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# Gas Prices Are Americans' Top Concern in Iran War

*Public is split on whether the U.S. is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties*

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## About this research

This Pew Research Center report looks at Americans' views of the U.S. military action against Iran, which began in February 2026, as well as Americans' confidence in Trump to make good decisions when it comes to foreign policy.

### Why did we do this?

Pew Research Center does research to help the public, media and decision-makers understand important topics. We have studied Americans' views of politics and major policy issues, including the use of U.S. military force, for decades.

We also conducted this research to check in on how confident the public is about President Trump's foreign policy decision-making. It is part of our regular work to understand how Americans feel about international affairs – as well as to understand how Americans feel about major foreign policy issues.

[Learn more about Pew Research Center.](#)

### How did we do this?

For this report, we surveyed 3,507 adults from March 23 to 29, 2026. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center's [American Trends Panel](#). The survey represents the views of the full U.S. adult population.

Here are the [survey questions](#) used for this report, the [detailed responses](#) and the [survey methodology](#).

# Gas Prices Are Americans' Top Concern in Iran War

*Public is split on whether the U.S. is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties*

Nearly six weeks into the U.S. military campaign against Iran, a new Pew Research Center survey finds that higher gas prices are the outcome that concerns Americans the most. But [majorities also worry](#) about the United States sending ground troops into Iran, large numbers of military casualties, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, and the war expanding outside the Middle East.

The survey was conducted March 23-29 among 3,507 U.S. adults.


## Conduct of the war

Americans are closely divided on whether the U.S. is doing enough to prevent civilian casualties in the Iran war: 41% say it's doing enough, while 45% say the opposite; 13% are not sure.

Most Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say the U.S. is *doing enough* to prevent civilian casualties (65%), while a similar share of Democrats and Democratic leaners (68%) say it is not. But there is broad agreement among all adults that Iran itself is not doing enough to prevent civilian casualties (69%).

## How Americans view key aspects of the Iran war


% who say, thinking about the U.S. military action against Iran, they are \_\_\_ concerned about **higher gas and fuel prices**



% who say the U.S. is \_\_\_ to **avoid civilian casualties** in the U.S. military action against Iran



% who say they are \_\_\_ confident that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to **U.S. policy toward Iran**



Note: Those who said "Not sure" or did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.

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Americans also express little faith in President Donald Trump's ability to make good decisions when it comes to Iran: 35% are confident in his policymaking in this area, while 64% are not.

Around two-thirds of Republicans (66%) are confident, compared with fewer than one-in-ten Democrats (7%).


Read more on confidence in Trump's ability to handle various foreign policy issues.

### How might the war affect Iran?

Americans are equally divided on whether U.S. military action will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon more likely (27%), less likely (27%) or about as likely as before (29%), while another 16% are not sure. Younger Americans and Democrats are more likely than older adults and Republicans to say U.S. military action will *increase* the likelihood of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.

## About 7 in 10 Americans are concerned about higher gas prices resulting from military action against Iran

% who say, thinking about the U.S. military action against Iran, they are \_\_\_ concerned about each of the following



Note: Those who said "Not sure" or did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.

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Americans also have differing views about the ultimate fate of Iran after the conflict ends. More say the Iranian people will be worse off (36%) than say they will be better off (25%), while 16% believe they will be about as well off as before and 21% are not sure.

Additionally, most Americans (77%) say the U.S. military action against Iran is important to them personally, including 48% who say it is *very* important to them. Majorities of Republicans (81%) and Democrats (76%) alike hold this view.

## Do Americans think Trump can make good decisions about Iran?

Confidence in Trump's ability to make good decisions about U.S. policy toward Iran has declined among both Republicans and Democrats.

In the latest survey, 35% of Americans are very or somewhat confident in Trump's policymaking in this area, while 64% are not too or not at all confident.

Confidence in Trump's dealings with Iran is down 12 percentage points since 2024, when he was running for a second presidential term. And it has declined by 9 points since August 2025.

Among Republicans, there has been an 18-point decline in confidence since 2024 and a 12-point drop since 2025. Confidence among Democrats has decreased from 14% in 2025 to 7% today.


There is also a stark age divide among Republicans.

The youngest Republicans (ages 18 to 29) are divided: 46% are confident in Trump's policymaking toward Iran, while 53% are not. But Republicans ages 65 and older are overwhelmingly confident (80%) in Trump's ability to make good decisions in this area.

Republicans who are concerned about the higher gas prices as a result of the war are also less likely to have confidence in Trump's policymaking on Iran. Among Republicans who are extremely or very concerned about gas prices increasing, 56% have confidence in him, while 44% do not.

### Declining confidence in Trump's ability to make good policy decisions about Iran

% who say they are **very/somewhat confident** that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to U.S. policy toward Iran, by party



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. In previous surveys, the question read "wise decisions" instead of "good decisions." In 2024, we asked about candidate Trump and issues he "may face next year."

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026. "Gas Prices Are Americans' Top Concern in Iran War"

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Among Republicans who are *not* concerned about gas prices increasing, 86% have confidence in Trump to make good policy decisions.

## What are Americans' concerns about the Iran war?

About seven-in-ten Americans (69%) are concerned about higher gas and fuel prices as a result of the U.S. military action against Iran, including 45% who are *extremely* concerned. Of the potential outcomes we asked about, this one worries Americans most.

Majorities also are concerned about the U.S. sending ground troops into Iran, large numbers of military casualties, terrorist attacks in the U.S., and expansion of the war into countries outside the Middle East.

Fewer Americans (31%) are concerned about a shortage of weapons for the U.S. military.


Levels of concern also differ by party. Still, most Democrats (79%) and Republicans (59%) are worried about higher gas prices as a result of the Iran war.

However, Democrats are about twice as concerned as Republicans about the conflict expanding outside the Middle East.

Another [Pew Research Center survey](#) conducted in March found that 68% of Democrats think the war will continue for six months or longer, while 58% of Republicans expect the war to end within the next six months.

### Majorities in both parties are concerned the Iran war could lead to higher gas prices and terrorist attacks

% who say, thinking about the U.S. military action against Iran, they are *extremely/very concerned* about each of the following, by party



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.  
"Gas Prices Are Americans' Top Concern in Iran War"

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**Related:** [Americans Broadly Disapprove of U.S. Military Action in Iran](#)

## Are both sides doing enough to avoid civilian casualties?

Majorities of Americans in both parties say Iran is not doing enough to avoid civilian casualties in the war.

But the public is more divided on the U.S., though slightly more say it is *not* doing enough to prevent civilian casualties (45%) than say it is doing enough (41%).


Around two-thirds of Democrats (68%) say the U.S. is not doing enough to avoid civilian casualties, compared with 23% of Republicans.

Younger Republicans are more likely than older Republicans to say that the U.S. is not doing enough to avoid civilian casualties. Around one-third of Republicans ages 18 to 29 (35%) say this is the case, compared with 13% of those ages 65 and older.

Among Democrats, there are no significant age differences on this question.

### Americans tend to say Iran is not doing enough to avoid civilian casualties but are divided on the U.S.

*% who say, thinking about the U.S. military action and Iran's military response, each of the following countries is \_\_\_ to avoid civilian casualties*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.  
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## What are the projected outcomes of the war?

Americans are evenly divided on whether U.S. military action will hinder Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon. But more predict the conflict will leave the Iranian people worse off, rather than better off, in the long run. Younger Americans and Democrats tend to be more skeptical of the outcomes of military action.

### Likelihood of Iran developing a nuclear weapon

There are no real differences in the shares of Americans who say Iran will be more likely (27%), less likely (27%) or about as likely as before (29%) to develop a nuclear weapon.


Republicans are nearly five times more likely than Democrats to say this will be less likely in the long run (47% vs. 10%). In contrast, 17% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats expect Iran will be *more* likely to develop a nuclear weapon than before.

Republicans ages 65 and older are significantly more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to say Iran will be less likely to develop a nuclear weapon (67% vs. 25%).

Democrats ages 18 to 29 are more likely than those ages 65 and older to say this is *more* likely (45% vs. 25%).

### Older and younger Republicans diverge on whether military action will make Iranian nuclear capability less likely

% who say that in the long run, U.S. military action against Iran will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.

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### Impact of the conflict on the Iranian people


When it comes to the ultimate outcome of U.S. military action, 36% of Americans say that the Iranian people will be worse off. A quarter say the Iranian people will be better off, and 16% expect no change.

Just under half of Republicans (47%) expect the Iranian people to be better off as a result of U.S. military action, while just 5% of Democrats agree. A majority of Democrats (56%) expect the Iranian people to be worse off, as do 17% of Republicans.

Again, there are age differences within each party, but the contrast is much more stark among Republicans: Around six-in-ten Republicans ages 65 and older (63%) say the Iranian people will be better off in the long run, compared with 33% of those ages 18 to 29.

### More Americans predict the Iranian people will be worse off than better off due to U.S. military action

*% who say that in the long run, U.S. military action against Iran will make the Iranian people ...*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.  
 "Gas Prices Are Americans' Top Concern in Iran War"

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# Do Americans think Trump can make good decisions about various foreign policy issues?

A new Pew Research Center survey conducted March 23-29, finds that majorities of Americans express little or no confidence in President Donald Trump’s handling of various foreign policy issues.

The survey asked about his decision-making in 12 foreign policy areas, including bilateral relations with several countries, trade and international military conflicts.


There is no issue on which a majority express confidence in Trump, but he garners more support in some areas than others. For example, 43% of Americans are very or somewhat confident in his handling of U.S.-Israel relations, compared with 32% who have confidence in him to make good decisions about the Russia-Ukraine war.

There are wide and persistent partisan gaps on these questions.

Among Republicans and independents who lean toward

## Confidence in Trump’s foreign policy decisions

% who say they are **very/somewhat confident** that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to each of the following, by party



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.  
 “Do Americans think Trump can make good decisions about various foreign policy issues?”

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the Republican party, confidence in Trump to make good policy decisions ranges from 74% on trade policy to 60% on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Democrats and Democratic leaners peak at 16% confidence on Trump’s handling of U.S.-Israel relations. But that shrinks to just 7% confidence on U.S. policy toward Iran and the Russia-Ukraine war.

On every issue in the survey, Republicans ages 50 and older are more confident than those ages 18 to 49. For instance, older Republicans are 27 percentage points more confident than younger ones when it comes to Trump’s handling of U.S.-Israel relations (87% vs. 60%).

On some of these issues, there has been a noticeable downward trend in confidence over time.


For example, confidence in Trump’s ability to make good decisions on the Russia-Ukraine war was at 45% in 2024, during his campaign for a second presidential term. But that share fell to 40% in 2025 and stands at 32% today.

Confidence in Trump’s ability to make good policy decisions toward Iran, China and North Korea has also declined.

Views on Trump’s handling of U.S. relations with Israel and Canada have not change since 2025. But confidence is down on policy toward Venezuela since this past January (44% then vs. 39% today).

**Confidence in Trump’s ability to make good decisions on certain foreign policy issues is falling**

*% who say they are \_\_\_ that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to each of the following*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. In previous surveys, the question read “wise decisions” instead of “good decisions.” In 2024, we asked about presidential candidate Trump and issues he “may face next year.”

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 23-29, 2026.

“Do Americans think Trump can make good decisions about various foreign policy issues?”

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**Related:** [How Americans view Trump's handling of trade and tariffs](#)

## Acknowledgments

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## Methodology

### The American Trends Panel survey methodology

#### Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 190 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 23 to March 29, 2026. A total of 3,507 panelists responded out of 4,046 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 87%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,507 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes an [oversample](#) of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,377) and live telephone (n=130) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

#### Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.<sup>1</sup> Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.<sup>2</sup> Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

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<sup>1</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

<sup>2</sup> Email [pewsurveys@pewresearch.org](mailto:pewsurveys@pewresearch.org).

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

### **Sample design**

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Muslim, Jewish, and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

### **Questionnaire development and testing**

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

### **Incentives**

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

### **Data collection protocol**

The data collection field period for this survey was March 23 to March 29, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

**For panelists who take surveys online:**<sup>3</sup> Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 23.<sup>4</sup> Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 23. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 24.

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**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,  
ATP Wave 190**

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 23, 2026	March 24, 2026
First reminder	March 26, 2026	March 26, 2026
Final reminder	March 28, 2026	March 28, 2026

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

**For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer:** Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 20. Soft launch took place on March 23 and involved dialing until a total of three interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

### Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, five ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

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<sup>3</sup> The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

<sup>4</sup> Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

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### American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2024 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Validated 2024 presidential election turnout and vote choice	Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS.

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. For weighting to the 2024 presidential election results, panelists are considered validated voters if their self-report of having voted was confirmed after matching to a national voter registry.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

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### Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 190

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,507	1.9 percentage points
Form 1	1,765	2.7 percentage points
Form 2	1,742	2.8 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,504	2.8 percentage points
Form 1	769	4.0 percentage points
Form 2	735	4.1 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,858	2.7 percentage points
Form 1	920	3.8 percentage points
Form 2	938	3.9 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. Refer to the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

### Final dispositions, ATP Wave 190

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,507
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	95
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	32
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	407
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	5
<b>Total panelists sampled for the survey</b>		<b>4,046</b>
Completed interviews	I	3,507
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	127
Non-contact	NC	407
Other	O	5
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,046</b>
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		<b>87%</b>

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### Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 190

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	74%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 190	40%
Response rate to Wave 190 survey	87%
Cumulative response rate	3%

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## Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center**  
**Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey**  
**April 7, 2026 Release**

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the [Methodology section](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

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		DT_FP_CH. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. policy toward China							
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	39	60	14	25	24	36	1	100
	August, 2025	45	55	19	26	24	30	1	100
	July, 2024	48	49	25	23	18	31	3	100

In 2024 and 2025, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions. In 2024, the question asked about candidate Trump and issues that he may face next year.

		DT_FP_IRN. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. policy toward Iran							
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	35	64	16	19	21	42	1	100
	August, 2025	44	56	20	23	23	32	0	100
	July, 2024	47	50	25	22	18	32	3	100

In 2024 and 2025, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions. In 2024, the question asked about candidate Trump and issues that he may face next year.

		ASK FORM 1: DT_FP_NATO. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? Working effectively with NATO								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	35	63	11	24	25	39	2	100	1765

		ASK FORM 1: DT_FP_ISRL. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? The relationship between the U.S. and Israel								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	43	55	19	24	21	34	1	100	1765
	August, 2025	46	53	20	27	22	31	1	100	1770

In 2025, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions.

		ASK FORM 1: DT_FP_CAN. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? The relationship between the U.S. and Canada								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	42	57	13	29	23	34	1	100	1765
	August, 2025	43	56	16	27	24	32	1	100	1770

In 2025, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions.

		ASK FORM 1: DT_FP_CUB. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. policy toward Cuba								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	37	61	13	24	24	37	2	100	1765

		ASK FORM 1: DT_FP_TRD. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. trade policy								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	41	58	17	24	22	36	1	100	1765

		ASK FORM 2: DT_FP_NK. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. policy toward North Korea								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	39	60	16	23	24	35	1	100	1742
	August, 2025	44	55	20	25	23	32	1	100	1784
	July, 2024	48	49	25	23	17	32	3	100	4677

In 2024 and 2025, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions. In 2024, the question asked about candidate Trump and issues that he may face next year.

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		ASK FORM 2: DT_FP_UKR. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? The war between Ukraine and Russia								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	32	66	10	23	25	41	1	100	1742
	August, 2025	40	59	16	25	25	34	0	100	1784
	July, 2024	45	52	23	22	17	35	3	100	4677

In 2024 and 2025, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions. In 2024, the question asked about candidate Trump and issues that he may face next year.

		ASK FORM 2: DT_FP_VEN. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. policy toward Venezuela								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	39	60	17	22	22	38	1	100	1742
	January, 2026	44	55	19	24	20	36	1	100	8512

In January 2026, this question asked about 'wise' decisions instead of 'good' decisions. In 2024, the question asked about candidate Trump and issues that he may face next year.

		ASK FORM 2: DT_FP_MEX. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? The relationship between the U.S. and Mexico								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	39	60	13	26	25	35	1	100	1742

		ASK FORM 2: DT_FP_TAR. Thinking about some foreign policy issues facing the country, how confident are you that Donald Trump can make good decisions when it comes to ...? U.S. tariff policy								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No confidence	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2026	36	63	14	22	21	42	1	100	1742

		CONFERS_D. How important would you say each of the following is to you personally? The U.S. military action against Iran								
		TOTAL Important	TOTAL Not important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	77	14	48	29	8	6	9	1	100

		IRNCRN_GAS. Thinking about the current U.S. military action against Iran, how concerned are you about each of the following? ...? Higher gas and fuel prices									
		Extremely/Very concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not concerned at all	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	69	9	45	24	19	6	3	4	1	100

		IRNCRN_WPN. Thinking about the current U.S. military action against Iran, how concerned are you about each of the following? ...? A shortage of weapons for the U.S. military									
		Extremely/Very concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not concerned at all	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	31	39	15	16	21	24	15	9	0	100

		IRNCRN_TRP. Thinking about the current U.S. military action against Iran, how concerned are you about each of the following? ...? The U.S. sending ground troops into Iran									
		Extremely/Very concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not concerned at all	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	61	13	35	26	21	10	3	5	1	100

		IRNCRN_EXP. Thinking about the current U.S. military action against Iran, how concerned are you about each of the following? ...? The war expanding outside the Middle East									
		Extremely/Very concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not concerned at all	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	53	16	27	26	24	12	4	6	1	100

		IRNCRN_TER. Thinking about the current U.S. military action against Iran, how concerned are you about each of the following? ...? Terrorist attacks in the U.S.									
		Extremely/Very concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not concerned at all	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	56	12	31	25	26	10	3	4	0	100

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		IRNCRN_CAS. Thinking about the current U.S. military action against Iran, how concerned are you about each of the following? ...? Large numbers of U.S. military casualties									
		Extremely / Very concerned	Not too / Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not concerned at all	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	59	14	32	27	21	11	3	5	1	100

		IRANNUKE_LIKELY. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make Iran's development of a nuclear weapon ...?					
		More likely	Less likely	About as likely as before	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	27	27	29	16	0	100

		IMP_IRNPPL. In the long run, do you think U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran will make the Iranian people...?					
		Better off	Worse off	About as well off as before	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	25	36	16	21	2	100

		CIVCASUAL_US. Thinking about the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran and Iran's military response, would you say each of the following countries is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties? The United States								
		TOTAL Enough	TOTAL Not enough	Definitely is	Probably is	Probably is not	Definitely is not	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	41	45	17	24	21	24	13	1	100

		CIVCASUAL_IRN. Thinking about the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran and Iran's military response, would you say each of the following countries is doing enough to avoid civilian casualties? Iran								
		TOTAL Enough	TOTAL Not enough	Definitely is	Probably is	Probably is not	Definitely is not	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	11	69	2	9	30	39	19	1	100

		U.S. Party ID with Leaners			
		Reps and Rep Leaners	Dems and Dem Leaners	DK/Refused/ No Lean	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2026	46	48	6	100