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AMERICA'S NEW INTERNATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW

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AMERICA'S NEW INTERNATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW

The terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan have created a new internationalist sentiment among the public. There is much more support for a multilateral foreign policy than before Sept. 11, with roughly six-in-ten (59%) now saying that the interests of allies should be taken into account by U.S. policymakers. By about a two-to-one margin (61%-32%) the public thinks that taking an active role in the world, rather than becoming less involved, will be a more effective way of avoiding problems like terrorism in the future. And support for assertive U.S. leadership also has grown, with as many as 45% saying that the United States should either be the single world leader or at least be the most active of leading nations.

However, this new internationalism, driven by a nearly universal imperative for defeating the terrorist threat, may have taken some of the steam out of what had been growing public support for solving non-geopolitical global problems. The current survey finds the public giving somewhat lower priority to solving a range of global problems, including: drug trafficking, hunger, global warming and the spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases. While public concern for these problems is still present, less urgency is associated with each in the current environment.

These are the principal findings of a national survey that re-interviewed 1,281 respondents who originally had been questioned about international issues Aug. 21 to Sept. 5. The new poll shows that public opinion on the Middle East has changed little as a result of the attacks. If anything, there is now more sympathy for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians than in the first round of interviewing. While 19% believe that the United States should side less with Israel in the future, these people were already the most sympathetic to the Palestinians prior to Sept. 11.

Pre- Post-9/11 Attitudes		
	<u>Then</u>	<u>Now</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
<i>Formulate foreign policy based on ...</i>		
Mostly U.S. interests	38	30
Interests of allies	48	59
Neither/Both	8	7
Don't know/Refused	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>
	100	100
<i>U.S. leadership role should be ...</i>		
Single leader or first among equals	38	45
Just one of leading nations	50	46
No leadership role	8	3
Don't know/Refused	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>
	100	100
<i>To prevent future terrorism, U.S. should...</i>		
Be active in world affairs	n/a	61
Not get too involved	n/a	32
Don't know/Refused	n/a	<u>7</u>
		100
<i>National defense spending should be ...</i>		
Increased	32	50
Keep the same	44	41
Cut back	20	7
Don't know/Refused	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>
	100	100

At the same time, only a minority of Americans subscribe to the view that the war against terrorism portends a broader cultural clash pitting the West against Islam. Nearly two-thirds (63%) see this as a struggle against a small group of radical terrorists, while 28% foresee a major conflict between people in United States and Europe, on one side, and the people of Islam, on the other.

The follow-up survey reveals that the war on terrorism is dramatically affecting opinions about security issues. Support for increased military spending now stands at 50%, which far surpasses levels dating back a quarter-century. There also is a collateral increase in support for a missile defense system. Nearly two-thirds (64%) favor the development of a missile shield and a growing number say we need such a system right now.

The survey finds views about U.S. anti-terrorism efforts are largely unchanged compared with opinions obtained earlier this month. Most Americans have a positive view of the way the war effort is going (83%) and the job being done to build homeland defenses (69%). But since mid-October, there has been a decline in the number who rate the military campaign as going very well (from 45% to 38%).

Despite the anthrax attacks, worries about another terrorist attack did not increase over the period of the re-interviews (Oct. 15-21). It should be noted that while the public is not more rattled than it has been, it also has not made much progress in getting back to normal. Just 41% said that life had returned to normal – about the same percentage giving that response in a Newsweek poll conducted in late September.

“The View Before 9/11: America’s Place in the World,” a companion survey by the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations, is available online (at www.people-press.org), or by contacting the Center at 202-293-3126. This quadrennial survey of American Opinion Leaders and the general public provides a detailed look at attitudes toward international issues before the Sept. 11 attacks.

Take the Lead, But Cooperate

Since the attacks, more Americans have come to support an active U.S. leadership role in the world. At the same time, a growing proportion of the public has become more sensitive to the need for the United States to cooperate with and listen to its allies, especially with regard to the international response to the threat of terrorism.

Overall, just under half of Americans (45%) agree with the notion that the U.S. should at the very least be the most active among leading nations, if not the single world leader, up from 38% before the attacks.

This change in opinion has occurred across the board, though somewhat less strikingly among Democrats, a majority of whom still feel the U.S. should be no more active than other leading nations in setting the direction of international policy.

By two-to-one (59% to 30%), Americans say the United States should strongly take into account the interests of its allies with regard to the war on terrorism, as opposed to basing decisions mostly on U.S. national interests. Prior to the attacks, when asked about general levels of cooperation with the allies, the public was more divided, with 48% in favor of taking the allies' views into account and 38% saying American national interests should take priority.

Every ideological group has shown increased support for multilateralism. Now, even a majority of conservative Republicans, who previously expressed the most skepticism, endorse that approach.

U.S. Should Lead, But Listen						
	<i>U.S. should take ...</i>					
	<i>lead role in world affairs*</i>			<i>into account views of allies</i>		
	Early		Late	Early		Late
	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>		<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	
	%	%		%	%	
Total	38	45	+7	48	59	+11
Conserv Republicans	51	60	+9	43	55	+12
Mod/Lib Republicans	33	41	+8	48	59	+11
Independents	33	46	+13	52	61	+9
Mod/Cons Democrats	40	40	0	48	60	+12
Liberal Democrats	34	37	+3	57	71	+14

* Combined "single world leader" and "most active among leading nations."

Other Priorities Lose Steam

Even before Sept. 11, the public rated anti-terrorism efforts as the nation's most important long-range foreign policy goal. As one might expect, even more people see this as the top objective now. Fully 93% list this as a top priority in the current survey, up from 80% in early September.

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is ranked as a top national priority by 81%, up slightly from 78% two months ago.

Yet it is clear that the events of Sept. 11 have affected attitudes on a range of other policy priorities. Efforts to stop the spread of infectious diseases, curb global warming, alleviate world hunger, raise living standards, and promote democracy in other nations all draw less support since the attacks.

The change in priorities has been most evident among those, like young people, who previously attached great importance to such goals. The number of Americans under age 30 who rate reducing global warming as a top priority has dropped by about half since early September (from 50% to 24%). Roughly one-in-three (32%) Americans under age 30 rate alleviating world hunger as a top priority today, compared with 54% who did so in early September.

Americans have revised their priorities to focus on the war on terrorism, but there is no sense that the public is turning inward. While there has been a noticeable decline in the proportion rating such goals as helping the hungry and addressing global warming as top priorities, an overwhelming majority favor giving *some* priority to all of the goals listed.

Public Priorities Shift			
	Early	Late	
<i>Percent considering each a "top priority"</i>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Change</u>
	%	%	
Protect against terrorist attacks	80	93	+13
Stop spread of weapons of mass destruction	78	81	+3
Protect jobs of American workers	77	74	-3
Insure adequate energy supplies	74	69	-5
Reduce spread of AIDS & other diseases	73	59	-14
Combat international drug trafficking	64	55	-9
Distribute costs of maintaining world order	56	54	-2
Protect groups threatened with genocide	49	48	-1
Strengthen the United Nations	42	46	+4
Deal with problem of world hunger	47	34	-13
Deal with global warming	44	31	-13
Promote U.S. business interests abroad	37	30	-7
Promote human rights abroad	29	27	-2
Promote democracy abroad	29	24	-5
Improve living standards in poor nations	25	20	-5

Equally important, most people believe that the best way to avoid problems like terrorism is to remain actively engaged in the world. This view is expressed across all major demographic groups, including both Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, the young and the old.

Even Americans who, prior to the attacks, considered foreign affairs largely irrelevant now say an activist U.S. foreign policy can prevent future problems internationally. Better than half of this group (54%) – who previously said that events in other regions mattered little to them personally – favor the United States staying involved globally, while 39% say it is better not to get too involved.

New Internationalists?		
	<i>Pre- 9/11 view of events in other nations</i>	
	Did not	Did
	<u>Matter*</u>	<u>Matter</u>
<i>To prevent future terrorism, U.S. should ...</i>	%	%
Be active in world affairs	54	66
Not get too involved	39	28
Don't know/Refused	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>
	100	100

* Respondents who said what happens in other parts of the world has little or no impact on their life.

Women, Men Agree on Defense Increase

Public opinion on defense policies has been transformed by the Sept. 11 attacks. Support for increased defense spending has risen 18 points since early September (from 32% to 50%), and now is far higher than at any point since at least 1974.

Much of the change has come among women and Democrats, groups that traditionally have tended to be skeptical of more military spending. Women are now nearly as likely as men to favor higher military spending (47%, compared to 53% of men). In early September, just 24% of women supported a higher defense budget, compared with 41% of men.

Backing for increased military spending is particularly pronounced among younger women. Support for more defense spending among women age 18-49 has grown from 17% in early September to 44%. Among men in this age group, the number favoring higher military spending has increased, but much more modestly (from 39% to 53%).

While the gender gap on this issue has all but disappeared, at least temporarily, political divisions remain. More Republicans than Democrats favor higher military spending (70% vs. 38%). Still, the number of Democrats supporting more money for the military has doubled, from 19% to 38%, since early September. GOP backing has risen from 56% to 70% over the same period.

Missile Shield Gains Favor

Some of the same trends are evident in the growing public support for a missile defense system. Public backing for the missile shield has risen from 56% to 64%. And there has been a sharp increase in the number who see this as an urgent need – 35% favored the immediate development of such a system in early September, compared with 49% who feel that way now.

As with defense spending, much of the change has come among women, and especially mothers. Overall, 64% of women favor developing a missile defense system, up from 52% in early September. More significantly, half of women want the system in place now, compared with roughly three-in-ten (29%) in early September. By contrast, attitudes among men have remained fairly stable – as in the earlier survey, more than six-in-ten (65%) support the missile shield and nearly half (47%) say we need it right now.

Mothers for Missile Defense			
	<i>Percent saying we need national missile defense "right now"</i>		
	<u>Early Sept</u>	<u>Late Oct</u>	<u>Change</u>
	%	%	
Total	35	49	+14
Women	29	51	+22
Mothers	27	59	+32
Non-mothers	31	45	+14
Men	42	47	+5
Fathers	51	54	+3
Non-fathers	37	44	+7

Nearly three-quarters of women with children at home (73%) favor the deployment of a missile defense system, up from 53% in early September. The proportion of mothers who favor immediate development of a missile shield has more than doubled, from 27% to 59%. Support among non-mothers for immediate deployment has increased, but not as much (from 31% to 45%).

There has been only a slight narrowing of the partisan gap on this issue, however. Democratic support for a missile shield has grown slightly (from 49% to 58%), while the number who want it in place now has increased from 30% to 45%. Roughly three-quarters of Republicans back missile defense (77%), no change from early September; 60% favor immediate development now, up from 47% then.

Views Stable on Mideast

Slightly less than half of the public (47%) say they sympathize more with Israel in the Middle East conflict, while just 10% have more sympathy for the Palestinians. There has been a modest shift in support of Israel since early September, when 40% sympathized with Israel, with 17% sympathizing with the Palestinians. These numbers have remained fairly stable since the late 1970s.

While there have been no major demographic or political shifts in attitudes on the Middle East, Americans who are less attentive to foreign news and less informed about international issues have become somewhat more supportive of Israel since Sept. 11. Among those who pay little attention to foreign news, 48% sympathize with Israel now, compared with 36% who did so in early September. Most of the change came from those who were previously neutral in the conflict or who had not formed an opinion. A similar shift has occurred among those who are less knowledgeable about international matters.

A solid majority of the public (56%) favors keeping aid for Israel at its current level. Similarly, 56% say the United States should take Israel's side as much as it has in the past, while 19% favor taking Israel's side less and 16% think the United States should side with Israel more in the future.

No Clash of Cultures

By wide margins, Americans of all backgrounds and political persuasions reject the notion that the terrorist attacks are the start of a major "clash of civilizations" between the West and Islam. Just over one-in-four (28%) say this is a conflict between the people of America and Europe versus the people of Islam, while nearly two-thirds (63%) say this is only a struggle against a small, radical group. Americans who show the least knowledge about world affairs, and those with less education, are the most likely to believe that we are on the brink of a clash of cultures, but even among these groups a majority believes this is a more limited conflict.

Back to Normal?

Americans clearly are on edge over the prospect of new terrorist strikes, although no more so than they were before the recent anthrax scare. About seven-in-ten expressed at least some concern over new terrorism throughout the survey period. That figure has not changed significantly over the past three weeks.

No Anthrax Panic				
<i>Worried about another terrorist attack ..</i>				
	<u>Very</u>	<u>Some-</u>	<u>Not</u>	<u>DK/</u>
<i>Nights of...</i>	%	what	%	Ref
		%	%	%
Wed-Sun, Oct. 17-21	27	41	31	1=100
Mon-Tues, Oct. 15-16	28	45	26	1=100
Fri-Sun, Oct. 12-14	27	42	29	2=100
Wed-Thurs, Oct. 10-11	27	38	33	2=100
Mon-Wed, Oct. 1-3	28	45	26	1=100

But Americans have been slow to return to a sense of normalcy and, as seen in earlier Pew Research Center surveys after the Sept. 11 attacks, women are feeling the emotional impact of the attacks more acutely than are men. In the current survey, eight-in-ten women worry that there will soon be another terrorist attack in the United States, while only 63% of men have that worry.

Women also are much less likely than men to say their lives have returned to normal (34% to 48%). In fact, women are among the most likely of all Americans to say life will never return to normal following the attacks, with fully one-in-five expressing this view. And women with children at home are especially shaken. Just 28% of mothers say their life has returned to normal, and 41% are very worried about an impending attack.

Men Rebounding More Quickly			
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
<i>Worried about another attack ...</i>	%	%	%
Very	29	36	23
Somewhat	42	44	40
Not too/not at all	28	19	37
Don't know/Refused	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>*</u>
	100	100	100
<i>Life has ...</i>			
Returned to normal	41	34	48
Is beginning to	31	34	27
Still hasn't	8	10	7
Will never	17	20	14
Don't know/Refused	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
	100	100	100

Confidence Slips Slightly

The public's evaluations of the government's progress in combating terrorism have remained fairly stable, with 84% saying things are going very or fairly well. Still, since mid-October there has been a decline in the proportion giving the highest evaluation to the government's efforts (from 48% to 38%). And the number giving the military campaign a top grade of "very well" has slipped from 45% to 38% over the same period, although overall positive ratings have not declined.

Interestingly, the anthrax outbreaks have had no effect on public assessments of the government's performance in building homeland defenses. Roughly seven-in-ten (69%) grade the government's job in this area as good or excellent (with 18% saying excellent), virtually the same as in mid-October. Despite their high degree of concern over new attacks, women are just as upbeat as men about the ongoing efforts to defeat terrorism abroad, and if anything, rate the government's efforts at homeland defense more highly than do men.

There also are modest partisan differences in assessments of the government's efforts at stopping terrorism. Nearly eight-in-ten Republicans rate progress on the home front as excellent or good, compared with two-thirds of Democrats. Republicans are also more likely than Democrats or independents to say the military campaign is going well.

Military Action Remains Higher Priority

Despite the anthrax attacks, Americans continue to believe that destroying terrorist networks abroad is more important than bolstering anti-terrorist defenses in this country. Opinion on this issue has remained steady since late September (see "Military Action a Higher Priority Than Homeland Defense," Sept. 27).

When asked to choose, 48% of Americans say taking military action to destroy terrorist networks should take priority over building defenses against future attacks, while 37% say creating homeland defenses is more important (13% volunteer that they'd like to see both). Republicans favor military action to building defenses at home by 54%-31%, while Democrats are more evenly split (45%-41%).

African-Americans, who are much more concerned about another terrorist attack than are whites, strongly favor building military defenses at home to conducting military attacks. By a margin of two-to-one, African Americans favor homeland defense (60% homeland defense to 31% military action), while more whites prefer military action (50% military action, 34% homeland defense).

Partisanship and Confidence				
<i>Effectiveness of...</i>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Rep</u>	<u>Dem</u>	<u>Ind</u>
	%	%	%	%
<i>Homeland defense</i>				
Excellent/Good	69	78	66	65
Fair/Poor	27	18	32	31
Don't know/Refused	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
	100	100	100	100
<i>Military effort</i>				
Going well	83	89	82	82
Not going well	11	7	13	11
Don't know/Refused	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>
	100	100	100	100

Less Aware, More Worried

Americans who are not well informed about foreign affairs are more worried by the possibility of new terrorist attacks and less supportive of an internationalist role for the United States. In early September, respondents were asked a series of factual questions designed to measure their knowledge of international matters.¹ Those who scored lowest on this “quiz” have very different views on the current conflict and international affairs generally than those who are more knowledgeable about foreign issues.

	<i>Knowledge of International Affairs</i>		
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>High</u>
Very worried about more terrorist attacks	% 37	% 27	% 22
Attacks are start of a major conflict	35	27	22
U.S. should pay attention to interests of allies	51	60	68
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>(366)</i>	<i>(507)</i>	<i>(408)</i>

Roughly a third (34%) of the less knowledgeable group say the best way for the U.S. to avoid problems like terrorism is to not get too involved with international problems, compared to about one-quarter (26%) of those who are well informed about international affairs.

When the United States does get involved, as in pursuing those responsible for the terrorist attacks, Americans who are less familiar with international matters are the most likely to say the government should base its policies on national interests, rather than strongly taking into account the interests of its allies. A higher proportion of this group also believes that the terrorist attacks are the start of a major conflict between the West and Islam.

¹ Respondents were asked to name the president of Russia (23% correct), the country in which the crew of a U.S. spyplane was held for several days earlier in the year (62%), and the issue addressed in the Kyoto treaty (14%).

HARD TIMES AND HARD POLICIES

During the Cold War, public debate over foreign policy focused on the confrontation with the Soviet Union. There was widespread support for the strategy of containment-disagreements were essentially over tactics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the display of overwhelming American military power in the Persian Gulf War, however, all threats to the United States appeared to vanish. Without the challenge of a rival superpower to serve as a focal point, public opinion migrated toward the extremes. On the one hand, conservatives favored an increasingly unilateral (in many cases, even isolationist) approach to foreign policy in which the U.S. would wield its extraordinary clout to get what it wanted regardless of foreign opposition. On the other, liberals pressed to make international health, environmental, and human rights issues the priorities of U.S. foreign policy.

The latest nationwide poll by the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations reveals that the "luxury" foreign policies in vogue prior to Sept. 11 are rapidly losing ground, as public opinion slides back to more centrist positions around the new threat to U.S. security, international terrorism. I use the term "luxury" not to belittle these policies, but to reflect the fact that they became popular only with the end of the Cold War, when the United States was seen as having a surfeit of security, and thus the "surplus" could be used to pursue American interests that were often neglected during the Cold War because of the all-consuming priority of the U.S.-Soviet balance.

For the Bush administration, this shift is helpful in two ways. First, it has largely eliminated the sometimes raucous public debate between the disparate liberal and conservative foreign policy proscriptions that had previously entangled the administration. The first ten months of this year saw the Bush administration frequently criticized for taking a more unilateralist approach-toward North Korea initially, toward China at the beginning of the EP-3 incident, toward the Kyoto treaty, and toward national missile defense. These public wrangles were clearly embarrassing for the administration. Second, the shift in public opinion has created a new foreign policy consensus precisely where the administration has taken U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration's own approach toward the crisis, and its subsequent restructuring of priorities has produced a foreign policy that appears perfectly in accord with public attitudes as revealed in the Pew/CFR poll.

Immediate Threat Crowds Out Other Issues

Probably the most obvious trend that the Pew/CFR poll has revealed is the (natural) tendency for public opinion to become captured by an immediate threat to the United States, and consequently to relegate other considerations to a secondary status. Prior to Sept. 11, the American public had a wide range of foreign policy priorities. Preventing the spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases was considered a top priority by nearly as many people as preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction or defending against terrorist attacks. Likewise, many Americans felt that ending world hunger, global warming, and drug trafficking should rank with more traditional security interests as American foreign policy priorities. Because the United States was seen to be prosperous and unthreatened, many Americans (particularly liberal Americans) felt that we had the opportunity to employ our unmatched resources and geopolitical position to advance other items on our national agenda.

Sept. 11 reversed that trend by demonstrating that a direct security threat existed. As has been the case throughout our history, the manifestation of such a threat caused Americans to once again place national security issues at the forefront of their priorities. As the Pew/CFR data shows, far more Americans now favor increasing the defense budget (even though our armed forces may not be the most important weapon in the "war" against terrorism) and are more interested in homeland security and even national missile defense (even though a ballistic missile defense system could not have stopped the Sept. 11 attacks).

A New Internationalism

If the left has at least deferred its dreams of greater international and transnational aid, the right has had to abandon much of its determination to pursue U.S. foreign policy objectives regardless of how other nations might react. Since Sept. 11, the administration has stressed that the campaign against the al-Qa'eda terrorist network is going to require the cooperation of many U.S. allies. The network itself spans some 50-60 countries, and even the immediate military problem of striking the al-Qa'eda personnel in Afghanistan and persuading the Taliban to surrender Usama bin Ladin and his top lieutenants will require some difficult steps from a variety of different nations-Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, India, and Saudi Arabia to name only a few.

The public appears to have grasped the necessity of sustaining an international coalition in support of this campaign and recognizes that this will mean taking into account the views of other nations. However, it also appears to signal another important aspect of the popular reaction to the current crisis. It suggests that the U.S. public is willing to make important sacrifices to achieve the paramount goal of eliminating the terrorist threat to the United States. After all, agreeing that the U.S. should "take into account the views of allies" also means that the United States should not try to get our way at all costs. Quite the contrary. It indicates that the American people are willing to be patient to allow diplomacy to take its course, and willing to accommodate the differing goals and

interests of our allies. Indeed, it suggests that the administration will have considerable freedom of action with its diplomatic activities and is likely to find the public ready to accept that the U.S. may have to make compromises on other policy issues to attain the support we need in the war on terrorism.

By the same token, it implies that the administration might find itself out of step with popular opinion should it pursue policies that alienate key allies. The greater popular interest in allied participation suggests that the public believes in the necessity of a coalition effort and so may become concerned if the U.S. government begins moving in a direction that causes key allies to break with us. Having convinced the American people that the war against terrorism will require a team effort, the administration may find it hard to go it alone at a later date.

Lingering Questions

Finally, the Pew/CFR poll results raise two interesting questions. First, the data indicate that popular views toward the Middle East had not changed appreciably as a result of the Sept. 11 attacks (and in fact have remained mostly static since the 1970s). A range of possible motives could lie behind this finding. It may be that the American public has simply made up its mind that the Middle East is a dangerous quagmire that breeds fanatical terrorists like a swamp breeds mosquitoes and nothing can be done about it. In short, a fatalistic response to Sept. 11 and the Middle East: the Middle East is the Middle East and there's nothing we can really do about it. On the other hand, it may be that people have made up their minds-whom they support in the Middle East and whom they do not-and they simply have interpreted the attacks to suit their own pre-existing perspectives. Alternatively, it may be that the populace is simply confused about the Middle East and the most recent attacks only added to the confusion. Additional public opinion sampling might be able to uncover the reason for the stasis in this category.

A crucial question for the U.S. government about these findings is whether the changes they reveal reflect a true sea change in U.S. popular attitudes or merely a short-term reaction to the horrific events of Sept. 11. An administration that will be looking to reelection three years down the road must attempt to gauge whether it will be judged by the same standards then as it is today. Three years from now, will the American public still believe that whatever price we had to pay and whatever sacrifices we had to make to pursue the war on terrorism were worth it? As noted, the American people currently appear quite willing to make important compromises and sacrifices in the name of fighting terrorists, but there can be no guarantee they will still be as willing tomorrow. Although to some extent this is always the case, it is much more so in this instance. Shocking events such as the Sept. 11 attacks frequently distort popular sentiments, but there is no guarantee that the shift will not simply be a momentary "blip."

FORMULATING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

	--- Early September 2001 ---			--- Late October 2001 ---			Change in Interests of Allies
	Based on ...			Based on ...			
	Mostly U.S. Interests	Interests of Allies	Both/ Neither/DK	Mostly U.S. Interests	Interests of Allies	Both/ Neither/DK	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Total	38	48	14=100	30	59	11=100	+11
Sex							
Male	38	50	12	29	62	9	+12
Female	38	46	16	31	56	13	+10
Race							
White	37	51	12	29	60	11	+9
Non-white	42	37	21	35	53	12	+16
Black	43	35	22	33	57	10	+22
Race and Sex							
White Men	37	52	11	28	63	9	+11
White Women	37	50	13	30	58	12	+8
Age							
Under 30	41	48	11	38	53	9	+5
30-49	38	50	12	29	62	9	+12
50-64	40	46	14	29	59	12	+13
65+	30	47	23	22	60	18	+13
Sex and Age							
Men under 50	36	52	12	28	63	9	+11
Women under 50	42	47	11	37	54	9	+7
Men 50+	40	48	12	29	62	9	+14
Women 50+	32	45	23	24	57	19	+12
Education							
College Grad.	32	58	10	24	67	9	+9
Some College	37	47	16	34	56	10	+9
High School Grad.	39	47	14	32	58	10	+11
<H.S. Grad.	45	37	18	27	53	20	+16
Family Income							
\$75,000+	34	55	11	28	64	8	+9
\$50,000-\$74,999	33	56	11	29	60	11	+4
\$30,000-\$49,999	41	49	10	31	60	9	+11
\$20,000-\$29,999	39	47	14	35	59	6	+12
<\$20,000	41	40	19	30	52	18	+12

Question: How should the U.S. determine its foreign policy? Should it be based mostly on the national interests of the U.S., or should it strongly take into account the interests of its allies? (Sept. 2001)

How should the U.S. determine its policy with regard to the war on terrorism? Should it be based mostly on the national interests of the U.S., or should it strongly take into account the interests of its allies? (Oct. 2001)

Continued ...

	--- Early September 2001 ---			--- Late October 2001 ---			Change in Interests of Allies
	Based on ...			Based on ...			
	U.S. Interests	Interests of Allies	Both/ Neither/DK	U.S. Interests	Interests of Allies	Both/ Neither/DK	
%	%	%	%	%	%		
Total	38	48	14=100	30	59	11=100	+11
Region							
East	36	53	11	30	59	11	+6
Midwest	37	50	13	28	61	11	+11
South	42	43	15	34	53	13	+10
West	34	51	15	25	66	9	+15
Religious Affiliation							
Total White Protestant	36	50	14	29	58	13	+8
White Protestant Evangelical	39	47	14	33	54	13	+7
White Prot. Non-Evangelical	33	53	14	24	62	14	+9
White Catholic	43	48	9	30	63	7	+15
Secular	33	56	11	24	64	12	+8
Community Size							
Large City	42	45	13	29	58	13	+13
Suburb	35	52	13	27	64	9	+12
Small City/Town	36	50	14	30	60	10	+10
Rural Area	41	45	14	35	55	10	+10
Party ID							
Republican	45	45	10	33	56	11	+11
Democrat	36	51	13	29	61	10	+10
Independent	34	52	14	28	61	11	+9
Party and Ideology							
Conservative Republican	46	43	11	35	55	10	+12
Moderate/Liberal Republican	42	48	10	29	59	12	+11
Conservative/Moderate Democrat	38	48	14	31	60	9	+12
Liberal Democrat	34	57	9	25	71	4	14
2000 Presidential Vote							
Bush	41	48	11	32	59	9	+11
Gore	30	56	14	26	64	10	+8
America's Place in the World							
Single Leader	50	40	10	36	55	9	+15
Assertive Multilateralism	39	48	13	27	60	13	+12
Non-Assertive Multilateralism	35	55	10	28	64	8	+9
Information about Intl. Matters							
High	32	56	12	23	68	9	+12
Moderate	37	50	13	28	62	10	+12
Low	43	41	16	35	51	14	+10
Labor Union							
Union Household	36	48	16	31	57	12	+9
Non-Union Household	38	48	14	30	60	10	+12

FUTURE ASSESSMENTS

	<i>Best way for U.S. to avoid terrorism is ...</i>			<i>Terrorist attacks are ...</i>			<i>(N)</i>
	Stay	Not get	DK/	Start of	Radical Group	DK/	
	<u>Involved</u>	<u>too Involved</u>	<u>Refused</u>	<u>Major Conflict</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Refused</u>	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Total	61	32	7=100	28	63	9=100	(1281)
Sex							
Male	65	32	3	26	68	6	(588)
Female	57	33	9	31	58	11	(693)
Race							
White	63	30	7	28	65	7	(1103)
Non-white	50	46	4	29	55	16	(168)
Black	48	48	4	30	55	15	(100)
Race and Sex							
White Men	67	29	4	26	69	5	(517)
White Women	60	29	11	30	60	10	(586)
Age							
Under 30	52	43	5	32	60	8	(214)
30-49	63	31	6	29	65	6	(507)
50-64	68	24	8	25	68	7	(304)
65+	57	34	9	27	55	18	(244)
Sex and Age							
Men under 50	63	33	4	27	68	5	(345)
Women under 50	56	37	7	33	58	9	(376)
Men 50+	70	28	2	24	67	9	(240)
Women 50+	59	28	13	27	59	14	(308)
Education							
College Grad.	68	24	8	21	73	6	(477)
Some College	58	35	7	29	66	5	(323)
High School Grad.	58	36	6	32	59	9	(376)
<H.S. Grad.	59	35	6	29	51	20	(101)
Family Income							
\$75,000+	70	25	5	22	75	3	(279)
\$50,000-\$74,999	64	29	7	29	67	4	(218)
\$30,000-\$49,999	59	34	7	32	63	5	(313)
\$20,000-\$29,999	50	43	7	29	62	9	(168)
<\$20,000	58	35	7	31	49	20	(179)

Questions: In the long run, what is the best way for the U.S. to avoid problems like terrorism? Should the U.S. be very much involved in solving international problems, OR not get too involved with international problems?

Do you think the terrorist attacks are the start of a major conflict between the people of America and Europe versus the people of Islam, or is it only a conflict with a small, radical group?

Continued ...

	<i>Best way for U.S. to avoid terrorism is ...</i>			<i>Terrorist attacks are ...</i>			<i>(N)</i>
	<i>Stay Involved</i>	<i>Not get too Involved</i>	<i>DK/ Refused</i>	<i>Start of Major Conflict</i>	<i>Radical Group Conflict</i>	<i>DK/ Refused</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	
Total	61	32	7=100	28	63	9=100	(1281)
Region							
East	63	33	4	33	59	8	(234)
Midwest	62	31	7	28	63	9	(298)
South	60	34	6	27	64	9	(462)
West	58	32	10	28	63	9	(287)
Religious Affiliation							
Total White Protestant	62	29	9	28	64	8	(623)
White Prot. Evangelical	63	28	9	29	62	9	(305)
White Prot. Non-Evangelical	61	30	9	27	66	7	(318)
White Catholic	67	28	5	29	65	6	(253)
Secular	58	37	5	23	65	12	(138)
Community Size							
Large City	56	38	6	30	60	10	(274)
Suburb	62	31	7	25	71	4	(305)
Small City/Town	64	30	6	31	60	9	(450)
Rural Area	59	33	8	25	64	11	(246)
Party ID							
Republican	63	29	8	30	65	5	(387)
Democrat	58	36	6	28	61	11	(433)
Independent	63	31	6	27	66	7	(375)
Party and Ideology							
Conservative Republican	62	28	10	31	63	6	(255)
Moderate/Liberal Republican	63	31	6	27	69	4	(128)
Conservative/Moderate Democrat	58	37	5	30	58	12	(298)
Liberal Democrat	61	35	4	23	72	5	(122)
2000 Presidential Vote							
Bush	65	25	10	23	71	6	(486)
Gore	61	33	6	30	61	9	(429)
America's Place in the World							
Single Leader	60	36	4	33	59	8	(159)
Assertive Multilateral	69	26	5	27	64	9	(325)
Non-Assertive Multilateral	60	33	7	28	66	6	(663)
Informed about Intl. Matters							
High	68	23	9	23	70	7	(172)
Moderate	60	34	5	25	68	7	(743)
Low	59	34	7	35	53	12	(366)
Labor Union							
Union Household	67	28	5	30	62	8	(184)
Non-Union Household	60	33	7	28	64	8	(1087)

CHANGE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

Early September 2001 vs. Late October 2001

(Based on Percent Saying "Top Priority")

	<i>Reducing the Spread of AIDS</i>			<i>Dealing with Global Warming</i>			<i>Dealing with World Hunger</i>			<i>Combating Intl. Drug Trafficking</i>			<i>Promoting U.S. Business Interests</i>		
	<u>Sep</u> %	<u>Oct</u> %	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u> %	<u>Oct</u> %	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u> %	<u>Oct</u> %	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u> %	<u>Oct</u> %	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u> %	<u>Oct</u> %	<u>a</u>
Total	73	59	-14	44	31	-13	47	34	-13	64	55	-9	37	30	-7
Sex															
Male	68	52	-16	41	30	-11	42	30	-12	59	49	-10	43	33	-10
Female	79	65	-14	46	31	-15	52	38	-14	68	61	-7	32	27	-5
Race															
White	69	54	-15	42	28	-14	43	32	-11	62	52	-10	36	27	-9
Non-white	92	80	-12	51	43	-8	64	43	-21	72	68	-4	42	39	-3
Race and Sex															
White Men	64	50	-14	40	29	-11	40	29	-11	57	46	-11	44	31	-13
White Women	74	59	-15	43	26	-17	46	35	-11	66	58	-8	29	24	-5
Age															
Under 30	80	69	-11	50	24	-26	54	32	-22	52	41	-11	37	31	-6
30-49	73	56	-17	46	36	-10	45	35	-10	59	50	-9	37	29	-8
50-64	66	56	-10	36	31	-5	51	42	-9	72	70	-2	37	31	-6
65+	74	61	-13	40	26	-14	38	27	-11	80	74	-6	37	26	-11
Sex and Age															
Men under 50	71	54	-17	44	31	-13	42	29	-13	52	38	-14	41	29	-12
Women under 50	81	66	-15	50	32	-18	55	40	-15	61	56	-5	33	30	-3
Men 50+	61	50	-11	35	29	-6	44	32	-12	73	74	-1	48	38	-10
Women 50+	76	65	-11	40	29	-11	46	37	-9	78	70	-8	28	22	-6
Education															
College Grad.	66	43	-23	40	30	-10	40	36	-4	48	39	-9	36	31	-5
Some College	74	63	-11	46	25	-11	50	32	-18	62	50	-12	40	31	-9
High School Grad or less	76	65	-11	45	33	-12	50	34	-16	72	66	-6	36	28	-8
Family Income															
\$75,000+	61	44	-17	41	34	-7	39	33	-6	56	45	-11	40	33	-7
\$50,000-\$74,999	72	47	-25	45	30	-15	49	36	-13	62	53	-9	35	19	-16
\$30,000-\$49,999	74	57	-17	38	29	-9	44	29	-15	65	58	-7	35	27	-8
\$20,000-\$29,999	77	68	-9	50	25	-25	52	40	-12	72	64	-8	35	36	+1
<\$20,000	85	76	-9	51	35	-16	55	37	-18	66	62	-4	41	33	-8

Question: As I read a list of possible LONG-RANGE foreign policy goals which the United States might have, tell me how much priority you think each should be given. First, [READ AND ROTATE], do you think this should have top priority, some priority, or no priority at all?

Continued ...

	<i>Reducing the Spread of AIDS</i>			<i>Dealing with Global Warming</i>			<i>Dealing with World Hunger</i>			<i>Combating Intl. Drug Trafficking</i>			<i>Promoting U.S. Business Interests</i>		
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>a</u>
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Total	73	59	-14	44	31	-13	47	34	-13	64	55	-9	37	30	-7
Region															
East	73	62	-11	44	34	-10	49	28	-21	64	56	-8	40	36	-4
Midwest	72	62	-10	40	30	-10	43	27	-16	65	53	-12	36	34	-2
South	75	61	-15	46	29	-17	50	38	-12	66	59	-7	40	23	-17
West	73	50	-23	45	32	-13	47	39	-8	57	52	-5	31	29	-2
Religious Affiliation															
Total White Protestant	69	54	-15	41	27	-14	46	37	-9	70	60	-10	38	28	-10
White Protestant Evangelical	67	50	-17	38	19	-19	50	40	-10	79	67	-12	38	24	-14
White Prot. Non-Evangelical	70	58	-12	43	35	-8	41	34	-7	62	53	-9	38	33	-5
White Catholic	65	49	-16	41	27	-14	43	29	-14	60	47	-13	38	28	-10
Secular	76	65	-11	46	34	-12	40	25	-15	39	40	1	24	18	-6
Community Size															
Large City	78	67	-11	48	39	-9	55	32	-23	66	54	-12	36	30	-6
Suburb	68	57	-11	41	25	-16	37	36	-1	57	44	-13	38	36	-2
Small City/Town	76	59	-7	49	34	-15	52	35	-17	65	59	-6	38	29	-9
Rural Area	70	53	-17	34	22	-12	43	34	-9	66	64	-2	34	21	-13
Party ID															
Republican	64	47	-17	30	14	-16	40	30	-10	70	64	-6	44	35	-9
Democrat	82	70	-12	51	34	-17	55	31	-24	67	55	-12	35	30	-5
Independent	70	56	-14	47	38	-9	48	41	-7	55	49	-6	32	25	-7
Ideology															
Conservative	68	58	-10	36	22	-14	45	35	-10	70	64	-6	40	36	-4
Moderate	76	59	-17	45	33	-12	47	30	-17	64	52	-12	37	26	-11
Liberal	78	64	-14	56	41	-15	58	42	-16	50	43	-7	31	24	-7
2000 Presidential Vote															
Bush	62	45	-17	29	17	-12	38	27	-11	73	66	-7	46	35	-11
Gore	78	67	-11	55	42	-13	54	39	-15	60	52	-8	34	25	-9
America's Place in the World															
Single Leader	68	46	-22	43	30	-13	52	31	-21	75	71	-4	48	29	-19
Assertive Multilateralism	76	67	-9	47	31	-16	54	38	-16	71	52	-19	41	27	-14
Non-Assertive Multilateralism	74	59	-15	45	34	-11	46	32	-14	60	52	-8	35	32	-3
Information about Intl. Matters															
High	62	40	-22	40	27	-13	41	40	-1	49	35	-14	43	29	-14
Moderate	73	54	-19	42	28	-14	45	29	-16	66	53	-13	37	29	-8
Low	82	73	-9	48	37	-11	55	41	-14	71	65	-6	33	30	-3
Labor Union															
Union Household	74	57	-17	42	35	-7	55	32	-23	71	62	-9	46	25	-21
Non-Union Household	73	59	-14	44	30	-14	46	35	-11	62	54	-8	36	31	-5

ABOUT THIS SURVEY

Results for the *America's Place In The World Callback* survey are based on telephone interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates among a sample of 1,281 adults who were interviewed for the original America's Place In The World Survey (August 21 - September 5, 2001 N=2,002). These re-interviews were conducted during the period October 15-21, 2001. For results based on the total sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on either Form 1 (N=638) or Form 2 (N=643), the sampling error is plus or minus 4.5 percentage points.

In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD METHODOLOGY IN DETAIL

The Call Back Survey

For the callback, at least 10 attempts were made to complete an interview with every respondent in the original survey. The calls were staggered over times of day and days of the week to maximize the chances of making a contact with a respondent. All interview breakoffs and refusals were re-contacted at least once in order to attempt to convert them to completed interviews.

Non-response in telephone interview surveys produces some known biases in survey-derived estimates because participation tends to vary for different subgroups of the population, and these subgroups are likely to vary also on questions of substantive interest. In order to compensate for these known biases, the sample data are weighted in analysis.

The demographic weighting parameters are derived from a special analysis of the most recently available Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (March 2000). This analysis produced population parameters for the demographic characteristics of households with adults 18 or older, which are then compared with the sample characteristics to construct sample weights. The analysis only included households in the continental United States that contain a telephone.

The weights are derived using an iterative technique that simultaneously balances the distributions of all weighting parameters.

The Original Survey

The sample for the original survey is a random digit sample of telephone numbers selected from telephone exchanges in the continental United States. The random digit aspect of the sample is used to avoid "listing" bias and provides representation of both listed and unlisted numbers (including not-yet-listed). The design of the sample ensures this representation by random generation of the last two digits of telephone numbers selected on the basis of their area code, telephone exchange, and bank number.

The telephone exchanges were selected with probabilities proportional to their size. The first eight digits of the sampled telephone numbers (area code, telephone exchange, bank number) were selected to be proportionally stratified by county and by telephone exchange within county. That is, the number of telephone numbers randomly sampled from within a given county is proportional to that county's share of telephone numbers in the U.S. Only working banks of telephone numbers are selected. A working bank is defined as 100 contiguous telephone numbers containing one or more residential listings.

The sample was released for interviewing in replicates. Using replicates to control the release of sample to the field ensures that the complete call procedures are followed for the entire sample. The use of replicates also insures that the regional distribution of numbers called is appropriate. Again, this works to increase the representativeness of the sample.

At least 10 attempts were made to complete an interview at every sampled telephone number. The calls were staggered over times of day and days of the week to maximize the chances of making a contact with a potential respondent. All interview breakoffs and refusals were re-contacted at least once in order to attempt to convert them to completed interviews. In each contacted household, interviewers asked to speak with the "youngest male 18 or older who is at home." If there is no eligible man at home, interviewers asked to speak with "the oldest woman 18 or older who is at home." This systematic respondent selection technique has been shown empirically to produce samples that closely mirror the population in terms of age and gender.

Non-response in telephone interview surveys produces some known biases in survey-derived estimates because participation tends to vary for different subgroups of the population, and these subgroups are likely to vary also on questions of substantive interest. In order to compensate for these known biases, the sample data are weighted in analysis.

The demographic weighting parameters are derived from a special analysis of the most recently available Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (March 2000). This analysis produced population parameters for the demographic characteristics of households with adults 18 or older, which are then compared with the sample characteristics to construct sample weights. The analysis only included households in the continental United States that contain a telephone.

The weights are derived using an iterative technique that simultaneously balances the distributions of all weighting parameters.

**PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS
& COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD, III
GENERAL PUBLIC CALLBACK TOPLINE
OCT 15-21, 2001
N = 1,281**

All in all,

Q.1 What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or shouldn't it play any leadership role?

IF ANSWERED 2 "SHARED LEADERSHIP ROLE" IN Q.1, ASK:

Q.2 Should the United States be the most active of the leading nations, or should it be about as active as other leading nations?²

		Early Sept <u>2001</u>	Sept <u>1997</u>	June <u>1995</u>	Oct <u>1993</u>	Sept <u>1993</u>
12	Be the single world leader, or	13	12	13	9	10
79	Should it play a shared leadership role	75	73	74	78	81
33	Most active	25	22	25	23	27
45	About as active	49	50	47	53	52
1	Don't know/Refused	1	1	2	2	2
3	Shouldn't it play any leadership role	8	11	9	9	7
<u>6</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>
100		100	100	100	100	100

ASK ALL:

Q.3 In general, how well do you think the U.S. government is doing in reducing the threat of terrorism? **[READ]**

		Oct 10-14 <u>2001</u>
38	Very well	48
46	Fairly well	40
9	Not too well	6
4	Not at all well	2
<u>3</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>4</u>
100		100

² Before 1997 the answer categories were "... most active, or should it be no more or less active than other leading nations?"

Q.4 How should the U.S. determine its policy with regard to the war on terrorism? Should it be based mostly on the national interests of the U.S., or should it strongly take into account the interests of its allies?

		Early Sept <u>2001</u> ³
30	U.S. national interests	38
59	Interests and views of allies	48
7	Both (VOL)	7
*	Neither (VOL)	1
<u>4</u>	Don't Know/Refused	<u>6</u>
100		100

Q.5F1/

Q.6F2 As I read a list of possible LONG-RANGE foreign policy goals which the United States might have, tell me how much priority you think each should be given. First, [READ AND ROTATE], do you think this should have top priority, some priority, or no priority at all.⁴

Q.5F1/Q.6F2 ITEM [N=1,281]:		<u>Top</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>No</u>	
		<u>Priority</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>DK/Ref</u>
5F1d/					
6F2a.	Taking measures to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks	93	6	*	1=100
	Early September, 2001	80	16	3	1=100
Q.5F1 ITEMS ONLY [N=638]:					
5F1a.	Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction	81	14	2	3=100
	Early September, 2001	78	16	5	1=100
	September, 1997	70	23	6	1=100
	June, 1995	68	21	9	2=100
	September, 1993	69	24	5	1=100
5F1b.	Insuring adequate energy supplies for the U.S.	69	29	1	1=100
	Early September, 2001	74	23	2	1=100
	September, 1997	58	36	3	3=100
	June, 1995	59	34	3	4=100
	September, 1993	60	34	4	2=100
5F1c.	Promoting democracy in other nations	24	61	12	3=100
	Early September, 2001	29	52	16	3=100
	September, 1997	22	57	18	3=100
	June, 1995	16	57	24	3=100
	September, 1993	22	52	24	2=100

³ In Early September 2001, the question was worded: "All in all, how should the U.S. determine its foreign policy? Should it be based mostly on the national interests of the U.S., or should it strongly take into account the interests of its allies?"

⁴ Before 1997 the answer categories were "... should have top priority, priority but not top priority, or no priority at all."

Q.5F1 ITEMS ONLY [N=638]:		<u>Top</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>DK/Ref</u>
		<u>Priority</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Priority</u>	
5F1e.	Promoting U.S. business and economic interests abroad	30	63	4	3=100
	Early September, 2001	37	53	8	2=100
	September, 1997 ⁵	16	62	20	2=100
	June, 1995	26	50	20	4=100
	September, 1993	27	51	19	3=100
5F1f.	Strengthening the United Nations	46	46	7	1=100
	Early September, 2001	42	43	13	2=100
	September, 1997	30	53	14	3=100
	June, 1995	36	45	17	2=100
	September, 1993	41	46	11	2=100
5F1g.	Reducing the spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases	59	38	2	1=100
	Early September, 2001	73	23	3	1=100
5F1h.	Protecting groups or nations that are threatened with genocide	48	43	3	6=100
	Early September, 2001	49	41	5	5=100
Q.6F2 ITEMS ONLY [N=643]:					
6F2b.	Helping improve the living standards in developing nations	20	67	12	1=100
	Early September, 2001	25	61	12	2=100
	September, 1997	23	63	13	1=100
	June, 1995	16	59	22	3=100
	September, 1993	19	60	20	1=100
6F2c.	Protecting the jobs of American workers	74	24	1	1=100
	Early September, 2001	77	19	3	1=100
	September, 1997	77	20	2	1=100
	June, 1995	80	17	2	1=100
	September, 1993	85	13	2	*=100
6F2d.	Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	27	61	10	2=100
	Early September, 2001	29	54	14	3=100
	September, 1997	27	56	15	2=100
	June, 1995	21	56	20	3=100
	September, 1993	22	54	22	2=100
6F2e.	Combating international drug trafficking	55	38	5	2=100
	Early September, 2001	64	26	9	1=100
	September, 1997	67	24	7	2=100
6F2f.	Getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order	54	41	3	2=100
	Early September, 2001	56	35	6	3=100
6F2g.	Dealing with the problem of world hunger	34	59	6	1=100
	Early September, 2001	47	44	7	2=100

5

In September 1993, June 1995 and September 1997 the item was worded "Aiding the interests of US businesses abroad."

Q.6F2 ITEMS ONLY [N=643]:

	<u>Top Priority</u>	<u>Some Priority</u>	<u>No Priority</u>	<u>DK/Ref</u>
6F2h. Dealing with global warming	31	51	13	5=100
Early September, 2001	44	39	12	5=100
September, 1997 ⁶	50	42	6	2=100
June, 1995	56	36	6	2=100
September, 1993	56	37	6	1=100

NO Q.7 OR Q.8

ASK ALL:

Q.9 Do you think that we should increase our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut it back?

		Early RV's							Chicago Council on Foreign Relations						
		Sept <u>2001</u>	Sept <u>2000</u>	Aug <u>1999</u>	June <u>1999</u>	Sept <u>1997</u>	Feb <u>1995</u> ⁷	10/ <u>94+</u>	Sept <u>1993</u>	10- <u>90+</u>	10- <u>86+</u>	10- <u>82+</u>	11/ <u>78+</u>	12/ <u>74+</u>	
50	Increase	32	34	27	31	17	19	18	10	12	21	22	32	13	
41	Keep same	44	48	54	47	57	56	53	52	53	55	52	45	47	
7	Cut back	20	14	16	19	24	24	26	36	32	23	24	16	33	
<u>2</u>	DK/Ref.	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	
100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

+ Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Q.10 In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more, Israel or the Palestinians?

		Early			Chicago Council on Foreign Relations		
		Sept <u>2001</u>	Sept <u>1997</u>	Sept <u>1993</u>	Oct-Nov <u>1990</u>	Oct-Nov <u>1982</u>	Nov <u>1978</u>
47	Israel	40	48	45	34	41	39
10	Palestinians	17	13	21	13	17	12
8	Both (VOL)	6	5	3	7	8	8
18	Neither (VOL)	23	16	18	26	19	15
<u>17</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>14</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>13</u>
100		100	100	100	100	100	100

⁶ In September 1993, June 1995 and September 1997 the item was worded "Improving the global environment."

⁷ In 1995 and previous years, the question was worded "Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same or cut it back?"

ASK FORM 1 ONLY [N=638]:

Q.11 Thinking about the financial aid the United States provides Israel for military purposes, do you think U.S. military aid to Israel should be—increased, kept the same, or decreased?

		----- Gallup -----	
		<u>Sept 2001</u>	<u>July 1999</u>
10	Increased	16	10
56	Kept the same	47	42
25	Decreased	31	44
<u>9</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>
100		100	100

ASK FORM 2 ONLY [N=643]:

Q.12 Thinking about the Mideast situation these days, do you think the U.S. should take Israel's side more, less or about as much as it has in the past?

16	More
19	Less
56	As much as in the past
<u>9</u>	Don't know/Refused
100	

ASK ALL:

Q.13 Do you think the U.S. should put into effect a national missile defense system, or don't you think so?

IF 1 "YES" IN Q.13 ASK:

Q.14 Do we have a pressing need for this system right now or is this something we should put off into the future?

		Early <u>Sept</u> <u>2001</u>	May <u>2001</u>	Feb <u>2001</u> ⁸
64	Yes, U.S. should put into effect a national missile defense system	56	51	54
49	Need the system right now	35	29	n/a
14	Should put it off into the future	19	19	n/a
1	Don't know/Refused	2	3	n/a
26	No, U.S. should not	35	38	32
<u>10</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>9</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>14</u>
100		100	100	100

8

In February 2001 question was worded slightly different: "Do you favor or oppose the development of a national missile defense system?"

ASK ALL:

In your view,

Q.15 How well is the MILITARY effort to destroy the terrorist groups going? **[READ]**

		Oct 10-14
		<u>2001</u>
38	Very well	45
45	Fairly well	35
9	Not too well	6
2	Not at all well	4
<u>6</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>10</u>
100		100

Q.16 How would you rate the job the government is doing in BUILDING DEFENSES at home to prevent future terrorist attacks? Would you say the government is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or a poor job? **[READ]**

		Oct 10-14
		<u>2001</u>
18	Excellent	20
51	Good	47
22	Only fair	22
5	Poor	4
<u>4</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>7</u>
100		100

Q.17 If you had to choose, what should get a higher priority now? **[READ AND ROTATE]**

		Oct 10-14	Late Sept
		<u>2001</u>	<u>2001</u>
37	Building our defenses at home to prevent future terrorist attacks	36	33
	-OR--		
48	Taking military action to destroy terrorist networks around the world	45	44
13	Both (VOL)	13	16
<u>2</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
100		100	100

Q.18 How worried are you that there will soon be another terrorist attack in the United States? **[READ]**

		Oct 10-14	Early Oct
		<u>2001</u>	<u>2001</u>
29	Very worried	27	28
42	Somewhat worried	40	45
18	Not too worried	19	15
10	Not at all worried	12	11
<u>1</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
100		100	100

Q.19 As of today, do you feel that your life... **[READ]**

		<i>Newsweek</i>
		<u>9/27-28/01</u>
41	Has returned to normal	40
31	Is BEGINNING to return to normal	35
8	Still hasn't begun to return to normal	7
17	Will NEVER return to normal?	15
<u>3</u>	Don't know/Refused	<u>3</u>
100		100

Q.20 In the long run, what is the best way for the U.S. to avoid problems like terrorism? Should the U.S.: **[READ AND ROTATE]**

61	Be very much involved in solving international problems?
	--OR--
32	Not get too involved with international problems?
<u>7</u>	Don't know/Refused
100	

Q.21 Do you think the terrorist attacks are the start of a major conflict between the people of America and Europe versus the people of Islam, or is it only a conflict with a small, radical group?

28	Major conflict
63	Conflict with a radical group
<u>9</u>	Don't know/Refused
100	