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FOR RELEASE JULY 11, 2022

Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's

Americans' views on Israel differ sharply by party and age

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RECOMMENDED CITATION

Pew Research Center, July, 2022, "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on U.S. and Israeli views of the other country, the current state of U.S.-Israel relations and confidence in U.S. President Joe Biden. The report also explores demographic and partian differences among the publics of both countries.

In Israel, the survey was conducted face to face from March 16 to May 1, 2022, among 1,000 adults. Interviews were conducted in both Arabic and Hebrew and the survey is representative of the adult population ages 18 and older, excluding those in East Jerusalem and non-sanctioned outposts (the survey also does not include the West Bank or Gaza). The survey is weighted to be representative of the Israeli adult population with the following variables: gender by ethnicity, age by ethnicity, education, region, urbanity and probability of selection of respondent.

In the United States, we surveyed 3,581 U.S. adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the <u>ATP's methodology</u>.

Notably, the Israeli survey was conducted prior to the June 20 announcement that the governing coalition was collapsing, elections were being called for the fall and Yair Lapid would replace Naftali Bennett as prime minister until the results of the elections were clear. Throughout this report, any references to the "governing parties" or "the coalition" refers to the Bennett-Lapid coalition that was in power during the fieldwork and prior to the governmental collapse. For more, see the <u>Appendix</u>.

Here are the <u>questions</u> used for the report, along with responses, and the <u>survey methodology</u>.

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Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's

Americans' views on Israel differ sharply by party and age

As President Joe Biden embarks on his <u>first visit to Israel as president</u>, he does so against an amicable backdrop: A majority of adults in both Israel and the United States have favorable views of the other country and the current state of bilateral relations. But Israeli views of the relationship are somewhat rosier than American ones. And, with Biden in the White House, the intensity of positive sentiment in Israel toward the U.S. has diminished, with Israelis offering mixed reviews of the president's leadership relative to his predecessor, Donald Trump. Israelis were also divided on former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's handling of the U.S. relationship in this survey, which was

Israelis less confident in Biden's leadership than Trump's

% of Israeli adults who have ____ in the U.S. president to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q18a.

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fielded prior to the June <u>collapse of the government</u> and Yair Lapid's <u>ascension</u> as caretaker prime minister.

Israel stood out as one of the only countries (among 37 surveyed worldwide) where marks for Trump were higher than for former President Barack Obama in 2017, and Israelis' confidence in Trump actually grew during his presidency. Today, 60% of Israelis say they have a great deal or some confidence in Biden to do the right thing regarding world affairs, down 11 percentage points from assessments of Trump in 2019. The share of Israelis who express *a lot* of confidence in Biden is also about half the share who said the same of Trump (16% vs. 30%, respectively).



When asked about the U.S. president's specific qualities, Israelis are less likely to attach Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50a-g.

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the positive descriptions of "strong leader" and "charismatic" to Biden in 2022 than they were to describe Trump that way in 2017. (Roughly equal shares of the Israeli public described both U.S. presidents as "well-qualified" and as "caring about ordinary people.")

On the other hand, Israelis are much less likely to describe Biden as dangerous than they were to view Trump that way (21% for Biden vs. 42% for Trump), and only around three-in-ten see Biden as arrogant or intolerant, whereas majorities described Trump in those negative terms.

Israelis saw Trump in more extreme terms than they now see Biden – both positively and negatively

% of Israeli adults who say ____ is ...

Israelis are also divided in their assessments of Biden's policies in the region: Around a third think Biden favors the Israelis too much (31%), roughly a quarter say he favors the Palestinians too much (26%) and 34% think he's striking about the right balance.

Americans have limited awareness of whether Biden is favoring the Israelis, favoring the Palestinians or striking the right balance: 62% say they do

Israelis divided on whether Biden favors Israelis or Palestinians; Americans largely unsure

% of adults in each country who say U.S. President Joe Biden is favoring the Israelis or Palestinians too much, or striking the right balance



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not know (in the U.S., a "not sure" option was made explicit; in Israel, people had to voluntarily skip the question). A minority of U.S. adults express an opinion, with 16% saying he's striking the right balance, 13% saying he favors the Palestinians and 8% saying he favors the Israelis.

Timing of the Israel survey and how we analyze party differences in Israel

The Israeli survey took place from March 16 to May 1, 2022 – over a month before the <u>June 20</u> <u>announcement</u> that the governing coalition was collapsing, elections were being called for the fall and Yair Lapid would replace Naftali Bennett as prime minister until the results of the elections were clear.

Because of the large number of parties in the Israeli political system and the size of the survey, we do not have sufficient sample sizes to analyze the opinions of the supporters of any single political party other than Likud and Yesh Atid (There is a Future). For this reason, we focus our political analysis on those who supported any of the eight parties that were part of the Bennett-Lapid coalition at the time the survey was fielded, compared with those who did not support those parties. Because the Bennett-Lapid coalition was composed of leaders from across the political spectrum and included Arab as well as Jewish parties, we also analyze survey questions using each respondent's ideological self-placement on the left, right or center of the political spectrum.

Israeli opinion on this topic is divided along ideological lines. Those who place themselves on the ideological left (59%) are much more likely than those in the center (35%) or on the right (18%) to say Biden favors the Israelis too much. The opposite is true when it comes to perceptions that he favors the Palestinians too much: 47% on the right believe this, compared with 6% in the center and 1% on the left. Those who place themselves in the center (50%) are the most likely to say he's striking the right balance (35% of the left and 26% of the right agree).

Those on the ideological left are also more likely to describe Biden in positive terms like "charismatic," less likely to ascribe the negative adjective of "dangerous" to him and more likely to say current U.S.-Israel relations are in good shape. They are also more likely to have a lot of confidence in his handling of world affairs, but they see the U.S. in a less favorable light than those on the ideological right.

Israelis are also divided along partisan, ethnic and religious lines. Israelis who supported the Bennett-Lapid governing coalition tend to have more confidence in Biden, and to approve more

Israelis ideologically divided on Biden favoring Israelis or Palestinians too much

% of Israeli adults who have <u>a lot of confidence</u> in U.S. President Joe Biden to do the right thing regarding world affairs



% of Israeli adults who think U.S. President Joe Biden is favoring <u>the Israelis</u> too much



% of Israeli adults who think U.S. President Joe Biden is favoring **<u>the Palestinians</u>** too much



Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q18a & Q49. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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of his policies, than those who opposed the governing coalition (for more on the changes in the governing coalition, see Appendix).

Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs diverge sharply in their assessments, as well. Jews (65%) are much more likely than Arabs (34%) to express confidence in Biden and to think he strikes the right balance between Israelis and Palestinians (though Jews are also more likely to say he favors the Palestinians too much). And Jewish Israelis are more than twice as likely as Arab Israelis to report favorable views of the U.S. (93% vs. 38%).

Israeli Jews more likely to have favorable views of the U.S.

% of Israeli adults who have/say ____, among ...



Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q5a, Q18a & Q47. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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These differences between

Jews and Arabs in Israel somewhat obfuscate the enormous divisions *within* the Jewish community. Most notably, Jews who describe themselves as Haredi ("ultra-Orthodox") or Dati ("religious") tend to have much less confidence in Biden and more negative views of his policies than those who describe themselves as Masorti ("traditional") or Hiloni ("secular").

Jewish religious groups in Israel: Haredim, Datiim, Masortim and Hilonim

Nearly all Israeli Jews identify with one of four categories: Haredi (commonly translated as "ultra-Orthodox"), Dati ("religious"), Masorti ("traditional") or Hiloni ("secular"). The spectrum of religious observance in Israel on which Haredim are generally the most religious and Hilonim the least - does not always line up perfectly with Israel's political spectrum. On some issues, including those pertaining to religion in public life, there is a clear overlap: Haredim are furthest to the right, and Hilonim are furthest to the left, with Datiim and Masortim in between. But on other political issues, including those related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and views of the U.S., differences between religious groups do not always mirror those between people at different points on the ideological spectrum. Because of sample size considerations, in this report we combine Haredim and Datiim for analysis.

For more information on the different views of these religious groups, see the Center's 2016 deep dive on the topic, "Israel's Religiously Divided Society."

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Most Americans and Israelis agree the bilateral relationship is in positive shape

Biden took office seeking to <u>rebalance U.S.</u> <u>policy toward Israel</u>, and former Prime Minister Bennett said he wanted to inject "<u>a new spirit of</u> <u>cooperation</u>" into the relationship. Although the Bennett-Lapid coalition has called new elections for the fall, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, who is welcoming Biden on his state visit, does so against a positive backdrop: 89% of Israelis and 74% of Americans think bilateral relations are in good shape.

Arab Israelis are more intensely positive in how they see relations compared with Jews, but generally speaking, nearly all Israelis see U.S.-Israel relations in positive terms.

In the U.S., too, there is bipartisan agreement: A majority of both Republicans and Democrats describe Israel-U.S. relations as good.

Israelis, Americans have positive views of one another and their countries' bilateral relationship

% of adults in each country who say current relations between the U.S. and Israel are ...



% of adults in each country who have a(n) ____ opinion of the other country



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q5a,g, Q47 & Q58. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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When people in each country are asked about their views toward the other country, however, the results are more lopsided: 83% of Israelis say they have favorable views of the U.S., compared with just 55% of Americans who say the same about Israel.

While overall favorable views of the U.S. are unchanged since 2019, the share of Israelis who have *very* favorable views of the U.S. has fallen 9 percentage points over the same period, from 40% to 31%. And while nearly nine-in-ten Israelis think bilateral relations are in good shape, this is nonetheless a decline from the 98% who said relations with the U.S. were positive under Trump in 2019. Moreover, 39% of Israelis say relations in 2022 are *very* good – a significant decline from the 63% who said the same three years ago.

Republicans, older Americans have more positive views of Israel

In the U.S., views of Israel differ substantially across partisan lines and among age groups. Around seven-in-ten Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party have positive views of Israel, compared with 44% of Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party. Conservative Republicans are even more favorable toward Israel than are liberal and moderate Republicans, and the same is true of conservative and moderate Democrats relative to liberal Democrats. Republicans also have more favorable views of the <u>Israeli people and</u> <u>Israeli government</u> than Democrats.

Opinions of Israel also differ substantially across U.S. age groups. While 69% of those ages 65 and older and 60% of those ages 50 to 64 have positive views of Israel, opinion among younger age groups is more mixed. Among U.S. adults under 30, 56% have an *unfavorable* view of Israel.

This youngest age group also stands apart for expressing cooler views of the Israeli people – and warmer views of the Palestinian people – than older Americans. Whereas older Americans express more positive feelings toward the Israeli people than toward the

Republicans and older Americans have more positive views of Israel

% of U.S. adults who have a(n) _____ opinion of Israel



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5g. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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Palestinian people, this is not the case for U.S. adults under 30, who view the Palestinian people at least as warmly (61% very or somewhat favorable) as the Israeli people (56%). Younger Americans also rate the Palestinian government as favorably (35%) as the Israeli government (34%), while older Americans express more favorable views of the Israeli government than of the Palestinian government. (The survey did not define "Palestinian government" for respondents. Much of the West Bank continues to be administered by the Palestinian Authority, under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, while Gaza has been governed by Hamas since 2007.)

These are among the key findings of two Pew Research Center surveys. In the U.S., the survey was conducted on the Center's nationally representative American Trends Panel, among 3,581 adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. In Israel, a nationally representative survey was conducted via inperson interviews from March 16 to May 1, 2022, among 1,000 Israelis. Other key findings in the report include:

- In the U.S., while we have not asked whether Americans hold favorable or unfavorable views
 of Israel since 2013 (when 61% expressed a favorable view of the country), other recent
 survey data from the Center's American Trends Panel shows that Americans have become
 modestly more positive toward both the Israeli *people* and the Israeli *government*. (For more
 on how views of the country are related to views of the people or the government, see "When
 Americans think about Israel, what do they have in mind?")
- Nearly half of Israelis say that economic and cultural boycotts of Israel are a major threat to the country, and an additional 36% say they are a minor threat. Still, more describe infectious disease, cyberattacks and the condition of the global economy as major threats to Israel than say the same of boycotts.
- Americans, for their part, have very limited awareness of the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel: <u>Only 3% of Americans have heard "a lot"</u> <u>about BDS</u>, and an additional 12% say they have heard "some" about it.
- A majority of Israelis (55%) also disapprove of Biden's <u>plans</u> to **reopen the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem**.

1. Israeli views of the U.S.

On the whole, Israelis voice more favorable than unfavorable views toward the U.S., despite significant political shifts in both countries since this question was last asked in 2019.1 About eight-inten Israelis express favorable views of the U.S., a figure that has remained generally steady since 2013. But even though these views remain quite positive overall, the share in Israel who have a *very* favorable opinion of the U.S. has dropped from 40% in 2019 to 31% in 2022.

While there are no demographic differences on views of the U.S. when it comes to gender and age, opinions do vary somewhat across certain other groups in society. Israelis who have a postsecondary degree or higher levels of education are more likely to express a positive opinion of the U.S. than those with

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less education (87% vs. 80%, respectively).

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Among Israelis, favorable views of U.S. hold steady

% of Israeli adults who have a(n) _____ opinion of the U.S. 100% 83 84 81 ₈₁ 83 83 83 78 78 C 71 **Favorable** Unfavorable 28 26 20 20 18 ₁₇ ₁₄ 16 16 18 16 0 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 22 Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q5a. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

¹ There has also been a <u>notable political shift in Israel</u> since the survey was fielded: Naftali Bennett stepped down as prime minister and was replaced by former foreign minister Yair Lapid as elections were called for the fall of 2022. Despite the political tumult domestically, Lapid has tried to focus on the solidity of the U.S.-Israel relationship, declaring, "The [American] president's relationship with Israel is way more important, significant and long-lasting than any political event."

As has <u>historically been the case</u>, people at different points along the ideological spectrum tend to feel differently about the U.S. Israelis who place themselves on the ideological right are 22 percentage points more likely to have a favorable view of the U.S. than those who place themselves on the ideological left (88% vs. 66%, respectively).

A particularly sharp divide is between Israeli Jews and Arabs. About nine-in-ten Jews (93%) have a favorable view of the U.S., compared with just 38% of Arabs. A similarly large difference exists between those who identify as Jewish (93% favorable toward the U.S.) and Muslims (34%). Jewish religious groups, however, vary little in their opinions: Around nine-in-ten or more Haredi/Dati, Masorti and Hiloni Jews all have positive views of the U.S.²

Israelis with more education, higher income and those on the ideological right more favorable toward U.S.

% of Israeli adults who have a(n) _____ opinion of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q5a. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

² Because of limited sample size, we have combined Haredi and Dati Jews into one group for analysis.

Israeli views of relations with the U.S. remain overwhelmingly positive, though down somewhat from 2019

A very high share of Israelis (89%) say the current relationship between their country and the U.S. is good, which is more than the 74% of Americans who say the same. Still, this favorable assessment has declined in Israel since 2019, when 98% said the bilateral relationship was in good shape. The share describing relations as *very* good has also fallen substantially, from 63% in 2019 to 39% in 2022. Much of this decline comes from those on the ideological right and those in the ideological center, each of which were significantly more likely to describe relations in positive terms when Trump was in office than they are now. Those on the right (87%) are also less likely now than those on the left (96%) or in the center (95%) to say relations between the two countries are good.

Overwhelming majorities among both ethnic Jews (89%) and Arabs (94%) look favorably on the state of the U.S.-Israeli alliance. And among Jewish religious subgroups, no major differences of opinion emerge. (The survey sample is not large enough to allow researchers to analyze and report separately on subgroups of Israeli Arabs, such as Muslims and Christians.)

Overwhelming majority of Israelis say relations with the U.S. are in good shape



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q47. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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Israelis who have confidence in Biden are more likely to think relations are in good shape. Those who think he favors the Israelis too much and those that say he is striking the right balance are also more likely than those who think he favors the Palestinians to say bilateral relations are positive.

Fewer in Israel have confidence in Biden than in Trump

Relations between the Trump administration and the government of former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were quite warm, and the U.S. relocation of its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was <u>received</u> <u>particularly favorably in Israel</u>. Since Biden has taken office, Israeli confidence in the U.S. president has fallen, with 60% saying they have confidence in Biden to do the right thing regarding world affairs, down from 71% who said the same of Trump in 2019. Also, fewer Israelis say they have *a lot* of confidence in Biden (16%) than felt that way about Trump (30%).

Confidence in Trump, however, grew throughout his presidency. When he took office, 56% had confidence in him – more than the 49% who had confidence in Obama at the end of Obama's presidency, but roughly on par with the 60% who now say they have confidence in Biden.

Israeli confidence in the U.S. president declined between Trump and Biden

% of Israeli adults who have___ confidence in the U.S. president to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q18a. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

Jewish Israelis are nearly twice as likely as Arab Israelis to say they have confidence in Biden (65% vs. 34% respectively). But among Jewish religious subgroups, opinion varies markedly: About eight-in-ten Hilonim have confidence in Biden, compared with 58% of Masortim and half of Haredim/Datiim (self-identified ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox, combined).

Those who place themselves in the ideological center are more likely to have confidence in Biden than those who place themselves on the left or right. About three-quarters (74%) of those who politically identified with one of the parties in the Bennett-Lapid governing coalition have confidence in Biden, compared with half (51%) of those who did not support the governing coalition at the time of the survey (March-May 2022).

Opinion on several of Biden's policies toward Israel is also related to confidence in the U.S. leader. Roughly three-quarters (78%) of Israelis who say Biden is striking the right balance in the region have confidence in the president, compared with 55% of those who say Biden is favoring the Israelis too much and 40% of those who say he is favoring the Palestinians too much. In addition, those who approve of the Biden administration's plan to reopen a

Jewish Israelis – and especially Hilonim – have more confidence in Biden than Arab Israelis

% of Israeli adults who have <u>confidence</u> in U.S. President Joe Biden to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q18a. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

consulate in East Jerusalem are 22 percentage points more confident in the U.S. president than those who do not approve of this action (71% vs. 49% respectively).

Many in Israel do not see Biden's personality as favorably as Trump's

In 2017, when Israelis were asked about Trump's attributes, they <u>stood out</u> globally for the degree to which they praised Trump's leadership abilities and charisma. In 2022, Biden does not come close to Trump on these dimensions: Only 27% of Israelis consider Biden to be charismatic and

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fewer than half (41%) describe him as a strong leader. Still, the Israeli public considers him comparably well-qualified (55%), and about as many describe him as caring about ordinary people as said the same of Trump – though only around a third hold this view.

Although Israelis were more likely to praise various positive aspects of Trump's personality, they are also less likely to find fault with Biden on several negative traits. They are significantly less likely to describe Biden as arrogant (-37 percentage points), intolerant (-30) or dangerous (-21).

Israelis on the left of the ideological spectrum are more likely than those on the right to say Biden exhibits each of the positive personality traits tested in the survey. For example, those on the left are more than twice as likely as those on the right to say Biden is charismatic (46% vs. 17% respectively).

Israelis see Biden as less charismatic than Trump – but also less arrogant, intolerant and dangerous

% of Israeli adults who say U.S. President ___is ...



Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50a-g. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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Israelis on the left are more likely to use positive traits to describe Biden

% of Israeli adults who say U.S. President Joe Biden is ...

	Right	Center	Left	Left-right diff
	0			um
	%	%	%	
Charismatic	17	33	46	+29
Strong leader	32	52	51	+19
Caring about ordinary people	28	46	47	+19
Well-qualified to be president	49	62	67	+18
Arrogant	32	22	24	-8
Intolerant	33	25	25	-8
Dangerous	26	12	17	-9

Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50a-g. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

Israelis are divided over whether Biden is striking the right balance between Israelis and Palestinians

Biden took office looking to <u>reset the tenor</u> of the U.S.-Israel relationship, which his administration believed had skewed toward Israel during Trump's presidency. When examining Israelis as a whole, there is no clear sense that the U.S. skews one way or another. Rather, Israelis are very divided about whether Biden is favoring the Israelis too much (31%), favoring the Palestinians too much (26%) or striking about the right balance (34%).

But differences across ethnicities and religious groups are substantial. For example, Arab Israelis are much more likely than Jewish Israelis to think Biden favors the Israelis too much. Jewish Israelis are divided on the issue: 38% of Jews think Biden is hitting the mark, compared with 32% who think he's favoring the Palestinians and 20% who think he's favoring the Israelis.

Ideological left more likely to say Biden favors the Israelis too much

% of Israeli adults who think U.S. President Joe Biden is favoring the Israelis or Palestinians too much, or striking the right balance



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q49. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's" **PEW RESEARCH CENTER**

But, once again, Jewish religious groups vary greatly: A plurality of Hilonim think Biden is striking the right balance, a majority of the Haredim/Datiim think he's favoring the Palestinians and the Masortim fall in the middle, somewhat divided between the two positions.

Views of Biden's handling of the Israel relationship were also related to domestic political attitudes. Around half (46%) of those who supported one of the parties in the Bennett-Lapid

governing coalition thought Biden was striking the right balance, and few (5%) believed he was favoring the Palestinians too much; most others (40%) saw preferential treatment for the Israelis. But among those who did *not* support the ruling coalition, opinion was more mixed: 38% saw Biden favoring the Palestinians, 27% the Israelis and 26% striking the right balance.

Opinion is also divided ideologically: A majority of those on the left think Biden favors the Israelis too much, nearly half of those on the right thinks he's favoring the Palestinians too much and those in the center are much more likely to say he's striking the right balance.

Israeli sentiment about whether Biden's policies are evenhanded are also related to opinion about one of Biden's campaign promises: to <u>reopen the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem</u>, which has historically dealt primarily with Palestinian citizens. Overall, this move – <u>which the Bennett</u> <u>government opposed</u> – is also broadly unpopular with Israelis: 55% disapprove of the measure, compared with 26% who approve. A plurality (42%) of those who disapprove of the measure think Biden is favoring the Palestinians too much, whereas half of those who support the reopening of the consulate think he's striking the right balance.

More Israelis disapproved than approved of Bennett's policies toward the U.S.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett took office in June 2021, saying he wanted to bring "<u>a new spirit of cooperation</u>" to the U.S.-Israel relationship, following on the heels of Benjamin Netanyahu's <u>polarizing legacy</u> in <u>the</u> <u>U.S.</u> Now, his coalition partner, Yair Lapid, is in charge of the Israeli side of the relationship as Israel's caretaker prime minister, pending an election in the fall. Lapid also may inherit some public skepticism, as more Israelis disapproved (47%) than approved (40%) of Bennett's policies toward the U.S. at the time of the survey.

Jewish Israelis were slightly more likely than Arab Israelis to approve of Bennett's handling of the relationship (42% vs. 31%). But there were also deep divisions *within* Israel's Jewish population: 65% of self-identified Hilonim applauded his U.S. policy, compared with 34% of Masortim and just 15% of the combined Haredi/Dati community.

Political divides were also stark: 77% of those who supported Bennett's governing coalition said they approved of his policies, compared with 18% of those who did not support the parties then in power. Those who placed themselves in the center of Israel's ideological spectrum were also more likely to approve of

More Israelis disapproved of Bennett's U.S. policy

% of Israeli adults who ____ of (former) Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's policies toward the United States



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. For more information about governing parties, see Appendix. The survey was fielded while Prime Minister Bennett was still in office and did not include the word "former".

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q48. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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his policies than those who placed themselves on the left or the right. And Israelis with at least a

postsecondary education were more likely to approve of his policies than those with less formal schooling.³

When it comes to views of Bennett's U.S. policy, confidence in the U.S. president also played a role. Those who said they had a great deal or some confidence in Biden to do what is right regarding world affairs were more than twice as likely to approve of Bennett's handling of the relationship as those who had little or no confidence in Biden (52% vs. 23% respectively).

Israelis see boycotts as a threat to their country – but less so than many other issues

Around half of Israelis think that economic and cultural boycotts of Israel are a major threat to the country - and an additional 36% consider such boycotts to be a minor threat. Those figures are comparable to the shares who say that global climate change, as well as the condition of the global economy, are threats to Israel. But many more Israelis consider the spread of infectious diseases to be a major threat, and the same is true of cyberattacks from other countries.

Arab and Jewish Israelis don't differ very much in their assessments of how threatening boycotts are for

Israelis see disease and cyberattacks as greatest threats, less concerned about boycotts

% of Israeli adults who say ____ is a ...



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10a-f. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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Israel. But Jewish subgroups differ substantially: 57% of Hiloni Jews consider economic and cultural boycotts of Israel to be a major threat, compared with 44% of Masorti Jews and only 35% of Haredim/Datiim. Haredi and Dati Jews (28%) are also more than three times as likely as the

³ Education levels are standardized based on the UN's International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). In Israel, the "less education" category is secondary education or below and the "more education" category is postsecondary or above.

other groups to describe the boycotts as not a threat at all. Israelis with higher levels of education and those on the ideological left are also more likely than those with lower levels of education or those in the center or on the right, respectively, to perceive the boycott movements as major threats.

2. American views of Israel

More than half of Americans (55%) have favorable views of Israel, while 41% say they have unfavorable views of the country. Notably, this is slightly more than the share who reported favorable views of the Israeli government (48%) and lower than the share who said they had favorable views of the Israeli people (67%) on a separate survey in March. Overall, U.S. public attitudes about Israel, the country, are more closely related to views of the Israeli government (correlation of +0.62) than to views of the Israeli people (+0.56), though both are positively associated. This is consistent with other Pew Research Center work on views of China (for more, see "When Americans think about Israel, what do they have in mind?").4,5

Views of Israel vary markedly across age groups of Americans. While a majority of those ages 65 and older (69%) and ages 50 to 64 (60%) have positive views of the country, only about half of those ages 30 to 49 (49%) and around four-inten of those under 30 (41%) feel the same. Around a quarter of the oldest age group also feel *very* favorable toward Israel, while the youngest age group is more likely to say they feel *very unfavorable* (17%) than very favorable (10%).

Republicans and older Americans have more positive views of Israel

% of U.S. adults who have a(n) _____ opinion of Israel



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes survey. Q5g. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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Republicans and Democrats also diverge in their views of Israel, with a majority of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (71%) saying they have a favorable view, compared with a minority of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (44%). Views of Israel are

⁴ Americans were also asked their views of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian government; the Palestinian government was not defined for respondents. There is only a weak – and negative – correlation between views of Israel and the Palestinian people (-0.08) and between views of Israel and the Palestinian government (-0.12).

⁵ Other Pew Research Center surveys have routinely found that views of the people from a country tend to be more positive than views of the country, overall. This is the case, for example, when looking at <u>views of the United States and views of Americans</u>.

particularly positive among conservative Republicans (75%) relative to more moderate or liberal Republicans (62%). Conservative and moderate Democrats (50%) are also more favorable toward Israel than liberal Democrats (36%).

Differences between men and women are relatively muted and related to women being less likely to offer a response. There are few differences based on people's education levels, though those who have a college degree or more advanced degree (58%) are slightly more positive toward Israel than those who have less than a bachelor's degree (53%).

Protestants (63%) and Catholics (58%) also have more favorable views of Israel than do the religiously unaffiliated (42%). Among Protestants, however, differences are stark: White evangelical Protestants (80%) have much more positive views of Israel than do White non-evangelicals (61%) or Black Protestants (43%). The survey was conducted among Americans of all religious backgrounds, including Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus, but it did not obtain enough respondents from non-Christian religious groups to report separately on their responses.

Majority of Americans see relationship with Israel in good shape

Around three-quarters of Americans say relations with Israel are good, compared with 22% who think they are bad. In contrast to opinions on Israel, the country – which are highly partisan in nature – Republicans and Democrats largely agree on the state of bilateral relations: 74% of Democrats and Democraticleaning independents describe them as good, and 76% of Republicans and GOP leaners say the same. There are also few differences between conservatives, moderates and liberals on this question.

Older Americans, however, are more likely than younger ones to describe current relations between Israel and the U.S. positively: 82% of those ages 65 and older say that relations are good, compared with 76% of those ages 50 to 64, 73% of those ages 30 to 49 and 63% of those under 30. College-educated Americans (78%) are also more likely to say the current relationship is in good shape than those with less than a college degree (72%), though much of this difference comes from the fact that those with a postgraduate degree are particularly likely to describe bilateral relations positively. Men are somewhat more likely to say that relations are good than women, though much of the difference is due to women being less likely to answer the question.

Large majority of Americans think bilateral relations with Israel are good



% of U.S. adults who say current relations between the U.S. and Israel are ...

Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes survey. Q47. "Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

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Views of relations are related to perceptions of whether Biden is appropriately choosing sides between Israelis and Palestinians, or not. Those who think he has struck the right balance (84%) or that he is favoring the Israelis too much (81%) are more likely than those who think he is favoring the Palestinians too much (72%) to say that relations are good.

Most Americans are not sure how Biden is handling the Israel-Palestine issue

By and large, Americans seem to have little awareness of how Biden is managing his relationship with Israelis or Palestinians: 62% say they are not sure whether he is favoring one side too much or finding the right balance (in the U.S., this was an explicit option for respondents; in Israel, that was not the case).

Among those who express an opinion, the most common answers are that Biden is striking the right balance (16% of the public says this) or that he is favoring the Palestinians too much (13%). Just 8% say he is favoring the Israelis too much.

At present, Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to say they are not sure how Biden is handling the relationship. But Democrats who offer a substantive response lean toward the view that Biden is striking the right balance, while Republicans who offer a response tend to say he favors the Palestinians too much. Conservative Republicans are more likely to view Biden as favoring the Palestinians (34%)

Few Americans have an opinion on Biden's management of the Israel-Palestine issue



than are liberal and moderate Republicans (10%). Liberal Democrats differ little from moderate and conservative Democrats when it comes to whether Biden is striking the right balance (about a quarter of each group think this), but they are twice as likely to say he is favoring the Israelis too much (16% vs. 8%, respectively).

Those with higher levels of formal education are less likely to say they are unsure. But, even among postgraduates, around half say they are not sure how Biden is handling the relationship. Those who offer an opinion are about twice as likely to say Biden is striking the right balance (25%) as to say he is favoring the Palestinians (13%) or the Israelis (12%). Patterns are similar among those with less education, though the share who say they do not know is higher across other educational levels. Younger people, too, are less likely to give a substantive answer than older Americans, though they are also more likely to say Biden is favoring the Israelis too much.

Older Americans more likely to say Biden is striking the right balance between Israelis and Palestinians

% of U.S. adults who say Biden is favoring the Israelis or Palestinians too much, or striking the right balance



Note: "Not sure" was an explicitly provided response option. Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes survey. Q49.

"Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

Americans have little awareness of the BDS movement

Americans have <u>very little awareness</u> of the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel – one of the <u>most prominent groups in the U.S.</u> calling for boycotts of Israeli companies and sporting, cultural and academic institutions. Only 3% of Americans have heard "a lot" about BDS, and an additional 12% have heard "some," while 31% have not heard much and 53% have heard nothing at all about the movement. Respondents who have heard at least some about the movement were asked a follow-up question about whether they support or oppose it. Overall, 5% of U.S. adults say they support BDS at least somewhat, including 2% who strongly support it. An additional 3% neither support nor oppose the movement, while 6% are opposed to it, including 5% who strongly oppose it. The vast majority of the public (84%) has not heard much, if anything, about BDS and, therefore, was not asked whether they support or oppose it.

Few Americans are familiar with the BDS movement

% of U.S. adults who ...

	NET Support BDS movement	Strongly support	NET Heard a Somewhat support	a lot/some Neither support nor oppose	NET Oppose	Somewhat	Strongly oppose		NET Heard not much/ nothing at all about BDS
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
All U.S. adults	5	2	3	3	6	2	5	1	84
Republican/Lean Rep.	2	<1	2	3	12	2	10	1	82
Democrat/Lean Dem.	7	3	5	4	2	1	1	1	85
Ages 18-29	8	3	5	4	4	1	2	1	83
30-49	4	1	3	3	5	2	3	1	87
50-64	5	2	3	3	7	1	6	1	83
65+	4	1	3	3	9	2	6	1	83

Note: BDS stands for boycott, divestment and sanctions. Figures may not add to subtotals indicated due to rounding. Respondents who did not answer the question about how much they have heard about the BDS movement are not shown.

Source: Survey conducted March 7-13, 2022, among U.S. adults.

"Most Israelis Express Confidence in Biden, but His Ratings Are Down From Trump's"

Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

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Appendix: Political categorization

For this report, we grouped people into two political categories: those who supported the governing parties and those who did not. Because the Israeli government collapsed after fieldwork, for purposes of this report, we consider the governing parties to be those that held power as part of the Bennett-Lapid coalition during the duration of our fieldwork: Blue-White, New Hope, Israel is Our Home, Labor Party, Meretz, Ra'am (United Arab List), Yesh Atid (There is a Future) and Yamina.

The categories of those who supported the governing parties and those who did not are coded on the basis of respondents' answers to a question asking them which political party, if any, they identified with. All eight parties that governed as part of the Bennett-Lapid coalition are considered governing parties as part of this analysis. Survey respondents who did not indicate support for any political party, or who refused to identify with one, were considered to be *not* supporting the government in power.

Methodology

Pew Research Center's Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup and Langer Research Associates. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. More details about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs are <u>available here</u>. Results for the U.S. survey are based on data from the American Trends Panel.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from March 21 to March 27, 2022. A total of 3,581 panelists responded out of 4,120 who were sampled, for a response rate of 87%. The

cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,581 respondents is plus or minus 2.3 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large,

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,598
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	938
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	470
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,425
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,625
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,694
May 29 to July 7, 2021				
Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	935
	Total	39,540	27,414	11,685

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, \$5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a \$10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,685 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.⁶ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that

⁶ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 21 to March 27, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 21, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 21, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 22, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Invitation and reminder dates						
	Soft Launch	Full Launch				
Initial invitation	March 21, 2022	March 22, 2022				
First reminder	March 24, 2022	March 24, 2022				
Final reminder	March 26, 2022	March 26, 2022				

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of

leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, four ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for

Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S.	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2019 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on no	on-institutionalized adults. Voter registration i

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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their initial recruitment survey. The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort and then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists recruited in 2021 were measured at the time they were recruited to the panel. Likewise, the profile variables for existing panelists were updated from panel surveys conducted in July or August 2021.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made their 2021 measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted using the profile variables that were measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements from 2021 are used.

For panelists recruited in 2021, plausible values were imputed using the 2020 volunteerism values from existing panelists with similar characteristics. This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Group Total sample	Unweighted sample size 3,581	Plus or minus 2.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,764	3.2 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,600	3.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 790	4.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,881	3.1 percentage points
Half sample	At least 927	4.4 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,581
Logged onto survey; broke-off	2.12	44
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	27
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	463
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		4
Screened out		0
Total panelists in the survey		4,120
Completed interviews	I	3,581
Partial interviews	Р	0
Refusals	R	538
Non-contact	NC	1
Other	0	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,120
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		87%

Cumulative response rate	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	69%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 105	43%
Response rate to Wave 105 survey	87%
Cumulative response rate	3%

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey July 11, 2022 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section and our <u>international survey methods database</u>.
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q5a. Please tel	Q5a. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of? a. The United States					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	31	52	11	5	1	100	
	Spring, 2019	40	43	9	5	2	100	
	Spring, 2018	41	42	11	6	1	100	
	Spring, 2017	31	50	14	4	1	100	
	Spring, 2015	31	50	15	3	1	100	
	Spring, 2014	26	58	13	3	0	100	
	Spring, 2013	31	52	12	4	1	100	
	Spring, 2011	14	58	23	5	1	100	
	Spring, 2009	26	45	19	7	2	100	
	Spring, 2007	29	49	15	5	1	100	
	May, 2003	32	46	12	8	1	100	

		Q5g. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of? g. Israel						
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	
United States	Spring, 2022	14	41	31	10	4	100	

U.S. PHONE TREND FOR COMPARISON

		Q5g. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of? g. Israel						
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	
United States	Spring, 2013	21	36	18	9	17	100	

		Q10a. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? a. Global climate change						
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total		
Israel	Spring, 2022	47	31	21	1	100		
	Spring, 2018	38	40	18	4	100		
	Spring, 2017	38	40	18	4	100		
	Spring, 2013	30	48	18	4	100		

		Q10b. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? b. The condition of the global economy					
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	50	33	13	4	100	
	Spring, 2018	35	47	15	3	100	
	Spring, 2017	33	45	18	3	100	

Q10c. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concer (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major th minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? c. The spread of info diseases					najor threat, a	
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2022	67	24	9	0	100

		Q10d. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? d. The spread of false information online					
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	42	30	22	5	100	

Q10e. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns f (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? e. Cyberattacks from ot countries						najor threat, a
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2022	64	22	9	5	100
	Spring, 2018	42	41	11	6	100
	Spring, 2017	38	42	16	4	100

		(survey counti	e your opinion about some possible international concerns for try). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a t, or not a threat to (survey country)? f. Economic and cultural boycotts of Israel				
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	47	36	13	3	100	

		Q18a. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. a. U.S. President Joe Biden						
		A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	16	44	29	10	2	100	

						president to do t not too much cor		
			A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Biden	Spring, 2022	16	44	29	10	2	100
	Trump	Spring, 2019	30	41	16	13	1	100
		Spring, 2018	29	40	16	15	1	100
		Spring, 2017	18	38	27	15	2	100
	Obama	Spring, 2015	9	40	35	15	1	100
		Spring, 2014	16	55	20	8	0	100
		Spring, 2013	23	38	21	15	1	100
		Spring, 2011	10	39	34	17	0	100
		Spring, 2009	20	36	27	16	1	100
	Bush	Spring, 2007	21	36	23	15	4	100
		May, 2003	51	32	5	10	2	100

Q47. In general, how would you describe relations today between the United States and Israe Would you say they are very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?								
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	39	50	8	0	2	100	
	Spring, 2019	63	35	1	1	1	100	

		Q48. Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's policies toward the United States?					
		Approve	Disapprove	DK/Refused	Total		
Israel	Spring, 2022	40	47	13	100		

			Q49. Do you thi	nk U.S. Presiden	t Joe Biden	is?	
		Favoring the Israelis too much	Favoring the Palestinians too much	Striking about the right balance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	8	13	16	62	1	100

		Q49	Q49. Do you think U.S. President Joe Biden is?				
		Favoring the Israelis too much	Favoring the Palestinians too much	Striking about the right balance	DK/Refused	Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	31	26	34	9	100	

		describes U.S.	se tell me whetl president Joe Bi a. Well-qualif	den. Do you thin	nk of Joe Biden		
		Yes No DK/Refused Total					
Israel	Spring, 2022	55 30 15 100					

			PEW RESEARCH CENTER					
		•	president Joe Bi	ner you think the den. Do you thin rong leader				
		Yes No DK/Refused Total						
Israel	Spring, 2022	41 48 12 100						

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		Q50c. Please te U.S. presiden	t Joe Biden. Do				
		Yes No DK/Refused Total					
Israel	Spring, 2022	21 60 19 100					

		•	se tell me whetl president Joe Bi as d. Cl				
		Yes No DK/Refused Total					
Israel	Spring, 2022	27 61 12 100					

		•	se tell me whetl president Joe Bi as e. I				
		Yes No DK/Refused Total					
Israel	Spring, 2022	29 49 22 100					

			t Joe Biden. Do	ou think the follo you think of Joe ordinary people			
		Yes No DK/Refused Total					
Israel	Spring, 2022	36 39 25 100					

			se tell me whetl president Joe Bi as g. <i>l</i>				
		Yes No DK/Refused Total					
Israel	Spring, 2022	28 53 20 100					

		Q51. Do you approve or disapprove of U.S. President Joe Biden's plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in East Jerusalem?				
	Approve Disapprove DK/Refused Total				Total	
Israel	Spring, 2022	26	55	19	100	

		Q58. In gene	ral, how would y	ou describe relat	tions today betv	veen the U.S. an	d Israel?
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	10	64	20	2	5	100