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What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?

Protecting the U.S. from terrorism and reducing the flow of illegal drugs are top issues overall, but Democrats and Republicans have very different priorities

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How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to better understand Americans' long-range foreign policy priorities. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,600 U.S. adults from April 1 to April 7, 2024. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are the [questions](#) used for this analysis, along with responses, and its [methodology](#).

What Are Americans' Top Foreign Policy Priorities?

Protecting the U.S. from terrorism and reducing the flow of illegal drugs are top issues overall, but Democrats and Republicans have very different priorities

Americans have a lot on their plates in 2024, including an important election to determine who will remain or become again president. But the world does not stop for a U.S. election, and [multiple conflicts around the world](#) as well as other issues of global prominence continue to concern Americans.

When asked to prioritize the long-range foreign policy goals of the United States, the majority of Americans say preventing terrorist attacks (73%), keeping illegal drugs out of the country (64%) and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (63%) are top priorities. Over half of Americans also see maintaining the U.S. military advantage over other countries (53%) and preventing the spread of infectious diseases (52%) as primary foreign policy responsibilities.

About half of Americans say limiting the power and influence of Russia and China are top priorities. A recent [annual threat assessment](#) from the U.S. intelligence community focused heavily on those countries' strengthening military relationship and their [ability to shape the global narrative](#) against U.S. interests.

Fewer than half of Americans say dealing with global climate change (44%) and getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order (42%) are top priorities. The partisan gaps on these two issues are quite large:

- 70% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say climate change should be a top priority, while 15% of Republicans and Republican leaners say this.
- 54% of Republicans say getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order should be a top priority, compared with 33% of Democrats.

About four-in-ten Americans see limiting the power and influence of North Korea and Iran as top priorities. (The survey was conducted before [Iran's large-scale missile attack on Israel](#) on April 13.) And about a third say the same about the U.S. being a leader in artificial intelligence, a technology that governments around the world are [increasingly concerned about](#).

When it comes to goals that focus on international engagement, like strengthening the United Nations and NATO or finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fewer than a third of Americans mark these as top foreign policy priorities.


Related: [Fewer Americans view the United Nations favorably than in 2023](#)

Only about a quarter of Americans prioritize promoting human rights in other countries, leading other countries in space exploration and reducing military commitments overseas. And similar shares say supporting Ukraine (23%) and Israel (22%) are top issues.

At the bottom of this list of foreign policy priorities are promoting global democracy ([a major policy push from the Biden administration](#)) and aiding refugees fleeing violence around the world – about two-in-ten Americans describe these as top concerns. These assessments come amid a [recent global surge in asylum claims](#). Still, in Center surveys,

Americans' top long-range foreign policy goals

% who say each of the following should be a **top priority** in U.S. long-range foreign policy



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. "What Are Americans' Top Foreign Policy Priorities?"

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democracy promotion has typically been at the bottom of Americans' list of foreign policy priorities, even dating back to [George W. Bush's and Barack Obama's administrations](#).

Overall, a majority of Americans say that all 22 long-range foreign policy goals we asked about should be given at least *some* priority. Still, about three-in-ten Americans say supporting Israel (31%), promoting democracy (28%) and supporting Ukraine (27%) should be given *no* priority.

The long-range foreign policy priority questions were also asked in 2018 and 2021, and since then there have been some significant shifts in responses:

- Since 2018, the public has become significantly more likely to say limiting the power and influence of China (+17 percentage points) and finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (+11) are top foreign policy priorities.
- Americans have also increased the emphasis they place on limiting the power and influence of Russia, particularly in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (+8 points since 2021).
- On the decline since 2018 are strengthening the UN and aiding refugees (-8 points each), reducing foreign military commitments (-6), and promoting and defending human rights in other countries (-5).

How have American foreign policy priorities changed?

% who say each of the following should be a **top priority** in U.S. long-range foreign policy

| | 2018 | 2021 | 2024 | '18-'24 change |
|--|------|------|------|----------------|
| Limiting the power and influence of China | 32% | 48% | 49% | ▲17 |
| Finding a solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians | 18 | - | 29 | ▲11 |
| Limiting the power and influence of Russia | 42 | 42 | 50 | ▲8 |
| Maintaining the U.S. military advantage over all other countries | 49 | 48 | 53 | ▲4 |
| Getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order | 40 | 42 | 42 | ▲2 |
| Taking measures to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks | 72 | 71 | 73 | ▲1 |
| Reducing the spread of infectious diseases | 51 | 71 | 52 | ▲1 |
| Promoting democracy in other nations | 17 | 20 | 18 | ▲1 |
| Dealing with global climate change | 46 | 44 | 44 | ▼2 |
| Limiting the power and influence of North Korea | 40 | 40 | 38 | ▼2 |
| Limiting the power and influence of Iran | 39 | 38 | 37 | ▼2 |
| Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction | 66 | 64 | 63 | ▼3 |
| Promoting and defending human rights in other countries | 31 | 34 | 26 | ▼5 |
| Reducing U.S. military commitments overseas | 30 | 29 | 24 | ▼6 |
| Strengthening the UN | 39 | 30 | 31 | ▼8 |
| Aiding refugees fleeing violence around the world | 26 | 28 | 18 | ▼8 |

Note: Statistically significant changes are in **bold**.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024.

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- Preventing the spread of infectious diseases is down 19 percentage points since 2021 – during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic – and about back to where it was in 2018.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted April 1-7, 2024.

The survey of 3,600 U.S. adults shows that foreign policy remains a partisan issue. Republicans prioritize the prevention of terrorism, reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the country, and maintaining a military advantage over other nations. Meanwhile, Democrats prioritize dealing with climate change and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), but also preventing terrorist attacks.

There are also stark age differences on many of the policy goals mentioned, but for the most part, young adults are less likely than older Americans to say the issues we asked about are top priorities. The exceptions are dealing with climate change, reducing military commitments overseas, and promoting and defending human rights abroad – on these issues, 18- to 29-year-olds are significantly more likely than older Americans to assign top priority.

Even with these priorities, foreign policy generally takes the backseat to domestic policy for most Americans: 83% say it is more important for President Joe Biden to focus on domestic policy, compared with 14% who say he should focus on foreign policy.


Americans are even less likely to prioritize international affairs than they were in 2019, when 74% wanted then-President Donald Trump to focus on domestic policy and 23% said he should focus on foreign policy.

Differences by partisanship

Americans' foreign policy priorities differ greatly by party. The largest divide, by a significant margin, is the 55-percentage point gap between Democrats and Republicans on dealing with global climate change (70% vs. 15%, respectively, see it as a top priority).

Which should Biden focus on more?

% who say it is more important for President Joe Biden to focus on ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024.

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Supporting Ukraine, aiding refugees, reducing the spread of diseases, protecting human rights, and strengthening the UN are also issues on which Democrats are at least 20 points more likely than Republicans to prioritize. For example, 63% of Democrats say reducing the spread of infectious diseases is a top priority, compared with 41% of Republicans.

Republicans prioritize supporting Israel, reducing the flow of illegal drugs and maintaining a military advantage over other countries – among other security and hard power issues – significantly more than Democrats do. For example, more than half of Republicans (54%) say getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order should be a top focus in foreign policy. Only a third of Democrats say the same.

The priority assigned to several issues is divided even further by ideology within parties. Take support for Israel and Ukraine as examples. Supporting Israel is generally a higher priority for

Large partisan gaps on foreign policy priorities, especially climate change

% who say each of the following should be a **top priority** in U.S. long-range foreign policy



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024.
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Republicans than Democrats, but within the Republican Party, 48% of conservatives say it's a top concern, while 18% of moderates and liberals agree. Previous Center research shows that conservative Republicans are [especially likely to favor military aid to Israel](#).

Supporting Ukraine, something Democrats emphasize more than Republicans, is a top priority particularly for liberal Democrats (47%), while about three-in-ten moderate and conservative Democrats agree (29%). Democrats have also [shown more willingness than Republicans to provide aid to Ukraine](#) in its conflict with Russia.

Generally, the **partisan differences on the importance of several foreign policy issues have gotten smaller since 2021**, when most of these questions were last fielded. This is especially true for items related to the relative power of major countries, like the U.S. maintaining a military advantage and limiting the power and influence of both Russia and China.

However, finding a solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians – a priority that saw *no* partisan difference at all when it was last asked about in 2018 – has an emerging partisan gap today. The share of Democrats who call this a top priority has more than doubled, while the share of Republicans has changed little.

Differences by age

Age differences persist on foreign policy issues.


Older Americans prioritize *most* of the issues we asked about at higher rates than those ages 18 to 29.

On four issues, there is at least a 40-percentage point gap between Americans ages 65 and older and young adults ages 18 to 29. The oldest Americans are more likely to prioritize reducing the flow of illegal drugs, limiting the power and influence of China and Iran, and maintaining a U.S. military advantage.

Growing partisan divide on the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a U.S. foreign policy focus

% who say ___ should be a **top priority** in U.S. long-range foreign policy

Finding a solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. "What Are Americans' Top Foreign Policy Priorities?"

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Those in the oldest age group are also more concerned than their younger counterparts on an additional 11 issues, ranging from support for Israel to U.S. leadership in space exploration.

For their part, young adults are more likely to say dealing with global climate change, reducing U.S. military commitments overseas, and promoting and defending human rights in other countries should be top foreign policy priorities.


Even starker patterns appear when looking at partisanship within two age groups – adults ages 18 to 49 and those 50 and older.

Among Democrats, older adults place particularly high priority on supporting Ukraine, strengthening NATO, and limiting the power and influence of Russia amid its war with Ukraine. Older Democrats are also more likely than younger ones to prioritize preventing the development of WMDs, curbing the spread of diseases, strengthening the UN and promoting democracy around the world, among other issues.

Among Republicans, those ages 50 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 49 to prioritize supporting Israel, limiting the

Older Americans assign most foreign policy goals higher priority than young adults

% who say each of the following should be a top priority in U.S. long-range foreign policy



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024.
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power and influence of Iran and China, getting other countries to assume more foreign policy costs, reducing the amount of illegal drugs entering the U.S., preventing terrorism, and maintaining a military advantage.

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from ATP Wave 145, conducted from April 1-7, 2024, among a sample of ATP members who had previously completed both of ATP Waves 132 and 143. It includes an [oversample](#) of non-Hispanic Asian adults, non-Hispanic Black men and Hispanic men in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 3,600 panelists responded out of 3,776 who were sampled, for a response rate of 95%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,600 respondents is plus or minus 2.1 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based sampling (ABS) recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. ["AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."](#)

birthday is asked to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.²

We have recruited a national sample of U.S. adults to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to boost sample size with underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

| Recruitment dates | Mode | Invited | Joined | Active panelists remaining |
|---|-----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014 | Landline/ cell RDD | 9,809 | 5,338 | 1,390 |
| Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015 | Landline/ cell RDD | 6,004 | 2,976 | 831 |
| April 25 to June 4, 2017 | Landline/ cell RDD | 3,905 | 1,628 | 404 |
| Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018 | ABS | 9,396 | 8,778 | 3,844 |
| Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019 | ABS | 5,900 | 4,720 | 1,386 |
| June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021 | ABS | 3,197 | 2,812 | 1,438 |
| May 29 to July 7, 2021; Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021 | ABS | 1,329 | 1,162 | 731 |
| May 24 to Sept. 29, 2022 | ABS | 3,354 | 2,869 | 1,449 |
| April 17 to May 30, 2023 | ABS | 686 | 576 | 433 |
| | Total | 43,580 | 30,859 | 11,906 |

Note: RDD is random-digit dial; ABS is address-based sampling. Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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Across the six address-based recruitments, a total of 23,862 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 20,917 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. Of the 30,859 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,906 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample of active ATP members who completed both ATP Wave 132 and Wave 143. Among the panelists who met these criteria, Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the

² Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was April 1-7, 2024. Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset of ATP panelists with a known residential address on April 1.³

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on April 1. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on April 2.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

³ Postcard notifications are sent to 1) panelists who have been provided with a tablet to take ATP surveys, 2) panelists who were recruited within the last two years, and 3) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Invitation and reminder dates, ATP Wave 145

| | Soft launch | Full launch |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Initial invitation | April 1, 2024 | April 2, 2024 |
| First reminder | April 4, 2024 | April 4, 2024 |
| Final reminder | April 6, 2024 | April 6, 2024 |

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Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, one ATP respondent was removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

| Variable | Benchmark source |
|--|---|
| Age (detailed) | 2022 American Community Survey (ACS) |
| Age x Gender | |
| Education x Gender | 2021 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement |
| Education x Age | |
| Race/Ethnicity x Education | 2022 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement |
| Black (alone or in combination) x Hispanic | |
| Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans | 2023 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) |
| Years lived in the U.S. | |
| Census region x Metropolitan status | |
| Volunteerism | |
| Party affiliation x Voter registration | |
| Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity | |
| Frequency of internet use | |
| Religious affiliation | |

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 2nd and 98th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. This trimming is performed separately among non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, Hispanic and all other respondents. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 145

| Group | Unweighted sample size | Plus or minus ... |
|--------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Total sample | 3,600 | 2.1 percentage points |
| Rep/Lean Rep | 1,487 | 1.7 percentage points |
| Dem/Lean Dem | 1,952 | 1.7 percentage points |

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 145

| | AAPOR code | Total |
|--|------------|--------------|
| Completed interview | 1.1 | 3,600 |
| Logged on to survey; broke off | 2.12 | 29 |
| Logged on to survey; did not complete any items | 2.1121 | 9 |
| Never logged on (implicit refusal) | 2.11 | 135 |
| Survey completed after close of the field period | 2.27 | 2 |
| Completed interview but was removed for data quality | | 1 |
| Screened out | | 0 |
| Total panelists sampled for the survey | | 3,776 |
| Completed interviews | I | 3,600 |
| Partial interviews | P | 0 |
| Refusals | R | 173 |
| Non-contact | NC | 2 |
| Other | O | 1 |
| Unknown household | UH | 0 |
| Unknown other | UO | 0 |
| Not eligible | NE | 0 |
| Total | | 3,776 |
| AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO) | | 95% |

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Cumulative response rate as of ATP Wave 145

| | Total |
|---|-----------|
| Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys | 11% |
| % of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited | 71% |
| % of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 145 | 45% |
| Response rate to Wave 145 survey | 95% |
| Cumulative response rate | 3% |

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey
April 23, 2024 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see [Methodology](#) section.
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

| | | Q49. Right now, which is more important for President Biden to focus on? | | | |
|------|--------------|--|----------------|------------|-------|
| | | Domestic policy | Foreign policy | DK/Refused | Total |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 83 | 14 | 3 | 100 |
| | July, 2019 | 74 | 23 | 3 | 100 |

In 2019, asked about President Trump.

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51a. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? a. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 63 | 31 | 5 | 1 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 64 | 32 | 3 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 66 | 27 | 5 | 1 | 100 | 2635 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51b. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? b. Strengthening the United Nations | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 31 | 46 | 22 | 2 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 30 | 48 | 21 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 39 | 41 | 19 | 1 | 100 | 2635 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51c. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? c. Reducing U.S. military commitments overseas | | | | | |
|------|----------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 24 | 58 | 16 | 2 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 29 | 58 | 12 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 30 | 56 | 13 | 1 | 100 | 2635 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51d. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? d. Limiting the power and influence of Russia | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 50 | 40 | 8 | 1 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 42 | 49 | 8 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 42 | 45 | 11 | 2 | 100 | 2635 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51e. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? e. Promoting democracy in other nations | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 18 | 52 | 28 | 2 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 20 | 58 | 22 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 17 | 56 | 26 | 1 | 100 | 2653 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51f. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? f. Limiting the power and influence of China | | | | | |
|------|----------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 49 | 42 | 8 | 1 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 48 | 44 | 7 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 32 | 57 | 10 | 1 | 100 | 2653 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51g. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? g. Maintaining the U.S. military advantage over all other countries | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 53 | 37 | 8 | 2 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 48 | 36 | 15 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 49 | 39 | 11 | 0 | 100 | 2663 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51h. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? h. Dealing with global climate change | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 44 | 31 | 24 | 1 | 100 | 1810 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 44 | 38 | 18 | 1 | 100 | 1287 |
| | November, 2018 | 46 | 37 | 17 | 0 | 100 | 2663 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51i. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? i. Finding a solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 29 | 48 | 22 | 2 | 100 | 1810 |
| | November, 2018 | 18 | 57 | 25 | 1 | 100 | 2653 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51j. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? j. Reducing the flow of illegal drugs into our country | | | | | |
|------|--------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 64 | 29 | 6 | 1 | 100 | 1810 |

| | | ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q51k. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? k. The U.S. being a leader in developing artificial intelligence | | | | | |
|------|--------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 32 | 47 | 19 | 1 | 100 | 1810 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51l. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? l. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries | | | | | |
|------|----------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 26 | 55 | 18 | 1 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 34 | 56 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 31 | 57 | 11 | 1 | 100 | 2663 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51m. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? m. Reducing the spread of infectious diseases | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 52 | 40 | 6 | 1 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 71 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 51 | 44 | 5 | 1 | 100 | 2663 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51n. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? n. Limiting the power and influence of Iran | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 37 | 48 | 13 | 2 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 38 | 51 | 9 | 2 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 39 | 48 | 11 | 1 | 100 | 2663 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51o. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? o. Taking measures to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 73 | 23 | 2 | 1 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 71 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 72 | 24 | 4 | 0 | 100 | 2689 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51p. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? p. Getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 42 | 49 | 8 | 1 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 42 | 49 | 7 | 2 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 40 | 48 | 11 | 1 | 100 | 2689 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51q. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? q. Aiding refugees fleeing violence around the world | | | | | |
|------|----------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 18 | 58 | 21 | 2 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 28 | 54 | 16 | 2 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 26 | 56 | 17 | 1 | 100 | 2689 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51r. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? r. Limiting the power and influence of North Korea | | | | | |
|------|----------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 38 | 48 | 12 | 2 | 100 | 1790 |
| | Spring, 2021 | 40 | 49 | 9 | 2 | 100 | 1309 |
| | November, 2018 | 40 | 50 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 2689 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51s. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? s. Strengthening NATO | | | | | |
|------|--------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 27 | 52 | 19 | 3 | 100 | 1790 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51t. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? t. Supporting Israel | | | | | |
|------|--------------|--|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 22 | 45 | 31 | 2 | 100 | 1790 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51u. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? u. Supporting Ukraine | | | | | |
|------|--------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 23 | 48 | 27 | 2 | 100 | 1790 |

| | | ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q51v. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? v. The U.S. being a leader in space exploration | | | | | |
|------|--------------|---|---------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|
| | | Top priority | Some priority | No priority | DK/Refused | Total | N= |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 25 | 52 | 22 | 2 | 100 | 1790 |

| | | U.S. Party ID with Leaners | | | |
|------|--------------|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------|
| | | Reps and Rep Leaners | Dems and Dem Leaners | DK/Refused/No lean | Total |
| U.S. | Spring, 2024 | 45 | 47 | 8 | 100 |