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# Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently

*Israelis say the war will make Israel and the world safer,  
Palestinians expect more danger, and Americans are divided*

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## About this research

This Pew Research Center report looks at views of the war in Iran among people in the United States, Israel, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

### Why did we do this?

Pew Research Center does research to help the public, media and decision-makers understand important topics. The war in Iran was timely and topical for the public in all three places, and we wanted to better understand their opinions on the war and its long-term consequences.

[Learn more about Pew Research Center](#) and our [international surveys](#).

### How did we do this?

For this report, we surveyed 1,001 people in Israel and 1,038 people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Interviews were conducted from March 30 to May 6, 2026.

The report also uses data from three surveys conducted in the United States. The first polled 3,524 U.S. adults from March 16 to 22, 2026. The second polled 3,507 U.S. adults from March 23 to 29. The third was of 5,103 U.S. adults from April 20 to 26.

We designed the surveys so we could talk about the views of the adult population in each country. Here are the [survey questions](#) used for this report, along with responses, and the [survey methodology](#).

# Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently

*Israelis say the war will make Israel and the world safer, Palestinians expect more danger, and Americans are divided*

Israelis, Palestinians and Americans have very different views of whether the United States and Israel made a good choice in attacking Iran.

Three-quarters of Israelis say the U.S. made the *right* decision in attacking Iran, while eight-in-ten Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem say it was the *wrong* decision.

As of late April 2026, Americans are more divided, though a majority say that going to war was wrong. Americans' [views on this question held steady](#) between late March and late April, even while the share of U.S. adults who said the military action was not going well ticked up.


The [war began on Feb. 28](#) when U.S. and Israeli airstrikes killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on Israel and Persian Gulf states. [Palestinian areas](#) also came under Iranian fire. After more than five weeks of fighting, a [ceasefire went into effect](#) on April 7.

This report comparing the views of Americans, Israelis and Palestinians is based on several recent Pew Research Center surveys:

- In **Israel**, 1,001 Israelis (including 399 Arab Israelis) were surveyed from **April 5 to May 6**.
- In the **West Bank and East Jerusalem**, 1,038 Palestinians were surveyed from **March 30 to April 28**. We were not able to survey Gazans in 2026.

## Israelis, Palestinians and Americans differ over whether the U.S. attacking Iran was the right choice

% who say *the United States* made the \_\_\_ in attacking Iran



Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey and a separate survey of U.S. adults conducted April 20-26, 2026.

"Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

- In the **U.S.**, we conducted two surveys in **late March**, before the ceasefire, and another from **April 20 to 26**.

**Thinking about the potential outcomes of the war, Israelis broadly anticipate a safer world, a safer Israel and an Iran that is less likely to develop a nuclear weapon.** While they are less optimistic about how the Iranian people will fare, more Israelis think the war will leave the Iranian people better off (34%) than worse off (26%) – though many are unsure or anticipate little change.


Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem mostly expect the war to make things worse. **Majorities of Palestinians think the war will make them, Palestine and the world less safe.** And more Palestinians say the war will *increase* Iran’s likelihood of developing a nuclear weapon than decrease it – though large shares are unsure.

By comparison, **Americans have mixed assessments about the war’s long-term effects.** For example, 33% say the U.S. military action will make the world less safe, and 27% say it will make the world safer (19% say it will make no difference, and an identical share are not sure). But about twice as many Americans think the war will make the U.S. less safe as think it will make their country more safe.

Americans are about evenly split on whether the war will make Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon more likely, less likely or about as likely as it was before. And Americans are more likely to think the Iranian people will be worse off than better off. Republicans and Democrats also have very different views of the war.

## Many Israelis think the Iran war will make the world safer, Palestinians disagree and Americans are divided

% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make the world ...



Note: In the U.S., the question only asked about “U.S. military action.” In Israel and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, it asked about “U.S.-Israeli military action.” Those who said “Not sure” or did not answer are not shown.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey and a separate survey of U.S. adults conducted March 16-22, 2026.

“Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently”

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Israelis, Palestinians and Americans also disagree about whether the major actors in the war – the U.S., Israel and Iran – are doing enough to avoid civilian casualties. To read more, refer to [“Israelis, Palestinians and Americans disagree on which countries in Iran war are doing enough to protect civilians.”](#)

## How Israelis view the war

Most Israelis say that both the U.S. and Israel made the right decision in attacking Iran. However, opinion differs across ethnic and political groups.


**Israeli Jews are much more likely than Israeli Arabs to say Israel made the right decision in attacking Iran (87% vs. 19%).**

**There are also political divisions among Israeli Jews.** The vast majority of

Jews who *support* Prime Minister Benajmin Netanyahu’s governing coalition say Israel made the right decision (96%), while fewer – but still a majority – of Jews who *don’t* support the governing coalition take the same view (77%).

### Most Israeli Jews say Israel made the right decision in attacking Iran; most Israeli Arabs disagree

% who say *Israel* made the \_\_\_ in attacking Iran



Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.  
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Beliefs about the war's consequences also differ by ethnicity and governing coalition support. Most Israeli Jews think the military action against Iran will make Israel safer (66%), while a minority of Israeli Arabs agree (22%).

And Israeli Jews who support Netanyahu's governing coalition are much more likely than those who don't to think the war will make Israel safer (84% vs. 46%).

*For more about views of how the war will affect individuals' personal safety, as well as who has access to shelter, read "[Amid Iran conflict, how do Israelis and Palestinians feel about their safety?](#)"*


The same divisions show up in opinions about the war's effect on Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon.

- 58% of Israeli Jews think the war will make Iran *less* likely to develop nuclear weapons; 26% of Israeli Arabs agree.
- 71% of Jews who support Israel's governing party think an Iranian nuclear bomb will be less likely, while 43% of Jews who don't support the governing party say the same.

Large shares of both Arab and Jewish Israelis are unsure about the war's likely impact on the Iranian people. But Israeli Jews are much more likely than Israeli Arabs to think military action will make the Iranian people better off in the long run (40% vs. 13%). And Israeli Jews who support the governing coalition are about twice as likely as nonsupporters to think it will bring long-term benefits to Iranians (52% vs. 27%). (Refer to the [Appendix](#) for detailed tables by ethnicity and political support on these questions.)

## Israelis are divided over whether the Iran war will make Israel safer

*% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Israel ...*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## How Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem view the war

Large majorities of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem say the U.S. and Israel made the wrong decision in attacking Iran. (We were unable to survey Palestinians in Gaza.)

Around seven-in-ten Palestinians also anticipate that the war will make them, Palestine and the world less safe.

Views are slightly more mixed on the war's impact on Iran's nuclear capabilities. By roughly two-to-one, Palestinians think the military action against Iran will make Iran's development of nuclear weapons more, not less, likely (31% vs. 13%), though a 39% plurality say they are unsure.

Although about a third of Palestinians are unsure how the war will impact the Iranian people in the long run, many more think Iranians will be worse off than think they will be better off (46% vs. 9%).

Views on these issues are fairly similar across age groups and education levels.

### In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, most believe that the war in Iran will make Palestine less safe ...

*% of Palestinian adults in the West Bank and East Jerusalem who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Palestine ...*



### ... but many aren't sure how it will impact the likelihood of Iran developing a nuclear weapon

*% of Palestinian adults in the West Bank and East Jerusalem who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon ...*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## How Americans view the war

Around six-in-ten Americans say the U.S. made the wrong decision in using military force against Iran, while 38% say it was the right decision. In the U.S., we have asked this question twice, and views did not change between [mid-March](#) and [late April](#).


On balance, Americans tend to have negative evaluations of the war. They believe it will make the U.S. less safe, not more (40% vs. 22%) and, by a narrower margin, also make *the world* less safe rather than safer (33% vs. 27%).

Views vary drastically by party. Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party generally think the U.S. made the right decision in attacking Iran (70%), while Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents overwhelmingly say it was the wrong decision (90%).

In March, a narrow majority of Republicans thought the war would make the world safer (55%), with 10% saying it would make the world less safe, 19% saying the world would be about the same and 15% saying they were unsure. Democratic opinion was almost exactly the reverse, with 54% of Democrats saying the war would make the world *less* safe.

### As of late April, Americans are split across party lines on views of the war in Iran

% who say *the U.S.* made the \_\_\_ in attacking Iran



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 20-26, 2026. "Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently"

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Americans are divided on how U.S. military action will affect Iran. Nearly half of Republicans think the war makes Iran *less likely* to develop a nuclear weapon, while many Democrats think an Iranian nuclear bomb is now *more likely* or about as likely as before the war. Democrats are also much more likely than Republicans to think that the war will make the Iranian people worse off, rather than better off, in the long run.

On many of these questions, there also tend to be statistically significant differences between younger and older Americans – and especially between younger and older Republicans.

## Americans think the war in Iran will leave the Iranian people worse off but are divided on its impact on nuclear weapon development

*% of U.S. adults who say that in the long run, U.S. military action against Iran will make the Iranian people ...*



*% of U.S. adults who say that in the long run, U.S. military action against Iran will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon ...*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israelis, Palestinians and Americans disagree on which countries in Iran war are doing enough to protect civilians

To better understand public opinion about the U.S.-Israeli military action and Iran's response, Pew Research Center asked whether each country involved in the conflict is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties.


These questions are part of [a larger survey of](#) Americans, Israelis and Palestinians conducted this spring. The U.S. survey was conducted March 23-29, 2026, while hostilities were ongoing. In Israel, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, most of the field period took place after a [ceasefire was declared](#) in early April.

Views differ widely on whether each country is fulfilling its responsibilities to civilians:

- Americans are roughly split on whether the United States is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties, while most Israelis say the U.S. is doing enough and Palestinians disagree.
- Majorities in both the U.S. and Israel agree that Iran is not doing enough to protect civilians, but in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, a plurality hold the opposite view.
- Israelis are also much more likely than Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to say Israel is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties. (Americans were not asked this question.)
- Israeli Jews are much more confident than Israeli Arabs about U.S. and Israeli efforts to protect civilians. About a third of Israeli Arabs say Israel is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties (28%), and a similar share say the same about the U.S. (22%). Fewer say so about Iran (12%).

### Are sides in the Iran war doing enough to avoid civilian casualties? Americans, Israelis and Palestinians disagree

% who say each of the following countries is **doing enough** to avoid civilian casualties



Note: Americans were not asked if Israel was doing enough. Refer to topline for full question wording.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Is the U.S. seen to be doing enough to avoid civilian casualties?

Around four-in-ten Americans say the U.S. definitely or probably is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties, though a slightly larger share (45%) think their country is *not* doing enough. An additional 13% say they aren't sure.

Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party are at least three times as likely as Democrats and Democratic-leaning to say the U.S. is doing enough (65% vs. 19%).

Israelis have more confidence in U.S. efforts to protect civilians than Americans do:


72% say the U.S. is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties – including 41% who say the U.S. is *definitely* doing enough, more than twice the share of Americans who hold this view (17%).

Israeli Jews are much more likely than Israeli Arabs to say the U.S. is doing enough to protect civilians (84% vs. 22%). One-in-five Israelis say the U.S. *isn't* doing enough, and Arabs are considerably more likely than Jews to express this view (59% vs. 10%).

In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, one-in-five adults say the U.S. is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties. Palestinians ages 18 to 34 are more likely to hold this view than those 50 and older (25% vs. 13%). Half of all Palestinians surveyed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem say the U.S. isn't doing enough to protect civilians, and another quarter are not sure.

### Israeli Jews say the U.S. is doing enough to protect civilians in the war against Iran; Americans, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians are less sure

% who say *the U.S. is* \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Refer to topline for full question wording.  
Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

"Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently"

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## Is Iran seen to be doing enough to avoid civilian casualties?

In the U.S., 11% of adults surveyed say Iran is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties, while nearly seven-in-ten say Iran is probably or definitely *not* doing enough to protect civilians. Roughly one-in-five Americans aren't sure about Iran's military conduct.

Republicans are slightly more likely than Democrats to express skepticism about Iran's efforts, while Democrats are slightly more likely to be unsure.

[Israelis, who have been targeted by Iranian airstrikes,](#)

are very critical of Iran's

actions: Only 4% say Iran is


doing enough to avoid civilian casualties. Nearly nine-in-ten say Iran is not doing enough to protect civilians, including 79% who say it *definitely* isn't doing enough.

While there is a gap between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs on the question about Iran, it is smaller than the differences in their views of U.S. and Israeli efforts to avoid harm to civilians. Just 1% of Jews and 12% of Arabs in Israel say Iran is doing enough to protect civilians. Large majorities of Israeli Jews and Arabs agree that Iran is not doing enough on this front (93% and 71%, respectively).

Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, [who have also been subject to Iranian airstrikes,](#) have a much more positive view of Iran's efforts to protect civilians than Israelis do. A 43% plurality of Palestinians say Iran is definitely or probably doing enough to avoid civilian casualties. Smaller shares say Iran isn't doing enough (24%) or they aren't sure (27%).

### Americans and Israelis agree Iran isn't doing enough to protect civilians in war, but Palestinians are divided

% who say *Iran* is \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Refer to topline for full question wording.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

"Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently"

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To read more about Israelis' and Palestinians' views of their personal safety and access to shelter, refer to "[Amid Iran conflict, how do Israelis and Palestinians feel about their safety?](#)"

## Is Israel seen to be doing enough to avoid civilian casualties?

About three-quarters of Israelis say their own country is doing enough to protect civilians, including 52% who say it is *definitely* doing enough. One-in-five say Israel is not doing enough.


A large majority of Israeli Jews say Israel is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties – and Jews who support Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governing coalition are even more likely to say this than Jews who do not support it (95% vs. 77%).

About three-in-ten Israeli Arabs agree their country is doing enough to protect civilians. But roughly half say Israel probably or definitely *isn't* doing enough – more than triple the share of Jews who say this (12%). And about one-in-five Arabs say they aren't sure, compared with only 2% of Jews who give the same response.

Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are even more critical than Israeli Arabs of Israel's efforts to protect civilians. About one-in-five Palestinians say Israel is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties, while a slim majority of 55% say the opposite. An additional 21% say they aren't sure. Those under the age of 35 are somewhat more likely to say Israel is doing enough than Palestinians 50 and older (21% vs. 13%).

### Israelis think Israel is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties in the Iran war; Palestinians disagree

% who say *Israel* is \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Refer to topline for full question wording.  
Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes.  
"Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently"

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# Amid Iran conflict, how do Israelis and Palestinians feel about their safety?

Pew Research Center’s latest surveys in Israel, the West Bank and East Jerusalem were conducted amid U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran – as well as Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel, the West Bank and countries in the Persian Gulf.

Against this backdrop, we asked Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem about their personal safety: whether they have access to a protective shelter, and whether they think the war will make them safer or less safe in the long run.

### When did the surveys take place?

This year, Pew Research Center surveyed in Israel from April 5 to May 6, and in the West Bank and East Jerusalem from March 30 to April 28. Our field period began while hostilities were still ongoing and continued following the declaration of a ceasefire on April 7.

For more on how Israelis and Palestinians think about the war, refer to [“Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently.”](#)


## Who has access to a shelter?

Roughly nine-in-ten Israelis report having access to some kind of bomb shelter – typically either a safe room in their home or a public shelter nearby. Only 7% of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem say the same.

In Israel, 78% of adults surveyed have access to a private shelter – but Israeli Jews are more likely than Israeli Arabs to have such a shelter in their homes (82% vs. 62%). Israeli Jews are also significantly more likely than

### Israeli Jews are more likely than Israeli Arabs or Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to have access to shelter

% who say they have access to (a) ...



Note: Percentages are calculated based on two questions: “Do you have access to: 1) A shelter or safe room in your home or place of residence? 2) A public shelter or safe room near where you live?” Not shown are those who said no to one of the questions and did not answer the other, as well as those who did not answer both questions.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

“Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently”

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Israeli Arabs to report having access to a public shelter near where they live.

In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, just 5% of people surveyed say they have access to a private shelter, and 2% say they have access only to a public shelter. An overwhelming majority say they don't have access to either.

Palestinians in East Jerusalem are slightly more likely than those in the West Bank to report having access to a public shelter near where they live (12% vs. 2%). Both groups are about equally unlikely to say they have access to a shelter or safe room inside their home or place of residence.

## The long-term impact of the conflict on personal safety

We asked people in Israel and the West Bank and East Jerusalem how they think the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will affect their personal safety in the long term.

### Views in Israel


By nearly five-to-one, more Israelis say the military action against Iran will make them safer (54%) than less safe (12%) in the long run. Around a quarter think it will leave them about as safe as they were before the war, while 10% are not sure how the conflict will affect their personal safety in the long term.

Roughly eight-in-ten Israeli Jews who support Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu's governing coalition think military action against Iran will make them safer in the long

### Israelis and Palestinians, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs see impact of Iran conflict on their safety differently

% who say U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make them \_\_\_ in the long run



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
 Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.  
 "Israelis, Palestinians, Americans See War in Iran Differently"

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run – a significantly larger share than among Israeli Jews who don't support Netanyahu's coalition (45%). Israeli Arabs are even less likely to say the current conflict will make them safer (20%).

Having access to a private shelter is related to these feelings of safety, even after controlling for ethnicity, income and other demographic factors. Israelis who have access to a private shelter are more likely than Israelis without one to say military action against Iran will increase their personal safety in the long term (58% vs. 41%).

### **Views in the West Bank and East Jerusalem**

Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have very different views of the long-term impact of the conflict on them personally. Only 5% expect to be safer as a result of U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran, while roughly seven-in-ten expect to be less safe.

An additional 10% of Palestinians think they will be about as safe as they were before the war, and 15% are uncertain. (Because so few people in the Palestinian areas report having access to a shelter, we are unable to analyze how attitudes vary based on that access.)

## Appendix: Detailed tables

For this analysis, we grouped Israeli adults by ethnicity (Jewish or Arab). We then grouped Israeli Jews into two categories: those who supported Israel’s governing coalition at the time the survey was fielded, and those who did not. These categories were coded based on respondents’ self-identification as Jewish, Arab or something else, as well as their answers to a question asking which political party they feel closest to, if any. Jewish Israelis who indicated support for any party in the coalition were grouped together. Jewish Israelis who indicated support for a party in the opposition, did not indicate support for any political party, or who refused to identify with one were categorized as *not* supporting the government in power.

For the sake of our analysis, parties in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition include: Guardians of the Sephardim (Shas), Likud, Noam, Otzma Yehudit, the Religious Zionist Party and United Torah Judaism (Yahadut Ha’tora).

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### Israeli views of Israel’s decision to attack Iran

*% who say Israel made the \_\_\_ in attacking Iran, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition*

	<b>Right decision</b>	<b>Wrong decision</b>	<b>Don’t know/ Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	73%	20%	7%
Jews	87	9	4
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	96	2	1
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	77	15	8
Arabs	19	65	16

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the U.S.'s decision to attack Iran

% who say the U.S. made the \_\_\_ in attacking Iran, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	Right decision	Wrong decision	Don't know/ Refused (VOL)
Israeli adults	75%	19%	6%
Jews	89	7	5
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	97	1	2
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	80	13	8
Arabs	21	66	12

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the long-run impact of U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran on their personal safety

% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make them \_\_\_, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	More safe	Less safe	About as safe as before	Or are you not sure	Refused (VOL)
Israeli adults	54%	12%	24%	10%	0%
Jews	63	7	21	9	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	79	2	13	6	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	45	12	30	13	0
Arabs	20	35	33	12	0

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the long-run impact of U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran on Israel's safety

% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Israel \_\_\_\_, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	<b>More safe</b>	<b>Less safe</b>	<b>About as safe as before</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	57%	13%	22%	8%	0%
Jews	66	7	20	8	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	84	1	11	4	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	46	13	29	12	0
Arabs	22	37	32	9	0

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the long-run impact of U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran on the world's safety

% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make the world \_\_\_\_, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	<b>More safe</b>	<b>Less safe</b>	<b>About as safe as before</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	52%	12%	26%	9%	0%
Jews	61	8	23	8	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	78	4	14	3	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	43	12	32	13	0
Arabs	17	32	39	12	0

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the long-run impact of U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran on the likelihood of Iran's development of a nuclear weapon

% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon \_\_\_\_, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	<b>More likely</b>	<b>Less likely</b>	<b>About as likely as before</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	14%	51%	21%	13%	0%
Jews	12	58	18	12	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	5	71	14	11	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	19	43	23	14	1
Arabs	24	26	33	17	0

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the long-run impact of U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran on the Iranian people

% who say that in the long run, U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make the Iranian people \_\_\_\_, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	<b>Better off</b>	<b>Worse off</b>	<b>About as well off as before</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	34%	26%	21%	19%	0%
Jews	40	21	21	19	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	52	16	17	15	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	27	26	24	24	0
Arabs	13	44	25	18	0

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of Israel's efforts to avoid civilian casualties in the Iran war

% who say Israel is \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	<b>TOTAL Doing enough</b>	<b>Definitely doing enough</b>	<b>Probably doing enough</b>	<b>Probably not doing enough</b>	<b>Definitely not doing enough</b>	<b>TOTAL Not doing enough</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	74%	52%	23%	12%	8%	20%	5%	0%
Jews	86	62	24	9	2	12	2	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	95	79	16	4	1	5	0	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	77	43	34	15	4	19	4	0
Arabs	28	12	16	20	32	52	18	2

Note: Refer to topline for full question wording.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of the U.S.'s efforts to avoid civilian casualties in the Iran war

% who say the U.S. is \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition

	<b>TOTAL Doing enough</b>	<b>Definitely doing enough</b>	<b>Probably doing enough</b>	<b>Probably not doing enough</b>	<b>Definitely not doing enough</b>	<b>TOTAL Not doing enough</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	72%	41%	30%	10%	10%	20%	8%	0%
Jews	84	50	35	8	3	10	5	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	90	59	31	6	1	7	3	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	78	39	39	10	4	14	8	0
Arabs	22	9	13	20	39	59	17	2

Note: Refer to topline for full question wording.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Israeli views of Iran's efforts to avoid civilian casualties in the Iran war

*% who say Iran is \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties, by ethnicity and support for the governing coalition*

	<b>TOTAL Doing enough</b>	<b>Definitely doing enough</b>	<b>Probably doing enough</b>	<b>Probably not doing enough</b>	<b>Definitely not doing enough</b>	<b>TOTAL Not doing enough</b>	<b>Or are you not sure</b>	<b>Refused (VOL)</b>
Israeli adults	4%	2%	2%	9%	79%	89%	7%	1%
Jews	1	1	1	7	86	93	5	0
<i>Support the governing coalition</i>	1	1	0	5	90	95	4	0
<i>Do not support the governing coalition</i>	2	1	1	9	82	91	7	0
Arabs	12	4	8	19	52	71	14	3

Note: Refer to topline for full question wording.

Source: Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey.

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## Methodology

### About Pew Research Center’s Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on face-to-face interviews conducted in Israel and the West Bank and East Jerusalem under the direction of Gallup. The results are based on national samples unless otherwise noted. Read more about our [international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs](#).

For U.S. data, this analysis draws on three waves of Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel: ATP Wave 189, conducted March 16-22, 2026, ATP Wave 190, conducted March 23-29, 2026, and ATP Wave 192, conducted April 20-26, 2026.

### The American Trends Panel survey methodology, Wave 189

#### Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 189 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 16 to March 22, 2026. A total of 3,524 panelists responded out of 4,053 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 87%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,524 respondents is plus or minus 1.8 percentage points.

The survey includes an [oversample](#) of non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of this smaller demographic subgroup. Oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,383) and live telephone (n=141) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel](#).”

#### Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S.

Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.<sup>1</sup> Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.<sup>2</sup> Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

### **Sample design**

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

### **Questionnaire development and testing**

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

### **Incentives**

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$15 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

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<sup>1</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.”

<sup>2</sup> Email [pewsurveys@pewresearch.org](mailto:pewsurveys@pewresearch.org).

## Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 16 to March 22, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

**For panelists who take surveys online:**<sup>3</sup> Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 16.<sup>4</sup> Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 16. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 17.

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### Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents, ATP Wave 189

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 16, 2026	March 17, 2026
First reminder	March 19, 2026	March 19, 2026
Final reminder	March 21, 2026	March 21, 2026

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

**For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer:** Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 13. Soft launch took place on March 16 and involved dialing until a total of nine interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

## Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result

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<sup>3</sup> The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

<sup>4</sup> Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

of this checking, eight ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

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### American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2024 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Validated 2024 presidential election turnout and vote choice	Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS.

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. For weighting to the 2024 presidential election results, panelists are considered validated voters if their self-report of having voted was confirmed after matching to a national voter registry.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

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### Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 189

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,524	1.8 percentage points
Form 1	1,771	2.6 percentage points
Form 2	1,753	2.6 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,567	2.7 percentage points
Form 1	767	3.8 percentage points
Form 2	800	3.8 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,800	2.6 percentage points
Form 1	923	3.6 percentage points
Form 2	877	3.7 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of non-Hispanic Asian adults. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

### Final dispositions, ATP Wave 189

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,524
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	88
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	23
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	410
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	8
<b>Total panelists sampled for the survey</b>		<b>4,053</b>
Completed interviews	I	3,524
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	111
Non-contact	NC	410
Other	O	8
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,053</b>
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		87%

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### Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 189

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	74%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 189	40%
Response rate to Wave 189 survey	87%
<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>3%</b>

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## The American Trends Panel survey methodology – Wave 190

### Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 190 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 23 to March 29, 2026. A total of 3,507 panelists responded out of 4,046 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 87%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,507 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes an [oversample](#) of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,377) and live telephone (n=130) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

## Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.<sup>5</sup> Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.<sup>6</sup> Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

## Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Muslim, Jewish, and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

## Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

## Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the

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<sup>5</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.”

<sup>6</sup> Email [pewsurveys@pewresearch.org](mailto:pewsurveys@pewresearch.org).

respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

### Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 23 to March 29, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

**For panelists who take surveys online:**<sup>7</sup> Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 23.<sup>8</sup> Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 23. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 24.

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#### Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents, ATP Wave 190

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 23, 2026	March 24, 2026
First reminder	March 26, 2026	March 26, 2026
Final reminder	March 28, 2026	March 28, 2026

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

**For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer:** Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 20. Soft launch took place on March 23 and involved dialing until a total of three interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

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<sup>7</sup> The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

<sup>8</sup> Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

## Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, five ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the

population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

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### American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2024 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Validated 2024 presidential election turnout and vote choice	Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS.

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. For weighting to the 2024 presidential election results, panelists are considered validated voters if their self-report of having voted was confirmed after matching to a national voter registry.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

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### Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 190

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,507	1.9 percentage points
Form 1	1,765	2.7 percentage points
Form 2	1,742	2.8 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,504	2.8 percentage points
Form 1	769	4.0 percentage points
Form 2	735	4.1 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,858	2.7 percentage points
Form 1	920	3.8 percentage points
Form 2	938	3.9 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. Refer to the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

### Final dispositions, ATP Wave 190

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,507
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	95
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	32
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	407
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	5
<b>Total panelists sampled for the survey</b>		<b>4,046</b>
Completed interviews	I	3,507
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	127
Non-contact	NC	407
Other	O	5
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,046</b>
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		87%

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### Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 190

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	74%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 190	40%
Response rate to Wave 190 survey	87%
<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>3%</b>

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## The American Trends Panel survey methodology – Wave 192

### Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 192 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from April 20 to April 26, 2026. A total of 5,103 panelists responded out of 5,898 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 87%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 5,103 respondents is plus or minus 1.6 percentage points.

The survey includes [oversamples](#) of non-Hispanic Asian adults and Hispanic validated Trump voters in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=4,900) and live telephone (n=203) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

### Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.<sup>9</sup> Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.<sup>10</sup> Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”)

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<sup>9</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

<sup>10</sup> Email [pewsurveys@pewresearch.org](mailto:pewsurveys@pewresearch.org).

to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

### **Sample design**

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which the following groups were oversampled: non-Hispanic Asian adults and Hispanic validated Trump voters. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

### **Questionnaire development and testing**

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

### **Incentives**

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$15 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

### **Data collection protocol**

The data collection field period for this survey was April 20 to April 26, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

**For panelists who take surveys online:**<sup>11</sup> Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on April 20.<sup>12</sup> Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch.

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<sup>11</sup> The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

<sup>12</sup> Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on April 20. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on April 21.

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**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,  
ATP Wave 192**

	<b>Soft launch</b>	<b>Full launch</b>
Initial invitation	April 20, 2026	April 21, 2026
First reminder	April 23, 2026	April 23, 2026
Final reminder	April 25, 2026	April 25, 2026

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

**For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer:** Prenotification postcards were mailed on April 17. Soft launch took place on April 20 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

**Data quality checks**

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

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### American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2024 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Validated 2024 presidential election turnout and vote choice	Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS.

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. For weighting to the 2024 presidential election results, panelists are considered validated voters if their self-report of having voted was confirmed after matching to a national voter registry.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

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### Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 192

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	5,103	1.6 percentage points
Form 1	2,534	2.2 percentage points
Form 2	2,569	2.2 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	2,368	2.3 percentage points
Form 1	1,183	3.2 percentage points
Form 2	1,185	3.2 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	2,537	2.2 percentage points
Form 1	1,254	3.2 percentage points
Form 2	1,283	3.1 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of non-Hispanic Asian adults and Hispanic validated Trump voters. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

### Final dispositions, ATP Wave 192

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	5,103
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	149
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	40
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	603
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
<b>Total panelists sampled for the survey</b>		<b>5,898</b>
Completed interviews	I	5,103
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	189
Non-contact	NC	603
Other	O	3
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>5,898</b>
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		87%

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### Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 192

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	74%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 192	40%
Response rate to Wave 192 survey	87%
<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>3%</b>

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## Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center**  
**Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey**  
**June 9, 2026 Release**

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the Methodology section and our [international survey methods database](#).
- Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q62a. Do you think each of the following countries made the right decision or the wrong decision in attacking Iran? a. Israel			
		Right decision	Wrong decision	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2026	73	20	7	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	4	78	18	100

		Q62b. Do you think each of the following countries made the right decision or the wrong decision in attacking Iran? b. The United States			
		Right decision	Wrong decision	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	April, 2026	38	59	3	100
	March, 2026	38	59	3	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	75	19	6	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	2	80	18	100

		Q63. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make you ...?					
		More safe	Less safe	About as safe as before	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
Israel	Spring, 2026	54	12	24	10	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	5	68	10	15	2	100

		Q64. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make (survey country) ...?					
		More safe	Less safe	About as safe as before	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
U.S.	March, 2026	22	40	20	18	1	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	57	13	22	8	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	5	69	8	15	2	100

In the U.S., question asked about 'U.S. military action'

		Q65. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make the world ...?					
		More safe	Less safe	About as safe as before	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
U.S.	March, 2026	27	33	19	19	1	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	52	12	26	9	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	5	68	7	18	2	100

In the U.S., question asked about 'U.S. military action'

		Q66. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon ...?					
		More likely	Less likely	About as likely as before	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	27	27	29	16	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	14	51	21	13	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	31	13	11	39	5	100

In the U.S., question asked about 'U.S. military action'

		Q67. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make the Iranian people...?					
		Better off	Worse off	About as well off as before	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	25	36	16	21	2	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	34	26	21	19	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	9	46	9	32	5	100

In the U.S., question asked about 'U.S. military action'

		Q68a. Thinking about the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran and Iran's military response, would you say each of the following countries is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties? a. Israel								
		TOTAL Doing enough	TOTAL Not doing enough	Definitely is doing enough	Probably is doing enough	Probably is not doing enough	Definitely is not doing enough	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
Israel	Spring, 2026	74	20	52	23	12	8	5	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	19	55	11	8	10	45	21	5	100

		Q68b. Thinking about the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran and Iran's military response, would you say each of the following countries is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties? b. The United States								
		TOTAL Doing enough	TOTAL Not doing enough	Definitely is doing enough	Probably is doing enough	Probably is not doing enough	Definitely is not doing enough	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	41	45	17	24	21	24	13	1	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	72	20	41	30	10	10	8	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	20	50	10	10	10	39	25	5	100

In the U.S., question asked about 'U.S. military action'

		Q68c. Thinking about the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran and Iran's military response, would you say each of the following countries is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties? c. Iran								
		TOTAL Doing enough	TOTAL Not doing enough	Definitely is doing enough	Probably is doing enough	Probably is not doing enough	Definitely is not doing enough	Or are you not sure	Refused (DO NOT READ)	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	11	69	2	9	30	39	19	1	100
Israel	Spring, 2026	4	89	2	2	9	79	7	1	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	43	24	18	25	14	10	27	5	100

In the U.S., question asked about 'U.S. military action'

		Q69a. Do you have access to each of the following? a. A shelter or saferoom in your home or place of residence			
		Yes	No	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2026	78	22	0	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	5	95	1	100

		Q69b. Do you have access to each of the following? b. A public shelter or saferoom near where you live			
		Yes	No	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2026	51	44	6	100
West Bank / East Jerusalem	Spring, 2026	4	96	1	100