

FOR RELEASE JULY 29, 2024

War in Ukraine: Wide Partisan Differences on U.S. Responsibility and Support

Majorities in both parties approve of keeping strict economic sanctions on Russia

FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:

Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research
Jocelyn Kiley, Senior Associate Director, Research
Nida Asheer, Senior Communications Manager

202.419.4372

www.pewresearch.org

RECOMMENDED CITATION

Pew Research Center, July 2024, "War in Ukraine: Wide Partisan Differences on U.S. Responsibility and Support"

About Pew Research Center

Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It does not take policy positions. The Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, computational social science research and other data-driven research. It studies politics and policy; news habits and media; the internet and technology; religion; race and ethnicity; international affairs; social, demographic and economic trends; science; research methodology and data science; and immigration and migration. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder.

© Pew Research Center 2024

How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans' attitudes toward the war in Ukraine. For this analysis, we surveyed 9,424 adults from July 1-7, 2024. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other factors. [Read more about the ATP's methodology.](#)

Here are the [questions](#) used for this report, the [topline](#) and the survey [methodology](#).

War in Ukraine: Wide Partisan Differences on U.S. Responsibility and Support

Majorities in both parties approve of keeping strict economic sanctions on Russia

With the conflict in Ukraine now in its third year, Republicans and Democrats continue to differ over U.S. policy toward the war-torn country.

A 62% majority of Republicans say the United States does not have a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion.

Americans overall are evenly divided on whether the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine (48% say it does, 49% say it does not).


- About two-thirds of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (63%) say the U.S. has this responsibility.
- Only about a third of Republicans and Republican leaners (36%) say the same.

Americans remain divided on levels of U.S. aid to Ukraine. Today, 29% of Americans say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine, and a similar share say it's providing about the right amount (26%). About two-in-ten (19%) say the U.S. is not providing enough support, while a quarter are not sure.


- Democrats largely say the U.S. is providing either the right amount of aid (36%) or not enough assistance (27%). Just 13% say the U.S. is sending too much aid to Ukraine.

Deep partisan differences on U.S. responsibility to help Ukraine and how much support to provide

% who say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion



% who say that when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is providing ___ support to Ukraine



Note: No answer responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 1-7, 2024.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

- Nearly half of Republicans (47%) say the U.S. is providing too much aid to Ukraine, more than three times the share of Democrats who say this. Only 18% say current aid levels are about right, while just 12% say the U.S. is providing too little aid.

The new Pew Research Center survey of 9,424 U.S. adults was conducted July 1-7, 2024 – before President Joe Biden announced he was dropping his bid for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Related: [Joe Biden, Public Opinion and His Withdrawal From the 2024 Race.](#)

How much of a threat does the war in Ukraine pose to U.S. interests?

The share of Americans saying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to U.S. interests has declined significantly since 2022. Today, about a third of the public (34%) says Russia’s invasion of Ukraine poses a “major threat” to U.S. interests. Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, half said it was a major threat.


There is a wide and growing gap between Republicans and Democrats over whether the war in Ukraine is a major threat to U.S. interests.

Both Democrats and Republicans are less likely to say the conflict is a major threat to the U.S. than they were in its early days. But that decline is far sharper among Republicans.

- 45% of Democrats now say Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a major threat, 5 percentage points lower than in March of 2022 but 7 points higher than a year ago.
- 26% of Republicans say the war is a major threat to the U.S. This share has been essentially flat since early 2023 and remains well below the 51% of Republicans who said this early in the war.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a ‘major threat’ to the U.S.

% who say Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a major threat to U.S. interests



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 1-7, 2024.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Views of U.S. policies toward Ukraine: Sanctions, military aid, strikes on targets in Russia

A greater share of Americans approve of keeping strict economic sanctions on Russia (69%) than approve of continuing to send military equipment to Ukraine (54%) or allowing Ukraine to use U.S. weapons to strike targets inside Russia (54%).


Majorities of both Republicans (66%) and Democrats (77%) approve of keeping strict economic sanctions on Russia.

Much smaller shares of Republicans approve of continuing to provide military equipment and weaponry to Ukraine (42%) or allowing Ukraine to use U.S.-made weapons inside Russia's borders (46%).

Most Democrats approve of continuing to send military aid to Ukraine (71%) and allowing Ukraine to use American-made weapons to strike targets in Russia (65%).

Broad public support for maintaining sanctions on Russia; wider differences on providing military aid to Ukraine and allowing Ukraine to strike inside Russia

% who approve or disapprove of the U.S. ...



Note: No answer responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 1-7, 2024.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Views of U.S. aid to Ukraine

Americans continue to be divided over the amount of aid the U.S. is providing to support Ukraine against Russia.

Over the past year and a half, the leading view among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents has been that the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine (47% say this currently).


This balance of opinion among Republicans has not changed much over this period, and it represents a reversal from early in the conflict when fewer than a quarter of Republicans said the U.S. was providing too much aid.

Most Democrats and Democratic leaners have consistently said the U.S. is providing either too little or about the right amount of aid since the war began.

The share of Democrats who said the U.S. was sending too little aid increased in April, before a [new \\$95 billion aid bill](#) passed Congress. It has now returned to about where it was in late 2023. Only 13% of Democrats say the U.S. is providing too much aid to Ukraine.

Republicans and Democrats remain divided over U.S. aid to Ukraine

% who say that when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is providing ___ support to Ukraine



Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 1-7, 2024.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Assessments of Ukraine's military efforts and concerns about the war


Americans have mixed views of Ukraine's military effort. Only 11% say Ukraine's efforts to defend itself are going extremely or very well. More than twice as many (26%) say they are going not too well or not at all well. About four-in-ten (42%) say they're going somewhat well.

Republicans are slightly more pessimistic about Ukraine's defense than Democrats. About a third of Republicans (32%) say Ukraine's military efforts are not going well, compared with 21% of Democrats.

Nearly half of Democrats (47%) say Ukraine's defense is going somewhat well. About four-in-ten Republicans (39%) say the same.

Americans' views of how Ukraine's defensive efforts against Russia's invasion are going

% who say Ukraine's military effort to defend itself against Russia's invasion is going ...



Note: No answer responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 1-7, 2024.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Concerns over the war in Ukraine

Americans express a range of concerns arising from the Russia-Ukraine war:

- 51% say they are extremely or very concerned that the war will continue for many years.
- A nearly identical share (50%) are extremely or very concerned that Russia will invade other countries in the region.
- Somewhat smaller shares are at least very concerned about Ukraine being defeated by Russia (43% are extremely or very concerned) and U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine leading to a war with Russia (41%).

Related: [NATO Seen Favorably in Member States; Confidence in Zelenskyy Down in Europe, U.S.](#)

Democrats are significantly more likely than Republicans to say they are highly concerned about Russia invading other countries in Europe and that Ukraine will lose and be taken over.

Six-in-ten Democrats say they are extremely or very concerned that Russia will invade other countries in the region. Roughly four-in-ten Republicans (42%) are as concerned about this.


A majority of Democrats (56%) say they are extremely or very concerned about Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia, compared with 33% of Republicans. Democrats' concerns about Ukraine losing have increased modestly since 2022.

Republicans (45%) express somewhat higher levels of concern than Democrats (38%) that U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine will lead to a direct war between the U.S. and Russia. Concern among members of both political coalitions is somewhat higher than it was two years ago.


Democrats are more concerned than Republicans that Russia may defeat Ukraine and invade other countries in the region

% who say they are ___ concerned about the possibility of ...


The war in Ukraine will continue for many more years




Russia invading other countries in the region, not just Ukraine



Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia



U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine leading to a U.S. war with Russia



Note: No answer responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 1-7, 2024.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

Research team

Carroll Doherty, *Director, Political Research*
Jocelyn Kiley, *Senior Associate Director, Political Research*
Hannah Hartig, *Senior Researcher*
Baxter Oliphant, *Senior Researcher*
Gabe Borelli, *Research Associate*
Andrew Daniller, *Research Associate*
Andy Cerda, *Research Analyst*
Joseph Copeland, *Research Analyst*
Ted Van Green, *Research Analyst*
Shanay Gracia, *Research Assistant*

Communications and editorial

Nida Asheer, *Senior Communications Manager*
Talia Price, *Communications Associate*
David Kent, *Senior Copy Editor*

Graphic design and web publishing

Alissa Scheller, *Senior Information Graphics Designer*
Reem Nadeem, *Digital Producer*

Methodology

Andrew Mercer, *Senior Research Methodologist*
Dorene Asare-Marfo, *Senior Panel Manager*
Dana Popky, *Associate Panel Manager*
Arnold Lau, *Research Methodologist*

Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 149 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from July 1 to July 7, 2024. A total of 9,424 panelists responded out of 12,207 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 77%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 9,424 respondents is plus or minus 1.3 percentage points.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=9,106) and live telephone (n=318) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

² Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. All active panel members were invited to participate in this wave.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was July 1 to July 7, 2024. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on July 1.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty online panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on July 1. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on July 2.

³ The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

⁴ Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents, ATP Wave 149

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	July 1, 2024	July 2, 2024
First reminder	-	July 4, 2024
Final reminder	July 6, 2024	July 6, 2024

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on June 26, and reminder postcards were mailed on July 1. Ten randomly selected panelists responding by phone were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on July 1. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists responding by phone were included in the full launch. Panelists responding by phone receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, eight ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table. The weight is then trimmed at approximately the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. This trimming is performed separately among non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, Hispanic and all other respondents. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2022 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Black (alone or in combination) x Hispanic	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	
Party affiliation x Voter registration	2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Frequency of internet use	
Religious affiliation	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 149

Group	Unweighted sample size	Weighted %	Plus or minus ...
All adults	9,424		1.3 percentage points
Half form	At least 4,677		1.9 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	4,368	47	1.8 percentage points
Half form	At least 2,177		2.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	4,801	46	1.8 percentage points
Half form	At least 2,379		2.6 percentage points

Note: Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 149

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	9,424
Logged in (web) / Contacted (phone), but did not complete any items	2.11	411
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	129
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (phone)	2.20	2,235
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	8
Total panelists sampled for the survey		12,207
Completed interviews	I	9,424
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	540
Non-contact	NC	2,235
Other	O	8
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		12,207
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		77%

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 149

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 149	40%
Response rate to Wave 149 survey	77%
Cumulative response rate	3%

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

**2024 PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL
WAVE 149 JULY 2024
FINAL TOPLINE
JULY 1-7, 2024
N=9,424**

Note: This survey was conducted primarily online, with some interviews conducted by live telephone. This topline shows the programming language for online administration. For details on how questions were slightly modified for phone administration, visit the questionnaire.

American Trends Panel surveys conducted between October 2016 and June 2024 were conducted fully online (with tablets and data plans provided to adults without home internet). American Trends Panel surveys conducted prior to October 2016 were conducted primarily online, with some respondents completing by mail. For additional details, visit the Methodology.

*"No answer" includes web respondents who do not answer the question as well as telephone respondents who refuse to answer or who say that they don't know how to answer. In cases where "not sure" was offered as an explicit option to web and telephone respondents, the "no answer" category includes only web skips and telephone refusals.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED

ASK IF FORM 1 (XFORM=1) AND TRUMP SUPPORTER (VOTEGEN24=1 OR VOTEGEN24_LEAN=1) [N=1,859]:

DTPRES In your own words, what is the main reason you support or lean toward Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential election?

BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS WHO SUPPORT/LEAN TOWARD TRUMP [N=1,585]

Jul 1-7, <u>2024</u>		July 27- Aug 2, <u>2020</u>
31	Issues/Positions	22
30	He is not Biden/Lesser of two evils	20
25	Experience/Qualifications	23
14	He is for American people and values	17
10	Vote for Republicans/Against Democrats	16
9	Personal characteristics	11
1	Other responses	7
12	No answer*	13

Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

DTPRES TREND FOR COMPARISON ...**2016 TREND FOR COMPARISON:****ASK IF FORM=1 AND TRUMP SUPPORTERS (VOTEGENA=1 OR VOTEGENB=1):**

DTPRES In your own words, what is the main reason you [IF VOTEGENA=1: support] [IF VOTEGENB=1: lean toward] Donald Trump for president?

BASED ON FORM 1 VOTERS WHO SUPPORT/LEAN TOWARD TRUMP

	Aug 16- Sep 12 <u>2016</u>
NOT OR NOT AS BAD AS CLINTON/VOTE AGAINST HER NET CHANGE/OUTSIDE OF THE SYSTEM	33 27
Outsider/Not a politician	12
Will change things/Shake things up/Need new blood	8
Business experience/Successful businessman	4
Will not be influenced by special interests/Not corrupt	4
Change from Obama	2
NET ISSUE POSITIONS	26
Economic policy (debt, trade, taxes, jobs, middle class)	10
Immigration	8
Defense and military/Terrorism/Law and order/Keep American safe	7
Supreme Court appointments	4
Other specific issues/General issues/Represents my values	7
NET PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS/ASSOCIATIONS	19
He tells it like it is/Not politically correct/Honest/Trusted	13
Personality/Right person for job	7
MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN/HE IS FOR AMERICAN PEOPLE AND VALUES	10
NET HE'S A REPUBLICAN/NOT A DEMOCRAT	4
Republican nominee/He's a Republican/He's conservative	2
OTHER	4
DON'T KNOW/REFUSED	7

Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

**ASK IF FORM 1 (XFORM=1) AND BIDEN SUPPORTER (VOTEGEN24=2 OR VOTEGEN24_LEAN=2)
[N=1,950]:**

JBPRES In your own words, what is the main reason you support or lean toward Joe Biden in the 2024 presidential election?

**BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS WHO SUPPORT/LEAN TOWARD BIDEN
[N=1,749]**

Jul 1-7, 2024		July 27- Aug 2, 2020
56	He is not Trump/Lesser of two evils	58
30	Issues/Positions	13
13	Leadership/Performance	10
11	Personal characteristics	13
6	Vote for Democrats/Against Republicans	7
3	Other responses	10
10	No answer*	14

...
Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

JBPRES TREND FOR COMPARISON ...

2016 TREND FOR COMPARISON:

ASK IF FORM=1 AND CLINTON SUPPORTERS (VOTEGENA=2 OR VOTEGENB=2):

HRCPRES In your own words, what is the main reason you [IF VOTEGENA=2: support] [IF VOTEGENB=2: lean toward] Hillary Clinton for president?

BASED ON FORM 1 VOTERS WHO SUPPORT/LEAN TOWARD CLINTON

	Aug 16- Sep 12 2016
NET EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATIONS/ABILITY TO GOVERN	32
Experience/Qualified/Political knowledge	27
Ability to govern/Competence/Will get things done	6
NOT OR NOT AS BAD AS TRUMP/VOTE AGAINST HIM	32
NET ISSUE POSITIONS	22
Economic policy (jobs, taxes, middle class and poor)	3
Immigration	3
Supreme Court appointments	3
Foreign policy/Relationship with other countries	2
Other specific issues/General issues/Represents my values	13
NET PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS/ASSOCIATIONS	17
Temperament/Personality	12
Woman/First woman president	4
NET SHE'S A DEMOCRAT/NOT A REPUBLICAN	5
Democratic nominee/She's a Democrat/She's liberal	5
SHE IS FOR AMERICAN PEOPLE AND VALUES	3
OTHER	4
DON'T KNOW/REFUSED	10

Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

ASK IF FORM 1 (XFORM=1) AND ROBERT F KENNEDY SUPPORTER (VOTEGEN24=3 OR VOTEGEN24_LEAN=3) [N=678]:

RFKPRES In your own words, what is the main reason you support or lean toward Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in the 2024 presidential election?

BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS WHO SUPPORT/LEAN TOWARD KENNEDY JR. [N=474]

Jul 1-7,
2024

53	NET Not Biden/Trump
20	NET Characteristics
9	NET Policies
5	NET third party/system
4	Other responses
18	No answer*

...
Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

ASK IF FORM 2 (XFORM=2) AND NOT CERTAIN (VOTEGEN2_TRUMP=2 OR VOTEGEN2_BIDEN=2 OR VOTEGEN2_KENNEDY=2) [N=711]:

WHYCHANGE24

In your own words, what is the main reason you say there is a chance you might change your mind about supporting **[IF VOTEGEN2_TRUMP=2: Donald Trump IF VOTEGEN2_BIDEN=2: Joe Biden IF VOTEGEN2_KENNEDY=2: Robert F. Kennedy Jr.]**, in the 2024 presidential election?

BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS WHO SUPPORT TRUMP BUT ARE NOT CERTAIN [N=184]

Jul 1-7,
2024

25	Wish there was another Dem/Ind viable candidate
24	Uncertainty about whether Biden will be Dem nominee
15	Trump's behavior/attitude
9	Policy concerns
8	Open to new information about candidates
6	Needs to learn more about the candidates
4	Age/Health concerns
8	Other reasons
24	No answer* ⁵

Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS WHO SUPPORT BIDEN BUT ARE NOT CERTAIN [N=174]

Jul 1-7,
2024

35	Age/Health concerns
28	Wish there was another Dem/Ind viable candidate
26	Uncertainty about whether Biden will be Dem nominee
4	Policy concerns
3	Open to new information about candidates
3	Unkept promises/lack of confidence
1	Biden's behavior/attitude
1	Needs to learn more about the candidates
2	Other reasons
14	No answer*

Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses

⁵ Includes those who skipped the question and those who did not answer the question.

ASK IF FORM 2 (XFORM=2) AND CERTAIN (VOTEGEN2_TRUMP=1 OR VOTEGEN2_BIDEN=1 OR VOTEGEN2_KENNEDY=1) [N=3,129]:

WHYCERTAIN24 In your own words, what is the main reason you say you are certain you are supporting [IF VOTEGEN2_TRUMP=1: Donald Trump IF VOTEGEN2_BIDEN=1: Joe Biden IF VOTEGEN2_KENNEDY=1: Robert F. Kennedy Jr.], in the 2024 presidential election?

[QUESTION ASKED FOR EXPLORATORY PURPOSES; RESPONSES HAVE NOT BEEN CODED.]

ASK IF FORM 2 (XFORM=2) AND LEAN TOWARD A CANDIDATE (VOTEGEN24_LEAN=1,2,3) [N=584]:

WHYLEAN24: In your own words, what is the main reason you say you are leaning toward supporting [IF VOTEGEN24_LEAN=1: Donald Trump IF VOTEGEN24_LEAN=2: Joe Biden IF VOTEGEN24_LEAN=3: Robert F. Kennedy Jr.]?

[QUESTION ASKED FOR EXPLORATORY PURPOSES; RESPONSES HAVE NOT BEEN CODED.]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED****ASK ALL:**

FREETRADEUS In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries have been a...

Jul 1-7, <u>2024</u>		Jan 6-19 <u>2020</u>
65	Good thing for the United States	72
31	Bad thing for the United States	25
5	No answer*	4

ADDITIONAL QUESTION HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**ASK ALL:**

BILLION Do you think the fact that there are some people in this country who have personal fortunes of a billion dollars or more is...

Jul 1-7, <u>2024</u>		July 8-18, <u>2021</u>	Jan 6-19, <u>2020</u>
19	A good thing for the country	15	19
25	A bad thing for the country	29	23
56	Neither a good thing or a bad thing	55	58
1	No answer*	1	1

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**ASK ALL:**

JB_FP Thinking about some foreign policy issues the president may face next year...

How confident are you that Joe Biden would make wise decisions when it comes to...

		Very <u>confident</u>	Somewhat <u>confident</u>	Not too <u>confident</u>	Not at all <u>confident</u>	No <u>answer*</u>
ASK FORM 1 [N=4,747]:						
CH	U.S. policy toward China Jul 1-7, 2024	11	25	25	35	5

TREND FOR COMPARISON:

JBCONF Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following?

	Deal effectively with China					
	Mar 27-Apr 2, 2023	8	26	28	37	1
	Jun 27-Jul 4, 2022	9	30	23	38	1
	Jan 10-17, 2022	8	31	28	33	1
	Feb 1-7, 2021	19	34	20	26	1
ISHM	The war between Israel and Hamas Jul 1-7, 2024	7	22	28	39	5
ENR	Global energy and climate issues Jul 1-7, 2024	16	27	21	32	4
WRK	Working effectively with U.S. allies Jul 1-7, 2024	20	27	21	29	4
ASK FORM 2 [N=4,677]:						
NK	U.S. policy toward North Korea Jul 1-7, 2024	13	25	24	35	3
IRN	U.S. policy toward Iran Jul 1-7, 2024	11	25	24	38	2
UKR	The war between Ukraine and Russia Jul 1-7, 2024	13	24	23	37	3

[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF DT_FP, JB_FP FOR RANDOM HALF OF RESPONDENTS; SHOW ITEMS FOR DT_FP AND JB_FP IN SAME ORDER]

ASK ALL:

DT_FP Thinking about some foreign policy issues the president may face next year...
How confident are you that Donald Trump would make wise decisions when it comes to...

		Very <u>confident</u>	Somewhat <u>confident</u>	Not too <u>confident</u>	Not at all <u>confident</u>	No <u>answer*</u>
ASK FORM 1 [N=4,747]:						
CH	U.S. policy toward China Jul 1-7, 2024	25	23	18	31	3
ISHM	The war between Israel and Hamas Jul 1-7, 2024	23	22	18	33	5
ENR	Global energy and climate issues Jul 1-7, 2024	19	22	17	37	4
WRK	Working effectively with U.S. allies Jul 1-7, 2024	23	24	17	33	3

ASK FORM 2 [N=4,677]:

NK	U.S. policy toward North Korea Jul 1-7, 2024	25	23	17	32	3
----	--	----	----	----	----	---

TREND FOR COMPARISON:

DTCONF Thinking about Donald Trump's ability to handle a number of things,
how confident are you that Donald Trump can do each of the following?

	Handle the situation with North Korea July 22-Aug 4, 2019	21	24	20	35	1
IRN	U.S. policy toward Iran Jul 1-7, 2024	25	22	18	32	3

TREND FOR COMPARISON:

DTCONF Thinking about Donald Trump's ability to handle a number of things,
how confident are you that Donald Trump can do each of the following?

	Handle the situation with Iran July 22-Aug 4, 2019	21	22	17	39	*
UKR	The war between Ukraine and Russia Jul 1-7, 2024	23	22	17	35	3

ASK ALL:

UKRFOL How closely have you been following news about Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

	<u>Extremely closely</u>	<u>Very closely</u>	<u>Somewhat closely</u>	<u>Not too closely</u>	<u>Not at all closely</u>	<u>No Answer*</u>
Jul 1-7, 2024	8	16	37	25	13	*
Nov 27-Dec 3, 2023	6	14	40	27	13	*
Jun 5-11, 2023	9	15	35	24	17	1
Jan 18-24, 2023	9	18	38	23	12	*
Sep 13-18, 2022	9	16	37	23	14	*
Apr 25-May 1, 2022	15	21	38	19	7	*

ASK ALL:

UKR_SPRT When it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, do you think the U.S. is providing ...

RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 AND 2, ALWAYS ASK OPTIONS 3 AND 4 LAST

	<u>Too much support to Ukraine</u>	<u>Not enough support to Ukraine</u>	<u>About the right amount of support to Ukraine</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No answer*</u>
Jul 1-7, 2024	29	19	26	25	1
Apr 1-7, 2024	31	24	25	18	1
Nov 27-Dec 3, 2023	31	18	29	22	1
Jun 5-11, 2023	28	16	31	24	1
Jan 18-24, 2023	26	20	31	22	1
Sep 13-18, 2022	20	18	37	24	1
Apr 25-May 1, 2022	12	31	35	22	1
Mar 7-13, 2022	7	42	32	19	1

ASK ALL:

RU_UKN_THRT2 How much of a threat to U.S. interests is Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

	<u>A major threat</u>	<u>A minor threat</u>	<u>Not a threat</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No answer*</u>
Jul 1-7, 2024	34	30	10	25	1
Nov 27-Dec 3, 2023	33	34	10	22	1
Jun 5-11, 2023	32	32	11	24	1
Jan 18-24, 2023	35	33	9	21	1
Mar 7-13, 2022	50	28	6	16	1

TREND FOR COMPARISON:*How much of a threat to U.S. interests is Russia's military buildup near its border with Ukraine?*

	<u>Jan 10-17, 2022</u>
A major threat	26
A minor threat	33
Not a threat	7
Not sure	33
No answer	1

ASK ALL:

USUK_RESP Does the U.S. have a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's invasion?

	Jul 1-7, 2024
Yes	48
No	49
No answer*	3

ASK FORM 1 [N=4,747]:

UA_APPDIS Do you approve or disapprove of each of the following actions the U.S. is taking in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine? **[RANDOMIZE]**

		<u>Strongly approve</u>	<u>Somewhat approve</u>	<u>Somewhat disapprove</u>	<u>Strongly disapprove</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No answer*</u>
SANC	Keeping strict economic sanctions on Russia Jul 1-7, 2024	45	23	8	6	17	1
TREND FOR COMPARISON: Placing strict economic sanctions on Russia Apr 25-May 1, 2022		54	22	7	4	13	*
MIL	Continuing to send military equipment and weapons to Ukraine Jul 1-7, 2024	27	27	16	16	14	*
TREND FOR COMPARISON: Sending military equipment and weapons to Ukraine Apr 25-May 1, 2022		44	26	9	8	12	1
STRIK	Allowing Ukraine to use U.S.-made weapons to strike targets inside Russia Jul 1-7, 2024	26	28	15	13	17	1

ASK FORM 2 [N=4,677]:

UA_CONC How concerned are you about the possibility of each of the following? **[RANDOMIZE ITEMS]**

		<u>Extremely concerned</u>	<u>Very concerned</u>	<u>Somewhat concerned</u>	<u>Not too concerned</u>	<u>Not at all concerned</u>	<u>No answer*</u>
WARRS	U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine leading to a U.S. war with Russia						
	Jul 1-7, 2024	18	24	34	17	6	2
	Sep 13-18, 2022	13	19	37	23	7	1
	Apr 25-May 1, 2022	24	26	31	13	5	1
DFT	Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia						
	Jul 1-7, 2024	18	25	32	15	8	1
	Apr 1-7, 2024	22	23	31	13	10	2
	Sep 13-18, 2022	15	24	34	18	8	1
	Apr 25-May 1, 2022	26	29	28	10	6	1
MREYR	The war in Ukraine will continue for many more years						
	Jul 1-7, 2024	16	34	33	10	5	1
TREND FOR COMPARISON:							
	The war in Ukraine continuing for a long time						
	Apr 25-May 1, 2022	25	32	30	8	4	1
INVD	Russia invading other countries in the region, not just Ukraine						
	Jul 1-7, 2024	23	27	27	14	8	1
	Apr 1-7, 2024	26	22	27	13	10	2
	Sep 13-18, 2022	17	23	32	18	8	1
	Apr 25-May 1, 2022	30	29	25	10	5	1

ASK ALL:

UA_PROG From what you've read and heard about how Ukraine is defending itself against Russia's invasion, would you say that Ukraine's military effort is going ... **[RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1-5 AND 5-1 WITH 6 ALWAYS LAST]**

Jul 1-7,
2024

2	Extremely well
9	Very well
42	Somewhat well
21	Not too well
5	Not at all well
20	Not sure
1	No answer*

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED

ASK ALL:

ISGZ_FOL

How closely have you been following news about the Israel-Hamas war? **[RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1-5 AND 5-1 IN SAME ORDER AS UA_PROG]**

	Extremely <u>closely</u>	Very <u>closely</u>	Somewhat <u>closely</u>	Not <u>too closely</u>	Not at <u>all closely</u>	No <u>answer*</u>
Jul 1-7, 2024	9	15	35	22	20	1
Nov 27-Dec 3, 2023	9	17	37	21	15	*

[IF FORM 1, ASK BIDEN_FAVORISRPAL FIRST, IF FORM 2, ASK TRUMP_FAVORISRPAL FIRST]

ASK ALL:

BIDEN_FAVORISRPAL Do you think Joe Biden is... **[RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1 AND 2, OPTIONS 3 AND 4 ALWAYS LAST]**

Jul 1-7 <u>2024</u>		Feb 13-25, <u>2024</u>	Nov 27-Dec 3 <u>2023</u>	Mar 21-27, <u>2022</u>
21	Favoring the Israelis too much	22	21	8
20	Favoring the Palestinians too much	16	16	13
18	Striking about the right balance	21	25	16
40	Not sure	40	38	62
1	No answer*	1	1	1

[IF FORM 1, ASK BIDEN_FAVORISRPAL FIRST, IF FORM 2, ASK TRUMP_FAVORISRPAL FIRST]

ASK ALL:

TRUMP_FAVORISRPAL If Donald Trump were to win the 2024 presidential election, do you think he would... **[RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1 AND 2 IN SAME ORDER AS BIDEN_FAVORISRPAL, OPTIONS 3 AND 4 ALWAYS LAST]**

Jul 1-7 <u>2024</u>	
26	Favor the Israelis too much
3	Favor the Palestinians too much
28	Strike about the right balance
42	Not sure
1	No answer*

TREND FOR COMPARISON:

Do you think Donald Trump is...

	Apr 1-14 <u>2019</u>
Favoring the Israelis too much	34
Favoring the Palestinians too much	6
Striking about the right balance	50
No answer	10

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**ASK ALL:**

PARTY In politics today, do you consider yourself a...

ASK IF INDEP/SOMETHING ELSE (PARTY=3, 4 OR REFUSED):

PARTYLN As of today do you lean more to...

<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Something else</u>	<u>No answer*</u>	<i>Lean Rep</i>	<i>Lean Dem</i>
27	26	30	14	2	19	20

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED**ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**