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# Public Expresses Mixed Views of U.S. Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine 

$35 \%$ favor U.S. military action even if it risks nuclear conflict with Russia

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## How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to better understand Americans' attitudes about the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as the Biden administration's response to the invasion. For this analysis, we surveyed 10,441 U.S. adults in March 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its methodology.

## Public Expresses Mixed Views of U.S. Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

## $35 \%$ favor U.S. military action even if it risks nuclear conflict with Russia

Three weeks into Russia's military invasion of Ukraine, nearly half of Americans (47\%) approve of the Biden administration's handling of the Russian invasion, while about four-in-ten (39\%) disapprove; $13 \%$ say they are not sure.

Roughly a third of Americans (32\%) say that the United States is providing about the right amount of support to Ukraine as it fights to hold off the Russian invasion. A larger share - $42 \%$ - say the U.S. should be providing more support to Ukraine, while just $7 \%$ say it is providing too much

## More Americans approve than disapprove of Biden administration's response to Russian invasion; just 7\% say U.S. is providing 'too much' support to Ukraine


\% who $\qquad$ of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

$\%$ who say, when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is providing $\qquad$ support to Ukraine


Note: No answer responses not shown. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022. PEW RESEARCH CENTER support. About one-in-five (19\%) say they are not sure.

The new Pew Research Center survey, conducted March 7-13, 2022, among 10,441 U.S. adults on the Center's American Trends Panel, finds wide partisan differences in views of the administration's handling of the crisis and the level of support the U.S. has provided to Ukraine.

However, virtually identical shares in both parties - $51 \%$ of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents and 50\% of Democrats and Democratic leaners - regard the Russian invasion as a "major threat" to U.S. interests.

Moreover, there are several aspects of U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine that draw bipartisan support. While Republicans have previously expressed skepticism about the extent to which the U.S. should work with its allies, nearly three-quarters of Republicans (73\%) say that working closely with allies to respond to the Russian invasion is the right approach. An even larger share of Democrats (85\%) say the same.

## Broad support in both parties for U.S. cooperating with allies on Ukraine crisis

\% who say working closely with U.S. allies around the world to respond to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been the $\qquad$ for the U.S.

|  | Wrong <br> approach | Right <br> approach |
| ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Total | 18 | 79 |
| Rep/Lean Rep | 24 | 73 |
| Dem/Lean Dem | 13 | 85 |

Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022.
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Americans also are largely united in their support for strict economic sanctions on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine. An overwhelming majority of the public ( $85 \%$ ) - including similar shares of Republicans (85\%) and Democrats (88\%) favors maintaining strict economic sanctions. About six-in-ten Americans (63\%) strongly favor strict sanctions.

Large majorities also favor keeping large numbers of U.S. military forces in NATO countries near Ukraine in response to the conflict (77\%), a position shared by $75 \%$ of Republicans and 81\% of Democrats.

A majority strongly favors maintaining strict economic sanctions on Russia; only about a third favor U.S. military action even if it risks nuclear conflict \% who ...


Note: No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022.
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However, most Americans (62\%) say they would oppose the U.S. "taking military action even if it risks a nuclear conflict with Russia." About a third (35\%) say they would favor military action in this scenario. Comparable shares in both parties ( $36 \%$ of Republicans, $35 \%$ of Democrats) say they would favor military action even if it risks nuclear conflict with Russia.

And while nearly seven-in-ten Americans ( $69 \%$ ) favor admitting thousands of Ukrainian refugees into the U.S., including majorities of those in both parties, Democrats are substantially more likely than Republicans to say this ( $80 \%$ vs. $57 \%$ ).

The new survey also finds:

Broad public attention to Russian invasion. About seven-in-ten adults (69\%) now report having read or heard a lot about the Russian invasion, compared with $23 \%$ who said they had read or heard a lot about Russia's military buildup on its border with Ukraine in a January survey.

Today, nearly identical shares of Republicans (70\%) and Democrats (71\%) say they have heard or read a lot about the invasion.

Biden job approval largely unchanged from January. Currently, $43 \%$ of Americans approve of how Joe Biden is handling his job as president, while $55 \%$ disapprove. That is little changed since January, when 41\% approved of Biden's job performance.

Nearly half approve of Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion; more say U.S. is doing too little than right amount for Ukraine

Overall, more Americans approve (47\%) than disapprove (39\%) of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, while $13 \%$ say they are not sure.

For the most part, the patterns of opinion on the administration's handling of the Russian invasion are similar to those in views of Biden's overall job performance.

Democrats and Democratic leaners largely approve of the administration's response to the Russian invasion (69\% approve), while Republicans and Republican leaners mostly disapprove ( $67 \%$ disapprove).

Among demographic groups, Black adults are particularly likely to approve of the administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: $57 \%$ approve, $20 \%$ disapprove. Hispanic and Asian adults are more likely to approve than disapprove of the Biden administration's response,

Wide partisan gap in views of Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
$\%$ who ___ of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

*Asian adults interviewed in English only.
Note: No answer responses not shown. White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022.
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while White adults are divided (45\% approve, $44 \%$ disapprove).

There also are educational differences in views of the Biden administration's response to the Russian invasion. Nearly six-in-ten (57\%) of those with at least a four-year college degree approve of the administration's response, compared with $42 \%$ of those who have not completed college.

There is a correlation between Biden's overall job rating and views of his administration's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among those who disapprove of Biden's job performance, most (63\%) disapprove of the administration's Ukraine response; still, $22 \%$ approve and $14 \%$ are not sure. Among the $43 \%$ of the public who approves of Biden's overall job performance, very few (just 9\%) disapprove of the administration's response to the invasion, while $11 \%$ are unsure and 79\% approve.

## U.S. support for Ukraine

About a third of Americans overall say the U.S. is providing about the right amount of support for Ukraine, while a larger share (42\%) say it is not providing enough support; just $7 \%$ say it is providing too much support, while $19 \%$ are not sure.

While there are deep partisan divides in views of the administration's response to the crisis, views on U.S. support to Ukraine are less divided. Nearly half of Republicans (49\%) say the U.S. is providing too little support; $23 \%$ say it is providing about the right amount and 9\% think the U.S. is giving Ukraine too much support.

Among Democrats, comparable shares say the U.S. is providing Ukraine about the right amount of support (39\%) and too little backing (38\%). Just $5 \%$ of Democrats say the U.S. is giving Ukraine too much support - roughly half the share of Republicans who say the same.

There are modest ideological differences within both parties in views of support for Ukraine: A $54 \%$ majority of conservative Republicans (54\%) say the U.S. is not doing enough for Ukraine, compared with $41 \%$ of moderate and liberal Republicans. Among Democrats, liberals (43\%) are more likely than moderates and conservatives (34\%) to say the U.S. is not providing enough support.

Among those who disapprove of the Biden administration's response to the invasion, a majority (54\%) says the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine, compared with $18 \%$ who say it is providing about the right amount of support and just $13 \%$ who say it is providing too much support.

About half of those who approve of the administration's response (48\%) say the U.S. is providing about the right amount of support to Ukraine, while four-in-ten favor increasing the amount of support and hardly any (2\%) say the U.S. is providing too much support.

## Half of adults say Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a 'major threat' to U.S. interests

Half of Americans say Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a major threat to U.S. interests, while another $28 \%$ say it is a minor threat; just $6 \%$ say the invasion is not a threat to U.S. interests, while $16 \%$ are not sure. This marks a substantial change since before the Russian invasion; in January, just 26\% said "Russia's military buildup near its border with Ukraine" posed a major threat to U.S. interests.

Republicans and Democrats express virtually identical views of the threat from Russia's invasion; $51 \%$ of Republicans and $50 \%$ of Democrats say it is a major threat to U.S. interests. In January, about a quarter in each party viewed Russia's military buildup near Ukraine as a major threat.

## Nearly identical shares in both parties say Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a 'major threat’ to U.S. interests



[^0]
## Bipartisan backing for keeping strict sanctions against Russia, keeping large numbers of U.S. forces in Ukraine's NATO neighbors

More than eight-in-ten Democrats and Democratic leaners (88\%) and Republicans and Republican leaners (85\%) favor keeping strict economic sanctions on Russia. And at least six-inten in each party strongly favor maintaining strict sanctions (68\% of Democrats, $61 \%$ of Republicans).

Similar shares of Republicans (75\%) and Democrats (81\%) favor keeping a large military presence in NATO countries located near Ukraine. And there is limited support among both Republicans and
Democrats for taking military action, even if it risks a nuclear conflict with Russia: About a third of the public (35\%) and nearly identical shares of Democrats (35\%) and
Republicans (36\%) favor this.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022.
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However, Democrats are substantially more likely than Republicans to favor admitting thousands of Ukrainian refugees into the U.S.

Eight-in-ten Democrats say they favor admitting thousands of Ukrainian refugees, compared with a narrower majority of Republicans (57\%).

And Democrats are about twice as likely as Republicans to strongly favor admitting thousands of Ukrainian refugees into the U.S.: $42 \%$ of Democrats strongly favor this, compared with $20 \%$ of Republicans.

## Little change in views of Biden's job performance

The public's views of Joe Biden's job performance have changed little since January. Today, $43 \%$ of Americans say they approve of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as president; $41 \%$ gave Biden a positive job rating in January. Biden's job ratings have remained fairly stable over the past six months, after declining sharply last summer.

While Republicans overwhelmingly disapprove of Biden's job performance ( $91 \%$ disapprove), a smaller majority of Democrats (72\%) approve of the way he is handling his job as president.

Biden job rating is little changed since January
\% who say they___ of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as president

Approve


Source Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022. Note: No answer responses not shown.

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## Acknowledgments

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## Methodology

## The American Trends Panel survey methodology

## Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from March 7 to March 13, 2022. A total of 10,441 panelists responded out of 11,687 who were sampled, for a response rate of $89 \%$. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is $3 \%$. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is $1 \%$. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 10,441 respondents is plus or minus 1.5 percentage points.

## Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digitdial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50\%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of

## American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

| Recruitment dates | Mode <br> Landline/ | Invited | Joined | Active <br> panelists <br> remaining |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014 | cell RDD <br> Landline/ | 9,809 | 5,338 | 1,599 |
| Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015 | cell RDD | 6,004 | 2,976 | 938 |
| April 25 to June 4, 2017 | Landline/ <br> cell RDD | 3,905 | 1,628 | 470 |
| Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018 | ABS | 9,396 | 8,778 | 4,426 |
| Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019 <br> June 1 to July 19, 2020; <br> Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021 <br> May 29 to July 7, 2021 <br> Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021 ABS ABS | 5,900 | 4,720 | 1,625 |  |
|  | ABS | $\mathbf{1 , 3 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 1 6 2}$ | 935 |

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $\$ 5$ and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a $\$ 10$ pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,687 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as $98 \%$ of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low $90 \%$ range. ${ }^{1}$ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

## Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

## Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

## Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $\$ 5$ to $\$ 20$ depending on

[^1]whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

## Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 7 to March 13, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 7, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 7, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 8, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

## Invitation and reminder dates

|  | Soft Launch | Full Launch |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Initial invitation | March 7, 2022 | March 8, 2022 |
| First reminder | March 10, 2022 | March 10, 2022 |
| Final reminder | March 12,2022 | March 12, 2022 |

## Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a
base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort and then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists recruited in 2021 were measured at the time they were recruited to the panel. Likewise, the profile variables for existing panelists were updated from panel surveys conducted in July or August 2021.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made their 2021 measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted using the profile variables that were measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements from 2021 are used.

For panelists recruited in 2021, plausible values were imputed using the 2020 volunteerism values from existing panelists with similar characteristics. This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the $95 \%$ level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

## Weighting dimensions

| Variable | Benchmark source |
| :--- | :--- |
| Age $x$ Gender | 2019 American Community Survey |
| Education $x$ Gender | (ACS) | Education x Gender (ACS)

Education x Age
Race/Ethnicity x Education
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among
Hispanics and Asian Americans
Years lived in the U.S.

| Census region x Metro/Non-metro | 2020 CPS March Supplement |
| :--- | :--- |
| Volunteerism | 2019 CPS Volunteering \& Civic Life <br> Supplement |
| Voter registration | 2018 CPS Voting and Registration <br> Supplement |
| Party affiliation | 2021 National Public Opinion <br> Reference Survey (NPORS) |
| Religious affiliation |  |

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.
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| Group | Unweighted sample size | Weighted \% | Plus or minus ... |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total sample | 10,441 |  | 1.5 percentage points |
| Rep/Lean Rep | 4,972 | 42 | 2.2 percentage points |
| Dem/Lean Dem | 5,215 | 51 | 2.2 percentage points |

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## Dispositions and response rates

| Final dispositions | AAPOR code | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Completed interview | 1.1 | 10,441 |
| Logged onto survey; broke-off | 2.12 | 145 |
| Logged onto survey; did not complete any items | 2.1121 | 47 |
| Never logged on (implicit refusal) | 2.11 | 1,050 |
| Survey completed after close of the field period | 2.27 | 1 |
| Completed interview but was removed for data quality |  | 3 |
| Screened out | I | 0 |
| Total panelists in the survey | P | $\mathbf{1 1 , 6 8 7}$ |
| Completed interviews | R | 10,441 |
| Partial interviews | NC | 0 |
| Refusals | O | 1,245 |
| Non-contact | UH | 1 |
| Other | UO | 0 |
| Unknown household | NE | 0 |
| Unknown other |  | 0 |
| Not eligible |  | 0 |
| Total |  | $\mathbf{1 1 , 6 8 7}$ |
| AAPOR RR1 $=1 /(\mathrm{l}+\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{R}+\mathrm{NC}+\mathrm{O}+\mathrm{UH}+\mathrm{UO})$ | $89 \%$ |  |


| Cumulative response rate | Total |
| :--- | :---: |
| Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys <br> \% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to <br> join the panel, among those invited <br> \% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists <br> at start of Wave 104 | $12 \%$ |
| Response rate to Wave 104 survey | $69 \%$ |
| Cumulative response rate | $43 \%$ |

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# 2022 PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL Wave 104 March 2022 <br> FINAL TOPLINE <br> March 7-13, 2022 <br> $\mathrm{N}=10,441$ 

## ASK ALL:

POL1JB
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as president?

|  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mar 7-13, 2022 | 43 |  | No <br> Disapprove |
| answer |  |  |  |

See past presidents' approval trends: Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton

## ADDITIONAL ITEMS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

## ASK ALL:

RU_UKN_HRD How much have you read or heard about Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

```
Mar 7-13,
    2022
        69 A lot
        26 A little
        N Nothing at all
        * No answer
```


## ASK ALL:

JB_RUSUKR_APP Do you approve or disapprove of the Biden administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

```
Mar 7-13,
    2022
        1 8 \text { Strongly approve}
        29 Somewhat approve
        18 Somewhat disapprove
        21 Strongly disapprove
            13 Not sure
            1 No answer
```


## ASK ALL:

UKR_SPRT When it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, do you think the U.S. is providing...

## [RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 AND 2; ALWAYS ASK OPTIONS 3 AND 4 LAST]

```
Mar 7-13,
    2022
        7 Too much support to Ukraine
        42 Not enough support to Ukraine
        32 About the right amount of support to Ukraine [ANCHOR]
        19 Not sure
        1 No answer
```


## ASK ALL:

RU_UKN_THRT2 How much of a threat to U.S. interests is Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

| Mar 7-13, <br> $\frac{2022}{5}$ <br> 50 | A major threat |
| :---: | :--- |
| 28 | A minor threat |
| 6 | Not a threat |
|  |  |
| 16 | Not sure |
| 1 | No answer |

## TREND FOR COMPARISON:

How much of a threat to U.S. interests is Russia's military buildup near its border with Ukraine?

| Jan 10-17, |  |
| :---: | :--- |
| $\frac{2022}{26}$ | A major threat |
| 33 | A minor threat |
| 7 | Not a threat |
| 33 | Not sure |
| 1 | No answer |

## ASK ALL:

UA_ALLIES As you may know, the U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has involved working closely with U.S. allies around the world. All in all, do you think that has been the...
[RANDOMIZE]

```
Mar 7-13,
    2022
        79
        U.S
        4 No answer
```


## ASK ALL:

UA_FAVOPP Thinking about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, would you favor or oppose the U.S....


## ADDITIONAL ITEMS HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

## ASK ALL:

PARTY In politics today, do you consider yourself a:
ASK IF INDEP/SOMETHING ELSE (PARTY=3 or 4) OR MISSING:
PARTYLN
As of today do you lean more to... ${ }^{2}$

|  |  |  | Something | No | Lean | Lean |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Republican | Democrat | Independent | else | answer | Rep | Dem |
| 26 | 32 | 27 | 14 | 2 | 16 | 20 |

2
PARTY and PARTYLN asked in a prior survey.


[^0]:    Note: No answer responses not shown. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 7-13, 2022.

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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

