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# Majority of Americans Confident in Biden's Handling of Foreign Policy as Term Begins

*Sharp partisan divides, even as most support international cooperation and see importance of respect for U.S. around the world*

**FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:**

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## About Pew Research Center

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## How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand American views of confidence in U.S. President Joe Biden to do the right thing regarding world affairs and of general U.S. foreign policy attitudes. For this analysis, we surveyed 2,596 U.S. adults from Feb. 1 to 7, 2021. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

While Pew Research Center has been tracking confidence in the U.S. president and views of multilateralism since 2003, prior to 2020, most of this work was done using nationally representative phone surveys. As a result, some longstanding trends may not appear in this report.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with [responses](#) and [survey methodology](#).


# Majority of Americans Confident in Biden's Handling of Foreign Policy as Term Begins

*Sharp partisan divides, even as most support international cooperation and see importance of respect for U.S. around the world*

President Joe Biden begins his term with a majority of Americans having confidence in his ability to handle international affairs. In a new Pew Research Center survey, 60% of U.S. adults have confidence in Biden on foreign policy – fewer than said the same of Barack Obama as his presidency began (74%) but more than for [Donald Trump in his first year](#) (46%).

## At start of his presidency, Biden draws more public confidence than Trump in 2017 – but less than Obama in 2009 – for his handling of world affairs

% who have \_\_\_ in the U.S. president to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: No answer responses not shown. 2020 and 2021 data from Pew Research Center's online American Trends Panel, prior data from telephone surveys.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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But the sharp partisan divides in views of the presidential election and its aftermath are also reflected in attitudes about U.S. foreign policy, particularly Biden's handling of world affairs. Nearly nine-in-ten Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (88%) express confidence in

Biden's ability to handle foreign affairs, compared with only 27% of Republicans and Republican leaners. Just 17% of conservative Republicans say they have confidence in Biden's handling of foreign policy. Among moderate and liberal Republicans, 42% say this. Conservative and moderate Democrats are about as confident in Biden's foreign affairs ability as are liberal Democrats.


Large majorities of Americans say it is important that the United States is respected around the world (87% say it is very or somewhat important) and that Biden's leadership will result in other countries viewing America more positively (69% say this). [A recent Center survey in France, Germany and the United Kingdom](#) demonstrates how Biden's election has improved America's standing among those European allies after a [sharp downturn during the Trump administration](#). Younger Americans are less willing than older adults to say it is important the U.S. is respected by other countries.

Nearly two-thirds of Americans or more also say the U.S. benefits a great deal or a fair amount from being a member of international bodies such as NATO, the United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO), the latter of which [the U.S. just rejoined under the Biden administration](#). More than eight-in-ten Democrats see benefits in membership for each organization. But only 38% of Republicans say the U.S. benefits by being a member of the WHO, with 46% saying the same about the UN, even as more Republicans say a NATO membership benefits the country (55%).


As to America's role in the world, there is broad support among the public for working closely with U.S. allies. Nearly two-thirds (64%) say that the U.S. should consider the interests of other countries, even if it means compromising. Only 34% say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when allies disagree. Americans expressed similar levels of support for working with other countries [in 2018 and 2019](#).

### Most Americans say it's important for other countries to respect U.S. and that Biden will help improve U.S. image

% who say it is \_\_\_ important that other countries around the world respect the U.S.



% who say, now that Joe Biden is president, other countries will view the U.S. ...



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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In addition, 78% of Americans say they want to see the U.S. share a leadership role in the world, while only around one-in-ten want the U.S. to either be the single world leader or not play any leadership role at all. Those who favor shared leadership were asked if the U.S. should be the most active of leading nations, or about as active as others. A majority of this group (or 48% of the overall public) wants the U.S. to be about as active as other leading nations; 29% say the U.S. should be the *most* active. This figure [has remained relatively steady](#) over the past three decades.


But there is less consensus on the efficacy of multilateral order and whether the U.S. should be more involved in foreign affairs with so many dire problems at home. A slim majority of Americans say *many* of the problems facing the country can be solved by working with other countries (54%), compared with 45% who say *few* problems can be solved this way. Half of Americans want to pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home, while 49% say it is best for the country's future to be active in world affairs.

Compared with Republicans, Democrats are more likely to favor working with other countries and being active in world affairs. And young Americans (ages 18 to 29) are more likely than older Americans to prefer considering the interests of allies and to say that the U.S. can solve many


## Most Americans favor compromises with allies, but public is divided on active global role for U.S.

% who say ...


### Views of allies



### Working with other countries



### Participation in world affairs



### Leadership role in the world



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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
problems by working with other countries. But older Americans are generally more likely to want to be active in foreign affairs compared with younger Americans.

The American public's top foreign policy priorities are focused on key issues facing the nation, including protecting the jobs of American workers, reducing the spread of infectious diseases like the coronavirus and protecting the nation from terrorist attacks. A further 55% say improving relationships with allies, [a major Biden administration goal](#), should be a top priority.

Fewer than a third of Americans see strengthening the United Nations, aiding refugees, reducing military commitments overseas or promoting democracy abroad as top priorities. [Since 2018](#), Americans have become more concerned about the spread of disease and limiting the power and influence of China but less concerned about strengthening the UN.

## Sharp partisan divides in foreign policy priorities

% who say \_\_\_ should be given **top priority** as a long-range foreign policy goal



Note: See topline questionnaire for full question wording.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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Across most of the foreign policy priorities tested, older Americans are more likely than young people to name each issue as a top priority. Republicans are far more likely to prioritize jobs, fighting terrorism and maintaining a U.S. military advantage over other countries. Democrats, meanwhile, are more focused on the reducing the spread of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19, and dealing with global climate change.

On Biden's handling of specific policies, Americans express more confidence in his ability to improve relationships with allies (67% have a lot or some confidence) than in his ability to deal effectively with China (53% confident). Around six-in-ten support Biden's ability to handle the threat of terrorism, make decisions on the use of military force, deal with climate change and make good decisions about international trade.

These are among the findings of a new survey conducted by Pew Research Center on the Center's nationally representative American Trends Panel among 2,596 adults from Feb. 1-7, 2021.

## As Biden presidency begins, Americans broadly express confidence in his ability to handle world affairs


Overall, a 60% majority of Americans express confidence in U.S. President Joe Biden to do the right thing when it comes to world affairs. A smaller share (39%) say they are not confident he will do the right thing when it comes to international issues. However, partisans are far apart in their views of Biden's abilities on the world stage.

A large majority of Republicans and Republican leaners say they are not confident that Biden will do the right thing on the international stage: 72% say they lack confidence, including nearly half who say they have no confidence at all (47%).

And while Republicans across the ideological spectrum say they lack confidence in Biden, an overwhelming majority of conservative Republicans say this (82%), while moderate and liberal Republicans are slightly more divided: About six-in-ten (58%) say they do not have confidence in Biden, while about four-in-ten (42%) say they have at least some confidence in the new president to make the right decisions about international affairs.

### Stark partisan divides in confidence that Biden will do the 'right thing' regarding world affairs

*% who say they have \_\_\_ confidence in U.S. President Joe Biden to do the right thing regarding world affairs*



Note: No answer responses not shown.


Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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As has been the case for previous presidential administrations dating back to George W. Bush, there are stark partisan gaps in confidence in the U.S. president to handle international affairs.

## Wide partisan divides in confidence in Biden and his recent predecessors on handling world affairs

% who say they have **a lot/some** confidence in the president to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: No answer responses not shown. 2020 and 2021 data from Pew Research Center's online American Trends Panel, prior data from telephone surveys.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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Throughout Donald Trump's presidency, Democrats expressed low levels of confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. At the same time, Republicans were largely confident in his ability to handle foreign issues – with over eight-in-ten saying they had at least some confidence in Trump throughout his tenure.

Today, Democrats and Republicans (including those who lean to each party) express opposing views of Biden: 88% of Democrats are confident in Biden's ability to make the right decisions about world affairs, while just 27% of Republicans say the same. Republicans' early assessments of Biden are also slightly higher than Democrats' views of Trump in 2017; then, 16% of Democrats said they had confidence that Trump would do the right thing regarding world affairs.

Echoing confidence in Biden’s ability to handle world affairs overall, majorities of Americans also express confidence in Biden to deal with many specific aspects of U.S. foreign policy – though some issues garner more confidence than others.


Americans express the most confidence in Biden when it comes to improving relationships between the United States and its allies: Fully 67% say they are at least somewhat confident Biden will make progress in this arena. This includes nearly four-in-ten who say they are *very* confident. Only about a third of U.S. adults say they are not confident Biden can do this.

About six-in-ten also say they have confidence that Biden can deal effectively with the threat of terrorism (60%), deal effectively with global climate change (60%), make good decisions about the use of military force (59%) or make good decisions about international trade (59%). About a quarter or more of adults say they are *very* confident he can do each.

Americans are a bit more divided on whether Biden can deal effectively with China: While just over a half of adults say they are confident (53%), 46% say they are *not* confident. Just 19% say they are *very* confident in his ability to make good decisions when it comes to China – the lowest of the six items asked about on the survey.

**Broad public confidence in Biden on several aspects of U.S. foreign policy, less so when it comes to China**

*% who are \_\_\_ confident that Joe Biden can do each of the following*



Note: No answer responses not shown.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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As was true during [Trump's presidency](#), partisans express significantly different levels of confidence in the president to handle various aspects of foreign policy.

Overwhelming majorities of Democrats say they are very or somewhat confident that Biden can improve relationships with allies (93%), deal effectively with the threat of terrorism (89%) or make good decisions about international trade (89%). Similar majorities also say they have confidence in Biden to make good decisions about the use of military force (87%), deal effectively with global climate change (86%) and deal effectively with China (83%).

Across all issues surveyed, Republicans express significantly less confidence in Biden. For example, there is a


65 percentage point gulf between Republicans and Democrats on Biden's ability to make good decisions about international trade. Nearly nine-in-ten Democrats say they are confident, while just a quarter of Republicans say the same (24%).

Compared with the other issues asked about on the survey, Republicans express somewhat more confidence that Biden can improve relationships with U.S. allies (37%). This includes 10% who say they are *very* confident he can restore relationships. Similarly, while Biden enjoys wide-ranging confidence among Democrats to handle a number of international issues, they are most confident in his ability to repair relationships with allies: 93% of Democrats say this, including 63% who say they are *very* confident.

Republicans and Democrats both express the least amount of confidence that Biden can deal effectively with China. Just 19% of Republicans say he can do this, compared with 83% of Democrats – still a substantial majority, though somewhat lower ratings than for other issues.

### Biden draws more confidence on improving relations with allies than on other foreign policy issues

% who are *very/somewhat* confident that Joe Biden can do each of the following



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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On balance, more than twice as many Americans say countries will view the United States more positively than negatively now that Biden is president (69% vs. 29%). This includes three-in-ten who say other countries will view the U.S. *a lot* more positively with Biden in the White House.

There are some modest demographic divides on this question. Younger adults are more likely than older adults to say the U.S. will be viewed more positively: 77% of those under 30 years of age say the country will be seen in a more positive light, while a smaller majority of those 65 and older say the same (65%).


And while majorities of adults – regardless of their education level – say the U.S. will be viewed more positively, those with a college degree or more are considerably more likely to express this view than those with no four-year degree (81% vs. 63%, respectively).

One of the largest divides in views of Biden’s impact on the United States’ image worldwide is by partisanship. About four-in-ten Republicans say Biden’s presidency will lead to more positive views of the U.S., while a majority in the GOP say countries will view the U.S. more negatively. In contrast, Democrats overwhelmingly say Biden’s election will lead to more positive views of the U.S.

Beyond differences between Republicans and Democrats, there are sizable differences *among* Republicans in views of Biden’s impact on U.S. image. By a two-to-one margin, conservative Republicans are more likely to say the U.S. will be viewed more *negatively* (66% vs. 31%). In contrast, a small majority of moderate and liberal Republicans say the U.S. will be viewed more *positively* (57% more positively vs. 41% more negatively).

## Sizable majority of Americans say Biden presidency will lead to more positive views of U.S. globally

*% who say, now that Joe Biden is president, other countries will view the U.S. ...*



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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Democrats are nearly unanimous in their view that the United States will be viewed more positively: At least 90% of Democrats across the ideological spectrum say this.

## Most adults say it is important that other countries respect the U.S.


A large majority of Americans say it is important that the U.S. is respected by other countries around the world (87%), including about half who say it is very important. Only small shares say it is not too (9%) or not at all (4%) important for other countries to respect the United States.

By and large, younger and older adults agree that it is at least somewhat important that the U.S. is respected. But there are more significant differences when it comes to the strength of importance. Overall, 50% of adults say it is *very* important for countries around the world to respect the U.S. Among adults younger than 30, just 29% say it is very important. This compares with half of adults ages 30 to 49, 55% of adults 50 to 64 and around six-in-ten of those 65 and older.

Overall, Democrats are slightly more likely than Republicans to say it is important that the U.S. is respected (91% vs. 82%). While 54% of Democrats say it is *very* important for other countries to respect the United States, a slightly smaller share of Republicans say the same (46%).

### Most Americans say it's important that the U.S. is respected by other countries

*% who say it is \_\_ important that the U.S. is generally respected by other countries around the world*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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## Strong support for U.S. sharing global leadership role


Americans continue to be generally supportive of the U.S. sharing a global leadership role with other countries. When asked to consider the country's leadership role in the world, about eight-in-ten (78%) say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role. In comparison, just 11% say the U.S. should be the single world leader and 10% say the country should not play any leadership role.

Among those who say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role, people were asked whether the U.S. should be about as active or more active than other countries on the world stage. About half of the American public (48%) say they want to be as active as other leading nations, compared with 29% who say they want to be the *most* active in the world.

Americans' preference for the U.S. playing a shared leadership role has remained relatively consistent since this question was first asked in a telephone survey in 1993. Similarly, the share of Americans who favor single world leadership or no leadership role at all has remained small over the past 28 years.

### Over three-quarters of Americans say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role in the world

% who say the U.S. should \_\_\_ in the world



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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
While majorities in both major parties support the U.S. playing a shared leadership role in the world, there are some differences along partisan lines.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and Republican-leaning independents to say the U.S. should share global leadership responsibilities (86% vs. 69%, respectively). Liberal Democrats are more likely to hold this view than conservative or moderate Democrats (90% vs. 83%). And among Republicans, about three-quarters (74%) of moderates or liberals say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role, significantly more than the 66% of conservative Republicans who say the same.

While a relatively small share of Americans say the U.S. should not play any leadership role in the world, younger adults are more likely to express this view than their older counterparts. Americans ages 18 to 29 are more likely than any other age group to say the U.S. should not have any global leadership role (16% hold this view).

## Consistent share of Americans support the U.S. playing a shared leadership role in the world

% who say the U.S. should play a \_\_\_ role in the world



Note: No answer responses not shown. 2021 data from Pew Research Center's online American Trends Panel, prior data from telephone surveys.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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## Many Americans want to account for allies' interests, but divided views on level of participation in world affairs


On decisions of foreign policy, about two-thirds (64%) of Americans say that the U.S. should take into account the interests of its allies, even if it means making compromises, while 34% say the country should follow its own national interests, even when its allies strongly disagree. The share of Americans who support taking allies' interests into account has remained relatively stable since 2019.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. should take allies' interests into account and compromise: 80% of Democrats hold this view, compared with 47% of Republicans. Republicans are in turn more likely to favor following U.S. national interests, even when allies disagree (51% vs. 20% of Democrats).

While majorities across all age groups say the U.S. should take allies' interests into account, even if it requires compromise, Americans ages 18 to 29 are particularly likely to say this: 74% hold this view. And those with a bachelor's or postgraduate degree are more likely than those with less education to favor considering the interests of allies, while the opposite is true on whether the U.S. should follow its own national interests, even when allies strongly disagree.

### More Democrats than Republicans support compromising with allies

*% who say, in foreign policy ...*



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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
Americans also express divided views on the level of engagement on the world stage. Half of U.S. adults say the country should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on domestic problems, while 49% say it is best for the future of the U.S. to be active in world affairs. This division on U.S. participation in world affairs has been consistent over time.

Democrats are more likely to favor the U.S. being an active participant in world affairs. About two-thirds of Democrats (65%) say this, compared with about one-third (32%) of Republicans.

Adults 65 and older are more likely than all other age groups to say it's best for the future of the U.S. to be active in world affairs (57% express this opinion).

## Republicans and Democrats split on U.S. role in world affairs

*% who say ...*



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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## Americans narrowly see solutions to U.S. problems through international cooperation

Americans are somewhat divided on the question of international cooperation's ability to solve problems facing the country. Over half (54%) of U.S. adults believe *many* of the problems facing their country can be solved by working with other countries, compared with 45% who say *few* problems can be solved this way.

About six-in-ten Hispanic adults (63%) say many problems facing the U.S. can be solved by working with other countries, significantly more than the share of White adults who say the same.


Adults with more education are more likely than those with less education to say many problems can be solved by working with other countries:

63% of Americans with a postgraduate degree say international cooperation can solve many U.S. problems, compared with 52% of Americans with a high school diploma or less.

Democrats and Republicans are sharply divided on the question of international cooperation to solve problems facing the country. About seven-in-ten Democrats (71%) say that working with other countries can solve many problems facing the U.S., compared with one-third of Republicans. In contrast, 66% of Republicans say that few problems are likely to be solved by working with other countries.

### Democrats far more likely than Republicans to see benefits from working with other countries

% who say ...



Note: No answer responses not shown. White and Black adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.


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## Majorities of Americans are positive on membership in international organizations

Six-in-ten or more of U.S. adults say the U.S. benefits at least a fair amount from membership in NATO, the United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO). And three-in-ten or more say the U.S. benefits *a great deal* from its membership in these organizations. In contrast, roughly one-third or fewer believe the U.S. does not benefit from membership in each international organization.

### Majorities say U.S. benefits from being a member of NATO, UN, World Health Organization

% who say the U.S. benefits \_\_\_ from being a member of ...



Note: No answer responses not shown.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.


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Previous Pew Research Center phone surveys have found that Americans have been more positive than negative toward [NATO](#) (57% favorable in 2020), [the UN](#) (62% favorable in the same year) and [the WHO](#) (53% said the organization had done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak).

Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. benefits from membership in each international organization. For example, Democrats are 50 percentage points more likely than Republicans to say the country benefits from WHO membership (88% vs. 38%, respectively). The Biden administration [recently announced](#) that the U.S. would resume funding to the WHO, after the Trump administration ceased funding last summer.

### Wide partisan gap on views of U.S. membership in international organizations

% who say the U.S. benefits a great deal/a fair amount from being a member of ...



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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
## Economic and security issues are public's top foreign policy priorities

Americans view economic and national security issues to be among the most pressing long-range foreign policy goals in 2021. At the top of the list of the 20 foreign policy goals polled, three-quarters consider protecting American jobs as a top priority. Fighting disease and combating terror attacks came in a close second, with about seven-in-ten seeing an urgent need to address these security threats. Majorities also see limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and improving relationships with allies to be critically important.

By contrast, issues like promoting democracy, providing aid to refugees and supporting human rights, as well as limiting legal immigration, strengthening the UN and reducing military commitments abroad were prioritized by about a third or fewer.

### Protecting American jobs, reducing the spread of disease and preventing terror attacks are top foreign policy priorities among U.S. adults

*% who say \_\_\_ should be given **top priority** as a long-range foreign policy goal*




Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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Attitudes toward these foreign policy goals have remained largely stable in recent years, with a few exceptions. Most notably, the share who say limiting the spread of infectious disease is a top priority has increased by 20 percentage points since 2018, the last time the question was asked. (In 2018, the question was asked about infectious diseases, such as AIDS and Ebola.) This shift comes amid the [coronavirus outbreak](#), which many in the U.S. and around the world say has meaningfully changed their lives. Support for prioritizing the containment of infectious disease increased among both Republicans and Democrats since 2018.

## Amid coronavirus pandemic, more Americans from both parties see curbing infectious disease as a top priority since 2018

% who say \_\_\_ should be given **top priority** as a long-range foreign policy goal



\*In 2018, question asked: "Reducing the spread of infectious diseases, such as AIDS and Ebola."

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

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Similarly, the share who say countering China's power should be given precedence in foreign policy has increased from about a third to roughly half since 2018. This comes as Americans and people across the globe have grown [more critical of China](#). The increase in urgency for limiting Chinese influence was also bipartisan, but Republican prioritization increased by 24 percentage points between 2018 and 2021, while Democratic support only increased by 10 points.

On the other hand, Americans are now less likely to think bolstering the UN should be at the top of the U.S.'s foreign policy agenda, despite holding consistently [positive opinions of the organization](#). Supporters of both parties grew less likely to prioritize a stronger UN by similar margins since 2018.

In addition, there are strong divides in how foreign policy goals are prioritized between partisans. Broadly speaking, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see goals related to the environment, human rights and global cooperation as top priorities. The largest divides are seen in views of combating climate change, where Democrats are five times as likely as Republicans to think it should be prioritized. Seven-in-ten Democrats say climate change should be a top priority compared with 14% of Republicans. Since 2018, partisans have become even more divided, with the share of Republicans seeing an urgent need to address climate change falling by 8 percentage points.

Republicans are more likely to see more traditional security issues and limiting immigration as the foreign policy goals needing the most attention. For example, Republicans are 48 points more likely than Democrats to consider curbing illegal immigration to be a top priority and 38 points more likely to say the same about maintaining a U.S. military advantage over other countries.

Key partisan divides are also seen in how to prioritize dealing with varying foreign powers. Republicans are more likely to see limiting Iranian, Chinese and North Korean power as critical challenges, while Democrats are more likely to give precedence to curbing Russian influence.


Still, some issues don't cleave much along partisan lines. For instance, similar shares in both camps agree that containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction should be prioritized. Additionally, only 29% in both groups see a need to reduce U.S. military commitments overseas. In 2018, 34% of Democrats considered limiting the military's reach abroad a top priority compared with only 26% of Republicans, an 8-point difference.

There are also differences by age in attitudes toward many of these foreign policy issues. Adults 65 and older are more likely than those under 40 to see 15 of the 20 foreign policy goals polled as top priorities. For instance, among older Americans, who are also [more likely to see terrorism as a major threat](#), the share who view protecting the U.S. from terror attacks as a top priority is 34 percentage points larger than the share of younger adults who say this. Older adults are also more supportive of prioritizing countering Iranian and Chinese influence, and also tend to be [more critical of Iran](#) and of [China](#) in general, when compared with their younger counterparts.

The only issues on which younger Americans express more urgency is providing support to refugees and limiting U.S. military commitments abroad. Those under 40 are 15 percentage points more likely than those 65 and older to consider aiding people around the world fleeing violence as a critical issue, and 13 points more likely to view reining in military commitments overseas a top priority.

### Older Americans prioritize most foreign policy issues

% who say \_\_\_ should be given **top priority** as a long-range foreign policy goal



Note: Only significant differences shown. See topline questionnaire for full question wording. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 1-7, 2021.

## Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

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## Methodology

### The American Trends Panel survey methodology

#### Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted Feb. 1 to Feb. 7, 2021. A total of 2,596 panelists responded out of 2,943 who were sampled, for a response rate of 88%. This does not include one panelist who was removed from the data due to extremely high rates of refusal or straightlining. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 4%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 2%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 2,596 respondents is plus or minus 2.7 percentage points.

#### Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a random, address-based sample of households selected

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#### American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	2,184
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	1,243
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	621
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS/web	9,396	8,778	5,903
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS/web	5,900	4,720	2,330
June 1 to July 19, 2020	ABS/web	1,865	1,636	1,272
	<b>Total</b>	<b>36,879</b>	<b>25,076</b>	<b>13,553</b>

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Across these three address-based recruitments, a total of 17,161 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 15,134 (88%) agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 25,076 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 13,553 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.<sup>1</sup> The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

### **Sample design**

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The sample was allocated according to the following strata, in order: tablet households, U.S.-born Hispanics, foreign-born Hispanics, high school education or less, foreign-born Asians, not registered to vote, people ages 18 to 34, uses internet weekly or less, non-Hispanic Black adults, nonvolunteers and all other categories not already falling into any of the above.

### **Questionnaire development and testing**

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data which was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

### **Incentives**

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach.

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<sup>1</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)"

Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

### Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was Feb. 1 to Feb. 7, 2021. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on Feb. 1, 2021.

On Feb. 1 and Feb. 2, invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on Feb. 1, 2021. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on Feb. 2, 2021.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

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#### Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch
Initial invitation	Feb. 1, 2021	Feb. 2, 2021
First reminder	Feb. 4, 2021	Feb 4, 2021
Final reminder	Feb. 6, 2021	Feb. 6, 2021

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### Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, one ATP respondent was removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

### Weighting

The ATP data was weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey (and the probability of being invited to participate in the panel in cases where only a subsample of

respondents were invited). The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort. To correct for nonresponse to the initial recruitment surveys and gradual panel attrition, the base weights for all active panelists are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table to create a full-panel weight.

For ATP waves in which only a subsample of panelists are invited to participate, a wave-specific base weight is created by adjusting the full-panel

weights for subsampled panelists to account for any differential probabilities of selection for the particular panel wave. For waves in which all active panelists are invited to participate, the wave-specific base weight is identical to the full-panel weight.

In the final weighting step, the wave-specific base weights for panelists who completed the survey are again calibrated to match the population benchmarks specified above. These weights are trimmed (typically at about the 1st and 99th percentiles) to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and test of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

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## Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender	2019 American Community Survey
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2019 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2017 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2016 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation	2020 National Public Opinion Reference Survey
Frequency of internet use	
Religious affiliation	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. The 2016 CPS was used for voter registration targets for this wave in order to obtain voter registration numbers from a presidential election year. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population. The 2020 National Public Opinion Reference Survey featured 1,862 online completions and 2,247 mail survey completions.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Unweighted sample size</b>	<b>Weighted %</b>	<b>Plus or minus ...</b>
Total sample	2,596		2.7 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,287		3.7 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,106	44	3.9 percentage points
Half sample	At least 549		5.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,410	49	3.7 percentage points
Half sample	At least 688		5.2 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

**Dispositions and response rates**

<b>Final dispositions</b>	<b>AAPOR code</b>	<b>Total</b>
Completed interview	1.1	2,596
Logged onto survey; broke off	2.12	41
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	23
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	282
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		1
Screened out		N/A
<b>Total panelists in the survey</b>		<b>2,943</b>
Completed interviews	I	2,596
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	346
Non-contact	NC	1
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,943</b>
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		88%

<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>Total</b>
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	72%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 82	57%
Response rate to Wave 82 survey	88%
<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>4%</b>

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# Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center**  
**Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey**  
**February 24, 2021 Release**

## Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section and our [international survey methods database](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, other have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q21a. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. a. U.S. President Joe Biden					
		A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	31	29	16	23	1	100

*U.S. phone trends for comparison*

		Q21a. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. a. U.S. President Joe Biden					
		A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Fall, 2020	33	27	10	28	0	100

In Fall 2020, asked 'U.S. President-elect Joe Biden'.

			How much confidence do you have in the U.S. president (Bush '01-'08, Obama '09-'16, Trump '17- Summer '20) to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all?					
			A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Trump	March, 2020	28	19	15	36	1	100

*U.S. phone trends for comparison*

			How much confidence do you have in the U.S. president (Bush '01-'08, Obama '09-'16, Trump '17- Summer '20) to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all?					
			A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Trump	Summer, 2020	28	15	12	45	0	100
		Spring, 2020	34	16	13	37	0	100
		Spring, 2019	25	20	14	40	1	100
		Spring, 2018	28	20	14	38	1	100
		Spring, 2017	25	21	16	38	1	100
	Obama	Spring, 2016	32	26	15	25	1	100
		Spring, 2015	26	32	15	27	0	100
		Spring, 2014	26	32	17	24	1	100
		Spring, 2013	32	25	16	26	1	100
		Spring, 2012	31	30	15	22	2	100
		Spring, 2011	29	32	19	19	1	100
		Spring, 2010	34	31	14	20	1	100
	Bush	Spring, 2009	48	26	13	11	2	100
		Spring, 2008	11	26	16	44	3	100
		Spring, 2007	18	27	19	34	2	100
		Spring, 2006	22	28	19	29	2	100
		Spring, 2005	34	28	19	17	2	100
		May, 2003	49	29	11	9	2	100

		Q37. What kind of leadership role should the U.S. play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, play a shared leadership role or not play any leadership role?				
		Single leader	Shared leadership	No leadership	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	11	78	10	1	100

		ASK IF "SHARED LEADERSHIP" IN Q37: Q38. Should the U.S. be the most active of the leading nations, or should it be about as active as other leading nations?				
		Most active	About as active	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	37	62	1	100	2064
	April, 2016	31	66	2	100	1498

*U.S. phone trends for comparison*

		Q37. What kind of leadership role should the U.S. play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, play a shared leadership role or not play any leadership role?				
		Single leader	Shared leadership	No leadership	DK/Refused	Total
United States	April, 2016	15	73	9	3	100

*U.S. phone trends for comparison*

		ASK IF "SHARED LEADERSHIP" IN Q37: Q38. Should the U.S. be the most active of the leading nations, or should it be about as active as other leading nations?				
		Most active	About as active	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	37	62	1	100	2064
	April, 2016	31	66	2	100	1498

		Q39. How important, if at all, is it that the U.S. is generally respected by other countries around the world?					
		Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	50	37	9	4	0	100

		Q40. Now that Joe Biden is president, do you think other countries view the U.S. a lot more positively, a little more positively, a little more negatively or a lot more negatively?					
		A lot more positively	A little more positively	A little more negatively	A lot more negatively	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	30	39	13	16	2	100

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41a. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? a. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	64	32	3	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	66	27	5	1	100	2635

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41b. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? b. Protecting the jobs of American workers					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	75	22	2	0	100	1287
	November, 2018	71	23	5	1	100	2635

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41c. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? c. Strengthening the United Nations					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	30	48	21	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	39	41	19	1	100	2635

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41d. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? d. Reducing U.S. military commitments overseas					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	29	58	12	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	30	56	13	1	100	2635

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41e. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? e. Limiting the power and influence of Russia					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	42	49	8	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	42	45	11	2	100	2635

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41f. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? f. Promoting democracy in other nations					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	20	58	22	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	17	56	26	1	100	2653

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41g. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? g. Reducing illegal immigration into the U.S.					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	38	44	17	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	42	41	16	0	100	2653

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41h. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? h. Limiting the power and influence of China					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	48	44	7	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	32	57	10	1	100	2653

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41i. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? i. Maintaining the U.S. military advantage over all other countries					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	48	36	15	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	49	39	11	0	100	2663

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q41j. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? j. Dealing with global climate change					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	44	38	18	1	100	1287
	November, 2018	46	37	17	0	100	2663

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41k. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? k. Reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	40	54	4	1	100	1309
	November, 2018	42	47	9	1	100	2663

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41l. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? l. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	34	56	9	1	100	1309
	November, 2018	31	57	11	1	100	2663

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41m. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? m. Reducing the spread of infectious diseases					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	71	24	3	1	100	1309
	November, 2018	51	44	5	1	100	2663

In 2018, question asked: "Reducing the spread of infectious diseases, such as AIDS and Ebola."

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41n. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? n. Limiting the power and influence of Iran					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	38	51	9	2	100	1309
	November, 2018	39	48	11	1	100	2663

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41o. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? o. Improving relationships with our allies					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	55	40	3	1	100	1309
	November, 2018	58	38	4	0	100	2689

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41p. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? p. Taking measures to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	71	26	2	1	100	1309
	November, 2018	72	24	4	0	100	2689

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41q. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? q. Getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	42	49	7	2	100	1309
	November, 2018	40	48	11	1	100	2689

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41r. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? r. Aiding refugees fleeing violence around the world					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	28	54	16	2	100	1309
	November, 2018	26	56	17	1	100	2689

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41s. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? s. Reducing legal immigration into the U.S.					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	22	39	38	2	100	1309
	November, 2018	26	35	38	1	100	2689

Due to an error in 2021, question asked about 'reducing legal immigrations into the U.S.'

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q41t. Thinking about long-range foreign policy goals, how much priority, if any, do you think each of the following should be given? t. Limiting the power and influence of North Korea					
		Top priority	Some priority	No priority	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2021	40	49	9	2	100	1309
	November, 2018	40	50	9	1	100	2689

		Q42a. Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following? a. Make good decisions about international trade					
		Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	26	33	18	23	1	100

		Q42b. Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following? b. Deal effectively with the threat of terrorism					
		Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	26	34	17	22	1	100

		Q42c. Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following? c. Make good decisions about the use of military force					
		Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	29	30	17	23	1	100

		Q42d. Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following? d. Deal effectively with global climate change					
		Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	26	34	19	20	1	100

		Q42e. Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following? e. Improve relationships with our allies					
		Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	38	29	14	18	1	100

		Q42f. Thinking about Joe Biden's ability to handle a number of things, how confident are you that Joe Biden can do each of the following? f. Deal effectively with China					
		Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not too confident	Not at all confident	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	19	34	20	26	1	100

		Q43. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right?			
		Many of the problems facing our country can be solved by working with other countries	Few of the problems facing our country can be solved by working with other countries	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	54	45	1	100
	March, 2020	56	43	1	100

		Q44. Please choose the statement that comes closer to your own views – even if neither is exactly right.			
		In foreign policy, the U.S. should take into account the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises with them	In foreign policy, the U.S. should follow its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	64	34	2	100
	September, 2019	68	31	2	100
	March, 2019	65	33	2	100

		Q45. Please choose the statement that comes closer to your own views – even if neither is exactly right.			
		It's best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs	We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	49	50	1	100
	September, 2019	53	46	1	100
	March, 2019	51	48	1	100

		Q46a. How much, if at all, do you think the U.S. benefits from being a member of each of the following organizations? a. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO					
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	30	41	20	7	2	100

		Q46b. How much, if at all, do you think the U.S. benefits from being a member of each of the following organizations? b. The United Nations					
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	32	35	21	10	1	100

		Q46c. How much, if at all, do you think the U.S. benefits from being a member of each of the following organizations? c. The World Health Organization, or WHO					
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2021	33	32	20	14	1	100