## Pew Research Center

# Americans' Concerns About War in Ukraine: Wider Conflict, Possible U.S.-Russia Clash 

Share of adults saying the U.S. isn't providing enough support to Ukraine has declined since March

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## How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to better understand Americans' attitudes about the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as the Biden administration's response to the invasion. For this analysis, we surveyed 5,074 U.S. adults in May 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its methodology.

# Americans' Concerns About War in Ukraine: Wider Conflict, Possible U.S.-Russia Clash 

## Share of adults saying the U.S. isn't providing enough support to Ukraine has declined since March

As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine enters its third month, most Americans say they support actions taken by the Biden administration in response to the Russian invasion, such as placing strict economic sanctions on Russia, sending military equipment and weapons to Ukraine and stationing large numbers of U.S. military forces in NATO countries near Ukraine.

In general, more U.S. adults approve (45\%) than disapprove (34\%) of the Biden's administration's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Views of the administration's response are largely unchanged since March (when 47\% approved and $39 \%$ disapproved).

The new Pew Research Center survey, conducted April 25May 1, 2022, among 5,074 U.S. adults found that the public has multiple concerns over possible consequences from the war in Ukraine. Roughly six-in-ten (59\%) are extremely or very concerned about the possibility of Russia

## Majority of Americans are 'extremely' or 'very' concerned Russia may invade other countries

\% who are concerned about the possibility of each of the following

| Russia invading other countries in the region, not just Ukraine | Extremely | Very | Not too |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Somewhat | $\left.\right\|_{\text {at all }} ^{\text {Not }}$ |
|  | 30 | 29 | 25 | 105 |
| The war in Ukraine continuing for a long time | 25 | 32 | 30 | 84 |
| Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia | 26 | 29 | 28 | 106 |
| U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine leading to a U.S. war with Russia | 24 | 26 | 31 | 135 |

Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER invading other countries in the region, while another $25 \%$ are somewhat concerned; $15 \%$ are not too or not at all concerned.

Similar shares are at least very concerned about the war in Ukraine possibly continuing for a long time (57\%) and Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia (55\%).

About half of Americans also say they are either extremely (24\%) or very (26\%) concerned about the possibility of U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine leading to a U.S. war with Russia, with about
one-third also saying they are somewhat concerned about this. Only about one-in-five (18\%) say they are not too or not at all concerned about this.

Opinions about the level of support the United States is providing to Ukraine have changed since March.
Currently, $31 \%$ say the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine, while $35 \%$ say its support is about right; $12 \%$ say the U.S. is doing too much. The share of Americans who say the U.S. is doing too little to support Ukraine has declined 11 percentage points

## Decline in share of Americans saying the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine

\% who say, when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is providing__ support to Ukraine

Not enough About right Toomuch Not sure


March


Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER since March, from $42 \%$ to $31 \%$.

In late April, President Joe Biden proposed a massive package of military and economic assistance to support Ukraine and U.S. allies in the region, more than doubling the aid the U.S. has provided thus far during the conflict.

The public's views of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine have changed little since March. However, these opinions have shifted somewhat within each party.

Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, the share who disapprove of the Biden administration's response to the Russian invasion has declined since March. Two months ago, two-thirds of Republicans said they disapproved of the administration's response; today, a smaller majority (55\%) disapproves. The share of Republicans who strongly disapprove of the Biden administration's handling of the situation has declined by 15 points ( $42 \%$ in March, $27 \%$ now).

Among Democrats and Democratic leaners, there has been a decline in the share saying they approve of the Biden administration's response to the Russian invasion. In March, $69 \%$ approved, including three-in-ten who strongly approved. That is down to $63 \%$ today, with $23 \%$ who strongly approve. Equal shares of Democrats say they disapprove today as did in March.

More U.S. adults continue to approve than disapprove of Biden administration response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
\% who __ of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine


Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Large majorities of Americans support various actions taken by the U.S. in response to the Russian invasion. Three-in-four Americans approve of the U.S. placing strict economic sanctions on Russia, including more than half who strongly approve. About one-in-ten say they disapprove ( $12 \%$ ), while a similar share is unsure ( $13 \%$ ).

The U.S. decision to send military equipment and weapons to Ukraine also draws strong support from the public: $71 \%$ say they approve this action, while just $16 \%$ disapprove. About one-in-ten (12\%) say they are not sure.

Nearly two-thirds (64\%) also approve of the U.S. decision to station large numbers of U.S. military forces in NATO countries near Ukraine. One-in-five Americans disapprove of this decision, while $15 \%$ are not sure.

Majorities approve of strict economic sanctions against Russia, sending U.S. military equipment to Ukraine and deploying U.S. forces to NATO countries
\% who ...


Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
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## Wide support in both parties for U.S. actions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats say they approve of all three U.S. actions included in the survey.

Sizable majorities of both Republicans (73\%) and Democrats (80\%) say they approve of the U.S. placing strict economic sanctions on Russia. Similar shares say they approve of sending military equipment and weapons to Ukraine.

About seven-in-ten Democrats and six-in-ten Republicans also say they approve of stationing large numbers of U.S. military in NATO countries near Ukraine.

While there is bipartisan approval on all three U.S. actions surveyed, Democrats are somewhat more likely than Republicans to say they strongly approve of each of the actions.

## Bipartisan support for economic sanctions on Russia, sending U.S. weapons to Ukraine and stationing U.S. forces in NATO countries near Ukraine

\% who ...

| Disapprove | Approve |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\equiv$ Strongly $\equiv$ Somewhat | हSomewhat $\equiv$ Strongly |




Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
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For example, $61 \%$ of Democrats strongly approve of placing economic sanctions on Russia, compared with $48 \%$ of Republicans who say this. There are similar differences in strength of opinion on sending weapons to Ukraine and stationing U.S. military forces in nearby NATO countries.

Overall, about a third of Americans (35\%) say that the U.S. is providing about the right amount of support to Ukraine, while a somewhat similar share (31\%) say the U.S. is providing not enough support. Just $12 \%$ of Americans say the U.S. is providing too much support, while roughly one-infive are not sure.

Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, roughly similar shares say that the U.S. is either providing too little (34\%) or about the right amount (30\%) of support to Ukraine. About one-in-five Republicans say that the U.S. is providing too much support.

Conservative Republicans are somewhat more likely than liberal and moderate Republicans to say that the U.S. is providing too little support to Ukraine ( $40 \%$ vs. 24\%).

Among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, nearly four-inten say that the U.S. is providing about the right amount of support for Ukraine. Three-in-ten say that the U.S. is providing too little support, and $8 \%$ think the U.S. is giving Ukraine too much support.

There are not substantial differences among Democrats by ideology.

## Modest partisan differences in views of how much support the U.S. is providing for Ukraine

\% who say, when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is providing $\qquad$ support to Ukraine


Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
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While opinions about U.S. efforts to support Ukraine do not differ widely along partisan lines, this also is generally the case for concerns about the conflict. For example, while $62 \%$ of Democrats say they are extremely or very concerned about the possibility that Russia could invade other countries in the region, $56 \%$ of Republicans also express that level of concern. Comparable shares in both parties also say they are extremely or very concerned that U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine could lead to a war with Russia ( $51 \%$ of Democrats and $48 \%$ of Republicans are at least very concerned).

## Concerns about conflict in Ukraine cross partisan lines, but Democrats are more concerned than Republicans over possibility of a lengthy war, Russian victory

\% who are $\qquad$ concerned about the possibility of each of the following


Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25-May 1, 2022.
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Democrats are more likely than Republicans to be at least very concerned about the war in Ukraine continuing for a long time ( $63 \%$ vs. $51 \%$ ) and Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia (60\% vs. 51\%).

## Acknowledgments

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## Methodology

## The American Trends Panel survey methodology

## Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from April 25 to May 1, 2022 and included oversamples of Asian, Black and Hispanic Americans in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 5,074 panelists responded out of 5,897 who were sampled, for a response rate of $86 \%$. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is $3 \%$. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is $1 \%$. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 5,074 respondents is plus or minus 2.0 percentage points.

## Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50\%) agreed to participate.

## American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

| Recruitment dates | Mode | Invited | Joined | Active panelists remaining |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014 | Landline/ cell RDD | 9,809 | 5,338 | 1,597 |
| Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015 | Landline/ cell RDD | 6,004 | 2,976 | 937 |
| April 25 to June 4, 2017 | Landline/ cell RDD | 3,905 | 1,628 | 470 |
| Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018 | ABS | 9,396 | 8,778 | 4,423 |
| Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019 | ABS | 5,900 | 4,720 | 1,623 |
| June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021 | ABS | 3,197 | 2,812 | 1,693 |
| May 29 to July 7, 2021 |  |  |  |  |
| Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021 | ABS | 1,329 | 1,162 | 934 |
|  | Total | 39,540 | 27,414 | 11,677 |

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.
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In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $\$ 5$ and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a $\$ 10$ pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,687 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as $98 \%$ of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low $90 \%$ range. ${ }^{1}$ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

## Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Black, Asian and Hispanic panelists were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

## Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that

[^0]was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

## Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $\$ 5$ to $\$ 20$ depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

## Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was April 25 to May 1, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on April 25, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on April 25, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on April 26, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

## Invitation and reminder dates

|  | Soft Launch | Full Launch |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Initial invitation | April 25, 2022 | April 26, 2022 |
| First reminder | April 28, 2022 | April 28, 2022 |
| Final reminder | April 30, 2022 | April 30, 2022 |

## Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of
leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, 6 ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort and then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists recruited in 2021 were measured at the time they were recruited to the panel. Likewise, the profile variables for existing panelists were updated from panel surveys conducted in July or August 2021.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made their 2021 measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted using the profile variables that were measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements from 2021 are used.

For panelists recruited in 2021, plausible values were imputed using the 2020 volunteerism values from existing panelists with similar characteristics. This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the $95 \%$ level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

|  | Unweighted <br> sample size | Weighted \% |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Group | 5,074 |  | Plus or minus ... <br> Total sample |
|  | 2,0 percentage points |  |  |
| Rep/Lean Rep | 2,006 | 42 | 3.0 percentage points |
| Dem/Lean Dem | 2,902 | 51 | 2.7 percentage points |

Note: This survey includes an oversamples of Asian, Black and Hispanic respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

| Final dispositions | AAPOR code | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Completed interview | 1.1 | 5,074 |
| Logged onto survey; broke-off | 2.12 | 44 |
| Logged onto survey; did not complete any items | 2.1121 | 89 |
| Never logged on (implicit refusal) | 2.11 | 681 |
| Survey completed after close of the field period | 2.27 | 3 |
| Completed interview but was removed for data quality |  | 6 |
| Screened out | I | 0 |
| Total panelists in the survey | P | $\mathbf{5 , 8 9 7}$ |
| Completed interviews | R | 5,074 |
| Partial interviews | NC | 0 |
| Refusals | O | 820 |
| Non-contact | UH | 3 |
| Other | UO | 0 |
| Unknown household | NE | 0 |
| Unknown other |  | 0 |
| Not eligible |  | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Total |  | $\mathbf{5 , 8 9 7}$ |
| AAPOR RR1 $=\mathrm{I} /(\mathrm{l}+\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{R}+\mathrm{NC}+\mathrm{O}+\mathrm{UH}+\mathrm{UO})$ | $86 \%$ |  |


| Cumulative response rate | Total |
| :--- | :---: |
| Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys <br> \% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to <br> join the panel, among those invited <br> \% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists <br> at start of Wave 107 | $12 \%$ |
| Response rate to Wave 107 survey | $69 \%$ |
| Cumulative response rate | $43 \%$ |

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## 2022 PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL <br> WAVE 107 APRIL 2022 <br> FINAL TOPLINE <br> APRIL 25-MAY 1, 2022 <br> $\mathbf{N}=5,074$

## ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

## ASK ALL:

UKRFOL How closely have you been following news about Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

| Apr 25-May 1, <br> $\frac{2022}{15}$ <br> 21 |  |
| :---: | :--- |
| 38 | Extremely closely |
| 19 | Sory closely |
| 7 | Not too closely |
| $*$ | Not at all closely |
|  | No answer |

## ASK ALL:

JB_RUSUKR_APP Do you approve or disapprove of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

| Apr 25-May 1, <br> $\frac{2022}{13}$ | Mar 7-13, <br> 2022 |  |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| 32 | Strongly approve | 18 |
| 19 | Somewhat approve | 29 |
| 15 | Somewhat disapprove | 18 |
|  |  | 21 |
| 20 | Not sure |  |
| 1 | No answer | 13 |
|  |  | 1 |

## ASK ALL:

UA_APPDIS Do you approve or disapprove of each of the following actions the U.S. has taken in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine? [RANDOMIZE]

|  | Strongly approve | Somewhat approve | Somewhat disapprove | Strongly disapprove | Not sure | No answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| a. Placing strict economic sanctions on Russia |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apr 25-May 1, 2022 | 54 | 22 | 7 | 4 | 13 | * |
| b. Sending military equipment and weapons to Ukraine Apr 25-May 1, 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apr 25-May 1, 2022 | 44 | 26 | 9 | 8 | 12 | 1 |
| c. Stationing large numbers of U.S. military forces in NATO countries near Ukraine |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apr 25-May 1, 2022 | 32 | 32 | 12 | 8 | 15 | 1 |

## UA_APPDIS TREND FOR COMPARISON:

UA_FAVOPP Thinking about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, would you favor or oppose the U.S....

|  | Strongly <br> favor | Somewhat <br> favor | Somewhat <br> oppose | Strongly <br> oppose | No <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Keeping strict economic sanctions <br> on Russia <br> Mar 7-13, 2022 | 63 | 22 | 8 | 4 | 2 |

## ASK ALL:

UKR_SPRT When it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, do you think the U.S. is providing...
[RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 AND 2; ALWAYS ASK OPTIONS 3 AND 4 LAST]

| Apr 25-May 1, | Mar 7-13, |  |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $\frac{2022}{12}$ | Too much support to Ukraine | $\underline{2022}$ |
| 31 | Not enough support to Ukraine | 7 |
| 35 | About the right amount of support to Ukraine <br> [ANCHOR] | 42 |
|  |  | 32 |
| 22 | Not sure [ANCHOR] | 19 |
| 1 | No answer | 1 |

ASK ALL:
UA_CONC How concerned are you about the possibility of each of the following? [RANDOMIZE ITEMS]
a. U.S. and NATO support for

Ukraine leading to a U.S. war with Russia

Apr 25-May 1, 2022

| Extremely | Very | Somewhat | Not too | Not at all |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | No |
| :---: |
| concerned |$\quad \underline{\text { concerned }}$| concerned |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |$\quad$ concerned $\quad$ concerned $\quad$ answer

24
26
31
13
5
1
b. Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia Apr 25-May 1, 2022
c. The war in Ukraine continuing for a long time

| Apr 25-May 1, 2022 | 25 | 32 | 30 | 8 | 4 | 1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

d. Russia invading other countries in the region, not just Ukraine

| Apr 25-May 1, 2022 | 30 | 29 | 25 | 10 | 5 | 1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

ASK ALL:
PARTY In politics today, do you consider yourself a: ASK IF INDEP/SOMETHING ELSE (PARTY=3 or 4) OR MISSING:
PARTYLN As of today do you lean more to... ${ }^{1}$

|  |  |  | Something | No | Lean | Lean |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Republican | Democrat | Independent | else | answer | Rep | Dem |
| 26 | 31 | 27 | 14 | 2 | 16 | 20 |

[^1]
[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

[^1]:    1 PARTY AND PARTYLN asked in a prior survey.

