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Americans Have Become Less Confident in Trump's Decision-Making on Ukraine

Partisan differences continue in views of the Russia-Ukraine war

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About this research

This Pew Research Center report looks at U.S. views of the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Why did we do this?

Pew Research Center does research to help the public, media and decision-makers understand important topics. This report builds on our [previous work](#) on how Americans view Russia and Ukraine.

[Learn more about Pew Research Center.](#)

How did we do this?

For this report, we surveyed 3,507 adults from March 23 to 29, 2026. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center's [American Trends Panel](#). The survey represents the views of the full U.S. adult population. Views of Russia as a partner, enemy or competitor come from [an earlier survey](#) of 8,512 U.S. adults conducted Jan. 20 to Jan.26, 2026.

Here are the [survey questions](#) used for this report, the [detailed responses](#) and the [survey methodology](#).

Americans Have Become Less Confident in Trump's Decision-Making on Ukraine

Partisan differences continue in views of the Russia-Ukraine war

More than four years into the war between Russia and Ukraine, a new Pew Research Center survey finds that Republicans and Democrats continue to hold differing opinions about the conflict.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to say the United States is providing too much support to Ukraine and to have confidence in President Donald Trump's decision-making about the war.


This confidence has decreased in recent months. About three-in-ten Americans overall (32%) are very or somewhat confident that Trump can make good decisions about the war, down from 40% in August 2025. Confidence has dropped among both Republicans (-13 percentage points) and Democrats (-4 points) over this period.

Here are more key findings from the survey:

- Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say the Russia-Ukraine war is important to them personally (62% vs. 49%).
- Americans, including eight-in-ten or more in each party, still hold broadly negative views of both Russia and its leader, President Vladimir Putin. Opinion has not changed significantly over the past year.

Declining confidence in Trump's decision-making on Russia-Ukraine war

% who say they are *very/somewhat confident* that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to the war between Russia and Ukraine, by party



Note: In previous surveys, the question read "wise decisions" instead of "good decisions." In 2024, we asked about candidate Trump and issues he "may face next year."

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026. "Americans Have Become Less Confident in Trump's Decision-Making on Ukraine"

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- Half of U.S. adults have confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to do the right thing regarding world affairs, while 40% do not. Democrats continue to express more positive views than Republicans about Zelenskyy.

Views on a few issues have changed over time:

- More Americans now say the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine in its war with Russia (29%) than said this in February 2025 (22%).
- Since 2024, the share of Americans who say the war is important to them personally has decreased.
- While Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say Russia is an enemy of the U.S., as opposed to a competitor or partner, a January 2026 survey found that partisans have moved closer together on this question: More Republicans say Russia is an enemy than in 2025, while fewer Democrats say the same.

Related: [Republicans have become less likely to say NATO membership benefits the U.S.](#)

What is the right level of U.S. support for Ukraine?

Americans have mixed views of how much support their country should provide Ukraine, now more than four years after Russia’s military invasion.

About three-in-ten (29%) say the U.S. does not provide enough support to Ukraine, 26% say it provides about the right amount of support, and 20% say it provides too much support.


The share of Americans who say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine is on par with [sentiment in August 2025](#). But it’s down overall from February 2025, when 30% said the U.S. was providing too much support. The share of Americans who say the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine has also held steady since August but saw a jump between February and August last year.

Wide partisan gaps remain

Democrats are more than four times as likely than Republicans to say the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine (50% vs. 11%). Though Democrats have been more likely than Republicans to say this for several years, that partisan gap increased in 2025 and remains similarly large in 2026.

Wide partisan gap persists on how much support U.S. should give Ukraine

% who say when it comes to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is providing ___ support



Note: Those who said “not sure” or did not answer are not shown.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.
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Is the Russia-Ukraine war personally important to Americans?

A majority of Americans (54%) say the war is at least somewhat important to them personally, while 34% say it is not. Another 12% are not sure.


Slightly fewer Americans see the Russia-Ukraine war as important to them personally now than did in 2024 (54% vs. 59%). But the share who say the war is important to them did not change significantly from 2025 to 2026.

Democrats (62%) are more likely than Republicans (49%) to say the war is important to them personally.

Among partisans, there are significant differences by age. Democrats ages 50 and older (71%) are more likely than those ages 18 to 49 (55%) to say the war is important to them. Likewise, older Republicans (60%) are much more likely than younger Republicans (37%) to hold this view.

More than half of Americans see Russia-Ukraine war as important personally

% who say the war between Russia and Ukraine is ___ important to them personally



Note: Those who said "not sure" or did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.
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Do Americans have confidence in Trump to make good decisions on Ukraine?

About two-thirds of Americans (66%) are not confident Trump can make good decisions when it comes to the war between Ukraine and Russia.

Confidence in Trump on this issue ranks among the lowest across the [12 foreign policy issues](#) we asked about.

About a third (32%) say they are at least somewhat confident in Trump on the Russia-Ukraine war.


As with views of Trump's decision-making on other foreign policy issues, opinions are deeply divided along partisan lines: 60% of Republicans say they are confident in Trump's ability to make good decisions about the war, compared with 7% of Democrats.

Conservative Republicans are much more likely than their moderate and liberal counterparts to be confident in Trump's decision-making on this issue (68% vs 46%).

Related: [Do Americans think Trump can make good decisions about various foreign policy issues?](#)

Few Americans are confident Trump can make good decisions about the Russia-Ukraine war

% who are ___ that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to each of the following



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.

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Confidence in Zelenskyy

Half of U.S. adults express confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to do the right thing regarding world affairs, while 40% lack confidence in him. Another 9% say they have never heard of the Ukrainian leader.

Views of Zelenskyy have remained stable in recent years, following a [slight decline between 2023 and 2024](#) that occurred primarily among Republicans. While Democrats (69%) are more likely than Republicans (34%) to express confidence in Zelenskyy, Republicans' views have warmed slightly since last year (+4 points). Roughly the same share of Democrats express confidence in Zelenskyy today as did in 2025.


Is Russia seen as an enemy, competitor or partner?

Around half of Americans (51%) say they think of Russia as an enemy of the U.S., while 39% view it as a competitor and 7% see it as a partner, according to a survey conducted in late January 2026.

While these figures are largely unchanged from last year, the [partisan divide on views of Russia as an enemy](#) has decreased since last year, from 22 points to 10 points. This is because Republicans have become *more* likely to say Russia is an enemy of the U.S. over the past year (40% vs. 47%) while Democrats have become slightly *less* likely to say this (62% vs. 57%).

Rising share of Republicans and falling share of Democrats see Russia as an enemy of the U.S.

% who think of Russia as a(n) ___ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Jan. 20-26, 2026.

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More Republicans now say Russia is an enemy than a competitor – the first time we have seen this balance of opinion among them since 2024.

Younger Americans have slightly more positive views of Russia than older Americans on this question: 40% of adults under 50 see Russia as an enemy, compared with 62% of those ages 50 and older.

Views of Russia and Putin


When asked whether they have an overall favorable or unfavorable view of Russia, 83% of U.S. adults say the latter, including large majorities of Republicans and Democrats.

Similarly, large majorities in both parties express little or no confidence in Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs.


Opinions of Russia and Putin have generally not changed over the past year and have been consistently negative since before the war between Russia and Ukraine began.

Americans widely negative towards Russia and Putin

% who have a ___ opinion of Russia



% who have ___ in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer or said "Never heard of this person" are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 190 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 23 to March 29, 2026. A total of 3,507 panelists responded out of 4,046 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 87%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,507 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes an [oversample](#) of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,377) and live telephone (n=130) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

² Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Muslim, Jewish, and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 23 to March 29, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 23.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 23. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 24.

**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,
ATP Wave 190**

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 23, 2026	March 24, 2026
First reminder	March 26, 2026	March 26, 2026
Final reminder	March 28, 2026	March 28, 2026

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 20. Soft launch took place on March 23 and involved dialing until a total of three interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, five ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

³ The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

⁴ Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2024 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Validated 2024 presidential election turnout and vote choice	Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS.

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. For weighting to the 2024 presidential election results, panelists are considered validated voters if their self-report of having voted was confirmed after matching to a national voter registry.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 190

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,507	1.9 percentage points
Form 1	1,765	2.7 percentage points
Form 2	1,742	2.8 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,504	2.8 percentage points
Form 1	769	4.0 percentage points
Form 2	735	4.1 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,858	2.7 percentage points
Form 1	920	3.8 percentage points
Form 2	938	3.9 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. Refer to the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 190

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,507
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	95
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	32
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	407
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	5
Total panelists sampled for the survey		4,046
Completed interviews	I	3,507
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	127
Non-contact	NC	407
Other	O	5
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,046
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		87%

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Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 190

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	74%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 190	40%
Response rate to Wave 190 survey	87%
Cumulative response rate	3%

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**2026 PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL
Wave 190: Global Attitudes Survey
March 23-29, 2026**

QUESTIONNAIRE

Note: The questions presented below are part of a larger survey conducted on the American Trends Panel. For all questions, the 98 ("don't know" in phone mode) and 99 (refusal in phone mode and no answer in web mode) codes are combined in the data for analytical purposes.

PN = Programming note

CODEBOOK FOR ATP SAMPLE VARIABLES TO BE USED IN SURVEY PROGRAMMING LOGIC

X_FORM

- 1 Form 1
- 2 Form 2

Note: Flag to randomly assign panelists to one of two forms (Form 1, Form 2) and weight within form
Source: Randomly assigned for each survey.

 -----**MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE BEGINS HERE**-----

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

BAT: FAV

ASK ALL:

[**PN: RANDOMIZE ITEMS; SHOW ITEMS ACROSS TWO SCREENS WITH 5 ITEMS ON EACH SCREEN; ALWAYS SHOW FAV_US FIRST AND ON SCREEN 1; INCLUDE RANDOMIZATION IN DATA FILE**]

[**PN: SHOW "READ FOR FIRST ITEM" AND "READ FOR SUBSEQUENT ITEMS" ON THE FIRST SCREEN; ON THE FIRST SCREEN, BETWEEN THE QUESTION TEXT AND THE GRID, INCLUDE AN INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: "[INTERVIEWER NOTE: QUESTION CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE]"; ONLY SHOW "READ FOR SUBSEQUENT ITEMS" ON THE SECOND SCREEN**]

[**PN: IF WEB:**] Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...

[**PN: IF CATI: READ FOR FIRST ITEM:**] Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of (INSERT ITEM)? (READ LIST)

[**PN: IF CATI: READ FOR SUBSEQUENT ITEMS:**] Next, (INSERT ITEM). (READ AS NECESSARY: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of (INSERT ITEM)? (READ LIST IF NECESSARY))

BATTERY ITEMS:

US	The U.S.
CHINA	China
EU	The European Union
UN	The United Nations
NATO	NATO [PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: NAY-toe)], that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RUSSIA	Russia
ISRAEL	Israel
INDIA	India
CANADA	Canada
MEXICO	Mexico

RESPONSE CATEGORIES:

1	Very favorable
2	Somewhat favorable
3	Somewhat unfavorable
4	Very unfavorable
98	[PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99	[PN: IF WEB:] Web blank / [PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ) Refused

BAT: CONFID

ASK ALL:

[**PN: RANDOMIZE ITEMS; INCLUDE RANDOMIZATION IN DATA FILE**]

[**PN: IF WEB:**] How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs?

[**PN: IF CATI: READ FOR FIRST ITEM:**] How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs? First, (**INSERT ITEM**). (**READ LIST**)

[**PN: IF CATI: READ FOR SUBSEQUENT ITEMS:**] Next, (**INSERT ITEM**). (**READ AS NECESSARY:** How much confidence do you have in this leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs? (**READ LIST IF NECESSARY**))

BATTERY ITEMS:

XI Chinese President Xi Jinping [**PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: Shee Jin-PING)**]
 PUTIN Russian President Vladimir Putin [**PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: Vladda-MEER POO-tin)**]
 MACRON French President Emmanuel Macron [**PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: Eh-MAN-you-el Ma-CROAN)**]
 NETANYAHU Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [**PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: neh-tuhn-YAA-hoo)**]
 ZELENSKY Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy [**PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: Vuh-Luh-Dih-Mir Zeh-LEN-skee)**]

RESPONSE CATEGORIES:

1 A lot of confidence
 2 Some confidence
 3 Not too much confidence
 4 No confidence at all

[**PN: INSERT A LINE OF SPACE**]

5 [**PN: IF WEB:**] Never heard of this person [**PN: IF CATI:**] Or have you never heard of this person?
 98 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (**DO NOT READ**) Don't know
 99 [**PN: IF WEB:**] Web blank / [**PN: IF CATI:**] (**DO NOT READ**) Refused

BAT: DT_FP

ASK ALL:

[PN: RANDOMIZE ITEMS; INCLUDE RANDOMIZATION IN DATA FILE]

[PN: IF WEB:] Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country...

[PN: IF WEB:] How confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to...

[PN: IF CATI: READ FOR FIRST ITEM:] Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to **(INSERT ITEM)**? Are you... **(READ LIST)**

[PN: IF CATI: READ FOR SUBSEQUENT ITEMS:] What about **(INSERT ITEM)**? **(READ AS NECESSARY: How confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to (INSERT ITEM)? Are you... (READ LIST))**

BATTERY ITEMS:

CH U.S. policy toward China
 IRN U.S. policy toward Iran **[PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: ee-RON)]**
 NATO **ASK IF FORM 1 (X_FORM=1):** Working effectively with NATO **[PN: IF CATI: (PRONO: NAY-toe)]**, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 ISRL **ASK IF FORM 1 (X_FORM=1):** The relationship between the U.S. and Israel
 CAN **ASK IF FORM 1 (X_FORM=1):** The relationship between the U.S. and Canada
 CUB **ASK IF FORM 1 (X_FORM=1):** U.S. policy toward Cuba
 TRD **ASK IF FORM 1 (X_FORM=1):** U.S. trade policy
 NK **ASK IF FORM 2 (X_FORM=2):** U.S. policy toward North Korea
 UKR **ASK IF FORM 2 (X_FORM=2):** The war between Ukraine and Russia
 VEN **ASK IF FORM 2 (X_FORM=2):** U.S. policy toward Venezuela
 MEX **ASK IF FORM 2 (X_FORM=2):** The relationship between the U.S. and Mexico
 TAR **ASK IF FORM 2 (X_FORM=2):** U.S. tariff policy

RESPONSE CATEGORIES:

1 Very confident
 2 Somewhat confident
 3 Not too confident
 4 Not at all confident
 98 **[PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ)** Don't know
 99 **[PN: IF WEB:]** Web blank / **[PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ)** Refused

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

BAT: CONFPERS**ASK ALL:**

[PN: RANDOMIZE ITEMS; INCLUDE RANDOMIZATION IN DATA FILE]

[PN: IF WEB:] How important would you say each of the following is to you personally?

[PN: IF CATI: READ FOR FIRST ITEM:] How important would you say each of the following is to you personally? First, **(INSERT ITEM)**. **(READ LIST)**

[PN: IF CATI: READ FOR SUBSEQUENT ITEMS:] Next, **(INSERT ITEM)**. **(READ AS NECESSARY: How important is this to you personally? (READ LIST IF NECESSARY))**

BATTERY ITEMS:

- a The conflict between Israel and Hamas
- b The war between Russia and Ukraine
- c The tensions between China and Taiwan
- d The U.S. military action against Iran

RESPONSE CATEGORIES:

- 1 Very important
- 2 Somewhat important
- 3 Not too important
- 4 Not at all important

[PN: INSERT A LINE OF SPACE]

- 5 [PN: IF WEB:] Not sure [PN: IF CATI:] Or are you not sure?
- 99 [PN: IF WEB:] Web blank / [PN: IF CATI:] **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**QUE: UKR_SPRT****ASK ALL:**

[PN: ROTATE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1-2/2-1 HOLDING 3, 4 AND 99 LAST; INCLUDE ROTATION IN DATA FILE]

person

When it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, do you think the U.S. is providing...

[PN: IF CATI:] **(READ LIST)**

- 1 Too much support to Ukraine
- 2 Not enough support to Ukraine
- 3 About the right amount of support to Ukraine

[PN: INSERT A LINE OF SPACE]

- 4 [PN: IF WEB:] Not sure [PN: IF CATI:] Or are you not sure?
- 99 [PN: IF WEB:] Web blank / [PN: IF CATI:] **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey
April 23, 2026 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the [Methodology section](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Combined totals are based on unrounded topline figures. Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures, so they may differ from previous years.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.