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Behind Trump's 2024 Victory, a More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Voter Coalition

A study of the 2024 election, based on validated voters

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Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| About Pew Research Center | 1 |
| Table of Contents | 2 |
| How we did this | 3 |
| Terminology | 5 |
| Behind Trump's 2024 Victory, a More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Voter Coalition | 7 |
| 1. Voter turnout, 2020-2024 | 13 |
| 2. Voting patterns in the 2024 election | 22 |
| 3. Demographic profiles of Trump and Harris voters in 2024 | 38 |
| Acknowledgments | 46 |
| Methodology | 47 |
| Questionnaire | 55 |

How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to better understand which voters cast ballots in the 2024 presidential election and how they voted. We also wanted to compare how turnout and vote choices differed from previous elections in 2020 and 2016. Measuring turnout among different groups in the electorate is challenging; it is particularly difficult to assess changes in turnout from election to election.

Panel-based survey data provides us a unique opportunity to study elections. By surveying the *same* people over time and measuring their choice among the candidates (for both voters and nonvoters), we can more clearly see how differences in who stays home – and who turns out to vote – affect each election. We can also measure how adults’ partisan voting preferences change (or do not change) between elections.

For this study, we surveyed U.S. adults on our nationally representative American Trends Panel (ATP). We verified their turnout using commercial voter files that aggregate publicly available official state turnout records. The first analysis of validated voters was completed after the 2016 election. Turnout was validated for subsequent elections in 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024. Each state and the District of Columbia compiles these publicly available turnout records as part of their routine election administration.

To validate 2024 election turnout, we attempted to match adult citizens who are part of the ATP to a turnout record in at least one of three commercial voter files: one that serves conservative and Republican organizations and campaigns, one that serves progressive and Democratic organizations and campaigns, and one that is nonpartisan.

A member of the ATP is considered a **validated voter** for a given election if they:

- Told us they voted, and
- Were recorded as having voted in *at least one* of the three commercial voter files.

Those who said they did not vote in an election are considered **nonvoters**. Nonvoters also include anyone – regardless of their self-reported vote – for whom we could not locate a voting record in any of the three commercial voter files. Those who could not be matched were also considered nonvoters. Overall, 94% of panelists who we attempted to match were successfully matched to at least one of the three voter files.

The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other factors. For benchmarks of partisan affiliation within racial and ethnic categories, we used estimates produced by the Center's [2023-24 Religious Landscape Study](#) of more than 36,000 adults. In addition, this survey is weighted to benchmarks for voter turnout and presidential vote preference.

Here are the [questions used for this report](#). Additional information about the voter file matching and verification process, as well as sample sizes for all elections reflected in the validated voter variables, can be found in the [methodology section](#) of this report.

Terminology

Validated voters: Adult citizens who told us in a postelection survey that they voted in a given general election *and* have a record of voting in a commercial voter file.

Voting-eligible: In this report, any U.S. adult citizen in the American Trends Panel is considered “eligible” to vote. In some states, criminal records disqualify adult citizens from voting in elections. This study does not attempt to identify such individuals if they are in the panel. In addition, eligible voters living abroad are not included in the panel.

New and returning voters: Validated voters who turned out in the 2024 election, but not in the 2020 election. This includes both those who were old enough to vote in 2020, but did not, and voters who were too young to vote in 2020, but were 18 years of age or older in 2024 and cast a ballot.

Turnout: Refers to “turning out” to vote, or simply “voting.” Also used to refer to the share of eligible adults who voted in a given election (e.g., “The turnout in 2024 among the voting-eligible population in the U.S. was 64%”).

Differential partisan turnout: Refers to the difference in turnout between supporters of different parties (e.g., “More 2020 Trump voters than 2020 Biden voters turned out in 2024”).

Defectors/Defection: People who switched their vote to a different party’s candidate from one election to the next. Also referred to as “vote switching.”

Drop off/Drop-off voters: Voters who turn out in a given election but not in a subsequent one are said to have “dropped off” and are sometimes referred to as “drop-off voters.”

Nonvoters: Voting-eligible adults who did not vote in the 2024 election (or whichever election is specified).

American Trends Panel: Pew Research Center’s [probability survey panel](#), which consists of nearly 10,000 adults who take two to three surveys each month online or by telephone. Some panelists have been participating in surveys since 2014.

Voter file: A list of adults that includes information such as whether a person is registered to vote, which elections they have voted in, whether they voted in person or by mail, and additional data. Voter files *do not* record who a voter cast a ballot for. Federal law requires states to maintain

electronic voter files. Many businesses assemble these files to create a nationwide list of adults along with their voter information.

Panel survey: A type of survey that relies on a group of people who have agreed to participate in multiple surveys, either indefinitely or over a specific time period. Panel surveys make it possible to observe how individuals change over time because the answers they give to questions in a current survey can be compared with their answers from a previous survey.

Behind Trump's 2024 Victory, a More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Voter Coalition

A study of the 2024 election, based on validated voters


In his third run for president in 2024, Donald Trump defeated Kamala Harris by [1.5 percentage points](#) overall, winning 312 Electoral College votes and the national popular vote for the first time.

Trump won with a voter coalition that was **more racially and ethnically diverse** than in 2020 or 2016, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of the 2024 electorate.

- Among Hispanic voters, Trump battled to near parity in 2024 (51% Harris, 48% Trump) after losing to Joe Biden 61%-36% in 2020.
- Trump won 15% of Black voters – up from 8% four years earlier.
- Trump also did better among Asian voters. While a majority of Asian voters (57%) backed Harris, 40% supported Trump. This was a narrower margin than Biden's in 2020 (70% to 30%).

Trump's 2024 voters were far more racially and ethnically diverse than his voters in 2016, 2020

Composition of validated voters who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates (%)



* Estimates for Asian voters are representative of English speakers only.

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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These shifts were largely the result of differences in

which voters turned out in the 2020 and 2024 elections. As in the past, a relatively small share of voters switched which party's candidate they supported.

In 2024, Trump benefited from higher turnout among those who voted for him in 2020. He also held an edge over Harris among voters who did not vote four years earlier – a group that was considerably more diverse than those who voted in both elections.

And while Trump improved his performance among several groups in 2024, many of the demographic patterns in voting preferences that have dominated American politics for the last several decades remained evident last November:

Educational divide. In each of his campaigns, Trump has held an edge among voters without four-year college degrees. But his 14-point advantage among noncollege voters (56% to 42%) was double his margin in 2016. Harris won voters with college degrees by 57% to 41%, but that was smaller than Biden’s lead among this group in 2020.

A wider urban-rural gap. Trump won voters living in rural areas by 40 points (69%-29%), which was higher than his margins in 2020 or 2016. Harris’ advantage among voters living in urban areas was nearly as large (65% voted for Harris, 33% Trump).

Continued differences by religious attendance. Nearly two-thirds of voters who attend religious services monthly or more (64%) voted for Trump, while only about a third (34%) supported Harris. Harris held a narrower advantage (56%-43%) among the larger group of voters who attend services less frequently.

For more on voting patterns, refer to [Chapter 2](#).

About this report

This Pew Research Center analysis examines voter turnout and voting preferences in the 2024 presidential election through the lens of validated voters. **Validated voters** are adult citizens who told us that they voted in a postelection survey *and* have a record showing they voted in their state’s official voter turnout records.

The postelection survey of U.S. adults was conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024, on the American Trends Panel (ATP). The ATP is a panel survey, meaning that we have interviewed many of the same respondents after each national election going back to 2016. This allows us to examine how individuals changed their turnout or candidate preferences over time. For more on how the study was conducted, read the report’s methodology. For more about terms used in the report, refer to the terminology box.

From Biden 2020 to Trump 2024: A tale of differential turnout and changing voter preferences

While most of those who voted in 2020 cast ballots again in 2024, a larger share of Trump's voters (89%) than Biden's (85%) turned out.

And a larger share of those who did not turn out in 2020 – but did in 2024 – supported Trump (54%) than Harris (42%).

What 2020 voters did

Between 2020 and 2024, 85% of those who backed Trump in 2020 did so again in 2024. About one-in-ten of his 2020 voters (11%) didn't turn out in 2024, and 4% voted for Harris or someone else.


Harris received 79% of Biden's 2020 voters. Compared with Trump's 2020 voters, a larger share of Biden's didn't vote in 2024 (15%), and 6% voted for Trump or another candidate.

What new and returning voters did


Most adults who were eligible to vote in 2020 – but declined to do so – stayed home again

The flow of voters and nonvoters from 2020 to 2024


What did Trump's 2020 voters do in 2024?



What did Biden's 2020 voters do in 2024?



What did 2020 nonvoters do in 2024?



* Did not vote includes those who were too young to vote in 2020.

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice based on self-report from surveys. Refer to methodology for more detail.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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in 2024. But among those who did turn out, Trump had the edge. Among all 2020 nonvoters (including those who were too young and ineligible to vote in 2020), 14% supported Trump in 2024 while 12% supported Harris.

Stability and change

Roughly three-quarters of eligible adults did the same thing in 2024 as they did in 2020: voted for a candidate of the same party or did not turn out.

And about a quarter of eligible adults did something different in 2024 than in 2020: They switched their vote choice, voted in 2024 when they had not voted in 2020, or did not vote in 2024 after voting in 2020.

Harris would not necessarily have benefited from higher voter turnout

When asked how they would have voted, people eligible to vote who *did not* do so were fairly evenly split in their preferences: 44% say they would have supported Trump, while 40% say they would have backed Harris.

This is a stark contrast to 2020, when those who didn't vote expressed a clear preference for Biden over Trump (46% to 35%).



Democrats have held an edge among nonvoters in prior elections dating back to at least the 1960s – though there is some evidence this advantage had declined in recent elections.

As a result, **if all Americans eligible to vote in 2024 had cast ballots, the overall margin in the popular vote likely would not have been much different.**

In contrast, if all eligible Americans had voted in 2020, Biden's margin of victory would likely have increased.

Neither candidate had a clear edge among nonvoters in 2024 – a contrast to 2020, when they favored Biden

% who said they voted or would have voted for ...



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Nonvoters are those who either said they did not vote in the postelection survey or could not be verified as voters in official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. Voting-eligible citizens who did not vote were asked who they would have supported.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Other key findings

Naturalized citizens – immigrants who hold U.S. citizenship – who voted in the election split their votes about evenly, with 51% voting for Harris and 47% for Trump. In 2020, naturalized citizens favored Biden by 21 percentage points: 59% to 38%. In 2024, naturalized citizens made up 9% of voters.

Trump made gains among men – especially men under 50. Men favored Trump by 12 points (55%-43%) after being closely divided in 2020. In particular, men under 50 split their votes fairly evenly this year (49% Trump, 48% Harris). In 2020, this group backed Biden by 10 points (53% Biden, 43% Trump).


Even in an era of high-turnout elections, many eligible Americans remain on the sidelines. The 64% turnout rate in 2024 was the second highest since 1960, behind only 2020. However, about a quarter of Americans eligible to vote (26%) have no record of voting in *any* of the last three national elections (2020, 2022, 2024). These Americans are disproportionately young and much less likely to have four-year college degrees than those who vote more frequently.

For more on voter turnout, refer to [Chapter 1](#).

In-person early voting has grown in popularity. Nearly a third of 2024 voters (32%) cast their ballot in person prior to Election Day, up from 27% in 2020. Another 34% cast their ballot in person on Election Day.

Early in-person voting rose in 2024

% of validated voters who cast their ballot ...



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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1. Voter turnout, 2020-2024

Because partisanship and voting preference are highly correlated – and most adults stick with their preferred party over time – voter turnout is often a key factor in understanding why there are changes in electoral outcomes year to year.

In the 2024 presidential election, a higher share of Donald Trump’s 2020 voters than Joe Biden’s 2020 voters turned out to vote. Trump also won a higher share of those who had not voted four years earlier. This is different than in 2020 and 2016, when those who didn’t vote in the previous presidential election favored Democratic candidates.

Looking across multiple years, White voters, older voters, more affluent voters and voters with higher levels of formal education typically turn out at higher rates than other groups. These patterns persisted in 2024.

How did 2024 turnout compare with previous elections?

The 2020 and 2024 presidential contests were among the highest-turnout elections in the past century. The 66% turnout rate in 2020 was the highest since 1908, and 2024’s rate of 64% was the second highest, tied with 1960. The last two midterm elections also featured unusually high turnout levels, with rates not seen since the 1960s.


The spike in voter turnout is at least partly attributable to

intensifying political

polarization during the past decade, a period in which growing partisan antipathy has raised the stakes of election outcomes in the minds of many voters.

2020 and 2024 presidential contests were two of the highest-turnout elections in the past century

% of voting-eligible adults who turned out in each election



Note: Turnout data for presidential and midterm years compiled by University of Florida Election Lab, accessed June 2025. <https://election.lab.ufl.edu/voter-turnout/>

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Which party typically benefits from high turnout?

Almost by definition, high-turnout elections mobilize more infrequent and new voters. For the past several decades, [high turnout often benefited Democratic candidates](#), who enjoyed greater support among less-affluent, minority and young voters – groups that tend to vote at lower rates. This pattern [has been weakening since 1960](#) but was still evident in the 2020 election.

The 2024 election was different.

New and returning voters

The 2024 Trump campaign was [reported to be targeting](#) infrequent voters. Voters in 2024 who had not turned out in 2020, but were eligible, favored Trump by a margin of 54%-42%. (Adding in the small share of voters who were too young to have voted in 2020 narrows the margin to 52%-45%.)

By contrast, Trump received 46% of the vote among 2020 voters who had not cast a

ballot in 2016 but were eligible to do so; 51% voted for Biden. (Among all new and returning voters in 2020, including those too young to have voted in 2016, Biden led Trump by 52%-44%.)

This pattern reflects shifts in public preferences toward Trump and away from the Democratic ticket, as well as greater voter engagement among Trump supporters. Both overall and across most demographic groups in the population, Trump's 2020 voters turned out at higher rates than Biden's did.

Those who didn't vote in 2020 favored Trump in 2024

% in each year who voted for ...

| 2024 voting preferences among those who were ____ | | Harris | Trump | Other |
|---|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Eligible but did not vote in 2020 | | 42 | 54 | 4 |
| 2020 nonvoters* | | 45 | 52 | 3 |
| 2020 voting preferences among those who were ____ | | Biden | Trump | Other |
| Eligible but did not vote in 2016 | | 51 | 46 | 3 |
| 2016 nonvoters* | | 52 | 44 | 4 |

* All nonvoters include those who were too young to vote in previous presidential election.
Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.


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Nonvoters

Moreover, eligible voters in 2024 who did not cast a ballot were fairly closely divided in their preferences: 44% say if they *had* voted, it would have been for Trump, while 40% say they would have voted for Harris. This stands in contrast to 2020, when eligible voters who didn't vote expressed a clear preference for Biden (46% said they would have voted for Biden, 35% said they would have voted for Trump).

While 2020 nonvoters favored Biden, 2024 nonvoters were more closely divided in their views

% of **nonvoters** in each year who said they would have voted for ...



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. In a survey conducted in the month after the election, voting-age citizens who did not vote were asked who they would have supported.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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
Turnout and the 2024 election

Among all 2020 Trump voters, 89% voted in 2024, compared with 85% among Biden's 2020 voters. The turnout difference was larger among Hispanic voters than among many other groups: 86% of Trump's 2020 Hispanic voters turned out in 2024, compared with 77% of Biden's Hispanic voters.

- Trump also held turnout advantages among men and women, adults 35 and older, and those with no college degree.
- In contrast, there was almost no difference in 2024 turnout among 2020 Trump and Biden voters who are White.
- And among young voters who were eligible to vote in both elections (those ages 22 to 34 in 2024), there was a 3 percentage point difference in the rate at which Biden's 2020 voters turned out in 2024 (77%) compared with Trump's voters (80%).

Larger share of Trump's 2020 voters than Biden's voters turned out in 2024

% of 2020 presidential voters who turned out to vote in 2024



* Estimates for Asian voters are representative of English speakers only.

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice was from a survey conducted in the month after the election. White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race. Black and Asian Trump 2020 voters are not shown due to small sample sizes. Family income tiers based on adjusted earnings from 2023; refer to methodology for details.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Composition of voters and nonvoters in 2024

Consistent with long-standing patterns in turnout, voters and nonvoters in 2024 differed substantially on several demographic characteristics. Compared with voters, nonvoters were younger, had lower family incomes, and were less likely to be White or to have attended college.


Young adults were a larger share of nonvoters in 2024 than in 2020 (30% vs. 25%). Age has long been a reliable predictor of turnout. Citizens under age 30 constituted only 15% of all voters in 2024, considerably below their share of the age-eligible population (20%).

Almost half of nonvoters (48%) had only a high school education or less, compared with 28% among voters. College graduates made up about twice the share of voters (41%) as nonvoters (22%).

Non-Hispanic White adults made up a larger share of voters than nonvoters in 2024, though the share who were voters declined slightly from 73% in 2020 to 71% in 2024. White

Demographic makeup of voters and nonvoters in 2024

Composition of validated voters and nonvoters (%)



* Estimates for Asian adults are representative of English speakers only.

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years from surveys conducted in the month after the elections. White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers based on adjusted earnings prior to each year; refer to methodology for details.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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adults were also a smaller share of nonvoters in 2024 than in 2020, reflecting the steady growth of the non-White population in the U.S.

In 2024, nonvoters were split in their preferences between Trump and Harris. They were also closely divided in their partisan affiliation. In both 2016 and 2020, nonvoters preferred the Democratic candidate and leaned Democratic in party affiliation. In 2024, nonvoters were more closely divided on both candidate preference and party affiliation: 44% of nonvoters preferred Trump and 40% preferred Harris. And 48% identified with or leaned toward the Democratic Party, while 45% identified as or leaned Republican. More nonvoters identified as or leaned Democratic (48%) than said they *would have* voted for Harris (40%).

Party affiliation and vote preference among voters and nonvoters in 2024

% of 2024 validated voters and nonvoters who ...

Identify as or lean toward ____ Party

| | Voters | Non-voters |
|--------------|----------|------------|
| Rep/Lean Rep | 51 | 45 |
| Dem/Lean Dem | 48 | 48 |
| No lean | <u>1</u> | <u>8</u> |
| | 100 | 100 |

Voted or said they would have voted for ...

| | | |
|--------|----------|-----------|
| Trump | 50 | 44 |
| Harris | 48 | 40 |
| Other | <u>2</u> | <u>13</u> |
| | 100 | 100 |

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from surveys conducted in the month after the election. Voting-age citizens who did not vote were asked who they would have supported.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Patterns of turnout across recent elections

Most Americans are not regular voters. Even across the three most recent national elections, which featured higher-than-normal turnout, just 41% of adult citizens who were old enough to vote cast a ballot in all three. About one-in-four (26%) did not vote in any of them.

All of the demographic differences between voters and nonvoters seen in the 2024 election are magnified when looking at turnout patterns across multiple elections.


Almost half of non-Hispanic White adult citizens (48%) voted in all three elections, compared with 27% of Black adults and 25% of Hispanic adults. Hispanics are about twice as likely as White adults to have not voted at all in these three elections (41% for Hispanics, 20% for White adults).

As a consequence of this pattern, regular voters skew

White: Among those who voted in all three elections, about three-quarters are non-Hispanic White, compared with just 50% among those who did not vote in any election.

Age, race and education continue to be strong predictors of regular voting

% of citizens ages 22 and older who voted in 0, 1, 2 or 3 national elections (2020 presidential election, 2022 midterm election and/or 2024 presidential election)



* Estimates for Asian adults are representative of English speakers only.

Note: Based on adult citizens ages 22 and older for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Those who did not answer a question about their age are excluded. Turnout was verified using official state election records. White, Black and Asian adults include those who report only being one race and are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Frequent voters are much older than infrequent voters. Among those 65 and older, 63% voted in all three elections. Young adults are especially likely to have sat out multiple elections: Just 16% of those old enough to have voted in all three actually did so, and 41% didn't vote in any of them.

Those with greater educational attainment vote more frequently. More than half of college graduates (54%) voted in all three national elections between 2020 and 2024. Only 35% of those without a college degree did so.


Trump held a clear advantage among those who voted in 2024 but stayed home in 2022 and 2020. Most striking is that those who only voted in the 2024 presidential election – but were eligible to vote in 2020 and 2022 – were the most supportive of Trump. He carried this group by 55%-41%. These voters constituted 12% of 2024 voters.

Slightly more than one-fifth (22%) voted in the presidential elections of 2020 and 2024, but not the 2022 midterms; Harris had a narrow edge among these voters (51%-47%).


The 64% of 2024 voters who turned out in all three elections were closely divided between the candidates (50% for Trump, 48% for Harris).

The most frequent voters were evenly divided, while Trump had the advantage among 2024-only voters

Among 2024 validated voters who ...



12% of 2024 voters voted in only the 2024 election. In 2024, 41% of those voters cast their ballot for Harris, while 55% chose Trump.



Note: Based on adult citizens ages 22 and older who were eligible to vote in 2020 and for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Those who did not answer a question about their age were excluded. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice based on self-report from surveys. Refer to methodology for more detail. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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2. Voting patterns in the 2024 election

For the most part, voting patterns across demographic groups in the 2024 presidential election were not substantially different from the 2020 and 2016 elections. But Donald Trump's gains among several key groups of voters proved decisive in his 2024 victory.

To explore voting patterns among subgroups over time, refer to [detailed tables](#).

Hispanic voters were divided in 2024, a major shift from 2020 and 2016. In 2020, Joe Biden won Hispanic voters by 25 percentage points, and Hispanic voters supported Hillary Clinton by an even wider margin in 2016. But Trump drew nearly even with Kamala Harris among Hispanic voters, losing among them by only 3 points.

Black voters also moved to Trump but remained overwhelmingly Democratic. Trump nearly doubled his support among Black voters between 2020 and 2024: 8% voted for him in 2020 vs. 15% last year. Still, 83% of Black voters backed Harris.

Men – especially men under 50 – backed Trump by larger margins. Men supported Trump by a wider margin than in 2020. Trump narrowly won men under age 50, a shift from 2020 when men in that age group favored Biden by 10 points.

As in prior elections, a change in voters' partisan allegiances – switching from the Democratic to the Republican candidate or vice versa – proved to be a less important factor in Trump's victory than differential partisan turnout. In the overall electorate and among key demographic groups, Republican-leaning eligible voters simply were more likely to turn out than Democratic-leaning eligible voters in 2024.

And despite some notable changes in the coalitions, many familiar divisions in demographic voting patterns were once again evident. For example, voters with at least four-year college degrees and urban residents voted for Harris by wide margins. By contrast, Trump retained sizable advantages among noncollege voters and voters living in rural areas.

Gender and race in voting preferences in 2024

Men favored Trump by 12 percentage points in the 2024 election, while women favored Harris by 7 points. Trump made gains among men compared with 2020 and held roughly steady among women:

- 55% of men voted for Trump in 2024, up from 50% of men in 2020.
- 46% of women voted for Trump in 2024, compared with 44% of women four years earlier.

Trump's support among Hispanic, Black voters higher in 2024 than in 2020, 2016

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | 2020 | | | 2024 | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| | Clinton | Trump | | Biden | Trump | | Harris | Trump | |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | 51 | 47 | +4 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Men | 41 | 52 | -11 | 48 | 50 | -2 | 43 | 55 | -12 |
| Women | 54 | 39 | +15 | 55 | 44 | +11 | 53 | 46 | +7 |
| White, non-Hispanic | 39 | 54 | -15 | 43 | 55 | -12 | 43 | 55 | -12 |
| Black, non-Hispanic* | 91 | 6 | +85 | 92 | 8 | +84 | 83 | 15 | +68 |
| Hispanic* | 66 | 28 | +38 | 61 | 36 | +25 | 51 | 48 | +3 |
| Asian*,** | N/A | | | 70 | 30 | +40 | 57 | 40 | +17 |
| White men | 32 | 62 | -30 | 40 | 57 | -17 | 39 | 59 | -20 |
| White women | 45 | 47 | -2 | 45 | 53 | -8 | 47 | 51 | -4 |
| Black men* | N/A | | | 87 | 12 | +75 | 75 | 21 | +54 |
| Black women | N/A | | | 95 | 5 | +90 | 89 | 10 | +79 |
| Hispanic men | N/A | | | 57 | 39 | +18 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Hispanic women | N/A | | | 65 | 33 | +32 | 52 | 46 | +6 |
| Asian men*,** | N/A | | | N/A | | | 56 | 40 | +16 |
| Asian women*,** | N/A | | | N/A | | | 57 | 40 | +17 |

* Sample sizes were relatively small for Asian men in 2024 (N=144, margin of error of +/- 11.0 percentage points at 95% confidence), Asian women in 2024 (N=148, margin of error +/- 10.4 points at 95% confidence), Asian voters in 2020 (N=238, margin of error +/- 10.8 points at 95% confidence), Black men voters in 2020 (N=231, margin of error +/- 10.6 points at 95% confidence), Black voters in 2016 (N=212, margin of error +/- 11.4 points at 95% confidence), and Hispanic voters in 2016 (N=166, margin of error +/- 12.4 points at 95% confidence). Some groups not shown in 2020 and 2016 due to insufficient sample sizes.

** Estimates for Asian voters are representative of English speakers only.

Note: White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanic voters are of any race. Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Race and ethnicity

A 55% majority of **White voters** cast ballots for Trump in 2024. An identical share of White voters favored Trump in 2020, and 54% selected him in 2016.

White men favored Trump by a margin of 20 points in the most recent election. White women favored Trump by a narrower 4-point margin.

Though most **Black voters** continued to prefer the Democratic candidate, a larger share of Black voters cast ballots for Trump in 2024 than in 2020 or 2016. Roughly eight-in-ten Black voters (83%) reported voting for Harris in 2024, while 15% favored Trump. In 2020, 8% of Black voters reported voting for Trump, and just 6% of Black voters favored him in 2016.

Black men and women alike were more likely to vote for Trump in 2024 than in 2020. One-in-ten Black women and 21% of Black men voted for Trump in the most recent election.

Increased shares of Black voters who favored Trump were driven not by individuals shifting their preferences, but by changes in who turned out to vote. While some Black voters did indeed switch from Biden in 2020 to Trump in 2024, these defections were largely canceled out by Black voters who switched in the opposite direction.

Nearly half of **Hispanic voters** backed Trump. His support among Hispanic voters was 12 points higher than in 2020 (48% in 2024, 36% in 2020). And the share voting for the Democratic candidate fell from 61% to 51%.

In 2024, Hispanic women and Hispanic men were divided in their preferences for president. In 2020, Hispanic women were more likely than Hispanic men to vote for the Democratic candidate.

Again, these changes were primarily driven by changing turnout patterns: 9% of eligible Hispanic voters voted in 2020 but not in 2024, and these voters favored Biden in 2020 by roughly two-to-one (69% to 31%). By contrast, among Hispanic eligible voters who voted in 2024 but not in 2020, 60% voted for Trump in 2024 and 37% voted for Harris.

Asian voters favored Harris in 2024, with 57% voting for her. Four-in-ten Asian voters (40%) cast ballots for Trump, up from 30% in 2020.

Asian men and women favored Harris by nearly identical margins (16 and 17 points, respectively).

Age and the 2024 vote

Consistent with other recent elections, younger voters tended to favor the Democratic candidate while older voters tended to favor the Republican.

Men under 50 slightly favored Trump in 2024, a reversal from 2020

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | 2020 | | | 2024 | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... Clinton | SHARE VOTING ... Trump | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... Biden | SHARE VOTING ... Trump | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... Harris | SHARE VOTING ... Trump | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | 51 | 47 | +4 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Ages 18-29 | 58 | 28 | +30 | 61 | 35 | +26 | 58 | 39 | +19 |
| 30-49 | 51 | 40 | +11 | 55 | 43 | +12 | 50 | 48 | +2 |
| 50-64 | 45 | 51 | -6 | 46 | 53 | -7 | 42 | 56 | -14 |
| 65+ | 44 | 53 | -9 | 48 | 52 | -4 | 48 | 51 | -3 |
| Ages 18-49 | 53 | 36 | +17 | 57 | 40 | +17 | 52 | 45 | +7 |
| 50+ | 44 | 52 | -8 | 47 | 52 | -5 | 45 | 54 | -9 |
| Men ages 18-49 | 43 | 46 | -3 | 53 | 43 | +10 | 48 | 49 | -1 |
| Men 50+ | 40 | 58 | -18 | 43 | 56 | -13 | 39 | 59 | -20 |
| Women 18-49 | 63 | 27 | +36 | 60 | 38 | +22 | 56 | 42 | +14 |
| Women 50+ | 48 | 47 | +1 | 51 | 49 | +2 | 50 | 49 | +1 |

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Voters ages 18 to 49 favored Harris by 7 percentage points in 2024, compared with a 17-point margin for Biden in 2020. Changing vote patterns were driven in part by defections among young voters: 8% of Biden's 2020 voters under 50 switched to Trump in 2024, while 4% of voters in this group went from Trump to Harris.

The share of voters ages 50 and older who favored Trump was essentially unchanged across the two most recent presidential elections: 54% voted for Trump in 2024, compared with 52% in 2020.

Vote margins shifted among men under 50. In 2024, men under 50 were divided in their preferences: 49% voted for Trump, while 48% supported Harris. By contrast, in 2020, Biden won men under 50 by 10 points (53% to 43%).

Age cohorts

The group of voters who were under age 50 in 2024 is not identical to the group of voters who were under age 50 in 2020: Some voters aged out of this group, while other young adults became newly eligible to vote. Looking at age *cohorts* – groups of people defined by when they were born as opposed to how old they are – allows us to see how the same subset of voters have changed over time.

Harris' advantage among voters born in the 1990s and 2000s was far smaller than both Biden's and Clinton's

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | 2020 | | | 2024 | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|-------|------------------------------|---------------------|-------|------------------------------|---------------------|-------|------------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| | Clinton | Trump | | Biden | Trump | | Harris | Trump | |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | 51 | 47 | +4 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| <i>Among those born in the ...</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| 1930s and earlier* | 40 | 58 | -18 | 44 | 56 | -12 | 44 | 54 | -10 |
| 1940s | 44 | 52 | -8 | 48 | 52 | -4 | 45 | 55 | -10 |
| 1950s | 47 | 51 | -4 | 48 | 51 | -3 | 50 | 49 | +1 |
| 1960s | 46 | 48 | -2 | 46 | 53 | -7 | 43 | 56 | -13 |
| 1970s | 50 | 41 | +9 | 52 | 46 | +6 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| 1980s | 52 | 36 | +16 | 55 | 42 | +13 | 47 | 50 | -3 |
| 1990s and 2000s* | 62 | 25 | +37 | 61 | 35 | +26 | 55 | 42 | +13 |

* Sample sizes were relatively small for 2024 voters born in the 1930s and earlier (N=129, margin of error of +/- 9.9 percentage points at 95% confidence), 2016 voters born in the 1930s and earlier (N=214, margin of error +/- 12.7 points at 95% confidence) and 2016 voters born in the 1990s and 2000s (N=138, margin of error +/- 12.4 points at 95% confidence).

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Most age cohorts of voters saw only small shifts in their candidate preferences between the 2020 and 2024 elections. However, those born in the 1980s and those born in the 1990s or 2000s stand out: Members of both groups became more likely to favor Trump between 2020 and 2024.

Defections played a significant role in the changing voting patterns of those born in the 1980s: 8% of 2020 Biden voters in this group switched their votes to Trump in 2024, while just 2% of 2020 Trump voters born in the '80s switched their votes to Harris. Among those born in the 1990s or 2000s, changes in who turned out to vote accounted for the shift in Trump's favor.

Education and the 2024 election

As has been the pattern through several elections, voters were sharply divided in 2024 by whether they have a college degree. Voters with a four-year degree or more education – [who constitute about 40% of all voters](#) – favored Harris by a double-digit margin (16 percentage points), while those without a college degree favored Trump by nearly as much (14 points).

College graduates and non-college graduates alike were slightly less likely to vote for the Democratic candidate compared with four years earlier.

Wide divide between voters with and without college degrees continues to be a major factor in Trump-era elections

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | | 2020 | | | | 2024 | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| | Clinton | Trump | | | Biden | Trump | | | Harris | Trump | |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | | 51 | 47 | +4 | | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Postgraduate | 66 | 29 | +37 | | 67 | 32 | +35 | | 65 | 33 | +32 |
| College graduate | 52 | 41 | +11 | | 56 | 42 | +14 | | 51 | 46 | +5 |
| Some college | 42 | 49 | -7 | | 49 | 50 | -1 | | 45 | 54 | -9 |
| HS or less | 44 | 51 | -7 | | 41 | 56 | -15 | | 39 | 59 | -20 |
| College grad+ | 57 | 36 | +21 | | 61 | 37 | +24 | | 57 | 41 | +16 |
| No college degree | 43 | 50 | -7 | | 45 | 53 | -8 | | 42 | 56 | -14 |
| White, college grad+ | 55 | 38 | +17 | | 57 | 42 | +15 | | 55 | 43 | +12 |
| White, no college degree | 28 | 64 | -36 | | 33 | 65 | -32 | | 35 | 64 | -29 |
| Black, college grad+ | N/A | | | | 92 | 8 | +84 | | 82 | 16 | +66 |
| Black, no college degree | N/A | | | | 92 | 7 | +85 | | 83 | 14 | +69 |
| Hispanic, college grad+ | N/A | | | | 69 | 29 | +40 | | 56 | 42 | +14 |
| Hispanic, no college degree | N/A | | | | 58 | 39 | +19 | | 49 | 50 | -1 |

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. Some groups not shown in 2016 due to insufficient sample sizes.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Voters with postgraduate degrees remained a strong Democratic group. Voters with postgraduate degrees favored Harris by roughly two-to-one (65% to 33%), which is similar to Biden's and Clinton's advantages in the past two elections. Harris led more narrowly among those with no more than a four-year degree, while Trump won by large margins among those with less formal education.

Educational differences among White and Hispanic voters, but not Black voters.

White noncollege voters were about 20 points more likely to support Trump than those with a four-year degree; that is similar to the difference four years ago. Noncollege Hispanic voters also were more likely to back Trump than Hispanic voters with college degrees, but the gap was smaller than among White voters. There were no meaningful educational differences among Black voters.

Party and ideology in the 2024 election

Among people who voted, more than nine-in-ten Republicans (95%) voted for their party's candidate in the 2024 election, and an identical share of Democrats voted for Harris. Including those who lean toward one of the two major parties, 92% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents voted for Trump, while 94% of Democrats and Democratic leaners voted for Harris.

In 2020, 95% in each party also voted for their party's nominee.

Independents were evenly divided in 2024

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | 2020 | | | 2024 | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| | Clinton | Trump | | Biden | Trump | | Harris | Trump | |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | 51 | 47 | +4 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Rep/Lean Rep | 4 | 89 | -85 | 6 | 93 | -87 | 6 | 92 | -86 |
| Dem/Lean Dem | 89 | 5 | +84 | 94 | 4 | +90 | 94 | 5 | +89 |
| Republican | 4 | 92 | -88 | 5 | 95 | -90 | 4 | 95 | -91 |
| Democrat | 94 | 5 | +89 | 95 | 4 | +91 | 95 | 4 | +91 |
| Independent/Other | 42 | 43 | -1 | 52 | 43 | +9 | 48 | 48 | 0 |
| Lean Rep | 5 | 82 | -77 | 10 | 86 | -76 | 8 | 87 | -79 |
| Lean Dem | 80 | 6 | +74 | 91 | 5 | +86 | 91 | 6 | +85 |
| Conserv Rep/Lean Rep | 3 | 94 | -91 | 2 | 97 | -95 | 2 | 97 | -95 |
| Mod/Lib Rep/Lean Rep | 8 | 79 | -71 | 16 | 81 | -65 | 14 | 82 | -68 |
| Cons/Mod Dem/Lean Dem | 85 | 8 | +77 | 91 | 7 | +84 | 90 | 8 | +82 |
| Liberal Dem/Lean Dem | 94 | 2 | +92 | 98 | 2 | +96 | 98 | 1 | +97 |

Note: Rep/Lean Rep and Dem/Lean Dem include those who lean toward one party or the other. Republican and Democrat exclude leaners. Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Independents (including those who lean toward one party or the other) were evenly divided in 2024, with 48% voting for Harris and 48% for Trump. Four years ago, this group favored Biden by 9 percentage points.

As in past elections, ideology was closely related to vote choice:

- 97% of conservative Republicans and Republican leaners voted for Trump.
- 82% of moderate and liberal Republicans and Republican leaners voted for Trump.
- 90% of conservative and moderate Democrats and Democratic leaners voted for Harris.
- 98% of liberal Democrats and Democratic leaners voted for Harris.

Community type and voting preferences in 2024

The urban-rural divide, already a major factor in presidential elections, grew in 2024 as rural voters favored Trump by an even larger margin than they did in 2020.

Rural and suburban voters both shifted in Trump's favor from 2020 to 2024

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | 2020 | | | 2024 | | |
|----------|------------------|-------|------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | SHARE VOTING ... | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| | Clinton | Trump | | Biden | Trump | | Harris | Trump | |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | 51 | 47 | +4 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Urban | 70 | 24 | +46 | 66 | 32 | +34 | 65 | 33 | +32 |
| Suburban | 45 | 47 | -2 | 54 | 44 | +10 | 51 | 47 | +4 |
| Rural | 34 | 59 | -25 | 34 | 65 | -31 | 29 | 69 | -40 |

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Nearly seven-in-ten validated voters who describe their communities as rural (69%) voted for Trump in 2024, while 29% voted for Harris. In 2020, 65% of rural voters favored Trump and 34% favored Biden. In 2016, 59% voted for Trump and 34% cast ballots for Clinton.

Trump benefited from rural voters defecting to him in addition to changing turnout patterns: 7% of Biden's rural 2020 voters who voted in both elections converted into Trump voters in 2024, while just 3% of Trump's rural 2020 voters switched to Harris.

Trump also benefited from changing turnout patterns – though not from significant defections – among suburban voters. Suburban voters continued to favor the Democratic candidate, but by a smaller margin than in 2020 (a 4-point margin in 2024 vs. 10 points in 2020).

While Harris maintained the Democrats' substantial advantage among urban voters, she did not make any gains within this group to offset her losses among suburban and rural voters. Urban voters favored Harris by roughly a two-to-one margin (65% vs. 33%) in 2024, just as they favored Biden by roughly two-to-one in 2020 (66% vs. 32%).

Religion and the presidential election

Voters who attend religious services monthly or more frequently favored Trump by nearly 2 to 1 in 2024

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2016 | | | | 2020 | | | | 2024 | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | | SHARE VOTING ... | SHARE VOTING ... | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) |
| | Clinton | Trump | | | Biden | Trump | | | Harris | Trump | |
| Total | 48 | 46 | +2 | | 51 | 47 | +4 | | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Protestant | 39 | 56 | -17 | | 40 | 59 | -19 | | 36 | 62 | -26 |
| White evang. Prot. | 16 | 77 | -61 | | 15 | 83 | -68 | | 16 | 81 | -65 |
| White nonevang. Prot. | 37 | 57 | -20 | | 43 | 57 | -14 | | 41 | 58 | -17 |
| Black Protestant | N/A | | | | 91 | 9 | +82 | | 83 | 15 | +68 |
| Other race Protestant | N/A | | | | 42 | 55 | -13 | | 29 | 70 | -41 |
| Catholic | 44 | 52 | -8 | | 50 | 49 | +1 | | 43 | 55 | -12 |
| White Catholic | 31 | 64 | -33 | | 42 | 57 | -15 | | 37 | 62 | -25 |
| Hispanic Catholic | N/A | | | | 66 | 31 | +35 | | 58 | 41 | +17 |
| Jewish | N/A | | | | N/A | | | | 63 | 35 | +28 |
| NET Unaffiliated | 65 | 24 | +41 | | 71 | 26 | +45 | | 70 | 28 | +42 |
| Atheist | N/A | | | | 87 | 11 | +76 | | 83 | 15 | +68 |
| Agnostic | N/A | | | | 84 | 14 | +70 | | 79 | 18 | +61 |
| Nothing in particular | 61 | 27 | +34 | | 61 | 36 | +25 | | 60 | 38 | +22 |
| <i>Religious attendance</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly or more often | 37 | 58 | -21 | | 40 | 59 | -19 | | 34 | 64 | -30 |
| A few times a year or less | 54 | 38 | +16 | | 58 | 40 | +18 | | 56 | 43 | +13 |

Note: White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanic voters are of any race. Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. Some groups not shown in 2020 and 2016 due to insufficient sample sizes.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Religious groups voted along familiar lines in 2024, even as Trump gained among Protestants, Catholics, and those who reported attending religious services on at least a monthly basis.

Protestants

Trump's margin among all Protestant voters increased to 26 percentage points in the most recent election (from 19 points in 2020), with 62% of Protestants favoring him. Trump's gains among Protestants included small but significant gains from defectors: 5% of Protestants who voted for Biden in 2020 switched to Trump in 2024, while just 3% of Trump's 2020 Protestants went to Harris.

Trump also gained – through changes in turnout – among Black Protestants and among Protestants of a race or ethnicity other than White or Black.

White evangelical Protestants continued to overwhelmingly favor Trump: 81% voted for Trump in 2024, compared with 83% in 2020. And nearly identical majorities of White nonevangelical Protestants voted for Trump in 2024 (58%) and 2020 (57%).

Catholics

Trump won a majority of Catholic voters, taking 55% of the Catholic vote to Harris' 43%. Four years earlier, Catholics split almost evenly: 50% voted for Biden and 49% for Trump.

As with Protestants, Trump benefited from a small advantage among Catholic defectors: 7% of 2020 Biden voters converted to Trump voters in 2024, while just 4% of Catholics who favored Trump in the earlier election shifted to Harris. The remainder of Trump's gains with this group came from changes in turnout.

The religiously unaffiliated

Unaffiliated voters continued to favor the Democratic candidate, with 70% voting for Harris and 28% voting for Trump. Four years earlier, 71% of religiously unaffiliated voters selected Biden and 26% selected Trump.

Attendance at religious services

Trump in 2024 won a larger share of voters who attend religious services at least once a month than he did in 2020. The same was true among voters who attend less frequently.

Among frequent attenders, Trump's share of voters increased to 64% from 59% in 2020. Among less frequent attenders, it increased to 43% from 40%.

Voting patterns among naturalized citizens

For the 2024 and 2020 presidential elections, we have sufficient data to look at vote choice among citizens who report having been born in another country – in other words, [naturalized U.S. citizens](#).

Naturalized citizens were closely divided in the 2024 election: About half (51%) voted for Harris and 47% voted for Trump.

This marked a shift from four years ago, when naturalized citizens backed Biden by a wide 59%-38% margin.

While a small share of naturalized citizens switched from voting for Biden in 2020 to Trump in 2024, these defectors were canceled out by voters who switched from Trump to Harris. Trump's gains among naturalized citizens were instead driven by different voters turning out to cast ballots across the two elections.

Roughly two-in-ten naturalized citizens who voted in 2024 had not voted in 2020 (22%), and a 57% majority of this group voted for Trump in 2024. Meanwhile, among the naturalized citizens who voted in 2020 but dropped off in 2024, 67% were Biden voters in the earlier election.

Citizens who were born outside the U.S. supported Trump at much higher levels in 2024 than in 2020

% of validated voters who reported voting for each candidate

| | 2020 | | | 2024 | | |
|---|---------------------|-------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------|-------|
| | SHARE VOTING ... | Biden | Trump | SHARE VOTING ... | Harris | Trump |
| | | | VOTE MARGINS (DEM-REP) | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Total | 51 | 47 | +4 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Born in the U.S. | 51 | 48 | +3 | 48 | 50 | -2 |
| Naturalized citizens | 59 | 38 | +21 | 51 | 47 | +4 |
| <i>Among naturalized citizens who are ...</i> | | | | | | |
| White, non-Hispanic* | 56 | 41 | +15 | 39 | 55 | -16 |
| Black, non-Hispanic* | N/A | | | N/A | | |
| Hispanic* | 58 | 39 | +19 | 48 | 51 | -3 |
| Asian*,** | 65 | 35 | +30 | 51 | 46 | +5 |

* Sample sizes were relatively small for Hispanic naturalized citizens in 2024 (N=143, margin of error of +/- 10.4 percentage points at 95% confidence), White naturalized citizens in 2020 (N=221, margin of error +/- 11.0 points at 95% confidence), Hispanic naturalized citizens in 2020 (N=389, margin of error +/- 10.4 points at 95% confidence) and Asian naturalized citizens in 2020 (N=120, margin of error +/- 13.4 points at 95% confidence). Black naturalized citizens not shown due to insufficient sample sizes.

** Estimates for Asian voters are representative of English speakers only.

Note: White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanic voters are of any race. Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Race and ethnicity among naturalized citizens

White, Hispanic and Asian naturalized citizens each shifted at least somewhat in Trump's direction between 2020 and 2024, due primarily to changes in turnout:

- 55% of White naturalized citizens voted for Trump in 2024, compared with 41% in 2020.
- 51% of Hispanic naturalized citizens voted for Trump, up from 39% in 2020.
- 46% of Asian naturalized citizens voted for Trump, an increase from 35% in 2020.

3. Demographic profiles of Trump and Harris voters in 2024

The composition of Republican and Democratic voters in the United States has changed since the 2020 presidential election, and the shifts have been even larger since the 2016 contest.

Donald Trump's voters overall were more racially and ethnically diverse in 2024 than in his prior campaigns, reflecting gains among Hispanic, Black and Asian voters. Conversely, Kamala Harris' voters were somewhat *less* diverse than the voters who backed Joe Biden in 2020 or Hillary Clinton in 2016.

Despite these changes, there continue to be wide differences in the makeup of the partisan coalitions.

Trump voters were less racially and ethnically diverse, older and less likely to have a four-year college degree than Harris voters. And the sizable religious differences between those who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates persisted: Roughly eight-in-ten Trump voters (79%) identified as Christian, compared with about half (52%) of Harris voters.

Racial and ethnic composition of Harris and Trump voters in 2024

The racial and ethnic composition of voters shifted only modestly over the past three elections, though the share of voters who are White and not Hispanic continued to tick lower. White voters made up 71% of all voters last year, down from 73% in 2020 and 74% in 2016.

Related: Explore long-term changes in the composition of registered voters in our report [*“Changing Partisan Coalitions in a Politically Divided Nation.”*](#)

White non-Hispanic adults continued to make up a large majority (78%) of voters who supported Trump. However, **this represents the lowest share in the past three presidential elections.** White voters made up 86% of Trump’s coalition in 2020 and 88% of Trump voters in 2016.


Another 10% of Trump voters were Hispanic, while 3% were Black and 3% were Asian. The share of Trump voters who are Hispanic, Black, Asian or another race has roughly doubled since his 2016 election, from 11% to 20%, mostly because Hispanic voters now make up a larger share of his voters (10%, up from 6% in 2016).

Among Harris voters, 64% were non-Hispanic White, slightly higher than the share of Biden (61%) or Clinton voters (60%) who were White.

Among Harris voters, 16% were non-Hispanic Black, while another 11% were Hispanic. Asian adults accounted for 5% of Harris’ voters.

White, non-Hispanic voters made up a smaller majority of Trump supporters in 2024 than in 2020, 2016

Composition of validated voters who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates (%)



* Estimates for Asian adults are representative of English speakers only.

Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanic voters are of any race.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Educational composition of 2024 voters

About six-in ten voters in 2024 (59%) did not have a college degree. This share has steadily decreased over time as the share of Americans with a [college degree has grown](#) (in 2016, 63% of voters did not have a college degree).

Overall, those who voted for Democratic candidates in recent elections have been more likely than Republican voters to have a college degree.

Harris voters were about evenly split between those who do have a college degree (48%) and those who do not (51%). The share of Democratic voters who have a college degree has risen somewhat since 2016, when 43% had a degree.

Among Trump's 2024 voters, two-thirds (67%) did not have a college degree, down slightly from 71% in 2016.


However, the share of Republican voters who are White and have no college degree has substantially declined since 2016.

In 2024, White noncollege voters made up a narrow majority (51%) of Trump's coalition. That is the smallest share in his three campaigns for the White House:

- In 2020, 58% of Trump voters were White adults who did not have a four-year degree;

White voters without college degrees continued to decline as a share of the GOP coalition in 2024

Composition of validated voters who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates (%)



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. White voters include those who report being one race and are not Hispanic. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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- In 2016, more than six-in-ten Trump voters (63%) were White, noncollege voters.

There has been less change in the share of Democratic voters who are White with no college degree (29% in 2024 vs. 27% in 2020 and 26% in 2016). As was the case for Biden and Clinton supporters, White college graduates made up a larger share of Harris supporters (35%) than did White voters who did not have a college degree (29%).

Age composition of 2024 voters

The age distribution of voters in 2024 was roughly the same as it was in the last two presidential elections. Overall, a majority of voters (56%) were ages 50 and older, while 44% were under the age of 50.

Younger voters continued to make up a somewhat larger share of the Democratic coalition than the Republican coalition, but voters under the age of 50 made up a larger share of Trump's coalition in 2024 than in 2016.

Among Democratic voters:


- 52% of Harris voters were ages 50 and older, while 48% were younger than 50.
- These numbers are similar to Biden and Clinton's coalitions.

Among Republican voters:

- 60% of Trump voters were 50 and older in 2024, down from 65% in 2016.
- Voters under 50 made up 40% of Trump's coalition in 2024, up from 35% in 2016.

Voters 50 and older made up a smaller majority of Trump voters than in 2016

Composition of validated voters who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates (%)



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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
Rural, suburban and urban composition of 2024 voters

The community profiles of Harris and Trump voters have not fundamentally changed since 2020.

Suburban voters made up the largest shares of both Harris (56%) and Trump (49%) voters in 2024. And while Harris voters were much more likely than Trump voters to describe their communities as urban (28% vs. 13%), rural voters made up a substantially larger share of Trump voters (36%) than Harris voters (16%).

Suburban residents made up a majority of Harris voters and nearly half of Trump voters in 2024

Composition of validated voters who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates (%)



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. Community type based on self-report.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Religious composition of 2024 voters

Overall, the religious composition of voters has shifted modestly since 2016. In 2024, roughly four-in-ten voters (43%) were Protestants, while about a quarter were religiously unaffiliated and 20% were Catholics. In 2016, Protestants made up 47% of voters.

Protestants again made up a majority of Trump voters (54%) in 2024, compared with 32% of Harris voters. The share of Protestants making up each coalition has dipped slightly since 2016.


Religiously unaffiliated voters (atheist, agnostic and those who describe themselves as “nothing in particular”) made up a much larger share of Democratic voters than Republican voters (39% vs. 15%).

Religiously unaffiliated voters were a slightly larger share of Harris voters (39%) than Biden or Clinton voters (35% each).

Catholics made up about one-in-five Trump voters (22%) and a slightly smaller share of Harris voters (18%).

Roughly three-quarters of Trump voters in 2024 were Christians, compared with about half of Harris voters

Composition of validated voters who voted for Republican and Democratic candidates (%)



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.


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White Protestants made up a smaller share of Trump's coalition in 2024 than they did in 2020 and 2016. In 2024, fewer than half of Trump's voters (43%) identified as White evangelical (29%) or nonevangelical Protestant (15%). That is lower than in 2020 (51%) or 2016 (52%).

Black Protestants continued to make up a larger share of the Democratic coalition than the Republican coalition (12% vs. 2%). The share of Trump's coalition that was made up of Protestants whose race or ethnicity is something other than White or Black has grown since 2020. In 2024, these voters made up 9% of Trump's voters, up from 5% in 2020.

White evangelical and mainline Protestants declined as a share of Trump's voters

Composition of validated voters who voted for **Republican** and **Democratic** candidates (%)



Note: Based on adult citizens for whom reliable data on turnout and vote choice is available. Turnout was verified using official state election records. Vote choice for all years is from a survey conducted in the month after the election. White, Black and Asian voters include those who report being one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanic voters are of any race.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2024.

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Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

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Methodology

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans voted in 2024 and how their turnout and vote choices differed from 2016 and 2020.

For this analysis, we surveyed 8,942 U.S. citizens ages 18 and older who are members of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP). We verified their turnout in the five general elections from 2016 to 2024 using commercial voter files that collect publicly available official state turnout records.

After each general election, panelists were asked if they voted and for whom (presidential candidates in 2016, 2020, and 2024 and U.S. House candidates in 2018 and 2022). For elections that had occurred before an individual joined the panel, turnout and vote choice were measured soon after their recruitment. For all elections, panelists who said in a postelection survey that they had voted and for whom a record of voting was located are considered validated voters; all others are presumed not to have voted.

The 2024 election and comparisons with earlier elections

Much of this report describes the 2024 vote broken down by various groups in the population, taken from the 2024 postelection survey (described below), with similar reporting from postelection surveys conducted after the [2016 presidential](#), [2018 congressional](#), [2020 presidential](#), and [2022 congressional](#) elections. Estimates for all earlier elections except 2020 are identical to those published in Pew Research Center’s earlier reports and rely solely on the relevant postelection surveys at the time. Results from 2020 reported here and in the online detailed tables may be slightly different from those in the 2020 version of the report because we revised our statistical approach for the 2020 survey when we published the 2022 postelection report. More detail about the [revision of the 2020 estimates](#) can be found at the end of this Methodology chapter.

The postelection ATP surveys used in this report were conducted Nov. 29-Dec. 12, 2016; Nov. 7-16, 2018; Nov. 12-17, 2020; Nov. 16-27, 2022; and Nov. 12-17, 2024. The surveys are weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, age, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education, and many other characteristics, as described below.

Validating turnout

In order to verify panelists’ self-reported turnout in the 2024 election, an effort was made to match the panelists to lists of registered voters (sometimes referred to as “voter files”) from three

vendors. One vendor works mostly with conservative and Republican organizations and campaigns; one works mostly with progressive and Democratic organizations and campaigns; and one is nonpartisan. These lists are updated following each election with a record of everyone who is registered to vote and turnout for all individuals who voted in the election.

For purposes of this study, a panelist is considered a *validated voter* if they said they voted in the election and a turnout record for them was located in at least one of the three voter lists. People who said they did not vote, along with those who said they voted but for whom no record of turnout could be located in any of the three lists, were considered *nonvoters*. Nonvoters include individuals whose names were not found in any of the files. Panelists who did not provide us with their names are excluded from this analysis entirely. In addition, panelists who did not answer voter turnout or vote choice questions in 2020, 2022 or 2024 are excluded from this analysis.

Because of a [law passed in 2018](#), Utah residents can opt to keep their voter registration and vote history data private. Consequently, panelists who live in Utah are considered to be voters if they reported having voted when asked in the postelection survey, without any voter file validation.

Out of the 8,942 voting-age citizens, 8,410 (94%) were matched to at least one of these files; 7,100 are considered to be validated voters. Panelists who said they did not vote and those who provided names but could not be matched, or for whom no 2024 turnout record could be located, were considered to be validated nonvoters (1,842 panelists).

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

The American Trends Panel, created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Currently, panelists participate via self-administered web surveys or live telephone interviews. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by SSRS.

At the time of the Nov. 29-Dec. 12, 2016, survey, the panel was managed by Abt Associates. At the time of data collection for the 2018, 2020 and 2022 surveys, it was managed by Ipsos.

Methodology reports for the surveys from 2016-2022 can be found in each year's validated voter report: [2016](#), [2018](#), [2020](#), [2022](#).

To learn more about the ATP, read "[What is the American Trends Panel?](#)"

Detailed ATP methodology for 2024

The survey for Wave 159 of the ATP was conducted from Nov. 12 to Nov. 17, 2024. A total of 9,609 panelists responded out of 10,604 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 91%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is less than 1%.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=9,323) and live telephone (n=286) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling](#)."

² Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. All active panel members were invited to participate in this wave.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was Nov. 12 to Nov. 17, 2024. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on Nov. 12.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on Nov.

³ The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

⁴ Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

12. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on Nov. 13.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,
ATP Wave 159**

| | Soft launch | Full launch |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Initial invitation | Nov. 12, 2024 | Nov. 13, 2024 |
| First reminder | Nov. 14, 2024 | Nov. 14, 2024 |
| Final reminder | Nov. 16, 2024 | Nov. 16, 2024 |

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For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on Nov. 8. Soft launch took place on Nov. 12 and involved dialing until a total of eight interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting of the 2024 study

Because some people are more likely than others to participate in surveys, survey data must be weighted for it to be fully representative of the population. This means giving more or less weight to different kinds of people based on how we sampled them and based on comparing how many of them are in the population versus how many are in our survey data. For this study, weighting involved a large number of considerations, as described below.

The weighting for this study is different from a standard wave of the ATP. It is designed to provide accurate estimates of 2024 voter choice and candidate preference among nonvoters as well as voters, and to make comparisons involving data collected about the 2020 and 2022 elections.

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

| Variable | Benchmark source |
|--|--|
| Age (detailed) | 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) |
| Age x Gender | |
| Education x Gender | |
| Education x Age | |
| Race/Ethnicity x Education | |
| Race/Ethnicity x Gender | |
| Race/Ethnicity x Age | |
| Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans | |
| Years lived in the U.S. | |
| Census region x Metropolitan status | |
| Volunteerism | 2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement |
| Voter registration | 2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement |
| Frequency of internet use | 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study (RLS) |
| Religious affiliation | |
| Party affiliation x Gender x Race/Ethnicity | |
| Party affiliation x Age | |
| Party affiliation among registered voters | Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS. |
| 2024 presidential popular vote and turnout among voting-eligible population. 2022 congressional popular vote and turnout among voting-eligible population. | |
| 2020 congressional popular vote and turnout among voting-eligible population. | |

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. In a final step, the trimmed weights were recalibrated to align exactly with the benchmarks for voter turnout and the presidential popular vote. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

| Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 159 | | |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Group | Unweighted sample size | Plus or minus ... |
| Total sample | 8,942 | 1.4 percentage points |
| Validated voters | 7,100 | 1.5 percentage points |
| Validated nonvoters | 1,842 | 2.8 percentage points |
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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Vote choice measures for panelists who did not participate in one or more of the surveys conducted in 2016, 2018, 2020 or 2022

A large number of people who participated in the 2024 postelection survey had not been on the panel or did not respond to the 2016, 2018, 2020 or 2022 postelection surveys at the time they were conducted. For these panelists, their vote choices for 2016, 2018, 2020 or 2022 were measured after the fact. Details about this measurement for 2016-2022 can be found in the [methodology statement](#) of the 2022 voter report. Panelists recruited in 2023 and 2024 were asked about their 2020 and 2022 votes during their recruitment or profile survey.

More details about the revision of the 2020 data

As part of the report on the 2022 midterm elections, we revised our statistical approach for the 2020 survey. That produced new results that slightly changed the numbers we had [previously reported](#) about the 2020 election but changed no substantive findings in our report. There was nothing inaccurate about the 2020 results, but we chose to use a slightly different survey

weighting approach that increases the precision of our estimates for some of the groups of voters we discussed in the report, especially those that are difficult to reach and interview.

Although the revised numbers for 2020 appear in the current report and in the accompanying online data tables, the report on the 2020 election has not been changed, and the data tables provided with that report are still available.

How family income tiers are calculated

To classify panelists as upper, middle, or lower income in this study, family income data is adjusted for household size and cost-of-living differences by geography. Panelists then are assigned to income tiers that are based on the median adjusted family income of all American Trends Panel members. The process uses the following steps:

1. First, panelists are assigned to the midpoint of the income range they selected in a family income question that was measured on either the most recent annual profile survey or, for newly recruited panelists, their recruitment survey. This provides an approximate income value that can be used in calculations for the adjustment.
2. Next, these income values are adjusted for the cost of living in the geographic area where the panelist lives. This is calculated using price indexes published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. These indexes, known as [Regional Price Parities](#) (RPP), compare the prices of goods and services across all U.S. metropolitan statistical areas as well as non-metro areas with the national average prices for the same goods and services. The most recent available data at the time of the annual profile survey is from 2022. Those who fall outside of metropolitan statistical areas are assigned the overall RPP for their state's non-metropolitan area.
3. Family incomes are further adjusted for the number of people in a household using the methodology from Pew Research Center's previous work on [the American middle class](#). This is done because a four-person household with an income of say, \$50,000, faces a tighter budget constraint than a two-person household with the same income.
4. Panelists are then assigned an income tier. "Middle-income" adults are in families with adjusted family incomes that are between two-thirds and double the median adjusted family income for the full ATP at the time of the most recent annual profile survey. The median adjusted family income for the panel is roughly \$74,100. Using this median income, the middle-income range is about \$49,400 to \$148,200. Lower-income families have adjusted incomes less than \$49,400 and upper-income families have adjusted

incomes greater than \$148,200 (all figures expressed in 2023 dollars and scaled to a household size of three). If a panelist did not provide their income and/or their household size, they are assigned “no answer” in the income tier variable.

Two examples of how a given area’s cost-of-living adjustment was calculated are as follows: the Pine Bluff metropolitan area in Arkansas is a relatively inexpensive area, with a price level that is 19.1% less than the national average. The San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley metropolitan area in California is one of the most expensive areas, with a price level that is 17.9% higher than the national average. Income in the sample is adjusted to make up for this difference. As a result, a family with an income of \$40,400 in the Pine Bluff area is as well off financially as a family of the same size with an income of \$58,900 in San Francisco.

**2024 PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL
WAVE 159 POLITICS SURVEY
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE
NOVEMBER 12–17, 2024**

Note: The questions presented below are part of a larger survey conducted on the American Trends Panel. For all questions, the 98 ("Don't know" in phone mode) and 99 ("Refusal" in phone mode and "No answer" in web mode) codes are combined in the data for analytical purposes.

PN = Programming note

CODEBOOK FOR ATP SAMPLE VARIABLES TO BE USED IN SURVEY PROGRAMMING LOGIC

X_FORM

- 1 Form 1
- 2 Form 2

Note: Flag to randomly assign panelists to one of two forms (Form 1, Form 2) and weight within form

X_CITIZEN

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 99 Refused

Note: Flag to identify U.S. citizens.

X_PBALLOT24_KENNEDY

- 1 Kennedy on state ballot
- 2 Not on state ballot

Note: Flag for response option 3 in VOTEGEN_POST and VOTEGEN_POSTNON, based on F_STATE.

X_PBALLOT24_OLIVER

- 1 Oliver on state ballot
- 2 Not on state ballot

Note: Flag for response option 4 in VOTEGEN_POST and VOTEGEN_POSTNON, based on F_STATE.

X_PBALLOT24_STEIN

- 1 Stein on state ballot
- 2 Not on state ballot

Note: Flag for response option 5 in VOTEGEN_POST and VOTEGEN_POSTNON, based on F_STATE.

X_PBALLOT24_WEST

- 1 West on state ballot
- 2 Not on state ballot

Note: Flag for response option 6 in VOTEGEN_POST and VOTEGEN_POSTNON, based on F_STATE.

X_PBALLOT24_DLC

- 1 De la Cruz on state ballot
- 2 Not on state ballot

Note: Flag for response option 7 in VOTEGEN_POST and VOTEGEN_POSTNON, based on F_STATE.

 -----**MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE BEGINS HERE**-----

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED

QUE: VOTED

ASK ALL CITIZENS (XCITIZEN=1):

Which of the following statements best describes you?

[PN: IF CATI:] **(READ LIST)**

- 1 I did not vote in the November 2024 election
 - 2 I planned to vote but wasn't able to
 - 3 I definitely voted in the November 2024 election
 - 98 [PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ) Don't know
 - 99 [PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ) Refused / [PN: IF WEB:] Web blank
-

QUE: VOTEGEN_POST

ASK IF VOTED (VOTED=3):

[PN: ROTATE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1-2/2-1 FIRST, FOLLOWED BY RANDOMIZATION OF
 OPTIONS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 WITH OPTIONS 8, 9, 98 AND 99 ALWAYS HELD LAST IN ORDER;
 INCLUDE ROTATION IN DATA FILE]

[PN: FOR WEB, ONLY SHOW CODES 8 AND 9 IF RESPONDENT INITIALLY TRIES TO SKIP]

[PN: SOFT PROMPT MESSAGE AFTER FIRST SKIP SHOULD READ: *If you voted for someone else,
 please select answer choice "Another candidate". If you did not vote for president, please select answer
 choice "I did not vote for a candidate for president." If you would like to skip, click Next...*]

[PN: FOR CODE 3 (RFK), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_KENNEDY=1]

[PN: FOR CODE 4 (OLIVER), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_OLIVER=1]

[PN: FOR CODE 5 (STEIN), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_STEIN=1]

[PN: FOR CODE 6 (WEST), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_WEST=1]

[PN: FOR CODE 7 (DE LA CRUZ), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_DLC=1]

In the 2024 presidential election, who did you vote for?

[PN: IF CATI:] **(READ LIST)**

- 1 Donald Trump, the Republican
- 2 [PN: IF WEB:] Kamala Harris, the Democrat [PN: IF CATI:] Kamala **(PRONO: COM-uh-la)** Harris, the Democrat
- 3 Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a third-party candidate
- 4 Chase Oliver, the Libertarian Party candidate
- 5 [PN: IF WEB:] Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate [PN: IF CATI:] Jill Stein **(PRONO: Sty-n)**, the Green Party candidate
- 6 Cornel West, a third-party candidate
- 7 [PN: IF WEB:] Claudia De la Cruz, the Socialism and Liberation Party candidate [PN: IF CATI:] Claudia De la Cruz **(PRONO: Deh-lah-kroos)**, the Socialism and Liberation Party candidate
- 8 [PN: IF CATI:] (DO NOT READ) Another candidate [PN: IF WEB:] Another candidate

- 9 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) I did not vote for a candidate for president [**PN: IF WEB:**] I did not vote for a candidate for president
- 98 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Don't know
- 99 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Refused / [**PN: IF WEB:**] Web blank
-

QUE: VOTEGEN_POSTNON

{W78 11-20, mod W23 'this November', mod W9}

ASK IF DID NOT VOTE (VOTED=1-2):

[**PN: ROTATE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1-2/2-1 FIRST, FOLLOWED BY RANDOMIZATION OF OPTIONS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 WITH OPTIONS 8, 98 AND 99 ALWAYS LAST IN ORDER; INCLUDE ROTATION IN DATA FILE**]

[**PN: FOR WEB, ONLY SHOW CODE 8 IF RESPONDENT INITIALLY TRIES TO SKIP**]

[**PN: SOFT PROMPT MESSAGE AFTER FIRST SKIP SHOULD READ:** *If you would have voted for someone else, please select answer choice "Another candidate". If you would like to skip, click Next...*]

[**PN: FOR CODE 3 (RFK), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_KENNEDY=1**]

[**PN: FOR CODE 4 (OLIVER), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_OLIVER=1**]

[**PN: FOR CODE 5 (STEIN), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_STEIN=1**]

[**PN: FOR CODE 6 (WEST), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_WEST=1**]

[**PN: FOR CODE 7 (DE LA CRUZ), DISPLAY ONLY IF X_PBALLLOT24_DLC=1**]

If you had voted in the presidential election, would you have voted for...

[**PN: IF CATI:**] **(READ LIST)**

- 1 Donald Trump, the Republican
- 2 [**PN: IF WEB:**] Kamala Harris, the Democrat [**PN: IF CATI:**] Kamala **(PRONO: COM-uh-la)** Harris, the Democrat
- 3 Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a third-party candidate
- 4 Chase Oliver, the Libertarian Party candidate
- 5 [**PN: IF WEB:**] Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate [**PN: IF CATI:**] Jill Stein **(PRONO: Sty-n)**, the Green Party candidate
- 6 Cornel West, a third-party candidate
- 7 [**PN: IF WEB:**] Claudia De la Cruz, the Socialism and Liberation Party candidate [**PN: IF CATI:**] Claudia De la Cruz **(PRONO: Deh-lah-kroos)**, the Socialism and Liberation Party candidate
- 8 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Another candidate [**PN: IF WEB:**] Another candidate
- 98 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Don't know
- 99 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Refused / [**PN: IF WEB:**] Web blank
-

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED

QUE: VOTE_HOW_POST

{W117 11-22; W78 11-20}

ASK IF VOTED (VOTED=3):**[PN: RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS; INCLUDE RANDOMIZATION IN DATA FILE]**

How did you vote in the election?

[PN: IF CATI:] (READ LIST)

- 1 In person at a polling place
- 2 By absentee or mail-in ballot
- 98 **[PN: IF CATI:]** (DO NOT READ) Don't know
- 99 **[PN: IF CATI:]** (DO NOT READ) Refused / **[PN: IF WEB:]** Web blank

QUE: VOTEINPWHEN

{W117 11-22; W78 11-20}

ASK IF VOTED IN PERSON (VOTE_HOW_POST=1):

When did you vote?

[PN: IF CATI:] (READ LIST)

- 1 Before Election Day
- 2 On Election Day
- 98 **[PN: IF CATI:]** (DO NOT READ) Don't know
- 99 **[PN: IF CATI:]** (DO NOT READ) Refused / **[PN: IF WEB:]** Web blank

QUE: VOTEMAIL

{W117 11-22; W78 11-20}

ASK IF VOTED BY ABSENTEE OR MAIL (VOTE_HOW_POST=2):**[PN: RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS; INCLUDE RANDOMIZATION IN DATA FILE]**

How did you return your absentee or mail-in ballot?

[PN: IF CATI:] (READ LIST)

- 1 In person to an election official or poll worker
- 2 At a designated dropbox
- 3 By mail
- 98 **[PN: IF CATI:]** (DO NOT READ) Don't know
- 99 **[PN: IF CATI:]** (DO NOT READ) Refused / **[PN: IF WEB:]** Web blank

QUE: MAILWHEN

{W78 11-20}

ASK IF VOTED BY ABSENTEE OR MAIL (VOTE_HOW_POST=2):

When did you mail or return your absentee or mail-in ballot?

[PN: IF CATI:] (READ LIST)

- 1 In the week leading up to Election Day
2 Before that
98 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99 [**PN: IF CATI:**] (DO NOT READ) Refused / [**PN: IF WEB:**] Web blank
-

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED
