

The People, The Press & Politics 1990

A Times Mirror Political Typology

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page Number</i>
<i>I. Description of Times Mirror Typology</i>	1
<i>II. Introduction</i>	2
<i>III. Findings</i>	11
Political Values and Attitudes	11
The Shape of the American Electorate	36
Image of the Parties	49
Priorities of the American Public	61
Policy Positions of the American People	68
Foreign Policy Attitudes	76
Public Evaluations	84
<i>IV. Survey Methodology</i>	90
<i>V. Questionnaires and Topline Results</i>	103
May Questionnaire	103
August Questionnaire	133

The Times Mirror Typology

The Times Mirror typology was constructed by classifying people according to nine basic values and orientations, by their party affiliation and by their degree of political involvement. A statistical technique called "cluster analysis" was used to identify these distinct segments of the American public.

Core Republican Groups

Enterprisers: 12% adult population. Affluent, well-educated and predominately male. This classic Republican group is mainly characterized by its pro-business and anti-government attitudes. Enterprisers are moderate on questions of personal freedom but oppose increased spending on most social issues.

Moralists: 11% adult population. Middle-aged and middle income, this core Republican group is militantly anti-communist and restrictive on personal freedom issues.

Republican-Leaning Groups

Upbeats: 8% adult population. Young and optimistic, the members of this group are firm believers in America and in the country's government. Upbeats are moderate in their political attitudes but were strongly pro-Reagan.

Disaffecteds: 12% adult population. Alienated, pessimistic and financially pressured, this group leans toward the GOP camp, but it has had historical ties to the Democratic party. Disaffecteds are skeptical of both big government and big business, but are pro-military.

Low Involvement Group

Bystanders: 12% adult population. The members of this group are young, predominately white and poorly educated. They neither participate in politics nor show any interest in current affairs.

Democratic-Leaning Groups

Followers: 5% adult population. Young, poorly educated and disproportionately black. This group shows little interest in politics and is very persuadable and unpredictable. Although they are not critical of government or big business, Followers do not have much faith in America.

Seculars: 7% adult population. This group is uniquely characterized by its lack of religious belief. In addition, Seculars are strongly committed to personal freedom and are dovish on defense issues. Their level of participation in politics, however, is not as high as one might expect, given their education and their political sophistication.

Core Democratic Groups

'60s Democrats: 9% adult population. This well-educated, heavily female group has a strong belief in social justice, as well as a very low level of militant anti-communism. These mainstream Democrats are highly tolerant of views and lifestyles they do not share and favor most forms of social spending.

New Dealers: 7% adult population. Older, blue-collar and religious. The roots of this aging group of traditional Democrats can be traced back to the New Deal. Although supportive of many social spending measures, New Dealers are intolerant on social issues and somewhat hawkish on defense.

God & Country Democrats: 8% adult population. This group is older, poor and disproportionately black, with high numbers concentrated in the South. The God and Country Democrats have a strong faith in America and are highly religious. They favor social spending and are moderately intolerant.

Partisan Poor: 10% adult population. Very low income, relatively high proportions of blacks and poorly educated, this traditionally loyal Democratic group has a strong faith in its party's ability to achieve social justice. The Partisan Poor firmly support all forms of social spending, yet they are conservative on some social issues.

INTRODUCTION

The American electorate, seen through the Times Mirror political typology of 1990, presents a disquieting picture of political gridlock.

Despite the personal popularity of President Bush, cynicism toward the political system in general is growing as the public in unprecedented numbers associates Republicans with wealth and greed, Democrats with fecklessness and incompetence.

This cynicism, combined with increased economic polarization among Americans at all but the wealthiest levels (especially among the poor and minority populations), threatens to subvert traditional partisan politics or block the effective resolution of social and economic issues.

In addition, while anti-communism is fading as a factor in American politics, anti-Japanese sentiment has soared as economic expectations plummet.

Changes in Partisanship

On the surface, party affiliation is not very different than it was three years ago. Between the spring of 1987 and the spring of 1990, there has been a meager three percentage point increase in the number of people who regard themselves as Republicans and a four percentage point decline among those who consider themselves Democrats. Overall, the voting age population divides 28% Republican, 33% Democratic, and 39% independent or no declared preference.

Beneath this surface stability, however, there are volatile forces at work. In the years since 1987, when Times Mirror first divided the electorate into eleven voting groups on the basis of their underlying political and social values and historical voting patterns, both parties have declined precipitously in the public's estimation.

While the public gives the Republican Party credit for its ability to foster economic growth and manage foreign affairs better than the Democrats, Americans in overwhelming numbers nevertheless believe the Democratic Party is more concerned with "people like me." (42% - 21%)

The conundrum paralyzing our politics today is that this perceived affinity cannot overcome the Democrats' image as a hapless party uncertain of its calling, while the Republicans' management skills cannot erase their popular perception as the tool of the rich.

And while the number of Americans who say they generally like the policies of the Democratic Party has fallen five points since 1987 -- from 43 to 38 percent -- the number who say they generally like the Republican policies has risen hardly at all, from 32 to 33 percent. Those saying they generally like Republican candidates held steady at 31 percent, while approval of Democratic candidates dropped from 37 to 32 percent.

The Democratic Party's decline is more dramatic, for today it is judged even by its core constituents as incapable of governing America successfully and unclear on what it should stand for.

Thus, while the Democratic Party continues to be seen as the party closer to prevailing public opinion on such issues as the environment, health care, job protection and abortion, it has made no

inroads in recent years among social activists and has even failed to stem the flow of defections from two of its largest and historically most faithful constituent groups.

Democratic performance failures and sharper feelings of financial pressure have thinned the ranks of New Dealers -- older, financially comfortable, working class Democrats with spiritual ties to Franklin D. Roosevelt -- and alienated the Partisan Poor from the party they once considered their champion.

New Dealers are now only 7 percent of the electorate, compared with 11 percent in 1987, reflecting the erosion of working class, unionized, white Catholic support which was once the sturdiest pillar of the Democratic Party.

The Partisan Poor, while still 10 percent of the electorate, are no longer automatic Democratic votes. People in this group have very low incomes, experience great financial pressure, and are principally concerned with issues of social justice that have direct bearing on their daily lives.

While three years ago the Partisan Poor were described as the most firmly Democratic group in the country, the percentage of the Partisan Poor who call themselves Democrats has fallen from 89 percent in 1987 to only 57 percent in the current survey.

In turn, the number who said they were independent or expressed no partisan preference rose from 11 to 39 percent. Further, fewer of the Partisan Poor now say the Democratic Party selects good candidates (-18% pts.), and fewer say the Democrats are able to bring about changes the country needs (-17% pts.).

Still, only one percent of the group reported a shift to the Republican Party, although 5 percent now "lean" Republican.

At the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, a group of Democratic-leaning, well-informed, socially tolerant and politically skeptical independents -- called Seculars in the Times Mirror typology -- have even less confidence in Democratic candidates and the ability of the party to manage government today than they had during the presidential campaign of Michael Dukakis.

The proportion of Seculars saying they are Democrats or leaning Democratic has fallen from 77% to 68% today, but here too there is no rush to the Republican Party, perhaps because the Seculars' commitment to issues of personal freedoms -- especially abortion -- is not reflected in Republican platforms.

The only good news for the Democrats is a return to their fold by God & Country Democrats -- older, less affluent, religious, patriotic voters -- once drawn by the force of Ronald Reagan's personality, social conservatism and ardent patriotism. These voters are somewhat more likely to identify with the Democratic Party now than they were three years ago. (80% in 1990, 70% in 1987).

The Republican Party, despite its ability to win the Presidency in six of the past seven elections and despite the unprecedented popularity of the incumbent Republican President, has been unable to capitalize on these declining Democratic fortunes because the GOP itself is now seen by a majority of the public as the political instrument of the nation's rich and powerful.

Between 1987 and 1990, the percentage of people who associated the Republican Party on an unprompted basis with "rich and monied interests" rose from 18 to 51. Twenty-eight percent of the new sample described the GOP as "not being for the people," up from 5 percent in 1987.

This remarkable spike in unfavorable public opinion toward the basic motivation of the Republican Party has overwhelmed the party's double-digit advantage over the Democrats on questions of economic and foreign policy management.

It has even colored the public's judgement on certain economic questions, and the public now gives the Democrats a slight preference on the issue of which party could better handle the savings and loan crisis.

In this ambivalent setting, the Republicans have not gained many new recruits in the last three years, and those they have gained come largely from the most unstable group in all of American politics: the Disaffecteds, who are highly suspicious of all forms of authority, alienated from both the political and economic establishment, aggravated by constant financial pressure, and ready to defect politically at the slightest provocation.

This group is larger now than in 1987 (12 percent of the electorate now, 9 percent then), but only half of the group calls itself Republican or says it leans to the Republican Party. Still, only 10 percent call themselves Democrats.

Most disappointing for Republicans must be their failure to solidify their hold on a new constituency first attracted to the party by Ronald Reagan -- the young, optimistic, patriotic Upbeats who are moderate in both their social and economic views.

Abortion policy, which is especially relevant to this under-40 constituency, may be partly responsible for the Republicans' failure to convert these voters fully to their case. Only 45 percent of Upbeats say the Republican Party better represents their views on abortion, and 32 percent say the Democratic Party comes closer to their views.

American Values and Basic Beliefs

Since 1987, there has been a significant upswing in feelings of mistrust of political leaders, disillusionment with politics and feelings of powerlessness. It is important to emphasize that the current survey shows an intensification of long latent feelings because Times Mirror's initial 1987 survey found large percentages of the public expressing feelings of powerlessness and disconnection from society and its leadership.

*Then as now, the vast majority of the public expressed the view that elected officials in Washington lose touch with the public...but complete agreement with that statement rose from **22% in 1987 to 31% today.**

*An increased majority of the public feels that people like themselves have no say in what the government does (**52% in '87, 57% in '90**).

*Fewer Americans feel that elected officials care what they think (**47% in '87, 42% in '90**)

There is also a comparable increase in the percentage of the public expressing feelings of hopelessness and futility about their *own* lives. For example, the percent agreeing that hard work offers no guarantee of success in life rose from **29%** in 1987 to **36%** currently.

As feelings of alienation have increased, the public has also become more sensitive to a growing disparity between rich and poor. Americans feel more economic pressure, more hopelessness and more disillusionment with their political system, and they see more social inequity.

No less than 78% of the public subscribes to the view that in this society "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer."

Analysis of the survey data further confirms strong economic and racial overtones to the upsurge in personal and political alienation. Virtually all the increased feelings of political and personal alienation have occurred among people with incomes below \$50,000 per year.

Between 1987 and 1990, there was almost no change among upper income people in the level of frustration with the political system, nor in the level of doubt about their ability to control their own success. Almost all of the change in these beliefs occurred among people in middle or lower income brackets.

Blacks express much higher levels of political and personal alienation than whites, but the greatest proportionate increases in personal alienation over the past three years have occurred among middle and lower income whites.

These are also the segments of American society that show much higher levels of financial pressure than they did just a few years ago. Overall, the percentage of people who say they are "pretty well satisfied financially" fell from **63%** in '87 to **58%** currently.

In the same period, the proportion who said they often don't have enough money to make ends meet rose from 43% to 47%. In our 1990 survey 53% reported that money is one of their most important concerns, compared to 47% in 1987.

Although the survey finds significant indications of economic polarization and increased alienation, many of the most significant attitudes and values show little change.

*Despite the emergence of abortion as a major political issue, accompanied by an increase in public support for the "pro-choice" position since 1987, we observe no movement along a wider range of personal freedoms questions. The public divides fairly evenly on questions from the rights of school boards to fire homosexuals to freedom of the press.

*Our measures of racial attitudes show little change over three years, despite widely publicized incidents of racial violence and confrontation in major American cities, the rise of major black political office-holders, and the increasing acknowledgement of racial tension in pop music and motion pictures.

*Americans continue to firmly hold ideologically inconsistent views about the desirability of government activity and social welfarism.

Large majorities of the public feel that government activity does more harm than good and is pernicious and inefficient, and they also hew to classically conservative views of government regulation -- generally, the less, the better.

But equally large majorities of the same public express support for liberal social welfare positions.

*There are few indications that the American public is any less critical than it has been of the practices of business corporations, with 63% percent now saying big business makes too much profit.

*As in all previous surveys, extremely large percentages of the public expressed strong religious convictions.

Communism

The most dramatic change in basic beliefs comes in response to the end of communism in much of Eastern Europe, the beginning of political pluralism in the Soviet Union, and the reduction in tensions between the super powers.

The Cold War attitudes which have dominated American thinking for forty years are melting away, and there has been a precipitous decline in the number of Americans who perceive a communist threat to the United States.

In 1987, 60% of the public believed there was an international communist conspiracy to rule the world. In the current survey, only 37% subscribed to that view. Similarly, Americans are less apt than they once were to see communists as having a hand in domestic problems. In 1987, 56% agreed with the statement that communists were responsible for a lot of the unrest in the US. Forty-three percent agree now.

Militant Nationalism

Despite changing views of communism, the American public remains as militant and nationalist as it was a few years ago. As in 1987, majorities of the public feel that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength (52%), and say they would "fight for their country right or wrong" (55%). Substantial numbers also continue to subscribe to more radical positions. Twenty-eight percent say American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries. And 47 percent say America should "get even" with countries that try to take advantage of it.

Defense Spending

These attitudes help explain the enduring support for large military expenditures. Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, and well after the Cold War was declared "over", we found a deep reservoir of popular support for defense spending.

Although the proportion favoring a cut in defense spending rose from 29% in 1987 to 40% in May 1990, large segments of the public still favored either keeping defense spending the same (39%)

or increasing it (18%). And since Iraq invaded Kuwait in August, the percentage of Americans calling for defense cuts has fallen back to 31 percent.

Japan

Even so, recent events in the Persian Gulf have not entirely clouded over other changes in public attitudes toward foreign affairs that are evident in Times Mirror's trend analysis. Perhaps the most striking shift is in American public opinion about Japan.

In the May 1990 survey, 56 percent of the sample expressed favorable opinions of Japan, compared with 39 percent unfavorable. This relatively narrow margin contrasts with 1987 results which found 70 percent favorable opinion and only 27 percent unfavorable.

Putting these results in perspective, public opinion of Japan and the Soviet Union were not materially different. Fifty-one percent expressed favorable opinions of the Soviet Union, 44 percent unfavorable. And even in the August re-interview, while America was focusing its anger on Iraq, Japan drew little more than 60 percent favorable opinion.

The growth in anti-Japanese sentiment has been greatest among people who previously had the highest regard for the Japanese: affluent people, whites, Enterprise Republicans and people in the West. In effect, dislike for Japan has become more mainstream. It is no longer primarily concentrated among the kinds of people who have been hit especially hard by Japanese competition.

Nonetheless, we see a link between the rise in economic pessimism and growing dislike of Japan. Among people who expect to be better off next year, 34% hold unfavorable views of the Japanese. That percentage increases to 44% among those who expect to be worse off.

Nationalism also tends to correlate with opinions about Japan. Among those who expressed the most consistently nationalistic opinions, 45% held an unfavorable opinion of the Japanese. At the other end of the nationalistic opinion spectrum, only 31% expressed negative feelings for Japan. Among those expressing strong nationalism and a pessimistic economic outlook, 50 percent dislike Japan.

Israel

As the sagging economy has fueled anti-Japanese sentiment, the Intifada has taken a heavy toll on overall opinions about Israel.

Since 1987, the balance of American opinion toward Israel has moved from favorable to divided. In the May 1990 survey, 44% rated Israel favorably and 45% rated it unfavorably. In 1987, the division of opinion was 65% favorable to 27% unfavorable. The August re-interview, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, only 48% expressed a favorable opinion of Israel compared to 38% who had an unfavorable one.

Growing dislike for Israel is evident across all demographic, political and social groups, except among American Jews. Declines in favorability were especially evident in the Midwest and South, among whites, and among people who live outside of the major American cities.

A sharp drop in the number of Americans who think of themselves as pro-Israeli has accompanied the broader decline in favorable attitudes toward the Jewish state. Between 1987 and 1990

the percentage who said they self-identified with Israel dropped from 25% to 15%. And even among American Jews self-identification with Israel fell from 86% in 1987 to 63% in the latest survey.

FINDINGS

POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Beliefs About Communism Change

Changing perceptions of the "communist threat" are evident in all demographic, political and social groups. The survey indicates anti-communism is also no longer as much a corollary to American nationalism and militancy as it was just a few years ago. The American public remains as militant and nationalistic as it was in 1987, but these feelings are less linked to perceptions of the communist threat. There has been a precipitous decline in the number of Americans who perceive a communist threat to the United States. In 1987, 60% of the public believed that there was an international communist conspiracy to rule the world. In the current survey only 37% subscribed to that view. Similarly, Americans are less apt than they once were to see communists as having a hand in domestic problems. In 1987, 56% agreed with the statement that communists were responsible for a lot of the unrest in the US. Forty-three percent now subscribe to that opinion. But less well-educated people and Southerners are less likely than others to have changed their minds about the dangers of international communism. A near majority (47%) of Southerners still believe that there is an international communist conspiracy to rule the world, and 47% of those who did not graduate from high school feel that way as well.

As in 1987, a majority of the public feels that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength (52%), and say they would "fight for their country right or wrong" (55%). Substantial numbers also continue to subscribe to more radical positions such as: American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries (28%) and America should get even with countries that try to take advantage of it (47%). However, in 1990 these views are not as closely tied to perceptions of a communist threat as they were in earlier Times Mirror surveys. Analysis of the data suggests that the bridge between American nationalism and anti-communism has been significantly weakened. For example, the percentage of the public holding highly militant beliefs *and* hardline opinions about anti-communism fell from 25% in 1987-88 to 18% in 1990, even though a steady one-third of the population held militant beliefs in both periods. In fact in the current survey there appears to be more of a link between hardline anti-communism and cultural intolerance than between it and militancy.

Although there is much less concern about a communist threat, Americans in 1990, just as in 1987, refer to themselves as "anti-communist" more often than they take the label of any other political, ideological or special interest cause. In 1987, 70% of the Times Mirror sample said the label "anti-communist" described them well, ranking ahead of such descriptions as a religious person (49%), civil rights supporter (48%) or environmentalist (39%). In the current survey somewhat fewer said the label "anti-communist" described them, but no fewer than 60% continued to think of themselves as anti-communists, ahead of all other political value self-identifications measured in the survey. The loss of a sense of danger from the communist menace stems from widespread awareness of international communism's political, economic and social failure.

Feelings of Political and Personal Alienation Increase

If feelings about communism represent the most dramatic changes in public attitudes over the past three years, indications of increased alienation are clearly the most alarming. The Times Mirror battery of 72 values questions contained six measures that were explicitly designed to tap feelings of mistrust, disillusion with politics and helplessness. Over the three year period, we find a significant intensification of these feelings. However, it should be kept in mind that our initial survey found large majorities of the public expressing feelings of powerlessness and being disconnected from society and its leadership. What we see in the current survey is an intensification of this unease.

* Then as now, the vast majority of the public expressed the view that elected officials in Washington lose touch with the public... but complete agreement with that statement rose from **22% in 1987 to 30% currently**.

* An increased majority of the public feels that people like themselves have no say in what the government does (**52%** in '87, **57%** in '90).

* Fewer Americans feel that elected officials care what they think (**47%** in '87 **44%** in '90.)

In sum, the proportion of the public expressing opinions indicating a consistent pattern of political alienation rose from **37%** during 1987-88 to **42%** in 1990. There is also a comparable increase in the percentage of the public expressing feelings of hopelessness and futility about their personal lives. The percent agreeing that hard work offers no guarantee of success in life rose from **29%** in 1987 to **36%** currently. There was also a small increase in the proportion that feels that success in life is determined by forces outside of a person's control: **39%** in the current survey agreed with that view. As with political alienation, there was a small, but significant increase since 1987 in the percentage expressing high levels of personal alienation. Although feelings of personal and political alienation are closely related, there are obviously more Americans who feel a sense of frustration and disconnection with the political system than feel powerless in their own lives. Nonetheless, both sentiments largely correlate with race and socioeconomic measures. In the current survey blacks, less well-educated people and members of lower income groups are much more likely than others to express high degrees of political and personal alienation.

High levels of financial pressure, particularly among these groups, have risen sharply over the past three years. The percentage of people who say they are pretty well satisfied financially fell from **63%** in '87 to **58%** currently. At the same time, the proportion who said they often don't have enough money to make ends meet rose from 43% to 47%. In our 1990 survey 54% reported that money is one of their most important concerns, compared to 47% in 1987.

As feelings of alienation and financial pressure have increased, the public has also become more sensitive to a growing disparity between rich and poor. Times Mirror's comprehensive 1989 survey dealing with opinions about economic choices found that "the gap between rich and poor" was identified as a losing battle by nearly as many people as felt that way about drugs. In the current survey, no fewer than 78% agreed with the statement, "It's really true the rich get richer and the poor get poorer". The percentage completely agreeing with this statement increased from 31% in 1987 to 38% currently.

These feelings, when coupled with increased indications of alienation and financial pressure, suggest a growing socioeconomic schism within the country. Americans feel more economic pressure, more hopelessness and more disillusionment with their political system, and see more inequity. Analysis of our survey data bears out the economic overtones of feelings of personal and political alienation.

Virtually all the increased feelings of political and personal alienation have occurred among people with incomes below \$50,000 per year. As the table below indicates, upper income people expressed little or no increased feelings of frustration with the political system, nor doubts about their ability to control their own success between 1987 and 1990. Almost all of the change in these beliefs occurred among people in middle or lower income brackets.

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>COMPLETELY AGREE:</i>		
Generally speaking, elected officials in Washington often lose touch with the people <u>pretty quickly</u>		
Family Income		
<\$30,000	25	34
\$30,000-\$49,999	18	32
\$50,000+	14	18
<i>AGREE:</i>		
Hard work offers little <u>guarantee of success</u>		
Family Income		
<\$30,000	33	42
\$30,000-\$49,999	25	32
\$50,000+	20	22

Race and income are interrelated, but although the survey finds that blacks continue to express higher levels of alienation and financial pressure than whites, *there has been a greater proportionate increase in feelings of economic pressure among middle-income whites and greater indications of personal alienation among poor white people than among blacks.*

1987

1990

COMPLETELY AGREE:

Generally speaking, elected officials in Washington often lose touch with the people
pretty quickly

Whites/\$50,000+	13	16
Whites/<\$50,000	22	32
Blacks	30	39

AGREE:

Hard work offers little
guarantee of success

Whites/\$50,000+	21	20
Whites/<\$50,000	28	38
Blacks	41	43

COMPLETELY AGREE:

Today it's really true that the rich just get richer
while the poor get poorer

Whites/\$50,000+	18	18
Whites/<\$50,000	29	39
Blacks	54	61

Consistency in American Political Values 1987-1990

Although basic American attitudes have changed in response to a dramatically different international situation and there is evidence of a significant rise in alienation that has a strong economic basis, there is more stability than change in political values. There is also a decided stability of views in some areas where change may have been expected.

Personal Freedoms - despite the emergence of abortion as a top political issue and increased public support for choice since 1987, we observe no movement in a wider range of personal freedoms questions. As we found in earlier surveys, the public divides fairly evenly on most personal freedoms issues - from the rights of school boards to fire homosexuals to freedom of the press. Relatively equal sized segments of the public take opposing sides on these issues and we see no consistent pattern to suggest that the abortion debate is creating a new climate of opinion about personal freedoms.

Racial Tolerance - The past three years have been marked by widely publicized incidents of racial violence and confrontation in major American cities, state and city elections in which race played an important deciding role and the increasing acknowledgement of racial tension in pop music and the movies. Yet our measures of racial attitudes show little change. Only one in three

white Americans feel that blacks have made little progress in recent years, compared to 72% of blacks. Both percentages are statistically unchanged from our 1987 survey. Fewer than one in five whites support the idea of preferential treatment for blacks as a way of improving their position in society, but many more blacks feel that way (67%). Again these findings mirror those of three years ago.

There is somewhat stronger acceptance of interracial dating than was found in 1987 but nearly half of the white population disapprove of such pairing. As in 1987, 78% of blacks express approval of interracial dating. Despite the increased prominence of race in today's headlines, in politics and in pop culture, there is no measurable fundamental change in the racial values of whites or blacks since 1987.

Beliefs about Government and Social Welfare - Americans continue to firmly hold ideologically inconsistent views about the desirability of government activity and social welfarism. Large majorities of the public feel that government activity does more harm than good, believe that government activity is pernicious and inefficient, and generally take positions that are classically conservative with regard to government regulation. At the same time, equally large majorities of the same public express support for traditionally liberal social welfare ideas. For example, close to seven in ten feel that it is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who cannot take care of themselves, six in ten believe the government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep. Over the three year period there has been little substantive change in opinions about the role of government or the desirability of social welfare programs. If anything, people have become more insistently anti-government and more intense in their feelings about helping the needy.

Opinions about Business - A six in ten majority continues to feel that business corporations have too much power and an equally large number feel that big companies make too much profit. These opinions notwithstanding, the current survey finds a very significant upsurge in the percentage of people who think of themselves as pro-business. At the same time there are few indications that the American public is any less critical than it has been of the practices of business corporations.

Religious Beliefs and Traditionalist Values - As in all previous surveys, extremely large percentages of the public expressed strong religious conviction. The current survey finds larger percentages of the public expressing complete agreement with the questions that measured faith in God and religious commitment. There are equally large expressions of support for traditional family values and morality; however, as our earlier surveys indicated, there is little popular sentiment for women returning to traditional roles.

Liberals and Conservatives?

Given what our results indicate about the nature of political values, it's clear that simple labels such as liberal and conservative are inadequate to describe the American public. Yet in light of the prominence of these identifications in the past presidential campaign, we re-measured ideological self-identification. Surprisingly, the survey finds the public's self-identifications unchanged since 1987. Just as many people think of themselves as liberals as did before the '88 campaign made it a target term. As was also the case in the first survey in this series, more Americans say the term "conservative" fits them better (28%) than the term "liberal" (21%). And a somewhat larger number totally reject the label liberal for themselves (34%) than reject the term conservative (27%).

Similarly, we see little change in the number of people who regard themselves as environmentalist - 39% said that label described them well in '87 compared to 42% in the current survey. This suggests that the increased support for environmental measures as observed in this study stems from a rallying of support among people who already had regarded themselves as environmentalist, rather than in a broadening of the environmentalist base.

The same phenomenon is observed with regard to abortion. While this survey and others have shown increased support for the pro-choice side since the mid-1980's, there is no upsurge in the percentage of women who regard themselves as feminist, nor is there major change in strong identification either pro or anti-abortion.

A surprisingly strong public identification is observed with regard to smoking. As many as 41% said the label "a supporter of the anti-smoking movement" fit them well. At the other extreme, 29% said the identification did not describe them well at all. The anti-smoker self-identification has some political and demographic correlates. It is more prevalent among more affluent people, among white protestants, Jews and older people. Among Republicans, Disaffecteds are far less anti-smoking than other Republican groups while among Democrats, the Partisan Poor are far less likely to be anti-smoking.

CHANGES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL VALUES 1987- 1990

	<u>1987-1988</u>	<u>1990</u>
	%	%
Beliefs about government		
Anti-Government	33	35
2	24	25
3	19	18
Not Anti-Government	25	22
Militancy/Ethnocentric		
Not Milit./Ethno.	18	20
2	23	24
3	26	24
Militant	33	32
Anti-Communism		
Low	32	48
2	35	29
High	33	23
Political Participation*		
Low	26	26
2	26	27
High	48	47
Political Alienation		
Not Alienated	35	31
2	28	27
Alienated	37	42
Personal Alienation		
Not Alienated	50	49
2	30	27
Alienated	20	24
Welfarist		
Low	19	23
2	18	16
3	24	21
High	39	40
Racial Tolerance (Whites)		
Not Tolerant	39	40
2	35	34
Tolerant	26	26
Religiousness		
High	39	42
2	32	28
Low	29	30

	<u>1987- 1988</u> %	<u>1990</u> %
Personal Freedoms		
Repressive	26	26
2	25	25
3	21	20
Liberal	28	29
Traditionalist Social Values		
Liberal	32	30
2	29	30
Traditionalist	39	40
Financial Pressure*		
Low	48	41
2	25	24
High	27	35
American Exceptionalist		
High	25	26
Not high	75	74
number of interviews	(9374)	(3004)

 * Trended from 1987 only, because these measures are more cyclical than the other scales. That is, the participation measures are likely to change during election periods and financial pressure index will vary with the economic climate.

TIMES MIRROR POLITICAL VALUES QUESTIONS

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>ANTI-COMMUNISM</i>		
There is an international communist conspiracy to rule the world		
Completely Agree	22	11
Mostly Agree	<u>38</u>	<u>26</u>
	60	37
Communist countries are all alike		
Completely Agree	9	8
Mostly Agree	<u>28</u>	<u>23</u>
	37	31
Communists are responsible for a lot of the unrest in the United States today		
Completely Agree	17	13
Mostly Agree	<u>39</u>	<u>30</u>
	56	43
<i>MILITARISM</i>		
It is my belief that we should get even with any country that tries to take advantage of the United States		
Completely Agree	11	14
Mostly Agree	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>
	44	47
The best way to ensure peace is through military strength		
Completely Agree	14	17
Mostly Agree	<u>40</u>	<u>35</u>
	54	52
American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries		
Completely Agree	7	10
Mostly Agree	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>
	24	28
We all should be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong		
Completely Agree	17	22
Mostly Agree	<u>37</u>	<u>33</u>
	54	55

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>POLITICAL ALIENATION</i>		
People like me don't have any say about what the government does		
Completely Agree	14	19
Mostly Agree	<u>38</u>	<u>38</u>
	52	57
Generally speaking, elected officials in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly		
Completely Agree	22	30
Mostly Agree	<u>51</u>	<u>48</u>
	73	78
Most elected officials care what people like me think		
Completely Agree	5	7
Mostly Agree	<u>42</u>	<u>37</u>
	47	44
Voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things		
Completely Agree	23	23
Mostly Agree	<u>55</u>	<u>50</u>
	78	73
<i>INDIVIDUAL ALIENATION</i>		
Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control		
Completely Agree	8	11
Mostly Agree	<u>30</u>	<u>29</u>
	38	40
Hard work offers little guarantee of success		
Completely Agree	7	10
Mostly Agree	<u>22</u>	<u>26</u>
	29	36

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>PERSONAL FINANCIAL PRESSURE</i>		
I often don't have enough money to make ends meet		
Completely Agree	14	19
Mostly Agree	<u>29</u>	<u>28</u>
	43	47
Money is one of my most important concerns		
Completely Agree	13	18
Mostly Agree	<u>34</u>	<u>35</u>
	47	53
I'm pretty well satisfied with the way things are going for me financially		
Completely Agree	11	9
Mostly Agree	<u>52</u>	<u>49</u>
	63	58
<i>PERSONAL FREEDOMS</i>		
School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals		
Completely Agree	27	29
Mostly Agree	<u>24</u>	<u>20</u>
	51	49
Books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries		
Completely Agree	24	29
Mostly Agree	<u>26</u>	<u>21</u>
	50	50
The police should be allowed to search the houses of known drug dealers without a court order		
Completely Agree	25	33
Mostly Agree	<u>26</u>	<u>24</u>
	51	57
The government ought to be able to censor news stories that it feels threaten national security		
Completely Agree	19	24
Mostly Agree	<u>42</u>	<u>38</u>
	61	62

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>RACIAL TOLERANCE/BASED ON WHITES</i>		
In the past few years there hasn't been much real improvement in the position of black people in this country		
Completely Agree	5	7
Mostly Agree	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>
	31	33
I think it's all right for blacks and whites to date each other		
Completely Agree	10	17
Mostly Agree	<u>33</u>	<u>27</u>
	43	44
We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment		
Completely Agree	3	4
Mostly Agree	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>
	18	16
<i>RACIAL TOLERANCE/BASED ON BLACKS</i>		
In the past few years there hasn't been much real improvement in the position of black people in this country		
Completely Agree	28	31
Mostly Agree	<u>41</u>	<u>42</u>
	69	73
I think it's all right for blacks and whites to date each other		
Completely Agree	27	35
Mostly Agree	<u>45</u>	<u>43</u>
	72	78
We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment		
Completely Agree	27	33
Mostly Agree	<u>37</u>	<u>34</u>
	64	67

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES</i>		
Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good		
Completely Agree	12	16
Mostly Agree	<u>43</u>	<u>42</u>
	55	58
When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful		
Completely Agree	19	22
Mostly Agree	<u>44</u>	<u>45</u>
	63	67
The federal government should run only those things that cannot be run at the local level		
Completely Agree	22	26
Mostly Agree	<u>53</u>	<u>51</u>
	75	77
The federal government controls too much of our daily lives		
Completely Agree	18	22
Mostly Agree	<u>40</u>	<u>40</u>
	58	62
Dealing with a federal government agency is often not worth the trouble		
Completely Agree	14	21
Mostly Agree	<u>44</u>	<u>44</u>
	58	65

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
WELFARISM		
Our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed		
Completely Agree	37	45
Mostly Agree	<u>53</u>	<u>46</u>
	90	91
It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves		
Completely Agree	21	23
Mostly Agree	<u>50</u>	<u>44</u>
	71	67
The government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper in debt		
Completely Agree	13	15
Mostly Agree	<u>40</u>	<u>36</u>
	53	51
The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep		
Completely Agree	22	27
Mostly Agree	<u>40</u>	<u>35</u>
	62	62

<i>RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM</i>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
Prayer is an important part of my daily life		
Completely Agree	41	46
Mostly Agree	<u>35</u>	<u>31</u>
	76	77
We all will be called before God at the judgment day to answer for our sins		
Completely Agree	52	52
Mostly Agree	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>
	81	81
Even today miracles are performed by the power of God		
Completely Agree	47	49
Mostly Agree	<u>35</u>	<u>33</u>
	82	82
I am sometimes very conscious of the presence of God		
Completely Agree	41	45
Mostly Agree	<u>39</u>	<u>35</u>
	80	80
I never doubt the existence of God		
Completely Agree	60	60
Mostly Agree	<u>28</u>	<u>27</u>
	88	87

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>TRADITIONALIST VALUES</i>		
Women should return to their traditional role in society		
Completely Agree	9	10
Mostly Agree	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>
	30	30
Too many children are being raised in day care centers these days		
Completely Agree	23	26
Mostly Agree	<u>45</u>	<u>47</u>
	68	73
AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior		
Completely Agree	17	16
Mostly Agree	<u>26</u>	<u>22</u>
	43	38
I have old-fashioned values about family and marriage		
Completely Agree	45	48
Mostly Agree	<u>42</u>	<u>38</u>
	87	86
There are clear guidelines about what's good or evil that apply to everyone regardless of their situation		
Completely Agree	34	36
Mostly Agree	<u>45</u>	<u>43</u>
	79	79
<i>BUSINESS ATTITUDES</i>		
There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few big companies		
Completely Agree	27	29
Mostly Agree	<u>50</u>	<u>47</u>
	77	76
Business corporations make too much profit		
Completely Agree	21	23
Mostly Agree	<u>44</u>	<u>40</u>
	65	63

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
<i>AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM</i>		
As Americans we can always find a way to solve our problems and get what we want		
Completely Agree	12	13
Mostly Agree	<u>56</u>	<u>52</u>
	68	65
I don't believe that there are any real limits to growth in this country today		
Completely Agree	17	19
Mostly Agree	<u>50</u>	<u>45</u>
	67	64
I am very patriotic		
Completely Agree	43	48
Mostly Agree	<u>46</u>	<u>40</u>
	89	88
<i>POLITICAL PARTICIPATION</i>		
I feel it's my duty as a citizen to always vote		
Completely Agree	46	50
Mostly Agree	<u>39</u>	<u>35</u>
	85	85
I'm interested in keeping up with national affairs		
Completely Agree	28	33
Mostly Agree	<u>53</u>	<u>49</u>
	81	82
I'm pretty interested in following local politics		
Completely Agree	16	17
Mostly Agree	<u>54</u>	<u>52</u>
	70	69
I feel guilty when I don't get a chance to vote		
Completely Agree	25	30
Mostly Agree	<u>41</u>	<u>36</u>
	66	66

PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS WHO SELF-IDENTIFY STRONGLY WITH:

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
A Feminist		
A supporter of the women's movement	29	30
An Environmentalist	39	43
Pro Palestinian*		5
A Republican	20	24
A Democrat	31	31
A Liberal	19	21
A Conservative	27	28
A Union Supporter	27	28
A Business Supporter	29	41
An Anti-Communist	70	60
Pro Israel	25	15
A supporter of the civil rights movement	47	45
A supporter of the anti-abortion movement	32	31
A supporter of the anti-smoking movement*		41

*Asked in 1990 only

**THERE IS AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY
TO RULE THE WORLD**

	Completely & Mostly Agree	
	1987	1990
Total	60	37
<i>DEMOGRAPHICS</i>		
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	62	38
Female	58	36
<i>Race</i>		
White	61	37
Black	54	38
<i>Age</i>		
18-24	46	35
25-29	49	31
30-39	54	31
40-49	68	41
50-59	68	37
60+	70	44
<i>Education</i>		
College graduate	49	20
Other college	57	35
High school graduate	63	41
Less than high school graduate	65	47
<i>Family Income</i>		
<\$20,000	61	47
\$20,000-\$29,999	62	35
\$30,000-\$39,999	58	34
\$40,000-\$49,999	60	26
\$50,000+	56	25
<i>Region</i>		
East	59	28
Midwest	60	36
South	62	47
West	59	32
<i>Party ID</i>		
Republican	71	40
Democrat	57	37
Independent	56	34
Lean Republican	63	36
Lean Democratic	51	36
Reps. & Leaners	68	39
Dems. & Leaners	55	37

**GENERALLY SPEAKING, ELECTED OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON
LOSE TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE PRETTY QUICKLY**

	Completely Agree	
	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>
Total	22	30
<i>DEMOGRAPHICS</i>		
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	24	32
Female	21	29
<i>Race</i>		
White	21	29
Black	30	39
<i>Age</i>		
18-24	19	32
25-29	20	26
30-39	22	28
40-49	24	31
50-59	21	32
60+	24	33
<i>Education</i>		
College graduate	13	19
Other college	19	29
High school graduate	25	33
Less than high school graduate	28	37
<i>Family Income</i>		
<\$20,000	27	35
\$20,000-\$29,999	22	30
\$30,000-\$39,999	19	34
\$40,000-\$49,999	17	30
\$50,000+	14	18
<i>Region</i>		
East	22	27
Midwest	23	31
South	22	35
West	21	26
<i>Party ID</i>		
Republican	16	24
Democrat	24	28
Independent	22	37
Lean Republican	20	27
Lean Democratic	26	41
Reps. & Leaners	17	25
Dems. & Leaners	25	32

HARD WORK OFFERS LITTLE GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS

	Completely & Mostly Agree	
	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>
Total	29	36
<i>DEMOGRAPHICS</i>		
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	30	34
Female	29	38
<i>Race</i>		
White	27	34
Black	41	43
<i>Age</i>		
18-24	26	33
25-29	30	38
30-39	28	35
40-49	28	34
50-59	32	37
60+	33	38
<i>Education</i>		
College graduate	17	23
Other college	25	29
High school graduate	30	41
Less than high school graduate	43	47
<i>Family Income</i>		
<\$20,000	37	44
\$20,000-\$29,999	25	36
\$30,000-\$39,999	27	33
\$40,000-\$49,999	21	31
\$50,000+	20	22
<i>Region</i>		
East	33	36
Midwest	28	36
South	29	36
West	27	35
<i>Party ID</i>		
Republican	24	31
Democrat	32	36
Independent	31	39
Lean Republican	26	33
Lean Democratic	30	42
Reps. & Leaners	25	31
Dems. & Leaners	31	37

**I'M PRETTY WELL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY
THINGS ARE GOING FOR ME FINANCIALLY**

	Mostly & Completely Disagree	
	1987	1990
Total	35	40
DEMOGRAPHICS		
Sex		
Male	34	40
Female	35	41
Race		
White	31	39
Black	60	52
Age		
18-24	44	47
25-29	42	52
30-39	34	48
40-49	40	42
50-59	28	34
60+	25	25
Education		
College graduate	23	24
Other college	35	41
High school graduate	35	43
Less than high school graduate	43	50
Family Income		
<\$20,000	46	55
\$20,000-\$29,999	32	40
\$30,000-\$39,999	27	27
\$40,000-\$49,999	22	36
\$50,000+	17	22
Region		
East	32	44
Midwest	33	41
South	36	40
West	38	36
Party ID		
Republican	26	30
Democrat	38	42
Independent	37	45
Lean Republican	29	39
Lean Democratic	40	51
Reps. & Leaners	27	33
Dems. & Leaners	39	45

**TODAY IT'S REALLY TRUE THAT THE RICH JUST GET RICHER
WHILE THE POOR GET POORER**

	Completely Agree	
	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>
Total	31	38
<i>DEMOGRAPHICS</i>		
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	30	37
Female	33	39
<i>Race</i>		
White	28	35
Black	54	61
<i>Age</i>		
18-24	27	39
25-29	27	36
30-39	27	34
40-49	34	38
50-59	35	36
60+	36	44
<i>Education</i>		
College graduate	18	21
Other college	26	34
High school graduate	33	38
Less than high school graduate	42	57
<i>Family Income</i>		
<\$20,000	39	47
\$20,000-\$29,999	28	37
\$30,000-\$39,999	30	37
\$40,000-\$49,999	19	32
\$50,000+	19	20
<i>Region</i>		
East	31	35
Midwest	30	41
South	33	41
West	31	33
<i>Party ID</i>		
Republican	19	24
Democrat	41	50
Independent	32	38
Lean Republican	23	30
Lean Democratic	33	46
Reps. & Leaners	20	26
Dems. & Leaners	39	49

THE SHAPE OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

Over the past three years the political allegiances of the electorate have changed little despite significant changes in basic political attitudes and despite the fact that George Bush's election marked the first time since the 1940's that a member of the same political party had occupied the White House for more than two consecutive terms.

Party Affiliation

Looking at party affiliation over this period, we see a three percentage point increase in the number of people who regard themselves as Republicans and a four percentage point decline in the percentage who consider themselves Democrats. In total, the voting age population divides 28% Republican, 33% Democrat, and 39% Independent or no preference. Among registered voters the proportion professing allegiance to each party is slightly higher, but the spread between parties is the same - 32% Republican and 37% Democrat.

The increased allegiance to the Republican party and the fall off for the Democrats is comparable to the shifts in party support after the GOP victories in 1980 and 1984. Between 1979 and 1982 the Democratic plurality was reduced from 23% points to 19% points and between 1983 and 1986 it was further reduced from 19% points to 7% points. These Republican gains were offset somewhat in 1987 by some drift back to the Democrats in 1987 as the country absorbed the shock of the Iran-Contra scandal.

**PARTY AFFILIATION
The Gallup Poll**

	<i><u>Repub- lican</u></i>	<i><u>Demo- crat</u></i>	<i><u>% Pt. Spread</u></i>	<i><u>Ind.*</u></i>
<i>1975</i>	22	45	+23	33
<i>1978</i>	23	48	+25	29
<i>1979</i>	22	45	+23	33
<i>1982</i>	26	45	+19	
<i>1983</i>	25	44	+19	31
<i>1986</i>	32	39	+7	29

*Compared to other polls, Gallup's figures will always be higher for the Republican and Democrat categories and lower for Independents because it excludes the "no party" response from the % base.

Since 1987, the Democrats have lost some partisans in just about every demographic group in the country, but greater than average losses have occurred in the East, among very young people, older people, poor people, white Catholics and among union members. Republicans have registered small gains in allegiance among most segments of the public. However, GOP gains match losses for the Democrats among older people, poorer people, union members, white Catholics and in all parts of the country except the West. Regionally, the East shows the greatest party turnabout with the Democrats margin of 20% points in 1987 declining to only 9% points in the current survey.

Blacks, who have demonstrated the most loyalty to the Democrats at the polls over the past three decades, were also somewhat less likely to call themselves Democrats in the current survey than they were in 1987. At the same time, they were no more likely than in the past to identify with the Republican party.

TRENDS IN PARTY AFFILIATION

	Democrats			Republicans			Independent			Number of		
	87	90	Diff	87	90	Diff	87	90	Diff	90	Diff	Interviews
Total												(3004)
Demographics												
Sex												
Male	34	30	-4	26	31	+5	40	39	-1			(1477)
Female	39	35	-4	24	25	+1	37	40	+3			(1527)
Race												
White	31	28	-3	28	31	+3	41	41	0			(2459)
Black	70	65	-5	9	5	-4	21	30	+9			(415)
Age												
<25	31	25	-6	27	22	-5	42	53	+9			(336)
25-29	29	30	+1	27	26	-1	44	44	0			(297)
30-39	32	32	0	24	25	+1	44	43	-1			(605)
40-49	37	31	-6	22	27	+5	41	42	+1			(480)
50-59	44	36	-9	26	30	+4	30	34	+4			(363)
60+	44	40	-4	26	35	+9	30	25	-5			(897)
Education												
College graduate	28	30	+2	32	34	+2	40	36	-4			(638)
Other college	32	30	-2	29	30	+1	39	39	0			(745)
High school grad.	37	31	-6	25	29	+4	38	38	0			(904)
Less than high school graduate	46	41	-5	18	18	0	36	38	+2			(702)
Family Income												
<\$20,000	43	37	-6	19	24	+5	38	39	+1			(1138)
\$20,000-\$29,999	34	31	-3	27	29	+2	39	40	+1			(384)
\$30,000-\$39,999	33	30	-3	27	30	+3	40	40	0			(373)
\$40,000-\$49,999	28	31	+3	33	28	+5	39	41	+2			(247)
\$50,000+	28	25	-3	36	38	+2	36	37	+1			(435)
Region												
East	43	35	-8	22	26	+4	35	39	+4			(753)
Midwest	34	30	-4	24	27	+3	42	43	+1			(739)
South	37	34	-3	29	31	+2	34	35	+1			(929)
West	30	32	+2	27	26	-1	43	42	-1			(583)
Ethnicity												
Hispanic	37	36	-1	16	13	-3	47	51	+4			(244)
White												
Protestant	29	27	-2	32	37	+5	39	36	-3			(1365)
White Catholic	40	32	-8	22	25	+3	34	43	+9			(689)
Jewish	48	50	+2	17	17	0	65	67	+2			(71)
Union												
Yes	48	43	-5	16	21	+5	36	36	0			(558)
Marital Status												
Single without children	36	31	-5	20	13	-7	44	55	+11			(334)
Married with children	32	27	-5	27	32	+5	41	39	-2			(845)
Separated/Divorced	43	37	-6	17	19	+2	30	44	+14			(360)
Married	37	31	-6	27	32	+5	36	35	-1			(1763)
Single	37	32	-5	24	20	-4	39	48	+9			(510)

Clearly, the GOP has made some gains over the past three years and the Democrats have experienced some losses but, on balance the parties are mathematically where they were in the mid-1980's before Iran-Contra temporarily set back the Republicans. There is certainly no indication of a large sea change in party politics. Factoring in typically greater turnout and party loyalty among the Republicans, the parties are at parity nationwide.

The Times Mirror Typology

Times Mirror's voter typology is derived from party affiliation, political values, and measures of voter participation. It shows an overall stability comparable to what is observed for party affiliation between 1987 and 1990. It also shows in what ways the electorate has changed and why we have seen relatively little shift in partisan allegiances, despite Republican electoral victories and changing political attitudes and values.

Looking at the typology groups in partisan terms since 1987, Republican-oriented groups have increased from 39% of the public to 42%, while Democratic-oriented ones have slipped from 50% to 46% mirroring the shift in simple party allegiances. But when we look at what kinds of Republicans have become more numerous and what kind of people have been lost by the Democrats, we have a more meaningful picture of American politics. The largest gain for the Republicans has occurred among an independent group that mostly leans to the GOP - Disaffecteds. This group increased from 9% in 1987 to 12% in the current survey. It is composed of alienated, pessimistic people who distrust big business and big government. In 1988 these middle-aged, middle-income but financially pressured voters flirted with supporting Dukakis, only to desert him quickly as he was tagged as "liberal" by the Republican campaign. Although only half of this group calls itself Republican or says it leans to the Republican party, even fewer call themselves Democrats (25%) and over seven in ten supported Bush in 1990 and Reagan in 1984. The sharp rise in political and personal alienation reflected in this survey plays a significant role in the increased size of Disaffecteds as a group.

The Republican core groups, Enterprisers and Moralists, have not changed dramatically in size since 1987. There are somewhat more of the economically conservative Enterprisers (12%), particularly than there were in 1988, when this "traditional" Republican group had declined to 8%. Moralists, who are more accepting of government spending and critical of big business than Enterprisers, are extremely conservative on social and foreign policy issues. They have comprised a steady 11% of the public since 1987.

The fourth Republican-oriented group, Upbeats, showed no meaningful change in size over time. Upbeats are young moderate people who are uncritical of both business and government and take an extremely positive and optimistic view of the country's future. They lean strongly to the GOP without an obvious ideological connection to its policies. Upbeats are middle income, mostly under 40 years of age and comprise 8% of the public.

All things being equal, the changes in public values that are registered in this study have had relatively little effect on the Republican side of the ledger. The rise in alienation appears to have swelled the ranks of "disaffected" voters, but the decline in a perceived communist threat which has served to unify Republican adherents has yet to have an observable effect on GOP-oriented people.

Changes in basic political attitudes are having much more impact on people who are traditionally inclined to the Democratic party. However, as is the case for the Republicans, perceptions of a diminished communist threat are less significant than increasing alienation and economic polarization.

For the Democratic party the largest change occurs among one of its core groups. New Dealers, an aging group of traditional Democrats with roots in the New Deal Coalition, declined from 11% in 1987 to 7% in the current survey. The erosion among this moderate income but low financial pressure group reflects the continuation of a longstanding slide for the Democrats among certain demographic groups, notably working class, union members and white Catholics. But it also is a consequence of growing financial pressure among those with middle to lower incomes, particularly among older people. Compared to three years ago, there are fewer people in this demographic group who are still favorably disposed to the Democrats and not feeling financial pressure.

The second change among Democratically-oriented people also seems linked to the rise in financial pressure and the increase in public skepticism and distrust. However, in this instance the character of the group has changed, not its size. 10% of the public can be categorized as Partisan Poor, essentially the same as the 9% recorded in 1987. People in this group have very low incomes, experience great financial pressure and are principally concerned with social justice issues that have a direct bearing on their day-to-day lives. Three years ago the Partisan Poor were described as the most firmly Democratic group in the country, because they looked to the party to achieve social change. The description no longer fits.

A large percentage of this group, which bears the brunt of the social ills of the nation, has become disillusioned with a Democratic party that has not delivered. The percentage of Partisan Poor who call themselves Democrats fell from 89% in 1987 to 57% in the current survey. In turn, the number who said they were independent or expressed no party preference rose from 11% to 39%. Nearly half said they "lean" to the Democrats and only a few reported an actual shift to the Republican party (1% Republican and 5% lean Republican).

In effect, two of the four core constituency groups for the Democratic party have changed dramatically over the past three years. The reasons for these changes appear related to increased alienation, financial pressure and economic polarization.

One additional shift among Democratically-oriented groups is also apparent, but it seems less tied to distrust of the "system" than to an increasing disenchantment with the abilities of the Democratic party. Seculars, a well-educated, tolerant, middle-aged group, have had the most doubts of any about the

management ability of the party and the quality of the candidates it nominates for office. Recent experience appears to have given these liberal but skeptical people little reason to change their minds.

While Seculars are as numerous as they were three years ago, their links to the Democratic party have been weakened. The proportion of Seculars who either say they are Democrats or lean to the Democratic party declined from 77% to 69%. Only a slight increase in Republican leaning is observed for this group, whose commitment to personal freedoms issues, especially abortion, may constrain a move to the Republicans.

All other Democratic and Democratic-leaning independent groups remain the same size as in our 1987 study and basically the same in their partisan inclinations. Sixties Democrats, middle class, heavily female, tolerant, with a strong commitment to social justice, constitute 9% of the public. God & Country Democrats, who are older, poor, socially conservative and patriotic, comprise 8% of the public.

Followers, who are independents that lean to the Democrats, showed a small decline from 7% in 1987 to 5% currently. A lower socioeconomic group, Followers tend to be young people, many from minority groups, who although they see the system as irrelevant to their lives, are uncritical of its institutions and highly unlikely to vote.

TRENDS IN THE TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	May 1987	Jan 1988	May 1988	May 1990	Diff. 1987- 1990
<i>Republican Groups</i>					
Enterprisers	10	10	8	12	+2
Moralists	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	0
Sub	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>23</u>	+2
<i>Lean Republican</i>					
Upbeats	10	9	8	8	-2
Disaffected	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	+3
Sub	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>20</u>	+1
Bystanders	11	10	11	12	+1
<i>Democratic Groups</i>					
60's Democrats	8	8	10	9	+1
New Dealers	11	13	11	7	-4
God & Country Dems.	7	8	8	8	+1
Partisan Poor	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	+1
Sub	<u>35</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>34</u>	-1
<i>Lean Democratic</i>					
Followers	7	6	6	5	-2
Seculars	<u>8</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	-1
Sub	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	-3
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>					
<i>Subtotal</i> Republican-Oriented	40	39	35	43	+3
<i>Net Total</i> Democrat-Oriented	50	51	50	46	-4
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>					

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AMONG TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	Republican		Lean Republican		Democrat		Lean Democrat		Independent	
	87	90	87	90	87	90	87	90	87	90
<i>Enterprisers</i>	77	76	22	20	*	0	*	2	23	24
<i>Moralists</i>	87	97	12	2	0	0	0	0	13	3
<i>Upbeats</i>	34	38	33	34	3	3	10	5	63	54
<i>Disaffecteds</i>	16	24	28	25	6	10	21	16	78	64
<i>Bystanders</i>	16	10	13	15	20	18	14	18	65	68
<i>Followers</i>	10	10	13	11	39	43	16	22	51	45
<i>Seculars</i>	8	6	8	12	48	43	29	25	44	51
<i>60's Democrats</i>	1	1	2	5	62	66	28	23	36	33
<i>New Dealers</i>	0	1	0	0	86	95	13	4	14	5
<i>God & Country Democrats</i>	2	1	6	3	70	80	17	10	28	19
<i>Partisan Poor</i>	0	1	1	5	89	57	10	22	11	39

Changes in Political Values that Inhibit Partisan Change

The irony of these findings from the standpoint of partisanship is that the negative attitudes that have become increasingly sharp over the past three years are the ones that decrease the chances for partisan change. People who are highly distrustful of the political system or disillusioned with life are the least likely to see differences in political parties and the most likely to express frustration with both parties. For example, among the people with low alienation scores, only 19% see very little difference between the parties, while among more highly alienated 31% hold that view. Perhaps more tellingly, fully 37% of the more alienated portion of our sample could not pick a party that is concerned with the needs of people like themselves, compared to just 15% of people whose beliefs show the least alienation.

POLITICAL ALIENATION

<i>Party Concerned with you?</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>High</i>
Republicans	21	32	21	13
Democrats	42	39	45	43
Both	12	16	13	8
Neither	18	7	14	27
No Opinion	7	8	10	10

The growth in distrust of politics and disillusionment with the "system" has been greatest among the category of poor people whom we have described as the Partisan Poor. Their drift away from the Democrats is best understood in light of their increasing feelings of hopelessness and frustration with politics. The percentage of this group that expressed highly alienated political opinions rose from 38% in 1987 to 56% currently. The percentage expressing a high level of personal alienation climbed from 28% to 40% over that period. It should also be noted that the economic problems of this very underprivileged group have become even worse. No fewer than 90% agree that they often don't have enough money to make ends meet, up from the 81% recorded in 1987.

In contrast, the percentage of Enterprisers, Seculars, Sixties Democrats and Upbeats who agree with this statement declined at a time when all other groups expressed more feelings of financial pressure. These four groups, who share little else politically, are each less likely than average to concur with the statement that "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer."

Not so with the Disaffecteds, whose ranks have swelled as frustration with the "system" and economic polarization have increased. The gains that the Republican party has made among lower income people are among people who feel much frustration with the status quo. It should be kept in mind that the Republican hold on such people may not be strong. Also, the vast majority of alienated people feel little commitment to either party, and on balance feel more antipathy to the Republicans than to the Democrats. The Disaffecteds' tilt to the Republican party in the face of their anti-establishment attitudes is linked to their views on social issues and foreign policy. The latter may become less relevant as the international scene changes.

ALIENATION BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	HIGH <i>Political Alienation</i>		HIGH <i>Personal Alienation</i>	
	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>
Enterprisers	16	19	4	6
Moralists	28	26	17	22
Upbeats	16	20	6	7
Disaffecteds	76	84	32	49
Followers	40	30	28	20
Seculars	28	33	13	5
60's Democrats	27	25	8	6
New Dealers	40	37	15	20
God & Country Dems.	35	42	46	44
Partisan Poor	38	56	28	40

FINANCIAL PRESSURE BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	<i>Percent Who Agree Not Enough Money To Make Ends Meet</i>	
	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>
Enterprisers	40	14
Moralists	36	35
Upbeats	52	37
Disaffecteds	53	60
Bystanders	58	71
Followers	53	51
Seculars	40	31
60's Democrats	32	23
New Dealers	22	23
God & Country Dems.	63	73
Partisan Poor	81	91

ECONOMIC POLARIZATION BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

Percent Who Completely Agree The Rich get Richer, the Poor Get Poorer

	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>
Enterprisers	4	7
Moralists	24	31
Upbeats	16	16
Disaffecteds	48	51
Bystanders	37	54
Followers	25	34
Seculars	20	20
60's Democrats	22	34
New Dealers	42	45
God & Country Dems.	48	70
Partisan Poor	63	54

The Reduced Threat of Communism and the Shape of the Electorate

There's little indication that changing opinions about communism have had much effect on domestic politics. This is no doubt because the suddenness of the change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is both recent and so extraordinary in dimension that more time is necessary to absorb it into organic political response. An additional factor may be that just about all political groups have a changed opinion of the threat of communism. Out of the 11 typology groups only the God & Country Democrats remain as convinced as they were three years ago that there is a communist conspiracy to rule the world. They and the Followers show absolutely no change in attitudes about communism. This no doubt reflects the low level of information about the larger world among these groups.

The greatest change in attitudes about the communist threat have occurred among Enterpriser Republicans, whose information level is quite high. In 1987 their views on communism were among the most hawkish, while today they have opinions about the communist threat that are quite close to the opinions held by Sixties Democrats and Seculars. Today, Enterpriser Republicans stand out as the only group that is high on nationalism while not showing more than average concern with communism.

PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMUNIST THREAT BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

Percent Who Agree Communist Conspiracy to Rule the World

	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>Percent Highly Nationalistic</i>
Enterprisers	70	26	32
Moralists	86	55	60
Upbeats	46	26	22
Disaffecteds	74	45	35
Bystanders	50	35	32
Followers	37	40	18
Seculars	26	10	8
60's Democrats	36	10	8
New Dealers	77	48	36
God & Country Dems.	70	69	65
Partisan Poor	67	31	27

IMAGE OF THE PARTIES

The problem for the Democratic Party, and a major cause of its continuing weakness, is not that it is out of step with the concerns of the times. To the contrary, it is well thought of even by Republicans on issues of growing importance such as the environment, health care and protection of American jobs. Rather, the Democratic Party seems to many -- both inside and out -- increasingly less competent at finding the candidates or managing the machinery of government to deal effectively with those concerns. While these were identified as weaknesses in the image of the Democratic party in 1987, the party is even weaker in this regard today. The loss of confidence in the competency of the Democrats has been especially great among the Partisan Poor, who consequently have less faith in the Democratic Party as a vehicle for solving their crushing economic problems, and the Seculars, whose sophisticated disdain for the party's competence has been strongly reinforced over the past three years.

The Democrats also are losing adherents whose ties to the party were a matter of inheritance and lifelong tradition; that is, people who vote Democratic because they and their families have *ALWAYS* voted Democratic -- one of the most powerful factors in party loyalty. With grass-roots party activity displaced more and more by television, direct mail and other high-tech approaches to politics, the Democrats have apparently lost a traditional mechanism for winning and keeping adherents. Although the Republican Party has even fewer adherents reporting affiliation for "as long as I can remember," they seem to compensate better by attracting new adherents on the basis of policy and performance.

Still, the Republican Party does not seem to have fully exploited growing dissatisfaction with its Democratic opposition. While the number of Americans who say they generally like the policies of the Democratic Party has fallen five points since 1987 -- from 43 to 38 percent -- the number who say they generally like GOP policies has risen hardly at all, from 32 to 33 percent. Similarly, the number who say they generally like Republican candidates has held at 31 percent over three years while approval of Democratic candidates has fallen five points -- from 37 to 32 percent.

At least part of the reason for the GOP's lack of success in capitalizing on Democratic weakness is that during a time of growing alienation and economic polarization the GOP is increasingly seen as a party of the rich and the powerful. Between 1987 and 1990 the percentage of people who associated the party *on an unprompted basis* with "rich and monied interests" rose from 18% to 51%. Similarly, linking the GOP with business-oriented people increased from 13% in 1987 to 24% currently. Other people in the survey said the same thing but from a different perspective. *Twenty-eight percent of the sample described the party as "not being for the people". Only 5% of the public defined the Republican party that way in 1987.*

At the same time, the public's definition of the Democratic party generally has not changed and specifically there has been no increase in the number of people who spontaneously associate it with addressing the needs of middle class or poor people.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A REPUBLICAN?

(Unprompted Replies)

	1987	1990
<i>Top Five Mentions</i>		
Conservative	21	44
Rich, powerful, monied interest	18	51
Business-oriented	13	24
Not for the people	5	28

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A DEMOCRAT?

(Unprompted Replies)

	1987	1990
<i>Top Five Mentions</i>		
For working people	21	16
Liberal	18	17
Too much government spending	7	2
Cares for poor, disadvantaged	7	5
For social programs	7	5

On a *prompted* basis when respondents are asked to pick the party most concerned with the interests of the rich and powerful, 57% select the GOP and 15% the Democrats. These percentages are nearly identical to those obtained in 1987, suggesting that the Republican's "fat cat" face is not so much a new one to voters, but one that is more salient to people in this climate of opinion.

Party loyalty today is not what it once was on either side of the aisle. As in 1987 the vast majority of both Republicans and Democrats say they don't completely agree with what their party stands for (75% and 69%, respectively) and members of both parties readily admit that they sometimes support candidates of the other party.

When it comes to meaningful political roots, neither party has a lot to fall back on, but the GOP is making better progress. Twenty-four percent of those surveyed by Times Mirror said they had been a member of the Republican party as long as they could remember -- up four points from 20 percent in 1987. Thirty-seven percent said that about the Democratic Party -- down four points from three years ago. Those who feel the least historical connection to the Democratic Party, predictably, are Seculars (only 38 percent) and Followers (42 percent). Among the core Democratic constituencies, the Partisan Poor rank lowest on the longevity scale, with only 62 percent saying they have been Democrats for as long as they can remember. On the high end: New Dealers (89 percent) and God & Country Democrats (82 percent).

Among Republicans, by contrast, the tradition factor seems less important overall. Highest on the scale here are Moralists, at only 69 percent, and Enterprisers at 55 percent. Republicans also tend to generate less political involvement by their adherents, though neither party scores well in this area. Only 10 percent

of all those surveyed by Times Mirror said they were involved with the Republican Party in their own communities, compared with 16 percent who reported being involved in Democratic activities -- a one point increase for Republicans and a one point decrease for Democrats since 1987. The least active Democratic groups are Seculars (10 percent) and the Partisan Poor (24 percent).

Just over a quarter of all those surveyed (27 percent) said there was hardly any difference at all between the parties, up marginally from 25 percent in 1987, with little difference overall between Democrats and Republicans. The inside story is more instructive: *Moralists are more likely than any other GOP group to see a great deal of difference between the parties (36 percent), while their closest counterparts in terms of values on the other side of the aisle, God & Country Democrats, are similarly the staunchest on that issue in their party (40 percent).*

Those most likely to see hardly any difference at all -- and thus potentially likely to cross party lines or not vote at all -- are Republican Disaffecteds (36 percent), Democratic Followers (32 percent), Seculars (29 percent) and the Partisan Poor (24 percent).

The images of the parties differ dramatically on various specific issues, to the detriment of the Democrats on balance. This is despite the fact that on the key question of which party is most "concerned with the needs of people like me," Democrats hold a clear edge among all those surveyed -- cited by 42 percent vs. only 21 percent who named the Republican Party. That Democratic edge is shrinking, however, down from a 47-42 percent margin in early 1988. Within the parties, 80 percent of Democrats feel their party is concerned about people like them, compared with only 53 percent of Republicans who feel that way about the GOP.

Among the Democratic constituencies, however, barely 50 percent of Seculars, 55 percent of Followers and 63 percent of the Partisan Poor feel cared about by the party, compared with 75 percent of Sixties Democrats, an equal 75 percent of God & Country types and 78 percent of New Dealers.

The levels of perceived concern are obviously lower on the Republican side. Not even two-thirds of Moralists (59 percent) and barely more than a majority of Enterprisers (53 percent) feel that the Republican Party is concerned with their needs. More remarkable, 24 percent of Upbeats and nearly a third of Disaffecteds (32 percent) actually say the Democratic Party is more concerned about them than the GOP. Among Democratic groups, no more than 11 percent credit the GOP with caring about their needs.

On the other hand, Republicans have an increasing edge in competence categories. They are perceived as better organized by a 40-16 percent margin over the Democrats -- up from a 34-19 plurality in 1987. Republicans also are seen as better at selecting good candidates for office, by a 32-22 percent margin, increased from a marginal 27-26 difference three years ago.

Increased disillusionment with the quality of the Democratic party's choice of candidates is most apparent among the two groups of Democrats who show the most drift to Independent status over the past three years, Partisan Poor (-18% pts) and the Seculars (-11% pts).

**PARTY BEST DESCRIBED BY THE PHRASE:
SELECT GOOD CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE**

	Republicans			Democrats		
	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>
Total	27	32	+5	26	22	-4
Enterprisers	55	61	+6	3	5	+2
Moralists	63	62	-1	3	5	+2
Upbeats	39	46	+7	10	10	0
Disaffecteds	30	37	+7	12	17	+5
Bystanders	19	26	+7	22	16	-6
Followers	18	24	+6	32	36	+4
Seculars	15	20	+5	32	21	-11
60's Democrats	15	15	0	33	31	-2
New Dealers	8	14	+6	46	42	-4
God & Country Dems.	16	14	-2	53	50	-3
Partisan Poor	10	12	+2	54	36	-18

As significantly, the Republicans are perceived as better able to manage the federal government by a 28-20 percent margin, whereas it was a 24-25 percent toss-up on this score in 1987. Even among Democrats themselves, less than a majority, 45 percent, see their party as able to manage best. Strongest support for Democratic management comes from the God & Country Democrats (48 percent) and the Partisan Poor (only 40 percent); less impressed with the party's managerial capability are Followers (32 percent) and 60's Democrats (35 percent). Seculars who increasingly think of themselves as Independents stand out on this measure as having much lower confidence in the Democratic party's ability to manage. Only 18% of this group selected the Democrats, while nearly as many (15%) chose the Republicans.

Still, Republicans are not profiting fully from these shifts, arguably because direction as well as competence is important in politics. While the number of Americans who think the Democrats "can bring the kind of changes this country needs" has fallen from 36 percent to 31 percent over three years, the number who favor the GOP on this score has risen only a point to 27 percent. The explanation may be found in other partisan comparisons, largely on social welfare issues. Democrats are seen as better able than Republicans to keep Social Security financially sound (41-28 percent), to improve the educational system (42-30 percent), protect the environment (40-24 percent), deal with homelessness (52-15 percent) and improve health care (50-20 percent).

In the new cold war of international economic struggle, the results are mixed. Democrats have a 40-30 percent edge as being best able to protect U.S. jobs, but Republicans have a 41-25 percent margin as better able to make "America competitive in the world economy." And 40 percent see Republicans as better able to generate economic growth, compared with only 29 percent who see that description as better characterizing the Democrats. Twenty percent of the Partisan Poor agree that the GOP is more capable on this key issue.

If that gives Republicans the prosperity issue, they also clearly have foreign policy on their side. A 55 percent majority of all those surveyed sees the Republican Party as best able to deal with the Soviet Union, compared with 17 percent who cited the Democrats. The GOP also has a 39-20 percent margin as better able to handle the dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and a 41-26 percent margin for making America more respected in the world. The Republicans also are seen by a 32-23 percent margin as better able to win the war against drugs, now both a national and international problem.

Where are we headed for the 1990 congressional elections? The public's lack of confidence in the competence of Democrats, and increasing identification of the GOP as for the rich and powerful results in little change in voting intentions. The Democrats hold on to a narrow 48% to 42% edge over the Republicans when the public is asked who they would like to see win in their congressional district next fall. In a June 1986 Gallup Poll, the Democrats led the Republicans by a very similar 49% to 43% margin .

The Democratic edge holds in all regions of the country: 49 to 39 percent in the East, 48 to 40 percent in the Midwest, but only a bare 47 to 46 percent in the South and 45 to 44 percent in the West. The gender gap remains as well: while men favor Republican congressional candidates by a 47 to 42 percent margin, women favor Democrats by a solid 52 to 38 percent edge. And the minority vote remains even more solidly a Democratic province: while whites favor the GOP in congressional races by a 47 to 42 percent margin, non-whites prefer Democratic victories by a resounding 76 to 16 percent margin. The Democratic party is favored, not surprisingly, by 89 percent of 1988 Dukakis voters.

Looking at the typology, we see the highest GOP Congressional support among the two core groups, Moralists (94 percent) and Enterprisers (90 percent), and much less from Upbeats (70 percent) and Disaffecteds (only 46 percent). Strongest Democratic support comes from the shrinking ranks of New Dealers (87 percent), God & Country Democrats (88 percent) and 60's Democrats (84 percent), as opposed to Followers (68 percent), Seculars (66 percent) and the Partisan Poor (82 percent).

CONGRESSIONAL PREFERENCE

	Republicans	Democrats	Other Undecided	Number of Interviews
Total	42	48	10	(2308)
<i>Demographics</i>				
<i>Sex</i>				
Male	47	42	11	(1142)
Female	39	52	9	(1166)
<i>Race</i>				
White	47	42	11	(1910)
Black	9	82	9	(326)
<i>Age</i>				
<25	38	47	15	(172)
25-29	42	43	15	(181)
30-39	40	47	13	(436)
40-49	39	49	12	(390)
50-59	45	46	9	(316)
60+	47	48	5	(796)
<i>Education</i>				
College graduate	48	43	9	(573)
Other college	43	44	13	(591)
High school graduate	42	46	12	(667)
Less than high school graduate	35	59	6	(468)
<i>Family Income</i>				
<\$20,000	36	56	8	(807)
\$20,000-\$29,999	41	47	12	(304)
\$30,000-\$39,999	45	46	9	(311)
\$40,000-\$49,999	42	50	8	(207)
\$50,000+	54	35	11	(376)
<i>Region</i>				
East	39	49	12	(580)
Midwest	40	48	12	(574)
South	46	47	7	(724)
West	44	45	11	(430)
<i>Ethnicity</i>				
Hispanic	36	59	5	(144)
White Protestant	53	40	7	(1094)
White Catholic	40	46	14	(517)
Jewish	26	67	7	(65)
<i>Union Household</i>				
Yes	32	59	9	(464)
<i>City</i>				
1 Mil.+	25	61	14	(213)
<1 Mil.	31	59	10	(436)
Suburbs	50	40	10	(947)
Non-SMSA	45	46	9	(712)

CONGRESSIONAL PREFERENCE BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

<i>Total</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Other/ Undecided</i>
	42	48	10
Enterprisers	90	6	4
Moralists	94	4	2
Upbeats	70	14	16
Disaffecteds	46	32	22
Bystanders	30	47	23
Followers	19	68	13
Seculars	17	66	17
60's Democrats	5	84	11
New Dealers	8	87	5
God & Country Dems.	9	88	3
Partisan Poor	9	82	9

The inherent advantage of incumbency for Democrats in these congressional elections is not only the superior financial base and greater potential for media exposure. Incumbents have, in addition, had time to demonstrate their skills as representatives and managers of the district offices that are the most direct connection many Americans have with the Federal government beyond filing annual returns to the Internal Revenue Service. To the degree that this resolves the competency question in favor of Democratic candidates, there is no reason to predict a dramatic decline in their ability to retain a congressional edge.

**PARTY BEST DESCRIBED BY THE PHRASE:
CAN BRING THE KIND OF CHANGES THE COUNTRY NEEDS**

	Republicans			Democrats		
	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>
<i>Total</i>	26	27	+1	37	31	-6
Enterprisers	67	65	-2	3	2	-1
Moralists	68	66	-2	3	7	+4
Upbeats	41	41	0	13	7	-6
Disaffecteds	22	22	0	18	15	-3
Bystanders	20	17	-3	23	22	-1
Followers	16	14	-2	42	41	-1
Seculars	11	9	-2	50	40	-10
60's Democrats	7	5	-2	61	56	-5
New Dealers	4	10	+6	70	61	-9
God & Country Dems.	8	10	+2	64	69	+5
Partisan Poor	3	9	+6	76	59	-17

**PARTY COULD DO A BETTER JOB OF:
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
1990**

	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Neither/ Don't Know</i>
<i>Total</i>	24	40	36
Enterprisers	39	29	32
Moralists	58	13	29
Upbeats	36	28	36
Disaffecteds	25	26	49
Bystanders	16	31	53
Followers	20	42	38
Seculars	9	64	27
60's Democrats	7	67	26
New Dealers	11	56	33
God & Country Dems.	16	61	23
Partisan Poor	17	49	34

**PARTY COULD DO A BETTER JOB OF:
MAKING AMERICA COMPETITIVE
1990**

	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Neither/ Don't Know</i>
<i>Total</i>	41	25	34
Enterprisers	79	3	18
Moralists	72	7	21
Upbeats	54	14	32
Disaffecteds	37	17	46
Bystanders	25	23	52
Followers	30	32	38
Seculars	34	19	47
60's Democrats	36	35	29
New Dealers	19	45	36
God & Country Dems.	22	59	19
Partisan Poor	29	39	32

**PARTY COULD DO A BETTER JOB OF:
COUNTRY'S DEFENSE POLICIES
1990**

	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Neither/ Don't Know</i>
<i>Total</i>	39	28	33
Enterprisers	70	5	25
Moralists	75	5	20
Upbeats	56	14	30
Disaffecteds	42	16	42
Bystanders	28	23	49
Followers	28	35	37
Seculars	21	38	41
60's Democrats	17	49	34
New Dealers	20	51	29
God & Country Dems.	20	62	18
Partisan Poor	23	44	33

**PARTY COULD DO A BETTER JOB OF:
GENERATING ECONOMIC GROWTH
1990**

	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Neither/ Don't Know</i>
<i>Total</i>	40	29	31
<i>Enterprisers</i>	77	6	17
<i>Moralists</i>	74	7	19
<i>Upbeats</i>	57	14	29
<i>Disaffecteds</i>	36	22	42
<i>Bystanders</i>	24	20	56
<i>Followers</i>	25	43	32
<i>Seculars</i>	38	24	38
<i>60's Democrats</i>	27	41	32
<i>New Dealers</i>	18	54	28
<i>God & Country Dems.</i>	19	68	13
<i>Partisan Poor</i>	20	55	25

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S PRIORITIES

The public's priorities have always been more responsive to changing situations than underlying political values. Even so, our new Times Mirror survey shows some remarkable changes in the way Americans rate the relative importance of problems that face this country.

With the Cold War, the nuclear nightmare, and the arms race now fast-fading memories, the list of most important problems is dominated today by drugs -- cited by 36 percent of those questioned, compared with 6 percent just three years ago. This problem is rated relatively higher by women (39 percent), non-whites (47 percent), big-city dwellers (46 percent) and, surprisingly, farmers (47 percent). Looking at the typology, we find least concern about drugs among Seculars (only 17 percent) and 60's Democrats (23) and most concern among God & Country Democrats (42 percent), New Deal Democrats (53 percent) and, predictably, the Partisan Poor (42 percent) who are often caught in the middle of the nation's escalating drug wars.

The related scourge of crime has also risen in the American consciousness, cited as the nation's most important problem now by 7 percent, up from 3 percent in 1987. Democrats (7 percent) are almost twice as likely as Republicans (4 percent) to hold this view, particularly, elderly New Dealers (10 percent) and God & Country Democrats (9 percent). And while rising crime rates are evident all across the country, big-city dwellers still seem most concerned: 14 percent cite crime as the nation's most important problem, twice the national average.

The perceived importance of the drug problem is underscored by the even larger majority supporting increased spending to reduce drug addiction -- up from 66 percent in 1987 to 73 percent this year. Though President Bush has tried to take charge of the drug issue, the movement here is largely due to Democrats, 80 percent of whom say they favor such an increase, compared with only 63 percent of Republicans. This priority is supported more by women (77 percent) than men (68 percent), and more by non-whites (84 percent) than whites (70 percent).

Also twice as prominent on the Most Important Problem list this year as in 1987 is the complex of issues involving the poorest Americans. Back in 1987, the category of hunger and poverty was cited by 6 percent of those surveyed. Today, hunger and poverty are cited by 1 and 3 percent respectively while another 8 percent cite homelessness, the newest face of poverty in the United States. Add the other 1 percent who cite welfare as the country's leading problem, and the total rises to 13 percent.

But other data in the Times Mirror survey indicate that heightened consciousness of poverty as a national problem does not necessarily mean support for devoting more resources to a solution. There has been no increase since 1987 in the number of Americans who would spend more on the problem of homelessness (67 percent), or more for aid to blacks and other minorities (35 percent). Heavy support for

increased spending on homelessness among all Democratic typology groups, including 84 percent of 60's Democrats, 87 percent of God & Country Democrats and 81 percent of the Partisan Poor, is offset by far lower levels in major GOP constituency groups such as Enterprisers (only 38 percent) and Moralists (54 percent). Most of the Republican core groups also are far below the national average of support for increased aid to minorities. Only 15 percent of Enterprisers and a similar share of Moralists see such aid as a priority in the present economic situation.

The environment also has vaulted to the higher end of the list, cited by less than 1 percent three years ago but 8 percent in 1990. Only 5 percent of Republicans were among this group, however, compared with 8 percent of Democrats, 11 percent of Independents, 16 percent of Republican leaners and 14 percent of Democratic leaners. In the typology, far and away the most support for this priority comes from Seculars (26 percent) while the least comes from two other Democratic core groups: New Deal Democrats (only 3 percent) and God & Country Democrats (4 percent).

Still, 69 percent of God & Country Democrats and 70 percent of New Deal Democrats say they would increase spending to protect the environment, as do large majorities of the other Democratic constituency groups: Seculars (89 percent), 60's Democrats (85 percent) and the Partisan Poor (70 percent). Republican groups are not nearly as likely to see this as a spending priority, but nationwide the support for increased environmental spending averages out to 71 percent this year, up from 59 percent in 1987.

Despite the nation's skyrocketing budget deficit, the latest Times Mirror survey indicates that the deficit is seen as our most pressing problem by a relatively stable number of Americans -- 12 percent in 1987 and 11 percent today. The deficit ranks somewhat higher with Republicans (13 percent) than Democrats (10 percent), higher with those who live in smaller cities (10 percent) and suburbs (13 percent) than with big-city dwellers (4 percent), and higher in the South (12 percent) and Midwest (14 percent) than on the East or West Coast (9 percent each). It also ranks higher with older Americans, age 50-59 (14 percent) and 60 or over (15 percent). Concern over the deficit rises steadily with income -- increasing from 8 percent among those earning less than \$20,000 annually to 19 percent among those at the \$50,000 level or above.

Also stable nationwide is the view of inflation as our most important problem, 3 percent in 1987 and 3 percent today. The economy in general is seen as our main problem by only 5 percent today, compared with 7 percent three years ago. Seven percent of Republicans cite the economy as the most important problem, compared with 4 percent of Democrats. The level rises to 8 percent among people in the professional and business category, and to 13 percent among farmers.

TREND IN MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
Federal deficit	11	19	11
Homelessness	*	10	8
Unemployment	13	9	7
Economy (general)	10	4	5
Poverty	5	4	3
Inflation	5	2	3
Housing	*	*	2
Trade deficit	3	1	1
Recession	*	*	*
Competitiveness	*	*	*
Interest rates	*	*	*
Drugs	11	22	36
The environment	*	*	8
Crime	3	8	7
Education	*	*	4
Health care	*	*	2
AIDS	3	2	2
Failure of government	5	3	2
Hunger	*	*	1
Abortion	*	*	1
The military	*	*	1
Alcoholism	*	*	1
Social security	*	*	*
Protect jobs	*	*	*
Moral failure	5	2	3
Taxes	*	*	3
Racial tensions	*	*	2
The family	*	*	2
The elderly	*	*	2
Fear of war	23	9	1
Welfare	*	*	1
Rich get richer	*	*	1
The Soviet Union	*	*	1
The legal system	*	*	1
Over population	*	*	*
Too much foreign aid	*	*	3
The hostages	*	*	1
Japan	*	*	*
Eastern Europe	*	*	*
Germany	*	*	*

*Less than 1%

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM BY TYPOLOGY GROUP

	<u>Drugs</u>	<u>Federal Deficit</u>	<u>Homelessness</u>	<u>Environment</u>	<u>Unemployment</u>	<u>Crime</u>	<u>Economy</u>	<u>Poverty</u>	<u>Inflation</u>
Total	36	11	8	8	7	7	5	3	3
Enterprisers	31	16	7	6	4	5	9	1	2
Moralists	43	10	5	5	5	6	3	3	2
Upbeats	35	13	11	11	8	6	4	1	1
Disaffecteds	31	11	7	10	4	8	6	2	1
Bystanders	39	5	6	6	8	5	2	3	7
Followers	10	11	7	8	8	3	5	1	
Seculars	17	17	12	26	2	6	7	6	1
60's Democrats	23	12	12	10	9	7	5	6	2
New Dealers	53	10	9	3	8	10	4	2	2
God & Country Dems.	42	10	6	4	10	9	4	3	4
Partisan Poor	42	8	6	7	14	7	7	1	3

Looking at longstanding public concerns that don't dominate headlines but are closer to the day-to-day personal concerns of people, we see even higher levels of public concern about education and health care than three years ago.

Support for increased spending to improve the nation's health care system has risen from 72 percent to 80 percent over three years. Among Republican subgroups, only Enterprisers (53 percent) fall significantly below the national average; God & Country Democrats and the Partisan Poor share nearly identical high levels of support (91 percent and 92 percent respectively).

As in 1989, when we asked respondents what *they* most worry about affording, the largest category of answers related to health care -- 28% mentioned health care expenses for a major illness, 14% long term health care for the elderly, and 8% day to day health care expenses. Health care costs are clearly of greater concern than other types of costs for all typology groups, except the Partisan Poor -- among whom the cost of housing is of equal concern.

There has also been a sharp rise in support for increased spending to improve the nation's public school system, from 69 percent to 76 percent over the past three years. As with most spending programs, there is more support from Democrats (80 percent) than Republicans (66 percent). It is an issue on which there is agreement by majorities of 80 percent or more among New Dealers, God & Country Democrats and the Partisan Poor.

Support for increased spending on aid for college students has also increased from only 43 percent in 1987 to a 51 percent majority today. Stronger than average support for higher spending in this category comes from Upbeats (59 percent) and the Partisan Poor (67 percent), while Enterprisers (30 percent), Moralists (40 percent) and the Disaffecteds (41 percent) are at the low end.

Support for increased spending on AIDS research has actually fallen since 1987, from 69 percent to 59 percent today. Less than half of Republican voters (46 percent) now support such additional funding, while 67% of Democrats do. Support is higher among single people (71 percent) and non-whites (75 percent), and lower among farmers (38 percent).

Support for increased funding for Social Security is essentially stable at 63 percent (compared with 64 percent in 1987). The strongest support comes from God & Country Democrats and the Partisan Poor (83 percent each). Increased spending on long-term care for the elderly also is supported by 76 percent of Americans, with no great variations among sub-groups. For example, such spending increases are favored now by 74 percent of Americans aged 18-24, as well as a predictable 80 percent of those 60 or older.

Only a modest 53 percent majority favors increased spending on childcare facilities that would permit better care while parents work. Strongest support comes from God & Country Democrats (70 percent), the Partisan Poor (72 percent) and non-whites (71 percent). Least support comes from Enterprisers (29 percent) and Moralists (43 percent).

The Times Mirror survey also shows slim majorities of support for increased spending to aid farmers (50 percent), to rebuild highways, bridges and roads (54 percent) and for scientific research (51 percent, up from 45 percent in 1987).

INCREASE SPENDING FOR THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

	Improving and Protecting the Environment			Research on AIDS			Improving the Nation's Health Care		
	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>Diff</i>
<i>Total</i>	59	71	+12	69	59	-10	72	80	+8
Enterprisers	44	64	+20	60	43	-17	42	53	+11
Moralists	52	54	+2	64	49	-15	68	76	+8
Upbeats	56	83	+27	73	55	-18	71	84	+13
Disaffecteds	59	68	+9	66	51	-15	69	82	+13
Bystanders	55	71	+16	61	62	+1	75	83	+8
Followers	56	63	+7	69	61	-8	67	73	+6
Seculars	71	89	+18	69	71	+2	75	79	+4
60's Democrats	76	85	+9	76	75	-1	76	86	+10
New Dealers	58	70	+12	71	58	-13	80	84	+4
God & Country Dems.	64	69	+5	74	73	-1	85	91	+6
Partisan Poor	60	70	+10	76	64	-12	84	92	+8

POLICY POSITIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

The abortion issue grows ever more contentious politically. As Supreme Court decisions throw the question back to state legislatures and grass-roots political forces, we find that public opinion has shifted more heavily against legal changes that would make abortions more difficult to obtain. Whereas only 49 percent of all Americans opposed such restrictive changes in 1985, and only 51 percent in 1987, fully 55 percent now express opposition (including 26 percent who cite strong opposition). The number of those favoring such restrictions has dropped even more precipitously, to 38 percent -- down three percentage points since 1987, down nine since 1985.

The Times Mirror survey also demonstrates that the sharpest division over the abortion issues is among women. Twenty-four percent of women strongly favor restrictive legal changes (vs. only 18 percent of men), while 28 percent of women strongly oppose such changes (vs. only 24 percent of men). Thus 52 percent of women feel strongly about this issue, compared with only 42 percent of men.

The abortion issue also continues to be more divisive -- and thus more dangerous -- for the Republican Party. Our survey shows that Republicans and Republican leaners split almost evenly, 47 to 48 percent in favor of more restrictive abortion laws. Compare that with the relatively lopsided 62-33 margin against such new laws among Democrats and Democratic leaners. Moreover, the typology shows significant opposition to greater restrictions on abortion in several key GOP subcategories. This opposition could arguably lead to party-switching at election time for the 19 percent of Enterprisers, 21 percent of Upbeats and 25 percent of Disaffecteds who indicate strong opposition to tougher anti-abortion laws -- especially the women among them. By contrast, among the leaners that Democrats rely on, only 30 percent favor restrictive new abortion laws -- and only about half of them (16 percent) feel strongly enough to make party defection by them very likely. Republican pro-life candidates clearly face potentially far greater defections on this issue than do pro-choice Democrats.

And what about a "kid connection?" Does having children affect positions on abortion policy? Only in traditional families, it seems. Married respondents with children oppose tougher abortion laws by a far narrower margin than the nation as a whole (50 to 46 percent, including 27 percent who strongly support such tougher laws). Married respondents without children mirror the national split almost precisely -- opposing tougher laws by 56 to 38 percent. Also opposing tougher laws are single parents (57 to 38 percent), widowed or divorced parents (58 to 38 percent) and widowed or divorced people without children (52 to 38).

Another passionate response to changing circumstances is found in the area of trade policy. The overall balance of opinion toward taxes on imports to protect American jobs has changed little since 1987 -- from 75 in favor and 20 percent opposed then to a 77-18 percent margin today. But within those totals, the number who now *strongly* favor such protectionist tariffs has risen 8 percentage points -- from 28 to 36

percent. Republicans as a group are somewhat more in favor of these tariffs than Democrats, with majorities of 78 and 75 percent respectively. But the Democrats have an edge among those who strongly support taxes on imports -- 36 percent of Democrats strongly favor them vs. only 32 percent of Republicans. One reason for this, most likely, is the suspicion among the most well-educated and financially sophisticated GOP core group that such taxes might well backfire. Only 25 percent of Enterprisers strongly support tax increases to protect U.S. jobs. Not surprisingly, the most prosperous and financially sophisticated Democratic constituency groups also appear more dubious than most Americans about protectionist strategies. Only 21 percent of Seculars and 22 percent of Sixties Democrats strongly favor increased taxes on foreign imports. By contrast, 51 percent of God & Country Democrats strongly favor such increases -- the largest response of any group to this question -- suggesting that fighting foreign economic foes may have taken the place of anti-communism as a key mobilizing principle for this group in the post-Cold War period.

The fading of the Cold War and the consequent loss of anti-communism as a driving force in public affairs is evident as well in the stand off that now exists on the government's "Star Wars" program to develop a space-based defense against nuclear attack. The number of those who support "Star Wars" has dropped to 45 percent -- off 7 percentage points since 1987 and 12 points since 1985. Opposition has risen to 46 percent -- up ten points since 1987 and 11 points since 1985. Republicans and Democrats are still at odds on this program, however. Republicans split 55-39 in favor of "Star Wars" while Democrats break 52-38 against the program. But on this policy, predictably, God & Country Democrats divide as if they were Republicans -- 52-36 in favor. And New Deal Democrats are almost evenly split, 46-43 in favor. Among Republican constituencies, total opposition to "Star Wars" is highest among Enterprisers (38 percent) and Disaffecteds (46 percent). Overall, strong support for "Star Wars" runs lowest (8 percent) -- and strong opposition runs highest (20 percent) -- among the best-educated Americans, those with college degrees.

There is a significant 57-36 margin in favor of increasing environmental controls even if that reduces employment opportunities. But economic factors play a powerful role in determining that balance. Support is highest among those least vulnerable to the demand for sacrifice. Among the wealthiest Americans, making \$50,000 or more, fully 70 percent support tougher environmental controls, while only 27 percent oppose them. Support runs similarly high among college graduates (69 percent including 25 percent who say their support is strong) and those with at least some college (64 percent, including 20 percent who strongly favor tougher controls). Those in the business and professional category express a 70 percent level of support, including 21 percent strong support. Such controls are favored far more narrowly by those worst off financially, holding just a 48-44 margin of support among those who earn under \$20,000. There is little difference on this issue between union and non-union households. The former support increased environmental controls by a 60-35 percent margin, the latter by a 56-36 percent margin.

Given the basic economic underpinning of opinion on this policy, it should not be surprising that Republicans on balance are somewhat more supportive of stepped-up environmental controls (by a 60-35

percent margin) than are Democrats (54-37 in favor). On the Republican side, Upbeats are the most supportive constituency group, with 66 percent in favor (including 23 percent strongly in favor).

On the Democratic side, fully 88 percent of Seculars are supportive, including 35 percent who say they strongly favor increased controls. But these Democrats are offset by the Democratic constituency least capable of making sacrifices for the environment -- the Partisan Poor, who split 54-36 **AGAINST** increased controls that put jobs at risk.

It is a truism that having children gives us both a concern for and a tangible connection with posterity, and thus it would seem a logical element in deciding positions on policies for ecological survival. In fact, however, the Posterity Factor proves to be statistically ambiguous at best. Married people are more supportive of more environmental controls (61 percent) than singles (54 percent). Yet, married people with children are actually less in favor of such controls (60 percent) than those without (62 percent.) Of course, this may be because the latter group contains more high-income, high-education, childless professional couples.

Among hard-pressed heads of households, economics again offset the posterity factor. Single parents actually oppose stiffer environmental controls that might cost jobs by a slim 46-44 percent margin. Widowed and divorced parents support them more narrowly than the public generally (51-42 percent).

The increased presence of narcotics and handguns nationwide has helped create clear majorities for aggressive approaches to these modern plagues. There is a 73-24 percent margin in favor of capital punishment for major narcotics dealers and a 65-33 percent majority for tougher restrictions on handgun sales. These majorities hold up across all political, typological and demographic lines, albeit with interesting variations.

On the question of death penalties for major drug traffickers, sentiments are strong across the board, with 42 percent saying they are strongly in favor and only 6 percent feeling strongly opposed. Republicans are more strongly supportive than Democrats, however. Our survey shows an 82 to 17 percent margin in favor among Republicans, compared with a 66 to 30 percent margin among Democrats. But within the Democratic constituency groups, the margins of support indicated by God & Country Democrats (79 percent) and New Dealers (80 percent) look more like those of key Republican groups: Enterprisers (80 percent support), Disaffecteds (85 percent) and Moralists (87 percent).

Expressing less than the national average of support for capital punishment of drug bosses are two other principal Democratic groups: the Partisan Poor (66 percent) and 60's Democrats (53 percent). Other groups expressing less than average support for putting drug lords to death are college graduates (61 percent), non-whites (66 percent), those who live in big cities with populations of a million or more and frequently high crime rates (68 percent), and those in the professional/business category (68 percent). On the income scale, only the wealthiest Americans, earning \$50,000 or more, drop below the national level in their support of death sentences for major drug dealers (67 percent).

Although the drug problem is often viewed most seriously as a menace to young people, the "kid connection" again proves ambiguous. Married people with children are slightly more supportive of death sentences than the national average (74 percent, with 43 percent strongly in favor), but married people without children are even *MORE* supportive (76 percent, with 48 percent strongly in favor). Single parents fall below the national level (69 percent in favor) as do widowed and divorced people without children (71 percent), while widowed and divorced parents exceed it slightly (75 percent in favor).

On the issue of further restricting the sale of handguns, solid majorities of 60 percent or more are found in favor. Democrats are more supportive here, by a 68 to 30 percent margin, compared with a 60 to 37 percent margin among Republicans. Looking at the Times Mirror typology, we find the highest levels of support among 60's Democrats (84 percent) and the lowest among those most suspicious of Government controls -- Enterprisers (57 percent), Followers (56 percent) and Disaffecteds (55 percent). In terms of traditional demographics, crime-plagued big-city dwellers show higher than average support for more gun control (78 percent), as do women (73 percent), non-whites (73 percent) and college graduates (73 percent). Slimmer-than-average majorities of support are found among those with less than a high school education (59 percent) and those earning under \$20,000 annually (61%).

Putting more pressure on China to improve human rights conditions, even if it jeopardizes long-term U.S. relations with the Chinese is favored by a 53-35 percent margin nationwide, but with considerable variations among key subgroups. Democrats are much more supportive of increased pressure (57 to 30 percent) than Republicans (52 to 38 percent). This is because among Republican constituencies Enterprisers are split almost evenly, 48 to 45 percent in favor of increased pressure, and Upbeats split even more evenly, 49 to 47 in favor. Moralists, by contrast, split 59 to 24 percent in favor of putting human rights principles before beneficial Sino-American relations. Disaffecteds echo this view with a 59 to 31 percent margin in favor of increased pressure. Across the partisan boundary, God & Country Democrats, with their long tradition of anti-communism, show high levels of support for pressure on China (60 percent), but so do more liberal Seculars (61 percent) shocked by the violence at Tiananmen Square. Least support for increased pressure comes from those groups least concerned with foreign affairs, Followers (only 44 percent favor) and the Partisan Poor (44 percent).

Levels of support for increased pressure appear to grow with income: 50 percent for those earning under \$20,000, 52 percent for the \$20,000-29,000 group, 56 percent for those earning between \$30,000 and \$49,000. Support jumps to 61 percent for those earning above \$50,000. Non-whites support increased pressure at the same level as the nation as a whole, but with a larger number strongly in favor (22 percent). Women are less likely to support pressure tactics (only 50 percent in favor). Also expressing less than the national level of support for stepped up pressure on China are those with less than a high school education (45 percent) and the youngest Americans surveyed, those between 18 and 24 (49 percent).

**PERCENT FAVORING PROGRAMS AND PROPOSALS BEING
DISCUSSED IN THE COUNTRY TODAY**

	Proposals to Changing the Laws to Make it More Difficult for a Women to Get an Abortion			Increase Taxes on Foreign Imports to Project American Jobs in Certain Industries		
	<u>87</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>Diff</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>Diff</u>
<i>Total</i>	41	38	-3	75	77	+2
Enterprisers	40	44	+4	63	67	+4
Moralists	60	63	+3	81	84	+3
Upbeats	40	42	+2	84	80	-4
Disaffecteds	44	37	-7	84	83	-1
Bystanders	37	37	0	70	78	+8
Followers	43	40	-3	60	62	+2
Seculars	13	5	-8	60	64	+4
60's Democrats	26	20	-6	71	70	-1
New Dealers	54	45	-9	87	84	-3
God & Country Dems.	47	46	-1	78	83	+5
Partisan Poor	38	38	0	82	83	+1

**PERCENT FAVORING PROGRAMS AND PROPOSALS BEING
DISCUSSED IN THE COUNTRY TODAY**

	Increasing Environmental Controls, Even if it Reduces Employment Opportunities			<u>Restricting the Sale of Hand Guns</u>		
	<i><u>Favor</u></i>	<i><u>Oppose</u></i>	<i><u>DK</u></i>	<i><u>Favor</u></i>	<i><u>Oppose</u></i>	<i><u>DK</u></i>
<i>Total</i>	57	36	7	65	33	2
Enterprisers	61	35	4	57	41	2
Moralists	59	35	6	60	38	2
Upbeats	66	30	4	73	26	1
Disaffecteds	54	37	9	55	42	3
Bystanders	45	47	8	62	36	2
Followers	42	46	12	56	40	4
Seculars	89	11	*	77	23	*
60's Democrats	67	30	3	84	15	1
New Dealers	56	34	10	71	26	3
God & Country Dems.	53	33	14	64	34	2
Partisan Poor	35	54	11	66	32	2

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

American attitudes toward foreign affairs issues and defense policies are being influenced by three factors. First, there is the decreasing perception of a communist threat. Second, there is no accompanying decline in American nationalism and militancy. Third, nations that have traditionally been seen as friends are now increasingly viewed unfavorably by the American public.

As a consequence, there is still a reservoir of popular support for American defense expenditures, despite the sweeping international changes that have occurred in the past year. Even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the American military involvement in the Persian Gulf, there was a clear indication in the Times Mirror study that there is still substantial support for military spending. While there is certainly less support for specific programs such as "Star Wars", the public remains cautious in its attitudes about defense policy. For example, even though the proportion favoring a cut in defense spending rose from 29% in 1987 to 40% in 1990, large segments of the public still favor either keeping defense spending the same (39%) or increasing it (18%). Further public support for defense spending can only be accruing as a consequence of recent events in the Mideast.

Opinions about the military and the *CIA* also show little change in post-cold war America. Seven in ten Americans continue to hold favorable opinions of the military, not quite as high as in pre-Iran/Contra surveys in 1985 and 1986 (77%-85%), but no lower than surveys conducted in 1987 and 1988. Opinion of the *CIA* has actually improved markedly since 1987. Forty-eight percent in the current survey gave the *CIA* a favorable rating, compared to 40% in May of 1987.

TREND IN THE FAVORABILITY RATING OF THE CIA

	<u>MAY</u> <u>1990</u>	<u>MAY</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>JULY</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>JUNE</u> <u>1985</u>
Very Favorable	8	5	6	7	7
Mostly Favorable	40	35	32	43	42
Mostly Unfavorable	22	35	23	18	23
Very Unfavorable	11	11	11	6	10
Never Heard Of	1	*	0	1	2
Can't Rate	18	14	28	25	16
Sample Size	(3004)	(2169)	(1502)	(1504)	(2104)

TREND IN THE FAVORABILITY RATING OF THE MILITARY

	<u>MAY</u> <u>1990</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1988</u>	<u>APRIL-</u> <u>MAY</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>JULY</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>JUNE</u> <u>1985</u>
Very Favorable	18	20	17	19	32	24
Mostly Favorable	55	57	63	54	53	53
Mostly Unfavorable	15	14	12	11	7	13
Very Unfavorable	6	3	4	5	3	5
Never Heard Of	*	*	0	0	0	*
Can't Rate	6	6	4	11	5	5
Sample Size	(3004)	(2109)	(2169)	(1502)	(1504)	(2104)

The big shift in public opinion is the sudden emergence of unfavorable opinions about Japan. Our current survey differs from other recent polls in that it doesn't merely show a decline in highly favorable opinions toward Japan, but indicates that the long anticipated shift in the general public's opinion of the Japanese has taken place.

In the current survey, the division of favorable to unfavorable opinions about Japan is a relatively narrow 56% favorable to 39% *unfavorable*. In 1987 that margin was 69% favorable to 27% unfavorable. To put the current results in perspective, opinion of Japan and opinion of the Soviet Union were not materially different. The favorable to unfavorable ratio for the Soviet Union was 51% to 44%.

The increase in unfavorable opinions of the Japanese is evident in just about all demographic, political and social groups. However, some of the largest proportionate increases have occurred among groups of people who previously held a more positive view of Japan than average Americans. The greatest increases in unfavorable opinion toward the Japanese occurred among whites, men, upper income earners and those in the western United States, all of whom expressed more friendly attitudes toward the Japanese in 1987 than did their demographic counterparts.

Dislike for Japan has become more mainstream; it is no longer primarily concentrated among the kinds of people who have been hit especially hard by Japanese competition.

On the Republican side, free market Enterprisers and moderate Upbeats held much more favorable opinions of Japan in 1987 than more intolerant Moralists and financially pressed Disaffecteds. In the current survey the proportionate increase in antipathy toward Japan has been greatest among Upbeats and Enterprisers. At this point all four Republican-oriented groups hold generally similar opinions of Japan.

A somewhat different pattern is evident among Democratic groups. Unfavorable opinions of Japan have grown most among well-informed, progressive Seculars and poorly informed, intolerant God & Country Democrats. There is also a greater division of opinion about Japan within the Democratic ranks than there is among Republicans. Only about a third of liberal Seculars and 60's Democrats think of Japan unfavorably, compared with almost half of the New Dealers and God & Country Democrats.

RATINGS FOR JAPAN BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	<u>Favorable</u>			<u>Unfavorable</u>		
	<u>87</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>Diff</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>Diff</u>
<i>Total</i>	69	55	-14	27	39	+12
Enterprisers	81	60	-19	19	39	+20
Moralists	68	54	-14	29	40	+11
Upbeats	81	64	-17	16	33	+17
Disaffecteds	61	50	-11	33	45	+12
Bystanders	66	51	-15	25	38	+13
Followers	58	61	+3	38	28	-10
Seculars	84	67	-17	15	33	+18
60's Democrats	77	70	-7	22	30	+8
New Dealers	56	48	-8	39	46	+7
God & Country Dems.	65	41	-24	27	49	+22
Partisan Poor	62	50	-12	32	42	+10

RATINGS FOR JAPAN BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS

	Favorable			Unfavorable		
	87	90	Diff	87	90	Diff
Total	69	55	-14	27	39	+12
Demographics						
Sex						
Male	73	56	-17	24	40	+16
Female	65	55	-10	29	38	+9
Race						
White	71	56	-15	25	40	+15
Black	57	51	-6	37	38	+1
Age						
<25	71	59	-12	26	36	+10
25-29	80	60	-20	18	35	+17
30-39	75	63	-12	22	32	+10
40-49	69	55	-14	28	41	+13
50-59	65	57	-8	29	38	+10
60+	58	43	-15	34	49	+15
Education						
College graduate	84	70	-14	16	30	+14
Other college	75	60	-15	24	38	+14
High school graduate	67	54	-13	29	40	+11
Less than high school graduate	57	42	-15	32	46	+12
Family Income						
<\$20,000	61	50	-9	32	41	+17
\$20,000-\$29,999	71	67	-4	26	30	+4
\$30,000-\$39,999	75	60	-15	21	36	+15
\$40,000-\$49,999	77	57	-20	20	42	+22
\$50,000+	81	61	-20	20	37	+17
Region						
East	66	57	-9	29	40	+11
Midwest	71	58	-13	26	36	+10
South	66	53	-13	28	41	+13
West	76	55	-21	22	40	+18
Ethnicity						
Hispanic	73	62	-11	22	31	+9
White Protestant	68	52	-16	28	43	+15
White Catholic	73	60	-13	22	35	+13
Jewish	67	56	-11	33	44	+11
Union Household						
Yes	67	52	-15	29	43	+14
City						
1 Mil.+	73	61	-12	25	35	+10
<1 Mil.	79	51	-28	18	41	+23
Suburbs	69	57	-12	27	39	+12
Non-SMSA	61	52	-9	32	40	+8
Marital Status						
Married	71	57	-14	25	39	+14
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	58	46	-12	33	45	+12

Declining Economic Expectations, Nationalism and Anti-Japanese Sentiment

Changing attitudes toward the Japanese coincide with a decline in the personal economic expectations of the American public. In the current survey, the percentage expecting to be better off financially next year fell to 44% from the 54% recorded in Times Mirror surveys in both early 1989 and mid-1988. One in four Americans expect to be worse off than they were a year ago, up from the 15% who expressed that opinion in our 1989 poll.

Over this same period the public became even more bearish about the national economy. The percentage saying that economic conditions in the country would deteriorate rose from 22% in 1989 to 31% currently.

We see a link between the rise in economic pessimism and growing dislike of Japan. Analysis of our 1989 survey on public attitudes toward economic issues concluded that "as long as a majority of the public continued to think that things will be better for them next year ... the psychological effects of the deficit and the trade problem would remain latent and that there were no 'emotional overtones to the trade competition' issue." In the current survey, opinions of Japan are correlated with personal economic expectations. Among people who expect to be better off next year, 34% hold unfavorable views of the Japanese. The number increases to 44% among those who expect to be worse off.

As might be expected, nationalism also tends to correlate with opinions about Japan. Among those who expressed the most consistently nationalistic opinions, 45% held an unfavorable opinion of the Japanese. At the other end of the nationalist opinion spectrum, only 31% expressed negative feelings for Japan. When these two sentiments, strong nationalism and a poor economic outlook, are combined, the percentage disliking Japan reaches near the 50% mark.

It is the combination of nationalistic attitudes *and* economic pessimism that accounts for the greater division of opinion about Japan among Democrats than Republicans. 60's Democrats and Seculars, with their low level of nationalism, are more favorably disposed toward Japan than are other highly nationalistic or financially pressured groups. This cleavage of opinion on Japan is reminiscent of the traditional split within the Democratic party regarding communism.

If concern about our economic place in the world replaces communism as a major theme in American public opinion, it will do so in an environment of increasing pessimism. The percentage of the public feeling that American ability to compete in the world market place has gotten worse now stands at 51% (compared to 47% in 1989), and the proportion of the public which believes that the U.S. will regain its competitive abilities has fallen. In the 1990 survey, 39% expect improvements, compared to 46% a year ago.

Even so, fewer Americans today say that Japan is the world's leading economic power (46%) than held that opinion in 1989 (58%). In turn, more respondents in the current poll said the U.S. is number one (41% vs 29% in 1989). This would suggest that the decrease in Japan's rating as the leading economic power

has more to do with growing American dislike of Japan than with a changing perception of the economic power of that country.

**RATING OF U.S. ABILITY TO COMPETE IN
WORLD MARKETPLACE FOR PAST TEN YEARS**

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
Improved	21	20
Gotten Worse	47	51
No Change	27	25
Don't Know	5	4

**RATING OF U.S. ABILITY TO COMPETE IN WORLD
MARKETPLACE IN THE FUTURE**

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
Improve	46	39
Worsen	17	23
Stay the same	32	32
Don't Know	5	6

LOOKING AHEAD ONE YEAR - NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

	<u>Jan</u> <u>1988</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1988</u>	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1989</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1990</u>
Better	22	24	25	18
Worse	26	20	22	31
Same	45	46	49	45
Don't Know	7	10	4	6

LOOKING AHEAD ONE YEAR - OWN FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS

	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1988</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1988</u>	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1989</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1990</u>
Better	46	54	54	44
Worse	18	10	15	24
Same	30	31	28	27
Don't Know	6	5	3	5

Opinions of Israel and Mexico Less Favorable

Worsening economic prospects have little to do with increasingly unfavorable opinions about other traditional friendly nations, neighboring Mexico and longstanding ally Israel. The Intifada has had a heavy impact on public opinion about Israel. Since 1987, the balance of American opinion has moved from favorable to divided. Currently, 44% rated Israel favorably, and 45% rated it unfavorably. In 1987, the division of opinion was 65% favorable to 27% unfavorable. Growing dislike for Israel is evident across all demographic political and social groups, except among American Jews. Declines in favorability were especially evident in the Midwest and South, among whites and people who live outside of the largest American cities.

A sharp drop in the number of Americans who think of themselves as pro-Israel has accompanied the broader decline in favorable attitudes toward the Jewish state. Between 1987 and 1990 the percentage who said they self-identified with Israel dropped from 25% to 15%. The decline in self-identification with Israel was greatest among those sectors of the American public who have been the strongest supporters of Israel. Self-identification with Israel among American Jews fell from 86% in 1987 to 63% in the current survey, even though Jews were no less likely than in 1987 to say they have favorable opinions of Israel.

It is important to note that the sharp decline in identification with Israel has not been accompanied by a substantial identification with the cause of the Palestinians. Just 5% of the sample self-identified with Palestinians.

The factors behind a precipitous decline in American opinion of Mexico are less evident than in the case of Israel. The percentage of Americans who feel positively toward Mexico has declined from a two-thirds majority (67%) in 1987 to a bare 51%. Unfavorable opinions climbed from 27% to fully 42%.

There is very little demographic, social or political patterning to this decline. It is evident among Americans from all walks of life, all parts of the country and from all political persuasions. Our analysis of the survey shows no link between anti-Mexican sentiment and concern about drug use in the United States. Although the change in opinions of Mexico have occurred across the board, certain groups stand out having

had and continuing to have less favorable opinions of that country. Southerners, Westerners, Enterprisers and Disaffecteds were all less positive toward Mexico than other groups in the sample.

There may be something of a "south of the border" factor to growing dislike for Mexico. Public ratings of Panama were even more unfavorable, with a clear 55% majority rating that country unfavorably and only one in three giving it a favorable rating (34%). As with Mexico, ratings of Panama were more negative in the South and among Disaffecteds.

Opinions of Czechoslovakia

Dramatically improved opinions of the Soviet Union and the high ratings accorded Czechoslovakia have not led to a substantial desire to help former communist countries or even to much public interest in them.

Only 14% of the public favors increased aid to the new governments of Eastern Europe, and as many as 49% would like to see such aid cut. Vaclav Havel remains an unknown name to most Americans. Fully 62% of the Times Mirror sample could not rate the president of Czechoslovakia.

THE PUBLIC EVALUATES PUBLIC FIGURES AND INSTITUTIONS

Even before the crisis in the Mideast buoyed George Bush's popularity, his favorability ratings were quite high. In absolute terms, Bush's favorability score surpassed that of seventeen other political leaders tested in this poll, including former Presidents, former political opponents and possible future political opponents.

Richard Nixon continues to be regarded unfavorably by a majority of the American public. Jimmy Carter's favorability score exceeds Ronald Reagan's, despite the fact that his last White House approval rating was more than 20 percentage points below Reagan's last presidential approval measure.

Among political leaders, Bill Bradley and Robert Dole have the highest ratio of favorable to unfavorable ratings and Jesse Jackson, Jesse Helms and Dan Quayle have the lowest. It should be kept in mind that Bradley's strong ratings ratio are based upon evaluations from only 37% of the public.

The Congress gets lower favorability ratings than both President Bush and the Supreme Court. In fact, the Congress is rated favorably by only slightly more Americans than rate the *CIA* favorably.

Opinion of Congress is far less positive than it was in 1987. While almost all groups in the population feel less favorably about the Congress than they did in 1987, opinions are considerably less favorable among those groups who are most alienated -- the Partisan Poor, Followers and Disaffecteds -- and also among the two groups most concerned with the budget deficit, Enterprisers and Seculars.

Opinion of the Supreme Court is patterned quite differently. Views are most negative among those groups holding the strongest views on abortion. Moralists who are ardently pro-life and Seculars and Sixties Democrats who are strongly pro-choice rate the Court more negatively than other typology groups. Blacks and Jews also tend to be more critical of the Court than other ethnic and racial groups.

PUBLIC EVALUATIONS

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>	<u>Favorable to Unfavorable Ratio</u>
<i>George Bush</i>	24	52	15	7	2	.78
<i>Former Presidents:</i>						
Richard Nixon	8	30	33	25	4	.40
Jimmy Carter	18	49	19	10	4	.70
Ronald Reagan	18	44	20	16	2	.63
<i>National Political Leaders:</i>						
Ted Kennedy	18	43	19	15	5	.64
Jesse Jackson	12	38	23	22	5	.53
Dan Quayle	6	41	24	15	14	.55
Robert Dole	7	45	15	5	28	.72
Jesse Helms	4	19	16	11	50	.46
Richard Cheney	3	17	8	3	69	.64
Richard Gephardt	3	26	12	5	54	.63
Lloyd Bentsen	6	28	14	7	45	.62
Thomas Foley	3	17	6	3	71	.69
Bill Bradley	6	23	6	2	63	.78
Mario Cuomo	9	28	12	5	46	.68
<i>International Leaders:</i>						
Pope John Paul II	31	48	7	4	10	.88
Mikhail Gorbachev	10	52	15	12	11	.70
Vaclav Havel	5	10	2	2	81	.79
<i>Institutions:</i>						
The Congress	6	53	25	9	7	.63
The Supreme Court	10	55	18	7	10	.72
The Military	18	55	15	6	6	.78
The CIA	8	40	22	11	19	.59
The United Nations	15	55	13	6	11	.79
The Church	39	43	7	3	8	.89
<i>Media:</i>						
Daily Newspaper	22	56	12	5	5	.82
Network TV News	22	60	12	3	3	.84
<i>Other:</i>						
Investment Bankers	3	29	32	16	20	.40
The Klu Klux Klan	2	2	10	81	5	.04
Evangelical/Christians	12	31	19	19	19	.53

TRENDS IN PUBLIC EVALUATIONS

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>	<u>Favorable to Unfavorable Ratio</u>
<i>George Bush</i>	24	52	15	7	2	.78
1/89	24	54	9	4	9	.86
10/88*	23	35	20	17	5	.61
5/88	11	40	25	17	7	.54
1/88	11	41	26	13	9	.57
9/87	18	51	19	8	4	.72
5/87	11	56	19	7	7	.72
<i>Former Presidents:</i>						
Richard Nixon	8	30	33	25	4	.40
5/87	7	32	34	23	4	.41
Jimmy Carter	18	49	19	10	4	.70
5/87	14	56	19	8	3	.72
Ronald Reagan	18	44	20	16	2	.63
5/88	16	40	22	18	10	.62
1/88	17	42	24	13	4	.61
5/87	21	41	22	14	2	.63
6/85	26	43	18	10	3	.71
<i>National Political Figures Known to Virtually All Americans:</i>						
Ted Kennedy	18	43	19	15	5	.64
5/87	21	43	21	10	5	.67
6/85	17	42	22	12	7	.63
Jesse Jackson	12	38	23	22	5	.53
5/88	11	35	27	19	8	.50
5/87	13	38	24	17	8	.55
Robert Dole	7	45	15	5	28	.72
5/87	9	51	11	3	26	.81

*Based on Registered Voters

CONTINUED...

TRENDS IN PUBLIC EVALUATION

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>	<u>Favorable to Unfavorable Ratio</u>
<i>Other Well Known National Political Figures:</i>						
Jesse Helms	4	19	16	11	50	.46
5/87	3	19	15	9	54	.48
6/85	3	17	14	11	55	.44
<i>Institutions:</i>						
The Congress	6	53	25	9	7	.63
5/88	8	56	23	5	8	.70
1/88	6	58	25	4	7	.69
5/87	10	64	16	4	6	.79
<i>Media:</i>						
Daily Newspaper	22	56	12	5	5	.82
8/89	25	52	12	5	6	.82
1/89	22	56	13	4	5	.82
5/88	19	59	13	4	5	.82
1/27/88	19	62	11	3	5	.85
1/7-18/88	21	59	12	4	4	.83
10/87	21	58	9	4	8	.86
5/87	22	59	12	3	4	.84
1/87	19	57	13	6	5	.80
7/86	28	51	11	6	4	.83
6/85	25	56	8	3	8	.88
Network TV News	22	60	12	3	3	.84
8/89	28	54	11	3	4	.85
1/89	21	61	12	3	3	.84
5/88	20	58	14	4	4	.81
1/27/88	12	69	13	3	3	.84
1/7-18/88	18	60	14	4	4	.81
10/87	19	62	10	3	6	.86
5/87	21	63	11	3	2	.86
1/87	19	55	16	6	4	.77
7/86	30	53	10	4	3	.86
6/85	25	59	8	2	6	.89

RATED CONGRESS FAVORABLY

	<i>1987</i>	<i>1990</i>
Total	74	59
Enterprisers	69	52
Moralists	72	59
Upbeats	84	
Disaffecteds	65	47
Bystanders	67	48
Followers	66	52
Seculars	54	
60's Democrats	81	66
New Dealers	84	71
God & Country Dems.	81	68
Partisan Poor	74	54

1990 RATINGS FOR SUPREME COURT BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>
Total	65	25	10
Enterprisers	82	16	2
Moralists	60	32	8
Upbeats	87	9	3
Disaffecteds	63	31	6
Bystanders	58	22	20
Followers	58	25	17
Seculars	61	35	4
60's Democrats	62	34	4
New Dealers	68	21	11
God & Country Dems.	63	25	12
Partisan Poor	53	29	18

1990 RATINGS FOR SUPREME COURT BY DEMOGRAPHICS

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>
Total	65	25	10
Sex			
Male	64	29	7
Female	66	22	12
Race			
White	66	25	9
Black	59	31	10
Region			
East	61	26	13
Midwest	74	18	8
South	65	26	9
West	61	31	8
Age			
<25	77	16	7
25-29	71	18	11
30-39	65	26	9
40-49	65	28	7
50-59	59	32	9
60+	60	27	13
Education			
College Grad.	67	29	4
Other College	68	28	4
High School Grad.	67	23	10
Less than High School Grad.	59	22	19
Ethnicity			
Hispanic	66	16	18
White Protestant	65	26	9
White Catholic	69	22	9
Jewish	53	36	11
Union Household			
Yes	64	30	6
Family Income			
<\$20,000	63	24	13
\$20,000-\$29,999	65	27	8
\$30,000-\$39,999	64	30	6
\$40,000-\$49,999	72	25	3
\$50,000+	73	25	2
City			
1 Mil.+	54	33	13
<1 Mil.	65	27	8
Suburbs	70	23	7
Non-SMSA	63	24	13

PUBLIC EVALUATIONS

	<u>Very Favor- able</u>	<u>Mostly Favor- able</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavor- able</u>	<u>Very Unfavor- able</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>	<u>Favor- able to Unfavor- able Ratio</u>
George Bush	24	52	15	7	2	.78
<u>Former Presidents:</u>						
Richard Nixon	8	30	33	25	4	.42
Jimmy Carter	18	49	19	10	4	.70
Ronald Reagan	18	44	20	16	2	.63
<u>National Political Leaders:</u>						
Ted Kennedy	18	43	19	15	5	.64
Jesse Jackson	12	38	23	22	5	.53
Dan Quayle	6	41	24	15	14	.55
Robert Dole	7	45	15	5	28	.72
Jesse Helms	4	19	16	11	50	.46
Richard Cheney	3	17	8	3	69	.64
Richard Gephardt	3	26	12	5	54	.63
Lloyd Bentsen	6	28	14	7	45	.62
Thomas Foley	3	17	6	3	71	.69
Bill Bradley	6	23	6	2	63	.78
Mario Cuomo	9	28	12	5	46	.68
<u>International Leaders:</u>						
Pope John Paul II	31	48	7	4	10	.88
Mikhail Gorbachev	10	52	15	12	11	.70
Vaclav Havel	5	10	2	2	81	.79
<u>Institutions:</u>						
The Congress	6	53	25	9	7	.63
The Supreme Court	10	55	18	7	10	.72
The Military	18	55	15	6	6	.78
The CIA	8	40	22	11	19	.59
The United Nations	15	55	13	6	11	.79
The Church	39	43	7	3	8	.89
<u>Media:</u>						
Daily Newspaper	22	56	12	5	5	.82
Network TV News	22	60	12	3	3	.84
<u>Other:</u>						
Investment Bankers	3	29	32	16	20	.40
The Klu Klux Klan	2	2	10	81	5	.04
Evangelical/Christians	12	31	19	19	19	.53

TRENDS IN PUBLIC EVALUATIONS

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>	<u>Favorable to Unfavorable Ratio</u>
George Bush	24	52	15	7	2	.78
1/89	24	54	9	4	9	.86
10/88*	23	35	20	17	5	.61
5/88	11	40	25	17	7	.54
1/88	11	41	26	13	9	.57
9/87	18	51	19	8	4	.72
5/87	11	56	19	7	7	.72
<u>Former Presidents:</u>						
Richard Nixon	8	30	33	25	4	.42
5/87	7	32	34	23	4	.41
Jimmy Carter	18	49	19	10	4	.70
5/87	14	56	19	8	3	.72
Ronald Reagan	18	44	20	16	2	.63
5/88	16	40	22	18	10	.62
1/88	17	42	24	13	4	.61
5/87	21	41	22	14	2	.63
6/85	26	43	18	10	3	.71
<u>National Political Figures Known to Virtually All Americans:</u>						
Ted Kennedy	18	43	19	15	5	.64
5/87	21	43	21	10	5	.67
6/85	17	42	22	12	7	.63
Jesse Jackson	12	38	23	22	5	.53
5/88	11	35	27	19	8	.50
5/87	13	38	24	17	8	.55
Robert Dole	7	45	15	5	28	.72
5/87	9	51	11	3	26	.81
<u>Other Well Known National Political Figures:</u>						
Jesse Helms	4	19	16	11	50	.46
5/87	3	19	15	9	54	.48
6/85	3	17	14	11	55	.44

*Based on Registered Voters

CONTINUED...

TRENDS IN PUBLIC EVALUATION

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>	<u>Favorable to Unfavorable Ratio</u>
<u>Institutions:</u>						
The Congress	6	53	25	9	7	.63
5/88	8	56	23	5	8	.70
1/88	6	58	25	4	7	.69
5/87	10	64	16	4	6	.79
<u>Media:</u>						
Daily Newspaper	22	56	12	5	5	.82
8/89	25	52	12	5	6	.82
1/89	22	56	13	4	5	.82
5/88	19	59	13	4	5	.82
1/27/88	19	62	11	3	5	.85
1/7-18/88	21	59	12	4	4	.83
10/87	21	58	9	4	8	.86
5/87	22	59	12	3	4	.84
1/87	19	57	13	6	5	.80
7/86	28	51	11	6	4	.83
6/85	25	56	8	3	8	.88
Network TV News	22	60	12	3	3	.84
8/89	28	54	11	3	4	.85
1/89	21	61	12	3	3	.84
5/88	20	58	14	4	4	.81
1/27/88	12	69	13	3	3	.84
1/7-18/88	18	60	14	4	4	.81
10/87	19	62	10	3	6	.86
5/87	21	63	11	3	2	.86
1/87	19	55	16	6	4	.77
7/86	30	53	10	4	3	.86
6/85	25	59	8	2	6	.89

RATED CONGRESS FAVORABLY

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1990</u>
Total	74	59
Enterprisers	69	52
Moralists	72	59
Upbeats	84	82
Disaffectededs	65	47
Bystanders	67	48
Followers	66	52
Seculars	73	54
60's Democrats	81	66
New Dealers	84	71
God & Country Dems.	81	68
Partisan Poor	74	54

1990 RATINGS FOR SUPREME COURT BY TYPOLOGY GROUPS

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>
Total	65	25	10
Enterprisers	82	16	2
Moralists	59	32	9
Upbeats	87	9	4
Disaffectededs	63	31	6
Bystanders	58	22	20
Followers	58	25	17
Seculars	61	35	4
60's Democrats	62	34	4
New Dealers	69	20	11
God & Country Dems.	63	25	12
Partisan Poor	53	29	18

1990 RATINGS FOR SUPREME COURT BY DEMOGRAPHICS

4	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of/DK</u>
Total	65	25	10
Sex			
Male	64	29	7
Female	66	22	12
Race			
White	66	25	9
Black	59	31	10
Region			
East	61	26	13
Midwest	74	18	8
South	65	26	9
West	61	31	8
Age			
<25	77	16	7
25-29	71	18	11
30-39	65	26	9
40-49	65	28	7
50-59	59	32	9
60+	60	27	13
Education			
College Grad.	67	29	4
Other College	68	28	4
High School Grad.	67	23	10
Less than High School Grad.	59	22	19
Ethnicity			
Hispanic	66	16	18
White Protestant	65	26	9
White Catholic	69	22	9
Jewish	53	36	11
Union Household			
Yes	64	30	6
Family Income			
<\$20,000	63	24	13
\$20,000-\$29,999	65	27	8
\$30,000-\$39,999	64	30	6
\$40,000-\$49,999	72	25	3
\$50,000+	73	25	2
City			
1 Mil.+	54	33	13
<1 Mil.	65	27	8
Suburbs	70	23	7
Non-SMSA	63	24	13

METHODOLOGY

Summary of Survey Methodology

For the purpose of this research project, interviews were conducted among adult Americans on two separate occasions. The main survey was supplemented by telephone re-interviews with some respondents in order to update key attitudinal measures in light of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

The Principal Interview Survey

Face-to-face personal interviews were conducted among a nationally representative sample of 3,004 adults. Interviews were conducted during the period of May 1-May 31, 1990. A random sample of 1,000 respondents was re-interviewed by telephone during the period of August 19-25, 1990. The margin of error due to the sampling is ± 2 percentage points for the main sample and ± 3 percentage points for the re-interviews. The surveys were designed and analyzed by Princeton Survey Research Associates Inc. The field interviewing for this survey was done by Response Analysis Corporation under the supervision of PSRA.

Design Of The Personal Interview Sample

The sample used for this survey is a multi-stage area probability sample consisting of 100 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) and 1600 Secondary Sampling Units. For this survey, interviewing was conducted in 193 sampling locations.

Selection of PSUs and SSUs was based on 1980 Census data at the block group or enumeration district level. These block groups or enumeration districts were first stratified into three sizes of community strata: the 25 most populous MSAs; all other MSAs; and counties or county equivalents outside of MSAs, and were serpentine ordered to assure appropriate geographic representation. The 25 most populous MSAs were selected as self-representing PSUs and formed 35 PSU equivalents. The remaining 65 PSUs were selected with probabilities proportional to size of 1980 population. Within the 100 PSUs so selected 1600 SSUs were selected, 520 from the self-representing PSUs and 1080 from the remaining PSUs. The set of SSUs was then systematically divided into two replicates of 800 each. One replicate of SSUs is used for national cross-section surveys and the other replicate is used for studies requiring oversampling of Blacks or Hispanics. Within each replicate a subsample of 200 SSUs was selected for mapping and listing activities.

For a given survey, a sample of one or two blocks from a block group, or, in rural areas, segments for an enumeration district was selected for interviewing. In each cluster of blocks and each segment so selected, a randomly selected starting point was designated on the interviewer's map of the

area. Starting at this point, interviewers were required to follow a given direction in the selection of households until their assignment was completed.

At each household contacted, a systematic respondent selection technique was used to identify the respondent from among all adults in the household. Interviewing was conducted at times when adults, in general, are most likely to be at home, which means on weekends or weekday evenings after 4:00 P.M.

Allowance for persons not at home is made by a "times-at-home" weighting procedure rather than by call-backs. This procedure is a standard method for reducing the sample bias that would otherwise result from underrepresentation in the sample of persons who are difficult to find at home.

In a routine survey with one call made in an effort to reach a respondent at home, persons infrequently at home tend to be underrepresented. Since they are less often at home, there is less chance of catching them at home. Similarly, persons usually at home tend to be overrepresented, as the chances of finding them at home when the call is made are very good.

To correct the differential probability of inclusion in the sample of respondents frequently at home versus infrequently at home, a weighting is used. The respondent-specific weight is a function of the estimated probability of each respondent being at home at the time the interview was actually conducted. Specifically, the weight is the reciprocal of the probability of being at home, with the "at-homeness" probability estimated by asking each respondent whether he or she was home at the same time of day on other days the interviewing might have occurred.

Using this method, respondents rarely at home are given larger weights, and the representation of rarely at home respondents in the weighted sample is increased.

It is important to note that the "times-at-home" weight is not used by itself. Other weighting factors are combined with the times-at-home to produce a final weight for each respondent. The final sample of completed interviews is also weighted to bring the demographic characteristics of the sample into alignment with the most recently available estimates of the demographic composition of the adult population of the continental United States. Estimates were obtained from the March 1986 Current Population Survey for age, gender, race, education, and regional distribution.

The procedure used to design and draw the sampling locations, collect the data and weight the sample of completed interviews were thus designed to allow the projection of survey results to the total population of adults, 18 or older, living in the continental United States, excluding those persons living in institutions.

Composition Of The Sample For The Principal Survey

	<i>Weighted Percentage</i>	<i>Number Of Interviews</i>
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	47.5	1477
Female	52.5	1527
<i>Race</i>		
White	84.3	2459
Black	11.2	415
Other	<u>4.5</u>	<u>128</u>
	100	3004
<i>Age</i>		
18-29 years	25.1	633
30-49 years	40.7	1085
50 years +	33.9	1260
Undesignated	<u>.3</u>	<u>26</u>
	100	3004
<i>Education</i>		
College graduate	19.1	638
Other college	25.4	745
High school graduate	32.4	904
Less than high school graduate	23.0	702
Undesignated	<u>.1</u>	<u>15</u>
	100	3004

Composition Of The Sample For The Principal Survey

	<i>Weighted Percentage</i>	<i>Number Of Interviews</i>
<i>Region</i>		
<i>East:</i> Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia	24.7	753
<i>Midwest:</i> Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri	24.3	739
<i>South:</i> Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana	31.1	929
<i>West:</i> Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, California, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii	<u>19.8</u> 100	<u>583</u> 3004

Composition of the Typology

Through extensive research and from analysis of the findings of a nationwide survey of over 4000 personal interviews, Times Mirror identified nine dimensions that animate public opinion. Two of these dimensions are basic personal orientations while seven are values and basic beliefs:

Personal Orientations

Alienation: the degree of powerlessness, hopelessness, and the lack of trust in government people feel.

Financial Pressure: the degree of personal financial concern.

Values and Basic Beliefs

Religious Faith: a measure of belief in God.

Tolerance/Intolerance: the degree to which people value civil liberties and free speech and the extent to which they accept others who choose a different life style.

Social Justice: beliefs about social welfare, social class standing, and the role of the federal government in providing for the needy.

Militant Anti-Communism: perceptions about the threat of communism, militarism, ethnocentrism, and the use of force to further American interests.

Attitudes toward Government: beliefs about the size and effectiveness of government.

American Exceptionalism: a belief in America that combines patriotism with the view that the United States has a boundless ability to solve its problems.

Attitudes toward Business Corporations: beliefs about American "big business."

The Times Mirror typology was constructed by classifying people according to these nine basic values and orientations, by their party affiliation and by their degree of political involvement. A statistical technique called "cluster analysis" was used to identify these distinct groups of American voters. Two groups are solidly Republican, four are Democratic, and five are independent with two of them leaning Republican and two leaning Democratic.

The typology, then, consists of the following 11 groups:

CORE REPUBLICAN GROUPS

Enterprisers: Affluent, well-educated, and predominantly male. This classic Republican group is mainly characterized by its pro-business and anti-government attitudes. Enterprisers are moderate on questions of personal freedom, but oppose increased spending on most social programs.

Moralists: Middle-aged and middle-income, this core Republican group is militantly anti communist, and restrictive on personal freedom issues.

REPUBLICAN-LEANING GROUPS

Upbeats: Young and optimistic, the members of this group are firm believers in America and in the country's government. Upbeats are moderate in their political attitudes but strongly pro-Reagan.

Disaffected: Alienated, pessimistic, and financially pressured, this group leans toward the GOP camp, but it has had historic ties to the Democratic party. Disaffecteds are skeptical of both big government and big business, but are pro-military.

LOW INVOLVEMENT GROUP

Bystanders: The members of this group are young, predominantly white and poorly educated. They neither participate in politics nor show any interest in current affairs.

DEMOCRATIC-LEANING GROUPS

Followers: Young, poorly educated and disproportionately black. This group shows little interest in politics and is very persuadable and unpredictable. Although they are not critical of government or big business, Followers do not have much faith in America.

Seculars: This group is uniquely characterized by its lack of religious belief. In addition, Seculars are strongly committed to personal freedom and are dovish on defense issues. Their level of participation in politics, however, is not as high as one might expect given their education and their political sophistication.

CORE DEMOCRATIC GROUPS

60's Democrats: This well-educated, heavily female group has a strong belief in social justice, as well as a very low militancy level. These mainstream Democrats are highly tolerant of views and lifestyles they do not share and favor most forms of social spending.

New Dealers: Older, blue collar and religious. The roots of this aging group of traditional Democrats can be traced back to the New Deal. Although supportive of many social spending measures, New Dealers are intolerant on social issues and somewhat hawkish on defense.

God & Country Democrats: This group is older, poor, and disproportionately minority, with high numbers concentrated in the South. The God & Country Democrats have a strong faith in America and are materialistic. They favor social spending and are highly religious.

Partisan Poor: Very low income, relatively high proportions of blacks and poorly educated, this core Democratic group has a strong appetite for social justice. The Partisan Poor firmly support all forms of social spending, yet they are conservative on social issues.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INDICES

The following value scales are additive scores of the Times Mirror value questions as shown below:

BELIEFS ABOUT GOVERNMENT

Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good

When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful

The federal government should run only those things that cannot be run at the local level

The federal government controls too much of our daily lives

Dealing with a federal government agency is often not worth the trouble

MILITANCY/ETHNOCENTRIC

It is my belief that we should get even with any country that tries to take advantage of the United States

The best way to ensure peace is through military strength

American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries

We all should be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong

ANTI-COMMUNISM

There is an international communist conspiracy to rule the world

Communist countries are all alike

Communists are responsible for a lot of the unrest in the United States today

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

I feel it's my duty as a citizen to always vote

I'm interested in keeping up with national affairs

I'm pretty interested in following local politics

I feel guilty when I don't get a chance to vote

POLITICAL ALIENATION

People like me don't have any say
about what the government does

Generally speaking, elected officials in
Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly

Most elected officials care what people like me think

Voting gives people like me some say
about how the government runs things

PERSONAL ALIENATION

Success in life is pretty much determined
by forces outside our control

Hard work offers little guarantee of success

WELFARIST

Our society should do what is necessary
to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed

It is the responsibility of the government
to take care of people who can't take care
of themselves

The government should help more needy people
even if it means going deeper in debt

The government should guarantee every citizen
enough to eat and a place to sleep

RACIAL TOLERANCE

In the past few years there hasn't been much real improvement in the position of black people in this country

I think it's all right for blacks and whites to date each other

We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment

RELIGIOUSNESS

Prayer is an important part of my daily life

We all will be called before God at the judgment day to answer for our sins

Even today miracles are performed by the power of God

I am sometimes very conscious of the presence of God

I never doubt the existence of God

PERSONAL FREEDOMS

School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals

Books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries

The police should be allowed to search the houses of known drug dealers without a court order

The government ought to be able to censor news stories that it feels threaten national security

TRADITIONALIST SOCIAL VALUES

Women should return to their
traditional role in society

Too many children are being raised in
day care centers these days

AIDS might be God's punishment
for immoral sexual behavior

I have old-fashioned values about family and marriage

There are clear guidelines about what's good
or evil that apply to everyone regardless
of their situation

FINANCIAL PRESSURE

I often don't have enough money to make ends meet

Money is one of my most important concerns

I'm pretty well satisfied with the way
things are going for me financially

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALIST

As Americans we can always
find a way to solve our
problems and get what we want

I don't believe that there are
any real limits to growth in
this country today

I am very patriotic

BUSINESS ATTITUDES

There is too much power concentrated
in the hands of a few big companies

Business corporations make too much profit