A majority of Russians support public protests that followed the December 2011 parliamentary vote, yet 47% believe the election was fair. Notably, 72% of Russians say they have a favorable view of Vladimir Putin and 62% hold a positive opinion of Dmitri Medvedev.

Read the full report and see detailed findings on these subjects:

• National conditions
• Reaction to presidential election, protests
• Views of leaders
• Nationalism and Russia’s global image

Two decades ago, a survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center of the Soviet Union during perestroika showed a huge divide between hardline communists and the young, urban Russians who backed Boris Yeltsin and favoured a free market economy. Last weekend’s election results show how the divide endures 20 years on.

A new Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey finds that just 50 per cent of Russians approve of multi-party politics and half consider it a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. By a margin of 57 to 32 per cent, Russians believe that having a “strong leader” is more important than a democratic government.

This is the conviction that, for more than a decade, fuelled the popularity of Vladimir Putin, but is now beginning to pall. His “look-at-me” style appeared when the economy was on the rise but a combination of inflation and stagnant living standards is prompting many Russian voters once again to signal their unhappiness with the status quo. This search for leaders who will deliver economically holds an important lesson for the Middle East where the democratic tide still swells despite panicked opposition from some and the efforts of others to regulate its tempo.

Writing in the Financial Times, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Pew Research Center President Andrew Kohut assess Russia’s struggles in trying to make the transition to a more open society and what principles for nurturing democracy it suggests for the countries in the Middle East swept up by this year’s Arab Spring.

See the full article (registration required) and the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s report on the subject: Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union.

Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians are unhappy with the direction of their countries and disillusioned with the state of their politics. Enthusiasm for democracy and capitalism has waned considerably over the past 20 years, and most believe the changes that have taken place since 1991 have had a negative impact on public morality, law and order, and standards of living.

There is a widespread perception that political and business elites have enjoyed the spoils of the last two decades, while average citizens have been left behind. Still, people in these three former Soviet republics have not turned their backs on democratic values; indeed, they embrace key features of democracy, such as a fair judiciary and free media. However, they do not believe their countries have fully developed these institutions.

Today’s grim mood stands in contrast to public opinion in these countries in the spring of 1991 when the level of optimism was relatively high, according to a survey conducted at the time by the Times Mirror Center. Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania were still part of the decaying USSR (which formally dissolved on December 25, 1991). Then, solid majorities in all three republics approved of moving to a multiparty democracy. Now, just 35% of Ukrainians and only about half in Russia and Lithuania approve of the switch to a multiparty system.

The new findings about public opinion in the three countries are based on surveys conducted in March and April by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project.

Read the full report for more details on these subjects:

• Views of democracy and evaluations of how it is working
• Views of economic changes since 1991 and satisfaction with current conditions
• Changes in society over the last 20 years, and who has benefited most
• Nationalism and views of ethnic minorities
• Individualism and the role of the state

See also a commentary in the Financial Times by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Pew Research President Andrew Kohut, An ‘Iron Hand’ Is No Substitute For Democracy. (Registration required)

A fall 2009 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project found broad-based Czech discontent with the country’s economic situation and the way democracy is working. Nonetheless, the data also showed a strong commitment among Czechs to free markets and democratic values. Moreover, Czechs ranked high among their peers in the region in terms of happiness with the transition to free market economics and multiparty politics.

Broad Dissatisfaction with Country Direction and Economy

As of fall 2009, seven-in-ten (70%) Czechs were dissatisfied with the way things were going in their country. Roughly eight-in-ten (81%) described the current economic situation in the Czech Republic as somewhat or very bad, with many (32%) saying very bad.

Czech economic discontent is consistent with public sentiment throughout the region: majorities in all former Eastern bloc countries polled rated their current economic situation as bad. This view was particularly widespread in Hungary (94%), Lithuania (93%) and Ukraine (91%) while least common, but still prevalent, in Russia (68%) and Poland (59%).

Support for Free Markets

Despite its recent drop in economic growth and rise in unemployment and inflation, nearly eight-in-ten (79%) Czechs approved of the change from a state-controlled to a free market economy in the post-communist period. Of the other publics surveyed in the region, only east Germans (82%) rivaled Czechs in their support for free markets.

Czech enthusiasm for free markets is only slightly less widespread now than in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism. In a 1991 Times Mirror Center (the forerunner to the Pew Research Center) survey conducted just months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 87% of Czechs approved of the change to a capitalist economic system.

Support for free markets has also barely changed since the early 1990s in Russia (-4 percentage points), East Germany (-4 points) and Slovakia (-3 points). By contrast, capitalism is far less favored now in Hungary (-34 points), Lithuania (-26 points), Bulgaria (-20 points) and Ukraine (-16 points).

Still, Czechs are divided as to whether open markets have yet to deliver benefits to the average person. When asked to consider whether the economic situation for most people today is better, worse or about the same as it was under communism, 45% of Czechs said better while 39% said worse. Even so, the Czech Republic and Poland stand apart from other former communist states in that they were the only countries in which a plurality said people are better off today economically than under communism.

In another sign of Czech support for free markets, 63% agreed that people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people may be rich while others are poor; 33% disagreed. Only the Poles (70%) registered greater enthusiasm for free markets in general, though Slovaks (56%) and Russians (52%) were not far behind.

Dissatisfaction with Democracy and Politics in Practice

When asked to assess the current state of democracy in their country, roughly half (49%) in the Czech Republic said they were satisfied with how it was working while about half (49%) said they were dissatisfied. Among publics in the region, only Poles (53%) and Slovaks (50%) were generally as satisfied with democracy in their country, while discontent dominated in Lithuania (60% dissatisfied), Russia (61%), Ukraine (70%), Bulgaria (76%) and Hungary (77%).

But Czechs also saw a gap between most of the democratic values they embrace and the political realities in their country. Nearly eight-in-ten (78%) in the Czech Republic considered it very important to live in a country “where there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way.” Solid majorities of Czechs also said it is very important to reside in a country with a free media (66%) and multiparty elections (57%), while nearly half held the same view about freedom of speech (47%) and religion (46%). Slightly more than one-third (36%) said it is very important to live in a country “where the military is under the control of civilian leaders.”

However, fewer Czechs are convinced that their country embraces these democratic elements. For example, only 5% felt that the phrase “there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” described their country very well. Similarly, only 17% thought that the phrase “the media is able to report the news without government censorship” described the Czech Republic very well.

The gap between what the Czechs want and have in terms of their electoral system is smaller. More than half (57%) said that it is very important to live in a country “with honest elections that are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties;” 48% felt that this described elections in their country very well.

Faith in the electoral system does not translate into faith in politicians. Few Czechs (18%) agreed with the statement “most elected officials care what people like me think,” down from 34% in 1991. Moreover, the European Union’s Eurobarometer surveys conducted from the fall of 2001 through the fall of 2009 show only 10-15% of Czechs placed trust in political parties.

The same set of Eurobarometer surveys show that Czech distrust extended to government as well as to political parties in recent years. However, trust in government increased after the spring 2009 collapse of the Czech ruling political coalition and subsequent formation of a non-partisan-led interim government. Between June 2009 and October 2009, Eurobarometer data show Czech trust in government rising from 28% to 37%.

 Commitment to Democracy

Despite concerns about politicians and about the current state of democracy more generally, most Czechs (80%) approved of the change from a one-party to a multiparty system that took place in the early 1990s. Elsewhere in the region, support for the political changes was also strong; majorities in all of the former Eastern European publics surveyed except Ukraine embraced the move to competitive politics. But, only the east Germans (85%) edged Czechs out in support of the move to a competitive election system.

Czech approval of the change to a multiparty system is as widespread now as in 1991 when 80% embraced competitive elections. Similarly, support for the political changes slightly increased in Poland (+4 percentage points) and remained steady in Slovakia (+1 point).

Enthusiasm for these political changes has dimmed substantially in Ukraine (-42 percentage points), Bulgaria (-24 points), Lithuania (-20 points) and Hungary (-18 points) and somewhat in East Germany (-6 points) and Russia (-8 points).

The Czech public also clearly felt that a democratic government is better able to solve their country’s problems (81%) than can a strong leader (15%). Slovaks (81%) were equally as convinced, while 56% held the same view in Poland. By contrast, majorities or pluralities in Ukraine (69%), Bulgaria (68%), Russia (60%), Hungary (49%), and Lithuania (49%) said that a strong leader is better able to solve their country’s problems.

Czechs trust that a system of competitive elections gives ordinary citizens an opportunity to influence what government does. Roughly six-in-ten Czechs (61%) agreed with the statement that “voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things.” Czech faith in the ability of elections to give voice to the people is nearly as common now as it was following the fall of the Berlin Wall (64%). Among the Eastern European nations surveyed in 2009, only Bulgarians (66%) are more convinced of the capacity of elections to give people influence over government. 

Ukraine’s new governing coalition recently announced its intention to pass a law against joining military alliances, which will fulfill Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s campaign promise to prevent Ukraine from becoming a member in NATO. The new president’s opponents in parliament argue that this new strategy may result in pushing Ukraine back into the Russian “sphere of influence” and out of the European fold.

However, Yanukovych’s move to ban Ukraine from joining NATO is not without a base of public support. A September 2009 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, found that half of Ukrainians (51%) opposed their country’s admission to NATO, while only 28% favored such a step. Moreover, given the opposition to membership, it is not surprising that about half of Ukrainians (51%) gave NATO an unfavorable rating.

Views of membership in NATO vary by ethnicity and region. Ethnic Russians (74%) were far more likely to oppose admission to NATO than ethnic Ukrainians (46%). In terms of regional groupings, respondents living in the East (72%) and South (60%) — where the percentage of Russians tends to be higher than elsewhere in the country — were more likely to oppose joining NATO than were those living in the Central region (51%). And in the West a majority (59%) favored their country becoming part of NATO.

Outside of Ukraine, many European publics supported the country’s entry into NATO. Majorities in Poland (64%), Lithuania (58%), France (54%) and nearly half in Bulgaria (49%), Czech Republic (46%), and Spain (46%) favored Ukraine joining NATO. However, Germans and Italians disagreed — 53% in Germany and 42% of Italians opposed Ukraine’s membership in the military alliance.

The strongest opposition emanated from Russia, where more than seven-in-ten (72%) opposed Ukraine’s admission into NATO.

Closer Ties for Ukraine and Russia?

Just one day after the governing coalition’s declaration of opposition to NATO membership, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signaled his support by announcing a visit to Ukraine in May. Indeed, a closer relationship with Russia is likely to be well received by many Ukrainians. The Pew Research survey found that nearly half (46%) of Ukrainians said that Russia is a good influence on their country, and nearly six-in-ten Ukrainians (58%) cited Russia as their country’s most dependable ally

More recent polling in January 2010 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) found Ukrainians expressing an overwhelmingly positive view of Russia — more than nine-in-ten (93%) said they had a good attitude towards Russia. When asked about what they would like to see for their country’s relationship with Russia, two-thirds (66%) believed that the countries “should be independent, but friendly states — with open borders, no visas and customs.” Another 22% of Ukrainians believed that the countries “should unite into one state.” Few Ukrainians (8%) wanted relations to be “the same as with other countries — with closed borders, visas and customs.”

However, Ukrainians still express some reservations when it comes to closer ties with Russia — especially on the issue of energy dependence. In the fall 2009 Pew Research study, more than seven-in-ten (73%) Ukrainians said they are worried about being too reliant on Russia for their energy needs, up from 63% in 2007.

This is part of a Pew Research Center series of reports exploring the behaviors, values and opinions of the teens and twenty-somethings that make up the Millennial Generation

A Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in fall 2009 finds that members of the post-communist generation, who are now between the ages of 18 and 39, offer much more positive evaluations of the political and economic changes their countries have undergone over the past two decades than do those who were adults when the Iron Curtain fell. The younger generation is also more individualistic and more likely to endorse a free market economy than are those who are age 40 or older.

Throughout 2010, the Pew Research Center will release a series of reports that explore the values, attitudes and behavior of America’s Millennial Generation, which first came of age around the time of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and played an important role in the election of President Barack Obama. The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project’s contribution to this project focuses on a somewhat different age group: the post-communist generation in the former Eastern bloc. The older members of this generation came of age as their countries began to transition away from communism toward democracy and capitalism, and its youngest members were just being born as communism was collapsing. Their political socialization has taken place under a context that is drastically different from that of their older peers, who came of age under totalitarian regimes.The former Eastern bloc publics were surveyed as part of a Pulse of Europe study that included 13 countries in Eastern and Western Europe as well as the United States.¹

The generation gap on attitudes about democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe reflects a divide between the past, present and future. Both young and old express concerns about the way things are going in their country, especially with regard to the economic situation. But while the older generation looks back longingly, often saying that people were better off financially under communism, the younger generation expresses more confidence that democracy can solve their countries’ problems. This is a hopeful sign for the future, as the post-communist generation becomes the next leaders and decision-makers in Eastern Europe.

Change to Democracy

The post-communist generation is generally more supportive than respondents age 40 and older of their countries’ move to a multiparty system. This generation gap is especially pronounced in Russia, where overall support for the political changes is lukewarm. More than six-in-ten (64%) Russians younger than age 40 approve of their country’s shift to a multiparty system; in contrast, just 45% of older Russians approve of the change to democracy.

A similar pattern is also evident in some countries where support for the change to a multiparty system is widespread. In Poland, where seven-in-ten approve of the change, there is a double-digit generation gap — 77% of those younger than age 40 support Poland’s change to democracy, compared with 66% of those age 40 or older. In the Czech Republic, 84% of those in the younger age group favor their country’s switch from a one-party system; 76% of those 40 or older agree. And in Slovakia, about three-quarters (77%) of those younger than age 40 say they approve of their country’s change to a multiparty system, while 68% of older respondents share that view.

In Ukraine, where opinions about the change to democracy are negative among the young and the old, the post-communist generation expresses less negative views. About a quarter (26%) of Ukrainians who experienced communism as adults say they approve of their country’s change to a multiparty system, while a solid majority (64%) disapproves. Views are somewhat more balanced among the younger generation — 37% approve and 43% disapprove of Ukraine’s switch to a multiparty system; 21% do not offer an opinion.

Change to Capitalism

In every Eastern European country surveyed, the post-communist generation is much more supportive of the move away from a state-controlled economy than are those who lived as adults under communism. As is the case with opinions about the change to democracy, the generational divide is greatest in Russia; about six-in-ten (62%) Russians younger than age 40 say they approve of their country’s change to capitalism, compared with just 40% of those in the older age group.

A double-digit gap also exists in Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland, and a smaller gap is evident in Lithuania and Hungary. In Ukraine, where the overall level of support for the change to a market economy is lower than in any other country surveyed (36% approve of the change), nearly half (47%) of those younger than age 40 say they approve of the economic changes their country has undergone; just 28% of those 40 or older share that view.

How Most Have Fared Economically

The generational differences on opinions of the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe over the past two decades are reflected in views of how most people have fared under democracy and capitalism. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia, those younger than age 40 are much more likely than the older group to say the economic situation for most people in their country is now better than it was under communism.

In Poland and the Czech Republic, majorities of those younger than age 40 offer a positive assessment of how people in their country have fared economically: 53% and 54%, respectively, say most are now better off. Among those age 40 or older, however, views are more mixed. In Poland, virtually the same number in this age group say most people are better off now (42%) as say most are worse off (43%). In the Czech Republic, slightly more say the economic situation for most people is worse (45%) than say it is better (39%).

In Lithuania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary, the generational gap reflects mostly uncertainty among the younger group. While those who experienced communism as adults are significantly more likely than the post-communist generation to say that the economic situation for most people is now worse, a large share of those who are younger than 40 do not offer a response.

Have Ordinary People Benefited?

In six of the seven countries where the question was asked, fewer than half say average citizens have benefited a great deal or a fair amount from the fall of communism. And in five of the seven, this sentiment is shared by fewer than three-in-ten of those younger than 40 and those in the older age group. Yet, the post-communist generation offers somewhat more positive views than do their older peers.

In the Czech Republic, where a slim 53% majority says ordinary people have benefited a great deal or a fair amount, a more robust 64% majority of those younger than 40 say that is the case. In contrast, just 45% of older Czechs say average citizens have benefited from the changes that have taken place since communism collapsed.

Younger Poles are also considerably more likely than Poles who were adults when the Iron Curtain collapsed to say that ordinary people have benefited from the changes. About half (51%) of those younger than 40 say average citizens have benefited a great deal or a fair amount, but just over a third (35%) of those 40 or older agree. And while few Slovaks across age groups believe that ordinary people have benefited from the changes since the end of communism, the post-communist generation is twice as likely as the older generation to have that opinion (28% vs. 14%).

Among younger and older respondents in the seven countries where this question was asked, more say that politicians and business owners have reaped benefits from the changes since the collapse of communism than say the same about ordinary people; solid majorities across age groups say the political and business elites have benefited a great deal or a fair amount.

Satisfaction With the Current State of Democracy

When asked to assess the current state of democracy in their countries, the post-communist generation expresses more positive views than does the older generation. That is especially the case in the Czech Republic and Poland, where overall satisfaction with how democracy is working is higher than in most of the eight countries where this question was asked. About six-in-ten Poles (62%) and Czechs (60%) younger than 40 say they are satisfied with the state of democracy in their country. Among those who are 40 or older, just under half in Poland (47%) and even fewer in the Czech Republic (42%) share this view.

Younger respondents in Lithuania and Russia are also more likely than those in the older age group to say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country by double-digit margins. In both countries, however, majorities among the post-communist generation express dissatisfaction. In Lithuania, 43% of respondents who were not adults or were not yet born when communism collapsed are satisfied with the state of democracy and 54% are dissatisfied; among those who were 20 or older when the Iron Curtain came down, just 29% express satisfaction, while nearly two-thirds (64%) offer a negative assessment of democracy in their country. A similar pattern is evident in Russia.

Yet, while the post-communist generation tends to offer more positive evaluations of the state of democracy in their countries, a generational gap is not evident when respondents are presented with a list of six key democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and a fair judiciary, and asked how well each describes their country.

Individualism

The post-communist generation also differs from older generations on the issue of an individual’s relationship to the state. When asked which is more important, “that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state” or “that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need,” those younger than 40 in all of the former Eastern bloc countries surveyed are more likely than those 40 or older to consider being free from state interference a higher priority.

In Slovakia, where the public overall is much more likely to prioritize ensuring that no one is in need over individual rights, the post-communist generation is split — 48% say it is more important for the state to guarantee that nobody is in need and 46% say freedom to pursue one’s goals without state interference is a higher priority. Those who are 40 or older are more than twice as likely to say that the state should provide a social safety net as they are to say that freedom from state interference is more important (68% vs. 27%).

Double-digit generational divides on individualism are also evident in most of the other Eastern European countries surveyed and in the former East Germany. For example, in the Czech Republic, more than half (56%) of those who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed say freedom from state interference is more important to them; 44% say guaranteeing no one is in need is a higher priority. Among Czechs who were adults in 1989, however, opinions are reversed — 56% say it is more important for the state to play an active role in guaranteeing that nobody is in need and 40% prioritize freedom from state interference.

Views of Free Markets

There is also a significant generation gap in nearly every former communist country surveyed when respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people may be rich while others are poor. In Russia, a solid majority (62%) of those who are younger than 40 agree that people are better off in a free market economy, while just 35% disagree. Among older Russians, however, 46% favor the free market approach and about the same number (49%) rejects the idea that free markets are better.

Even in some countries where both young and old have embraced the free market approach, more in the younger age group agree that people are better off in a free market economy. In the Czech Republic, for example, 68% of those younger than 40 favor the free market model, compared with 58% of those 40 or older. And in Slovakia, where a clear majority (61%) of the post-communist generation expresses support for free markets, a slim majority (52%) of those 40 or older share that view.

Support for Key Democratic Principles

When it comes to supporting democratic institutions and freedoms, however, the post-communist generation and those who are 40 or older tend to offer similar views. Looking across the six democratic values tested — freedom of speech, honest elections, a fair judiciary, a civilian-controlled military, freedom of the press and religious freedom — the generation gap in nearly all of the former communist countries polled is small. For example, a median of 54% of Czechs younger than 40 and 52% of those in the older age group rate these features of democracy as very important to them.

Only in Poland is there a significant gap in attitudes toward key democratic principles. A median of 56% of Poles who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed consider these democratic values to be very important. By comparison, fewer than half (a median of 49%) among those who were adults when the Berlin Wall came down share that view. About the same median percentage of younger and older Poles agree that these features of democracy are at least somewhat important (93% and 90%, respectively).

Younger and older Poles are especially divided about the value of freedom of speech. More than half (56%) of Poles younger than 40 say it is very important to them to live in a country where they can openly say what they think and can criticize the government; 45% of those 40 or older agree. Younger Poles are also more like than those in the older age group to give high priority to honest multiparty elections (a gap of 8 percentage points), freedom of the press (7 points) and a civilian-controlled military (7 points).

There is also a generational split in Poland when respondents are asked whether a democratic form of government or a strong leader is better able to solve a country’s problems. More than six-in-ten (63%) Poles who were younger than 20 or not yet born when communism collapsed place more confidence in a democratic government, while 30% say a strong leader is better; among older Poles, a slim 51% majority choose a democratic government over a strong leader (39%). And while more Poles in both age groups would choose a strong economy over a good democracy, younger Poles value a good democracy more than do those who are 40 or older (41% vs. 33%).

The post-communist generation in Lithuania is also much more likely than older generations to say that a democratic government is better able than a strong leader to solve the country’s problems. About half (48%) of Lithuanians younger than 40 would choose democracy over a strong leader (43%); among older Lithuanians, 38% prefers a democratic government, while a majority (53%) say a strong leader would be more effective in solving the country’s problems.

The generational gap is somewhat less pronounced in other countries. For example, younger and older Czechs overwhelmingly prefer a democratic government over a strong leader when it comes to solving the country’s problems (84% and 79%, respectively), while strong majorities of Bulgarians younger than 40 (65%) and those 40 or older (71%) would choose a strong leader.

_{1. The former Eastern bloc publics were surveyed as part of a study which included 13 countries in Eastern and Western Europe as well as the United States. For more findings from this survey, including ratings of personal well-being and views of the European Union, country leaders and ethnic and religious minorities, see “Two Decades After the Wall’s Fall: End of Communism Cheered, But Now With More Reservations,” released Nov. 2, 2009.}