The places Latinos live, the jobs they hold, the schooling they complete, the languages they speak, even their attitudes on key political and social issues, are all in flux.
Hispanic households have less than ten cents for every dollar in wealth owned by White households.
Although the cost of sending remittances is now much lower than in the late 1990s, the rate of decline has slowed markedly in the past three years.
Latino support for the war in Iraq and for President George W. Bush has surged since the capture of Saddam Hussein, but Latinos remain concerned about the condition of the U.S. economy and the long-term consequences of the war. In order to probe Latino views of the war, the economy, and the upcoming presidential race, the Pew Hispanic Center (PHC) conducted two national surveys of Latino adults. One took place in December 2003, just before Hussein's capture, and the other in early January 2004
Central banks across the region are tracking remittance income more carefully which has somewhat boosted the numbers they report. Nonetheless, there seems little doubt that the remittance flow has continued to increase over the past two years even as the U.S. economy dropped from its boom time peaks. In 2000 remittances to Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua--nations that receive almost all their money transfers from the United States--totaled some $10.2 billion. This year that figure could reach $14.2 billion or more, a flow of $39 million a day. By 2005 the sum, which does not capture all remittances to Latin America, will go beyond $18 billion, according to projections by the Pew Hispanic Center.
The long-term effects of the recession will likely depress employment and incomes in Hispanic communities at least through the end of 2004, and judging from historical experience that time span will be longer than for any other major population group. Even if predictions of a turnaround later this summer prove valid, pocketbook issues will vex Latinos for several years after the national economy recovers. Second-generation Latinos--U.S.-born children of an immigrant parent-- are now experiencing high job losses. In recent recessions Hispanic unemployment has fallen hardest on low-skilled immigrants. This time, young people who are the products of U.S. schools are experiencing the highest unemployment rates among Latinos. Many work in skilled occupations, including managers, technicians and professionals, and many are in the early years of household formation. Prolonged joblessness could prove a historic setback for them, their communities and the nation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential impact of the current economic downturn on Hispanic workers and families, and analyze how prepared Hispanics are for the economic recession. The paper is divided into four sections: The first section briefly explores the progress made by Hispanics during the economic boom of the 1990s. The second section uses the experience of Hispanics in past economic downturns to predict how they will fare in the current economic slowdown. The third section analyzes how well prepared Hispanic workers are for the economic slowdown. The final section draws conclusions based on the first three sections.
Currently there are nearly 35 million Hispanics in the U.S., making them the second-largest ethnic group in the country. But the effect of the current recession on this important group is unknown. Yet, it is unlikely that all Hispanics have been similarly affected by the recession. Hispanics are a varied group not just in terms of national origin, but also in terms of time in the U.S., ranging from newly arrived immigrants to U.S.-born Hispanics. This report examines how three generations of Hispanics have fared in September and October 2001, compared to September 2000 and September 1999.
This research report presents data showing the major demographic and socioeconomic changes in the Hispanic population of New York in the 1990s. It shows that despite gains in some areas, on average, Hispanics in New York were not significantly better-off in 2000 than in 1990. The household income per capita of Hispanic New Yorkers increased only slightly in the 1990s, compared to a much stronger expansion among White New Yorkers. By 2000, Hispanics displayed per-capita income of about one-third that of the non-Hispanic White population. The roots of the lack of change in Hispanic overall socioeconomic status in the 1990s lie, first, in the major demographic changes in the city, as reflected in an influx of relatively unskilled immigrants and an exodus of relatively skilled, high-income Hispanic New Yorkers; it also responds to the sluggish economic recovery of the city from one of its most severe recessions this century.
The “New Economy” of the past decade lifted the prospects of all Hispanics. Still, on average Hispanics lagged behind non-Hispanic whites, mainly due to large-scale immigration and poor levels of education.