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# Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War

*Democrats significantly more likely than Republicans to rate NATO positively and to say U.S. benefits from membership*

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## How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans' opinions of NATO, Russia and the war between Russia and Ukraine. This analysis builds on previous Center research on [Americans' opinions of NATO, Russia and the war between Russia and Ukraine](#) and on the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day going back decades, such as [major world conflicts](#), [trade and tariffs](#), [U.S. military decisions](#) and [other related developments of the times](#).

For this analysis, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to March 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

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# Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War

*Democrats significantly more likely than Republicans to rate NATO positively and to say U.S. benefits from membership*

More than three years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Americans remain divided along partisan lines in their views of the conflict, as well as in their attitudes toward NATO and perceptions of Russia.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents have become less likely over the past year to say Russia is an enemy of the United States – and more likely to call it a partner or competitor.


Republicans have also become less likely to say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself and to express concern about Russia defeating Ukraine or invading other countries in the region. As a result of this change in opinion, the partisan gap on many of these issues has grown.

For example, when asked whether Russia is an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S., 40% of Republicans say Russia is an enemy, down from 58% last year. The share of Democrats and Democratic leaners who see Russia as an enemy is down 5 percentage points over the same period. Overall, half of Americans now call Russia an enemy, down from 61% in 2024.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted March 24–30, 2025, among 3,605 U.S. adults.

## Falling shares of Republicans see Russia as an enemy of the U.S., more say it is a competitor or partner

% who think of Russia as a(n) \_\_\_ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24–30, 2025.

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
## Views of NATO

Americans continue to see NATO in a mostly favorable light, and views among Republicans, Democrats and the public overall have changed little over the past year. As has long been the case, Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to have a positive opinion of the military alliance.


About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership, though this share has decreased slightly from 71% in 2021. This drop is reflected among Republicans (down 6 points) while opinion among Democrats has held steady.

### Republicans, Democrats differ widely in views of NATO and U.S. membership in it

% who have a(n) \_\_\_ opinion of NATO



% who think the U.S. benefits \_\_\_ from being a member of NATO



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.  
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## Views of Russia and Putin


Few in the U.S. see Russia favorably (13%) or have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs (12%).

Both Democrats and Republicans have generally negative views of Russia and Putin, but these attitudes are more intense among Democrats – who are more likely than Republicans to express *very* unfavorable views of Russia (62% vs. 41%) and say they have *no confidence at all* in Putin (72% vs. 43%).


Over the past year, Republicans have become somewhat more likely to see Russia favorably and to express confidence in Putin, while Democratic views are largely unchanged.

### Few U.S. adults see Russia or Putin in a positive light

% who have a \_\_\_ opinion of Russia



% who have \_\_\_ in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer or said "Never heard of this person" are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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## Views of the Russia-Ukraine war


Nearly half of Americans (47%) are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries, and 43% are concerned about Russia defeating and taking over Ukraine. Republicans have become less concerned about both possibilities in recent months, while Democrats have become more so.

Majorities of Republicans and Democrats alike see the war between Russia and Ukraine as important to U.S. interests, though Democrats are more likely to hold this view. Most Americans say the war is important to them personally, too, including 47% of Republicans and 66% of Democrats.

When it comes to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 49% have confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Democrats are much more likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy than Republicans (70% vs. 30%).

### Democrats are much more concerned than Republicans about various Russia-Ukraine war scenarios

% who are *extremely/very* concerned about the possibility of ...



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.  
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# 1. How Americans view Russia and Putin

Here are several key takeaways about Americans' views of Russia:

- Half of U.S. adults see Russia as an enemy of the U.S., down from 61% in 2024. More Republicans see Russia as a competitor than as an enemy for the first time since before the Russia-Ukraine war started.
- While most Americans – including majorities of Democrats and Republicans – continue to express negative views of Russia and Putin, smaller shares of Republicans express *very* unfavorable opinions of Russia and *no confidence at all* in Putin than in 2024. Opinions among Democrats have not changed much.

## Is Russia a competitor, partner or enemy of the U.S?

Half of Americans today label Russia as an enemy of the U.S., while 38% see Russia as a competitor and 9% see it as a partner. This represents an 11-point drop in views of Russia as an enemy since last year and a 20-point drop since March 2022, just weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Still, more Americans see Russia as an enemy now than they did before the invasion (50% vs. 41% in January 2022).


## Partisanship

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to see Russia as an enemy of the U.S. (62% vs. 40%). Republicans are about as likely to see Russia as an enemy now as they were before the current conflict in Ukraine began. In January 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, 39% of Republicans saw Russia as an enemy. This share increased to 69% in the early months of the war and has fallen fairly steadily since.

Republicans are also twice as likely as Democrats to see Russia as a partner of the U.S. (12% vs. 6%).

## Fewer Americans see Russia as an enemy than at any point since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine

% who say Russia is a(n) \_\_\_ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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
## Favorability of Russia

Americans continue to have negative views of Russia. In the current survey, 13% see Russia very or somewhat favorably, while 85% see it very or somewhat unfavorably. These are generally similar to ratings in 2024.

Strongly negative views of Russia have been declining in recent years. Currently, 51% of Americans have a *very* unfavorable opinion of the country. [As recently as March 2022](#), 69% had a very unfavorable view of Russia.

### Most Americans view Russia unfavorably

% who have a \_\_\_ opinion of Russia



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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## Partisanship


There are some differences in views of Russia by party. About four-in-ten Republicans (41%) hold a *very* unfavorable view of Russia, compared with 62% of Democrats. Inversely, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to have a *favorable* view of Russia (16% vs. 9%).

## Confidence in Putin

Americans' confidence in the Russian president remains low as well. About one-in-ten (12%) have at least some confidence in Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs, compared with 84% who have little or no confidence in his leadership. In fact, a 57% majority of Americans have *no confidence at all* in Putin.

### Democrats are more likely than Republicans to express no confidence in Putin

% who have \_\_\_ confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer or said "Never heard of this person" are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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### Partisanship and views over time

As with views of Russia, attitudes toward Putin have shifted slightly in recent years. In 2024, 67% of Americans had no confidence at all in Putin, including 75% of Democrats and 61% of Republicans. But in the current survey, 43% of Republicans have no confidence at all in Putin, an 18-point decline. Around seven-in-ten Democrats (72%) have no confidence at all in Putin, little changed from last year.

## 2. How Americans view the Russia-Ukraine war

Here are several key takeaways about U.S. opinion of the war between Russia and Ukraine:

- Democrats and Republicans are divided – and this divide has grown wider – when it comes to U.S. responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself and levels of concern over possible conflict outcomes.
- The survey asked about how committed four world leaders are to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine: French President Emmanuel Macron, Russian President Vladimir Putin, U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. A majority of Americans say Zelenskyy is committed to lasting peace, while 19% say the same of Putin. Fewer than half (47%) say Trump is committed to peace, and 45% say this of Macron.

### U.S. responsibility to help Ukraine

More than four-in-ten Americans (44%) say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion, while 53% say the nation does not have this responsibility.


Views on this issue have shifted over recent months. Fewer Americans now believe the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine in its war against Russia than said so in a November 2024 survey fielded after the U.S. presidential election. At that time, 50% held this opinion.

#### Partisanship and age

Opinion on the United States' responsibility to Ukraine is divided along partisan lines. Two-thirds of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say the U.S. has a responsibility help Ukraine defend itself, compared with 23% of Republicans and Republican leaners.

### Declining share of Republicans say the U.S. has responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion

% who say the U.S. **has a responsibility** to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.  
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The share of Republicans who believe the U.S. should aid in Ukraine's defense has dropped 13 points since November, while the share of Democrats who say the same is largely unchanged over the same period.

Partisans are also divided by age. Republicans and Democrats ages 50 and older are more likely than their younger counterparts to say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine.

## National and personal importance of the Russia-Ukraine war

Roughly seven-in-ten Americans (69%) view the war between Russia and Ukraine as important to U.S. national interests.

A 56% majority of U.S. adults also say the Russia-Ukraine war is at least somewhat important to them *personally*.

### Partisanship and age


Views of the war's national and personal importance vary by party. Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say that the war is important on both counts.

Liberal Democrats are especially likely to say the Russia-Ukraine war is important both to U.S. national interests and to them personally: About nine-in-ten liberal Democrats (88%) say this, compared with 72% of conservative or moderate Democrats. Conservative Republicans are more likely than liberal or moderate Republicans to view the war as important to U.S. interests (66% vs. 58%).

The share of Republicans who say the war between Russia and Ukraine is important to them personally has dropped by 9 points since January 2024, and the share who say it is important to U.S. interests has dropped by 6 points. In comparison, views of the war's personal importance among Democrats remain unchanged over the same period, and the share of Democrats who see the war as important to U.S. interests has declined by only 3 points.

### Majorities of Republicans, Democrats see Russia-Ukraine war as important to U.S. national interests

% who say the war between Russia and Ukraine is very or somewhat important ...



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025. "Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War"

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Views also vary by age more generally, with older U.S. adults more likely to consider the Russia-Ukraine war important personally and nationally. About three-quarters of Americans ages 65 and older say the war is at least somewhat important to them personally, while half of adults under 30 say the same. There's a similar gap in the shares of older and younger Americans who see the war as at least somewhat important to U.S. national interests (81% vs. 61%).

Differences between older and younger adults are evident among both Republicans and Democrats. Older Republicans (those ages 50 and older) are more likely than younger Republicans ages 18 to 49 (70% vs. 56%) to say the Russia-Ukraine war is important to U.S. national interests. And older Democrats are more likely to say this than younger Democrats (84% vs. 73%). This pattern holds on the question of the war's personal importance.

### **Views of Russia**

Americans who consider Russia an enemy of the U.S. are more likely than those who view Russia as a partner or competitor to see the war as important both to U.S. interests and to themselves personally.

Roughly seven-in-ten of those who see Russia as an enemy (68%) say that the war is at least somewhat important to them personally, compared with 45% among those who see Russia as a competitor and 41% of those who see Russia as a partner. Differences by views of Russia also exist on the question about national importance.

## Concerns about possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war

More than four-in-ten U.S. adults (43%) are extremely or very concerned about Ukraine possibly being defeated and taken over by Russia; another 29% are somewhat concerned and 28% are not too or not at all concerned.

Nearly half (47%) are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries in the region, while 26% are somewhat and 26% not too or not at all concerned.

Concerns about both situations have not changed much over the past year, but are lower than when the public was first asked about these outcomes [in the early months of Russia's invasion](#).

In April 2022, 55% were extremely or very concerned about a Ukrainian defeat, and 59% said the same about a wider Russian invasion.

### Partisanship

Democrats have long been more likely than Republicans to say they are extremely or very concerned about both a possible Ukrainian defeat and a Russian invasion of other countries in the region.

But the partisan gap on each of these questions has grown wider over the past year. Today, 29% of Republicans are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries in the region, down from 42% in July 2024. Democrats' opinions have not changed as much.

### Democrats more concerned than Republicans about Russia defeating Ukraine, invading other countries

% who are \_\_\_ about the possibility of ...

#### Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia

	Extremely/ Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned
Total	43%	29%	28%
Rep/Lean Rep	25	32	42
Dem/Lean Dem	62	25	13

#### Russia invading other countries in the region, not just Ukraine

	Extremely/ Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too/Not at all concerned
Total	47	26	26
Rep/Lean Rep	29	30	41
Dem/Lean Dem	66	22	10

Notes: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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
## World leaders' commitment to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine

A majority of Americans (59%) say that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is committed to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine, while 47% say this about U.S. President Donald Trump and 45% about French President Emmanuel Macron (33% say they are unsure when asked about Macron).

Two-thirds of Americans say that Russian President Vladimir Putin is *not* committed to lasting peace between the two countries, including 42% who say Putin is *not at all* committed to this outcome.

### Americans differ in views of various world leaders' commitment to peace between Russia, Ukraine

% who say the following leaders are \_\_\_ committed to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine



Notes: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.  
"Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War"


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### Partisanship

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say that Trump and Putin are at least somewhat committed to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. But Democrats are more likely to say this about Zelenskyy and Macron.

### Partisans diverge over world leaders' commitment to Russia-Ukraine peace

% who say the following leaders are *very/somewhat* committed to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.  
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## Confidence in Zelenskyy

Americans have mixed views of Zelenskyy, just a few weeks after his [contentious White House meeting](#) about U.S. support for Ukraine in the war. Roughly half of Americans (49%) have a lot or some confidence in his ability to do the right thing regarding world affairs, compared with 42% who have not too much or no confidence in him. Another 9% say they have never heard of the Ukrainian leader.

Zelenskyy's rating is mostly unchanged from 2024. But it's down since 2023, when 56% had a lot or some confidence in him.

### Partisanship and age


Zelenskyy receives much higher confidence ratings from Democrats (70%) than from Republicans (30%).

This represents a slight uptick since 2024 among Democrats (+5 points) and a slight decline among Republicans (-4 points) and marks the widest partisan gap on confidence in Zelenskyy since we first asked this question in 2023. Liberal Democrats are especially likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy (81%).

There [continue to be age differences](#) on confidence in Zelenskyy. Around four-in-ten Americans ages 18 to 29 (42%) have confidence in the Ukrainian leader, compared with 60% of those ages 65 and older. Younger Americans are also much more likely than older Americans to say they never heard of Zelenskyy (15% vs. 3%).

### Confidence in Zelenskyy steady among Democrats, down among Republicans

% who have **a lot of/some** confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer or said "Never heard of this person" are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025. "Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War"

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### 3. How Americans view NATO and U.S. NATO membership

Here are several key takeaways about Americans' assessments of NATO:

- While a majority of Americans (60%) express a positive view of NATO, there continue to be partisan differences: 77% of Democrats have a favorable view of the international alliance, compared with 45% of Republicans. These views have not moved significantly over the past year.
- More Americans say the U.S. benefits from membership in NATO (66%) than say it does not (32%). Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership.

#### NATO favorability


Six-in-ten U.S. adults have a favorable view of NATO, similar to the share who said this in 2024. Another 37% have an unfavorable view of the alliance.

#### Partisanship

For several years, there has been a wide partisan gap in U.S. opinions of NATO. About three-quarters of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (77%) express a positive view of the organization, while 45% of Republicans and Republican leaners feel this way. Neither partisan group has shifted significantly in their views over the past year.

#### Partisan gap on views of NATO continues

% who have a *very/somewhat* favorable opinion of NATO



Note: Starting in March 2020, data is from Pew Research Center's online American Trends Panel; older data is from telephone surveys.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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There are ideological differences in these views within both partisan coalitions:

- Moderate or liberal Republicans (51%) are more likely than conservative Republicans (41%) to express a positive view of NATO.
- Liberal Democrats are more likely than conservative or moderate Democrats to have a favorable opinion of the alliance (85% vs. 72%).

## Does the U.S. benefit from NATO membership?

About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say the U.S. benefits a great deal or a fair amount from being a member of NATO, while 32% say it does not benefit much or at all.

The share who say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership has [increased modestly](#) from 63% in February 2025, and is the same share who [viewed membership favorably](#) in spring 2024.


### Partisanship and change over time

About eight-in-ten Democrats (83%) believe the U.S. benefits from being a member of NATO, compared with about half of Republicans (49%). Liberal Democrats are particularly likely to say the U.S. benefits from membership in the alliance (90%), while a 57% majority of conservative Republicans say the U.S. does not benefit much or at all.

The share of Republicans who said the U.S. benefits from being part of NATO has dropped [since we first asked this question in spring 2021](#); at that time, 55% saw at least a fair amount of benefit to NATO membership. Democrats' views have not changed much since then.

### Democrats remain much more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership

*% who think the U.S. benefits a great deal/a fair amount from being a member of NATO*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.  
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**Views of international engagement and Russia**

U.S. adults who say the country should be active in world affairs (81%) are more likely to think the U.S. benefits from being a member of the alliance than those who prefer the country pay less attention to problems overseas and instead focus on domestic issues (52%).

And those who say Russia is an enemy of the U.S. (72%) are more likely than those who see Russia as a competitor (49%) or partner (44%) to have a favorable view of NATO.

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## Methodology

### The American Trends Panel survey methodology

#### Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 24 to March 30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes [oversample](#) of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel](#).”

#### Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.<sup>1</sup> Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.<sup>2</sup> Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

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<sup>1</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling](#).”

<sup>2</sup> Email [pewsurveys@pewresearch.org](mailto:pewsurveys@pewresearch.org).

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

### **Sample design**

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

### **Questionnaire development and testing**

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

### **Incentives**

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

### **Data collection protocol**

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24 to March 30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.



**For panelists who take surveys online:**<sup>3</sup> Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.<sup>4</sup> Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

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**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,  
ATP Wave 166**

	<b>Soft launch</b>	<b>Full launch</b>
Initial invitation	March 24, 2025	March 25, 2025
First reminder	March 27, 2025	March 27, 2025
Final reminder	March 29, 2025	March 29, 2025

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

**For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer:** Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

### **Data quality checks**

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

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<sup>3</sup> The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

<sup>4</sup> Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

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### American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2023 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Party affiliation among registered voters	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

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**Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 166**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Unweighted sample size</b>	<b>Plus or minus ...</b>
Total sample	3,605	1.9 percentage points
Form 1	1,804	2.7 percentage points
Form 2	1,801	2.6 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,586	2.7 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,909	2.7 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim, and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

### Final dispositions, ATP Wave 166

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,605
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	65
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	25
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	346
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
<b>Total panelists sampled for the survey</b>		<b>4,045</b>
Completed interviews	I	3,605
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	90
Non-contact	NC	346
Other	O	4
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,045</b>
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		89%

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### Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 166

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 166	35%
Response rate to Wave 166 survey	89%
<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>3%</b>

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## Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center**  
**Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey**  
**April 17, 2025, release**

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the [Methodology](#) section.
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Combined totals are based on unrounded topline figures. Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures, so these figures might be different than in previous years.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this Topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		FAV_NATO. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? NATO, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	60	37	17	43	25	12	3	100
	Spring, 2024	58	38	14	44	24	14	4	100
	Spring, 2023	62	35	13	49	24	11	3	100
	Spring, 2022	66	31	14	53	22	9	3	100
	Spring, 2021	61	35	12	49	26	10	4	100
	March, 2020	61	35	10	50	26	9	4	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON									
		FAV_NATO. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? NATO, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	57	25	15	42	16	9	17	100
	Spring, 2020	55	25	15	40	17	8	20	100
	Spring, 2019	52	26	15	37	18	8	22	100
	Fall, 2018	64	22	30	34	14	9	14	100
	Spring, 2017	61	24	20	42	15	8	15	100
	Spring, 2016	53	26	12	41	18	7	21	100
	Spring, 2015	49	31	9	40	20	11	20	100
	Spring, 2013	49	27	9	40	17	10	24	100
	Spring, 2012	51	23	12	39	15	7	26	100
	Spring, 2011	54	24	14	40	17	7	22	100
	Spring, 2010	54	21	13	41	15	6	25	100
	Fall, 2009	53	24	11	42	14	10	23	100

		FAV_RUSSIA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Russia							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	13	85	1	11	34	51	2	100
	Spring, 2024	11	86	1	10	29	57	3	100
	Spring, 2023	7	91	1	6	29	62	2	100
	Spring, 2022	7	92	1	6	23	69	1	100
	March, 2020	15	83	1	14	42	41	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON									
		FAV_RUSSIA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Russia							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	18	71	2	17	34	37	11	100
	Spring, 2020	22	68	3	19	34	34	10	100
	Spring, 2019	18	67	2	16	31	36	14	100
	Spring, 2018	21	64	3	18	33	31	15	100
	Spring, 2017	29	63	3	26	35	28	9	100
	Spring, 2015	22	67	3	19	40	27	12	100
	Spring, 2014	19	72	3	16	34	38	9	100
	Spring, 2013	37	43	4	33	29	14	20	100
	Spring, 2012	37	39	5	32	27	13	24	100
	Spring, 2011	49	32	8	41	22	10	19	100
	Spring, 2010	49	33	7	42	24	8	19	100
	Spring, 2009	43	39	7	36	27	12	18	100
	Spring, 2007	44	34	4	40	24	11	21	100

		CONFID_PUTIN. How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs? Russian President Vladimir Putin								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No Confidence	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	Never heard of this person	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	12	84	1	10	26	57	4	0	100
	Spring, 2024	8	88	1	6	21	67	3	1	100
	Spring, 2023	7	90	1	6	19	71	3	1	100

U.S. WEB TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		CONFID_PUTIN. How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs? Russian President Vladimir Putin							
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No Confidence	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2022	6	93	2	4	15	77	1	100
	Spring, 2021	16	81	2	14	36	45	2	100
	March, 2020	17	81	2	15	31	50	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		CONFID_PUTIN. How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs? Russian President Vladimir Putin							
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No Confidence	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	19	78	3	16	20	58	3	100
	Spring, 2020	19	77	4	15	21	56	4	100
	Spring, 2019	20	73	3	17	22	51	7	100
	Spring, 2018	21	74	6	15	25	49	5	100
	Spring, 2017	23	74	2	21	26	48	3	100
	Spring, 2015	20	75	2	19	26	49	5	100
	Spring, 2014	15	80	3	13	27	53	5	100
	Spring, 2012	29	54	4	24	29	25	18	100
	Spring, 2008	28	47	2	26	22	26	25	100
	Spring, 2007	30	50	2	28	25	25	21	100
	Spring, 2006	33	45	3	30	26	19	22	100
	May, 2003	40	47	2	39	28	19	13	100

		CONFID_ZELENSKY. How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy								
		TOTAL Confidence	TOTAL No Confidence	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	Never heard of this person	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	49	42	17	32	24	18	9	1	100
	Spring, 2024	48	39	15	33	21	18	11	2	100
	Spring, 2023	56	33	18	38	18	15	10	1	100

		BENEFITORG_NATO. How much, if at all, do you think the U.S. benefits from being a member of each of the following organizations? North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO							
		TOTAL A great deal/A fair amount	TOTAL Not too much/Not at all	A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	66	32	31	35	21	11	2	100
	February, 2025	63	34	29	34	23	11	3	100
	Spring, 2024	66	31	27	39	21	10	3	100
	Spring, 2022	69	29	31	38	21	8	2	100
	Spring, 2021	71	27	30	41	20	7	2	100

		CONFPERS_B. How important would you say each of the following is to you personally? The war between Russia and Ukraine								
		TOTAL Important	TOTAL Not Important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	56	31	21	35	20	12	12	0	100
	January, 2024	59	29	25	34	19	10	11	0	100

		CONFGEO_B. Regardless of how important they are to you personally, how important is each of the following for the U.S.'s national interests? The war between Russia and Ukraine								
		TOTAL Important	TOTAL Not Important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	69	18	35	34	12	6	12	0	100
	January, 2024	74	15	43	30	9	6	10	0	100

		USUK_RESP. Does the U.S. have a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion?			
		Yes	No	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	44	53	2	100
	November, 2024	50	47	4	100
	July, 2024	48	49	3	100

		UA_CONC_DFT. How concerned are you about the possibility of each of the following? Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia								
		TOTAL Extremely/Ver y concerned	TOTAL No too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	43	28	22	21	29	17	10	1	100
	July, 2024	43	23	18	25	32	15	8	1	100
	Spring, 2024	44	23	22	23	31	13	10	2	100
	September, 2022	38	26	15	24	34	18	8	1	100
	April, 2022	55	16	26	29	28	10	6	1	100

		UA_CONC_INVLD. How concerned are you about the possibility of each of the following? Russia invading other countries in the region, not just Ukraine								
		TOTAL Extremely/Very concerned	TOTAL No too/Not at all concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	47	26	24	23	26	16	10	1	100
	July, 2024	50	22	23	27	27	14	8	1	100
	Spring, 2024	48	23	26	22	27	13	10	2	100
	September, 2022	41	26	17	23	32	18	8	1	100
	April, 2022	59	15	30	29	25	10	5	1	100

		UKRCOMMIT_PUTIN. How committed do you think each of the following leaders are to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine? Russian President Vladimir Putin								
		TOTAL Committed	TOTAL Not Committed	Very committed	Somewhat committed	Not too committed	Not at all committed	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	19	67	5	14	25	42	14	1	100

		UKRCOMMIT_ZELENSKY. How committed do you think each of the following leaders are to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy								
		TOTAL Committed	TOTAL Not Committed	Very committed	Somewhat committed	Not too committed	Not at all committed	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	59	24	34	26	15	10	16	1	100

		UKRCOMMIT_TRUMP. How committed do you think each of the following leaders are to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine? U.S. President Donald Trump								
		TOTAL Committed	TOTAL Not Committed	Very committed	Somewhat committed	Not too committed	Not at all committed	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	47	41	23	23	20	22	12	1	100

		UKRCOMMIT_MACRON. How committed do you think each of the following leaders are to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine? French President Emmanuel Macron								
		TOTAL Committed	TOTAL Not Committed	Very committed	Somewhat committed	Not too committed	Not at all committed	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	45	21	17	28	15	6	33	1	100

		RUSSIA_US_ENEMY. On balance, do you think of Russia as a partner of the U.S., a competitor of the U.S. or an enemy of the U.S.?				
		Partner	Competitor	Enemy	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	9	38	50	3	100
	Spring, 2024	4	32	61	3	100
	Spring, 2023	3	30	64	3	100
	Spring, 2022	3	24	70	3	100
	January, 2022	7	49	41	3	100