--	--	4.5	4.8	4.5	4.1	1.8	4.3	3.3	4.6
Men	Sample size	16,291	17,514	1,750	1,689	1,707	2,461	15,658	2,416	4,472	2,362
	Margin of error	0.8	0.9	3.1	3.4	3.3	2.8	1.2	2.8	2.1	2.8
Women	Sample size	19,265	17,557	2,340	2,195	2,275	3,199	20,507	3,128	5,781	3,082
	Margin of error	0.8	0.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.4	1.0	2.3	1.7	2.3

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Sample sizes and margins of error, aggregated data from 2025 NPORS, 2025 Cross-Sectional Engagement Survey and 2026 NPORS

Group	Among all respondents		Among men		Among women		Among Rep/lean Rep		Among Dem/lean Dem	
	Sample size	Margin of error (+/- pct. pts.)	Sample size	Margin of error (+/- pct. pts.)	Sample size	Margin of error (+/- pct. pts.)	Sample size	Margin of error (+/- pct. pts.)	Sample size	Margin of error (+/- pct. pts.)
Full sample	15,926	1.1	6,834	1.7	8,863	1.4	6,927	1.6	7,849	1.5
Born 2004-08	443	5.7	188	8.4	244	7.7	139	10.0	273	7.4
Born 2000-03	537	5.4	206	8.6	312	7.0	189	8.9	321	7.1
Born in 1990s	1,923	2.9	715	4.7	1,157	3.7	718	4.5	1,080	3.8
Born in 1980s	2,340	2.6	916	4.2	1,390	3.4	947	4.1	1,210	3.7
Born in 1970s	2,334	2.7	928	4.3	1,387	3.4	1,074	3.8	1,086	4.0
Born in 1960s	3,002	2.4	1,388	3.5	1,591	3.1	1,456	3.3	1,311	3.7
Born in 1950s	3,089	2.3	1,458	3.5	1,616	3.1	1,378	3.3	1,537	3.3
Born before 1950	2,073	2.7	965	4.0	1,095	3.7	979	3.9	977	3.9

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

American Trends Panel

In addition to the cross-sectional surveys described above, this report also uses surveys conducted among respondents in Pew Research Center’s [American Trends Panel \(ATP\)](#). The ATP surveys analyzed here ask respondents whether they attended religious services during the prior month and (separately) whether they watched religious services online or on TV during the prior month. These are “yes/no” questions, and respondents can answer “yes” to both of them, one of them, or neither of them.

The most recent ATP survey that asked these questions was Wave 194, conducted May 26-June 1, 2026. Complete details about how the survey was conducted and what it found are available at the links below:

- Wave 194 [methodology](#)
- [Questionnaire](#)
- [Topline survey results](#)

Methodological details about previous ATP surveys that included these questions are available at the links below.

- [Wave 158](#)
- [Wave 117](#)
- [Wave 104](#)
- [Wave 96](#)
- [Wave 84](#)
- [Wave 70](#)

Sample sizes and margins of error

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the ATP surveys.

Sample sizes and margins of error (American Trends Panel)

Margins of error are reported as +/- ___ percentage points

		Jul 13-19, 2020	Mar 1-7, 2021	Sep 20-26, 2021	Mar 7-13, 2022	Nov 16-27, 2022	Oct 21-27, 2024	May 26- Jun 1, 2026
Full sample	Sample size	8,847	8,847	6,485	10,441	11,377	9,593	9,750
	Margin of error	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4
Born 2000-03	Sample size	--	--	--	--	--	305	331
	Margin of error	--	--	--	--	--	6.9	6.8
Born in 1990s	Sample size	934	934	756	1,106	1,296	1,282	1,291
	Margin of error	5.2	5.2	5.5	4.5	3.9	3.5	3.6
Born in 1980s	Sample size	1,440	1,440	1,069	1,690	1,851	1,562	1,618
	Margin of error	4.3	4.3	4.4	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.2
Born in 1970s	Sample size	1,432	1,432	1,088	1,734	1,857	1,527	1,545
	Margin of error	4.2	4.2	4.6	3.7	3.4	3.2	3.2
Born in 1960s	Sample size	1,726	1,726	1,239	2,043	2,180	1,868	1,909
	Margin of error	3.8	3.8	4.1	3.3	3.0	2.9	2.8
Born in 1950s	Sample size	1,861	1,861	1,295	2,167	2,354	1,824	1,872
	Margin of error	3.6	3.6	4.0	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.1
Born before 1950	Sample size	1,399	1,399	949	1,566	1,628	1,124	1,091
	Margin of error	4.0	4.0	4.3	3.5	3.5	3.8	4.0

Note: The sample sizes and margins of error for the July 13-19, 2020, survey and the March 1-7, 2021, survey are identical because results for those surveys are based on respondents who participated in both surveys.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

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