Pew Research Center

FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 17, 2022

The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong

People in both countries remain committed to transatlantic security

BY *Jacob Poushter and Sarah Austin*

FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:

Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Associate

202.419.4372

www.pewresearch.org

RECOMMENDED CITATION

Pew Research Center, October, 2022, "The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

About Pew Research Center

Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It does not take policy positions. The Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, computational social science research and other data-driven research. It studies politics and policy; news habits and media; the internet and technology; religion; race and ethnicity; international affairs; social, demographic and economic trends; science; research methodology and data science; and immigration and migration. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder. This report benefited from data provided by Körber-Stiftung, whose report, "The Berlin Pulse," cited Pew Research Center data and was released coincident with this publication.

How we did this

In 2017, Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung began collaborating on joint public opinion surveys to gauge the state of relations between the United States and Germany. The questions were developed together, and each organization fielded a survey within its own country starting that year. Some of the questions have been repeated annually to allow both organizations to track attitudes over time. Topics include relations with other countries, the state of the transatlantic partnership on a variety of foreign policy issues, views of China and Russia, and the state of international relations.

The results have been published in both countries, and the previous reports from Pew Research Center can be found here for November 2021, September 2020, May 2020, and March 2020, 2019 and 2018.

The Körber-Stiftung findings are contained within their larger "Berlin Pulse" report and can be found here for 2022 and prior years.

The U.S. findings come from a Pew Research Center survey conducted from July 18 to Aug. 21, 2022, among 12,147 respondents online and Aug. 1-14, 2022, among 7,647 respondents online. German findings are from a Körber-Stiftung survey conducted by Kantar from Aug. 2-11, 2022, among 1,088 respondents via telephone.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with the responses, and its U.S. survey methodology.

The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong

People in both countries remain committed to transatlantic security

As daunting challenges from Russia, China and a flagging global economy ripple across the world, Americans and Germans continue to say that relations between their countries are good. In fact, more Germans now say that the relationship with the United States is good (82%) than have since 2017, when Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung began asking about the issue. For their part, 81% of Americans also characterize the transatlantic relationship as good, but there remain differences between the two nations on specific aspects of the partnership and on perceptions of what threat if any is posed by Russia and China.

Record share of Germans say relations with the U.S. are good as Americans continue to support strong ties

% who say relations today between the U.S. and Germany are …



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Prior to 2022, U.S. surveys were conducted over the phone. German results are all from telephone surveys.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Aug. 1-14, 2022. Q6. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Most Americans and Germans continue to see each other as partners on protecting European security, and publics in each country are willing to support using military action to protect themselves and their allies. Majorities in each country also see the other as a good partner on dealing with Russia. Germans, however, are more skeptical about how a U.S. partnership can protect the environment, while Americans are relatively less convinced that Germany is a partner when it comes to dealing with China.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents tend to say Germany is more of a partner on a variety of issues than do Republicans and those who lean toward the Republican Party. People in both countries also think that Europe is not doing enough to become independent from Russian energy as a looming winter threatens to stretch European energy supplies.

Americans see Germany as a partner on key issues, but less so on dealing with China; most Germans see U.S. as a partner on security but not the environment



Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Aug. 1-14, 2022. Q7a-e. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Germans are more likely to say that the U.S. is their preeminent foreign policy partner, even as Americans are inclined to name the United Kingdom is their most important partner (the survey was conducted before the recent passing of Queen Elizabeth II). Americans for their part are also much more likely than Germans to see Russia and China as a military threat to their country. Older Americans are especially likely to see Russia and China as major military threats.

As to one of the more direct effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, both Americans and Germans strongly support Sweden and Finland joining NATO (60% and 75%, respectively). Germans are also much more likely to say they want a close relationship with the U.S. rather than Russia or China. But both publics express skepticism of using their militaries to promote democracy, and neither fully supports only purchasing energy supplies from nations that are democracies.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 12,147 people in the U.S. from July 18-Aug. 21 and 7,647 people in the U.S. from Aug. 1-14, 2022, as well as a Körber-Stiftung survey of 1,088 adults conducted in Germany from Aug. 2-11, 2022. This is the first year the American survey has been conducted online on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. In prior years, from 2017 to 2021, U.S. surveys were conducted via telephone. Additional results from the Körber-Stiftung survey can be found with the newly released "Berlin Pulse" publication. The German surveys were conducted entirely via phone in all years, including 2022.

The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Germany

Both Americans and Germans are overwhelmingly positive about current bilateral relations, with large majorities in both countries considering relations somewhat or very good in 2022.

Germans became substantially more optimistic about bilateral relations in 2021, after leadership changes in both countries. Positive sentiment has continued to rise in Germany, where a record share of 82% now say that relations with the U.S. are good. This represents an 11 percentage point increase from last year and more than a quadrupling in positive evaluations over the past two years.

Majority of Americans and Germans are positive about bilateral relations

% who say relations today between the U.S. and Germany are …



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Aug. 1-14, 2022. Q6. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Americans' assessments of the relationship also improved significantly in 2021 and remain overwhelmingly positive this year. Overall, Democrats and Republicans have similar sentiments about whether relations are Germany are good (84% and 80%, respectively), but Democrats are more intensely positive about the relationship. Notably, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more than twice as likely to say relations with Germany are very good (22% vs. 10%).

The American-German partnership on key issues

Roughly half or more of Americans say Germany is a partner in all five key issues tested, with 68% calling Germany a partner in protecting European security. Around six-in-ten Americans also say that Germany is a partner on protecting the environment and securing access to energy sources. However, only 56% and 52% of Americans call Germany a partner in dealing with Russia and China, respectively.

While majorities of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents consider Germany a partner on nearly all issues, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely to say they consider Germany a partner on every issue tested. This divide is greatest for securing access to energy sources and protecting the environment.

Democrats more likely than Republicans to say Germany is a partner on various issues, especially on access to energy sources and protecting environment

% of Americans who say Germany is a partner on ...



Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Aug. 1-14, 2022. Q7a-e.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Large shares of Germans consider the U.S. a partner on two key issues: About eight-in-ten Germans say the U.S. is a partner in protecting European security, and around six-in-ten describe the U.S. as a partner in dealing with Russia.

Germans are split over whether the U.S. is a partner in securing access to energy sources. Nearly half of Germans surveyed consider the U.S. a partner on energy, while 45% say they do not consider the U.S. a partner. Although a slight increase from 2021, only 48% of Germans say the U.S. is a partner in dealing with China, and just 40% say the U.S. is a partner in protecting the environment.

In addition, younger Germans are more critical of the partnership with the U.S. on the environment (59% say the U.S. is not a partner). And on all issues, those in former East Germany tend to be more critical of the partnership with the U.S. than those living in former West Germany. Politically, Green Party supporters are more likely to see the U.S. as a partner on dealing with China than those who support the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or CDU/CSU.

Most important foreign policy partner for U.S. and Germany

Although relations between the U.S. and Germany are on relatively solid footing, each public paints a different picture when naming its country's most important foreign policy partner. Americans are much more likely to say that the United Kingdom is their nation's most important foreign policy partner, which highlights the historical ties between the two English-speaking nations.

Americans say UK is their most important foreign policy partner, Germans say U.S.

% who say __ is the most important partner for American/German foreign policy



Note: In the U.S., responses that were given by fewer than 2% of respondents not shown. In Germany, responses that were given by fewer than 1% of respondents not shown. "Other responses" not shown. Asked as an open-ended question in the U.S.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. Q1. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Around a quarter of Americans say the UK is the most important partner for American foreign policy. Next down on the list, 11% say China is America's most important foreign policy partner, followed by 6% who cite Israel and 5% who choose Canada. Only 3% say Germany is America's most important international partner, ranking it fifth in the open-ended question on this year's survey. More than a third of U.S. panelists did not respond to this question.

Among Germans, the most critical foreign policy partner named is the U.S. at 36%, followed closely by France at 32%. Far behind those two traditional allies are Russia (3%), the European Union (2%), and China, Turkey and Poland (each 1%).

Comparisons to previous surveys in the U.S. are not possible due to a mode shift from phone to web panel in 2022, but similar patterns were seen among Americans on this question from 2017 to 2021, with the UK always on top and China usually coming in second.

In 2022, Republicans are far more likely than Democrats to cite Israel as a foreign policy partner. And Americans ages 18 to 29 rank China as the country's most important partner on foreign policy, while older Americans overwhelmingly say the UK.

Demographic differences in Germany are not profound on their most important international partner, but those in former West Germany are more likely to name the U.S. as that most critical partner compared with those in the former East.

Germans have fluctuated on their most important foreign policy partner

% of Germans who say __ is the most important partner for German foreign policy



Note: Only countries with 3% or more mentions shown.
Source: Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022. "The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

In 2020 and earlier, during Donald Trump's presidency, most Germans chose France as their most important partner, with the U.S. typically coming in second. But since President Joe Biden has taken the helm, Germans have been much more likely to say the U.S. is their most important partner. This mirrors overall attitudes toward the U.S. and its president in Germany and Western Europe in other Pew Research Center polling and analysis over the past five years.

China and Russia as a military threat

Despite the fact that around one-in-ten Americans name China as their most important foreign policy partner, around two-thirds consider China a military threat to American security (64%). And similar shares say the same about Russia as a military threat (66%), as Americans continue to share concerns about Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On the other hand, a much smaller share of Germans say that either Russia or China is a major military threat to their security. Only about two-in-ten Germans say Russia is a major military threat (22%), and even fewer say the same about China (7%). This equates to Americans being three times as likely as Germans to express major concerns about Russia's military, and roughly nine times as concerned about China. However, 44% of Germans see China as at least a minor military threat, and 72% say the same about Russia.

Germans much less likely than Americans to see China and Russia as military threats to their country's security

% who say each country represents (a) __ military threat to American/German security



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. Q3a&b. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Older Americans are much more concerned about the potential military threat from China and Russia than are younger Americans. Age differences in Germany are not as dramatic, but older Germans do tend to see Russia as more of a military threat than younger Germans.

Older Americans more likely to say Russia, China represent major military threats

*% of Americans who say __ represents a **major military threat** to American security*



Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. Q3a&b.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Republicans are more concerned about the military threat posed by China (75% say major military threat) than Democrats (58%), while Democrats are somewhat more likely to see Russia as a threat (69%) than Republicans (64%). This tracks with overall attitudes about China and Russia among supporters of the two major U.S. political parties.

Involvement of American and German military forces in foreign conflicts

An overwhelming share of Americans and Germans alike believe their military should be utilized in foreign conflicts to protect the security of their own country and its allies. Nearly nine-in-ten Americans say the military should be involved to protect the security of the U.S., and about three-quarters say this about protecting American allies. Roughly three-quarters of Germans say the same about protecting themselves and Germany's allies.

However, when it comes to using the military for the promotion of democracy abroad, a majority of Americans (58%) say the U.S. military *should not* be used for this purpose. Only 38% of Americans see a place for the military in democracy promotion abroad. This tracks with recent public opinion in the U.S., which ranks promoting democracy in other nations as the least important foreign policy priority.

Germans for their part are almost equally divided on using the German military for democratic expansion, with 49% saying they should and 46% saying should not.

Majorities in U.S. and Germany support military involvement in foreign conflicts to protect their own country and allies, but promoting democracy is less supported

% who say the U.S./German military __ be involved in foreign conflicts to …



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. Q2a-c. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Older Americans are more inclined to support democracy promotion via the military than younger Americans, although fewer than half of those 65 and older say this. Democrats are also slightly more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. military should bolster democracy abroad (42% vs. 35%, respectively).

NATO's expansion

In reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland have applied to become members in NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While the application is still in the process of ratification by the 30 NATO member states, both the U.S. and Germany have approved the ascension. And publics in both countries wholeheartedly support the acceptance of Sweden and Finland into NATO, with few opposed.

Majorities support Sweden and Finland joining NATO, but stronger approval in Germany than in U.S.

% who __ of Finland and Sweden potentially becoming NATO members



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. Q4. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Three-quarters of Germans say that they approve of Sweden and Finland potentially becoming NATO members, with six-in-ten Americans also approving. Fewer than one-in-ten in each country oppose the ascension. In the U.S., a third neither approve nor disapprove of the change in NATO membership, while 16% in Germany are neutral on the issue.

In Germany, support for NATO membership for Sweden and Finland is high across the major demographic groups. But slightly less support for the ascension is found among those in former East Germany (65%) compared with the West (78%). And older Germans are more approving of the potential expansion than younger Germans, although much of the difference is due to younger Germans being more likely to say they neither approve nor disapprove of the ascension rather than opposing it.

Similarly, Americans' demographic differences on this question tend to be mainly between those who approve and those who remain neutral, with only small minorities disapproving. For example, seven-in-ten men say they approve of Finland and Sweden joining NATO compared with 53% of women. But this is due to 41% of women saying they neither approve nor disapprove of NATO membership for the Scandinavian nations, while only 23% of men say the same. (Women were also more likely to say they were unsure on questions about details of international affairs in a recent [Pew Research Center survey on foreign policy knowledge](https://www.pewresearch.org).)

Those with more education and older Americans are also more likely to support NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. But again, much of the difference is due to younger and less educated Americans being more likely to say they neither approve nor disapprove of NATO's expansion.

There are also slight partisan differences on this question, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to support Sweden and Finland joining NATO. This tracks with other polling on U.S. partisan attitudes toward NATO, which shows Democrats more favorable toward the organization than Republicans and more likely to see a benefit in membership.

Americans generally approve of NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, but many are neutral

% who __ of Finland and Sweden potentially becoming NATO members



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. Q4.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Energy security

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent disruption to global energy markets has led to concerns about the looming winter and Europe's ability to cope without Russia's massive energy exports. To that end, two new questions were asked on this year's survey about whether American and German publics would be willing to import energy from any country or just those that are democracies, and if Europe is doing enough to become independent from Russian energy supplies.

Americans more likely than Germans to want energy supplies from democracies, but both say Europe is not doing enough to be independent from Russian oil

% who say European countries are doing __ to become independent from Russian energy supplies



Source: Pew Research Center surveys conducted in the U.S. July 18-Aug. 21, 2022, and Aug. 1-14, 2022. Q5 & Q8. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Aug. 2-11, 2022.
"The U.S.-German Relationship Remains Strong"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

On the latter, it is clear people in the U.S. and Germany think European countries are not doing enough to divest themselves from Russian energy. Six-in-ten Germans and two-thirds of Americans say Europe is not doing enough to become independent from Russian gas and oil. Only about three-in-ten in each country say Europe is doing enough. In the U.S., younger people and Democrats are somewhat more likely to say Europe is doing enough compared with older people and Republicans, but most in all demographic categories think Europe is not doing enough to divest itself from Russian energy.

And on the broader question of importing energy from all countries or only those that are democracies, Americans are almost evenly split, while a majority of Germans say they should seek out energy markets from all countries, regardless of their political system. Interestingly, younger Germans are more willing to say they should only purchase energy supplies from democratic countries, while younger Americans are more willing to get energy from all countries.

Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Jacob Poushter, *Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research*
Sarah Austin, *Research Assistant*

Dorene Asare-Marfo, *Panel Manager*
Janakee Chavda, *Assistant Digital Producer*
Laura Clancy, *Research Assistant*
Moira Fagan, *Research Associate*
Janell Fetterolf, *Senior Researcher*
Shannon Greenwood, *Digital Producer*
Sneha Gubbala, *Research Assistant*
Christine Huang, *Research Analyst*
Michael Keegan, *Senior Information Graphics Designer*
David Kent, *Senior Copy Editor*
Hannah Klein, *Communications Manager*
Gar Meng Leong, *Communications Associate*
Clark Letterman, *Senior Survey Manager*
Gracie Martinez, *Senior Administrative Coordinator*
Patrick Moynihan, *Associate Director, International Research Methods*
Laura Silver, *Senior Researcher*
Richard Wike, *Director, Global Attitudes Research*

This report benefited from data provided by Körber-Stiftung, whose report, "The Berlin Pulse," cited Pew Research Center data and was released coincident with this publication.

Methodology

Data from the American survey comes from two successive waves on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. See below for details about the two waves. German methodology, based on a nationally representative telephone sample, can be found through Körber-Stiftung.

American Trends Panel Wave 112 survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from July 18 to Aug. 21, 2022. A total of 12,147 panelists responded out of 13,978 who were sampled, for a response rate of 87%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 12,147 respondents is plus or minus 1.4 percentage points.

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,592
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	935
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	470
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,418
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,617
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,691
May 29 to July 7, 2021 Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	931
May 24 to July 6, 2022	ABS	2,724	2,324	2,324
	Total	**42,264**	**29, 738**	**13,978**

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel. The 2022 recruitment survey was ongoing at the time W112 was conducted. The counts reflect completed recruitment interviews up through July 6, 2022.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. In 2020 and 2021 another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that did not respond to the online survey were sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults who returned the paper version of the survey were invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults received a follow-up mailing with a $10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the five address-based recruitments, a total of 22,546 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 19,796 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 29,738 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 13,978 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.[1] The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. All active panel members were invited to participate in this wave.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated

[1] AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was July 18 to Aug. 21, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all existing ATP panelists with a known residential address on July 19, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to newly recruited, non-tablet households on July 22, and to newly recruited, ATP tablet-provided households on July 26.

Invitations were sent out in three separate launches: Soft Launch, Full Launch, and a special launch for newly recruited, ATP tablet-provided panelists. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on July 18, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. For full launch, English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were sent an invitation on July 20, 2022. Newly recruited ATP tablet-provided panelists were sent an invitation on July 26, 2022.

Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch	Tablet-provided New Recruits
Initial invitation	July 18, 2022	July 20, 2022	July 26, 2022
First reminder	July 23, 2022	July 23, 2022	
Second reminder	July 25, 2022	July 25, 2022	
Third reminder	July 27, 2022	July 27, 2022	
Interactive voice recording reminder	July 29, 2022	July 29, 2022	July 29, 2022
Fourth reminder	July 29, 2022	July 29, 2022	July 29, 2022 (1st reminder)
Fifth reminder	Aug. 15, 2022	Aug. 15, 2022	Aug. 15, 2022 (2nd reminder)
Final reminder	Aug. 19, 2022	Aug. 19, 2022	Aug. 19, 2022

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to six email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to six SMS reminders. Interactive voice recording reminder calls were made to 61 tablet households that previously provided consent to receive these reminders, on July 29, 2022.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 99.6th percentile to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists who completed the survey were measured in 2022.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made these more recent measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks.

To address this, volunteerism is weighted to an estimated benchmark that attempts to account for possible changes in behavior.

The weighting parameter is estimated using the volunteerism profile variable that was measured on the full American Trends Panel in 2021 but weighted using the profile variable that was measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements were used. For American Trends panelists recruited in 2021, the 2020 volunteerism measure was imputed using data from existing panelists with similar characteristics.

This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed) Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S.	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2021 American Trends Panel Annual Profile Survey
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Additional weighting dimensions applied within Black adults	
Age Gender Education Hispanic ethnicity	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation Religious affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	12,147	1.4 percentage points
Republican/ Lean Republican	5,544	2.1 percentage points
Democrat/ Lean Democrat	6,247	1.9 percentage points

Note: Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	12,147
Logged onto survey; broke off	2.12	84
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	73
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	1,670
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		3
Screened out		1
Total panelists in the survey		13,978
Completed interviews	I	12,147
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	1,830
Non-contact	NC	0
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		13,978

AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)	87%

Cumulative response rate	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	70%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 112	47%
Response rate to Wave 112 survey	87%
Cumulative response rate	3%

American Trends Panel Wave 113 survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from Aug. 1 to Aug. 14, 2022, and included oversamples of Hispanic, Asian and Black adults, as well as 18- to 29-year-old Republicans and Republican-leaning independents in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 7,647 panelists responded out of 13,221 who were sampled, for a response rate of 65%. This

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,592
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	935
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	469
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,418
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,616
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,690
May 29 to July 7, 2021 Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	931
	Total	**39,540**	**27,414**	11,651

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

included 6,025 respondents from the ATP and an oversample of 1,622 Hispanic respondents from Ipsos' KnowledgePanel. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 2%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 7,647 respondents is plus or minus 1.7 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020 another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a $10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,651 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.[2] The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

[2] AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Hispanic, Asian and Black adults, as well as 18- to 29-year-old Republicans and Republican-leaning independents were selected with certainty were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

The ATP was supplemented with an oversample of self-identified Hispanic respondents from the KnowledgePanel who were of Mexican origin, Central American ancestry or who had no more than a high-school education.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Ipsos operates an ongoing modest incentive program for KnowledgePanel to encourage participation and create member loyalty. The incentive program includes special raffles and sweepstakes with both cash rewards and other prizes to be won. Typically, panel members are assigned no more than one survey per week. On average, panel members complete two to three surveys per month with durations of 10 to 15 minutes per survey. An additional incentive is usually provided for longer surveys. For this survey, during the last few days of data collection, KnowledgePanel (KP) members were offered 10,000 points (equivalent to $10) in addition to the regular incentive program in an attempt to boost the number of responses from panel members of Central American ancestry.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was Aug. 1 to Aug. 14, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on Aug. 1.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty ATP panelists and 909 KP panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on Aug. 1, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on Aug. 3.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to four email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to four SMS reminders.

Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch
Initial invitation	Aug. 1, 2022	Aug. 3, 2022
First reminder	Aug. 6, 2022	Aug. 6, 2022
Second reminder	Aug. 8, 2022	Aug. 8, 2022
Third reminder	Aug. 10, 2022	Aug. 10, 2022
Final reminder	Aug. 12, 2022	Aug. 12, 2022

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, 12 ATP and seven KP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The data was weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist began with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights were then adjusted to account for each panelist's probability of being sampled to participate in this wave.

Next, respondents were placed into one of five sample groups: 1) Hispanic adults of Mexican origin 2) Hispanic adults of Central American origin 3) Other Hispanic adults with no more than a high school education 4) Other Hispanic adults with more than a high school education 5) Non-Hispanic adults. Separately within each group, the weights for ATP and KnowledgePanel respondents were scaled to be proportional to their effective sample size within that group. The ATP and KnowledgePanel respondents were then recombined and the weights were poststratified so that the weighted proportion of adults in each of the five groups matched its estimated share of the of the U.S. adult population.

The weights were then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table. These include a set of weighting parameters for the total U.S. adult population as well as an additional set of parameters specifically for Hispanic adults. Separately for each sample group, the weights were then trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for most ATP members were measured in 2022. A small number of panelists for which 2022 measures were not available use profile variables measured in 2021. For KnowledgePanel respondents, many of the weighting variables were measured on this wave.

Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S.	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2021 American Trends Panel Annual Profile Survey
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Additional weighting dimensions applied within Hispanic adults	
Age by Gender Education by Gender Education by Age Hispanic origin or ancestry Hispanic origin by U.S. citizenship Hispanic origin by education Birth country Years lived in the U.S.	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Census region Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Party affiliation Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Volunteerism	2021 American Trends Panel Annual Profile Survey
Voter registration x Mexican origin	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made these more recent measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted to an estimated benchmark that attempts to account for possible changes in behavior.

The weighting parameter is estimated using the volunteerism profile variable that was measured on the full American Trends Panel in 2021 but weighted using the profile variable that was measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements were used. For American Trends panelists recruited in 2021, the 2020 volunteerism measure was imputed using data from existing panelists with similar characteristics.

This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Group	**Unweighted sample size**	**Plus or minus ...**
Total sample	7,647	1.7 percentage points
Republican/ Lean Republican	3,073	2.6 percentage points
Democrat/ Lean Democrat	4,219	2.3 percentage points

Note: This survey includes an oversample of Hispanic, Asian and Black adults, as well as Republicans age 18-29 respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	ATP	KP	Total
Completed interview	1.1	6,025	1,622	7,647
Logged onto survey; broke off	2.12	56	126	182
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	28	95	123
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	682	3,519	4,201
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	1	0	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.3	12	7	19
Screened out	4.7	0	1,048	1,048
Total panelists in the survey		6,804	6,417	13,221
Completed interviews	I	6,025	1,622	7,647
Partial interviews	P	0	0	0
Refusals	R	778	133	911
Non-contact	NC	1	0	1
Other	O	0	0	0
Unknown household	UH	0	0	0
Unknown other	UO	0	3,614	3,614
Not eligible	NE	0	0	0
Screen out	SO	0	1,048	1,048
Total		6,804	6,417	13,221
Est. eligibility rate among unscreened: e = (I+R)/(I+R+SO)		100%	63%	89%
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		89%	30%	63%
AAPOR RR3 = I / (I+R+[e*UO])		89%	40%	65%

Cumulative response rate	ATP	KP	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%	8%	10%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	69%	49%	59%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 113	43%	53%	48%
Response rate to Wave 113 survey	89%	40%	65%
Cumulative response rate	3%	1%	2%

Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
July-August 2022 Survey
October 17, 2022 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on a national sample of the United States. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section.

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.

- Surveys in the U.S. were conducted online on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.

- German results, based on a nationally representative telephone sample, can be found through Körber-Stiftung.

		July-August, 2022
		United States
Q1. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	Asia	0
	Africa	0
	Canada	5
	China	11
	Europe	2
	European Union	1
	France	1
	Germany	3
	Israel	6
	Japan	2
	Mexico	2
	NATO	0
	Russia	1
	Saudi Arabia	0
	South America	0
	South Korea	0
	Ukraine	1
	United Kingdom	24
	United States	2
	Other	2
	All	0
	None	1
	DK/Refused	36
	Total	100
	N=	12147

Data is displayed vertically.

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		September, 2021	September, 2020	April, 2020	September, 2019	September, 2018	October, 2017
		United States	United States	United States	United States	United States	United States
Q1. Which country currently is the most important partner for American foreign policy?	Australia	2	0	0	1	0	0
	Canada	13	7	10	9	12	3
	China	9	14	18	16	18	15
	France	4	2	1	1	1	3
	Germany	7	10	6	4	3	5
	United Kingdom	31	27	26	22	21	20
	Israel	9	10	3	9	8	9
	Italy	0	0	1	0	1	0
	Japan	1	1	1	2	1	3
	Mexico	6	5	4	6	4	2
	North Korea	0	1	1	1	0	1
	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Russia	3	4	4	2	5	4
	South Korea	1	1	0	0	0	1
	Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0
	The European Union (EU)	3	5	2	4	3	1
	Other	2	2	3	2	2	4
	DK/Refused	10	11	20	22	19	29
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N=	1008	1007	1008	1004	1006	1012

Data is displayed vertically.

		Q2a. Do you think the U.S. military should or should not be involved in foreign conflicts to...? a. Protect the security of the United States			
		Yes, the U.S. military should be involved	No, the U.S. military should not be involved	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	89	8	3	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q2a. Do you think the U.S. military should or should not be involved in foreign conflicts to...? a. Protect the security of the United States			
		Yes, the U.S. military should be involved	No, the U.S. military should not be involved	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	85	14	0	100

		Q2b. Do you think the U.S. military should or should not be involved in foreign conflicts to...? b. Protect the security of U. S. allies			
		Yes, the U.S. military should be involved	No, the U.S. military should not be involved	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	76	21	4	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q2b. Do you think the U.S. military should or should not be involved in foreign conflicts to…? b. Protect the security of U. S. allies			
		Yes, the U.S. military should be involved	No, the U.S. military should not be involved	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**September, 2021**	77	21	2	100

		Q2c. Do you think the U.S. military should or should not be involved in foreign conflicts to…? c. Promote democracy			
		Yes, the U.S. military should be involved	No, the U.S. military should not be involved	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	38	58	5	100

		Q3a. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? a. China				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	64	26	7	3	100

		Q3b. Do the following countries represent a major military threat, minor military threat or no military threat to American security? b. Russia				
		Major military threat	Minor military threat	No military threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	66	26	5	3	100

		Q4. As you may know, Finland and Sweden have asked to join NATO, that is, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Do you approve or disapprove of Finland and Sweden potentially becoming NATO members?				
		Approve	Disapprove	Neither approve nor disapprove	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	60	5	33	2	100

		Q5. Should the United States purchase energy supplies for electricity and other needs only from countries that are democracies or from all countries?			
		Only from countries that are democracies	From all countries	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	48	46	6	100

		Q6. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?					
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	16	65	13	2	5	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q6. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Germany?					
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	23	62	10	2	3	100
	September, 2020	19	55	17	4	5	100
	September, 2019	13	62	14	3	9	100
	September, 2018	12	58	21	4	6	100
	October, 2017	9	59	18	4	10	100

		Q7a. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? a. Protecting the environment			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	63	29	8	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q7a. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? a. Protecting the environment			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	80	17	3	100
	September, 2020	76	21	3	100

		Q7b. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? b. Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	52	40	8	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q7b. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? b. Dealing with China			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	September, 2021	59	39	2	100
	September, 2020	60	35	5	100

		Q7c. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? c. Securing access to energy sources			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	July-August, 2022	57	35	8	100

		Q7d. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? d. Protecting European security			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	68	24	7	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q7d. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? d. Protecting European security			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**September, 2021**	80	18	2	100
	September, 2020	78	18	3	100

		Q7e. For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner or not? e. Dealing with Russia			
		Yes, as a partner	No, not as a partner	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	56	37	7	100

		Q8. Do you think European countries are doing enough to become independent from Russian energy supplies?			
		Yes	No	DK/Refused	Total
United States	**July-August, 2022**	27	67	6	100